Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship

Special Issue on the Rohingya:
Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion in Myanmar
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Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship
From 1911 the Journal of the Burma Research Society (JBRS) covered virtually all subjects pertaining to Burma and functioned as a serious publication for all enthusiasts — archaeologists, linguists, historians, epigraphers, ethnographers, art historians and more, until it was shut down by the Myanmar military in 1980. In 2011 on the eve of what was to become a momentous decade of social and political change in Myanmar, an organizing committee of seven Burmese and three Western scholars formed at Yale University with a mission to reestablish the JBRS for Burmese scholars in the humanities and social sciences. The new Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship (IJBS) was convened with “independent” in its title to emphasize its total independence from any government agency or body in Burma or abroad.

The organizing committee soon added six members based in Burma and began hosting thematic workshops and publishing issues with funds raised by Yale University, the Open Society Foundations, and the Luce Foundation. Our journal issues, like our website, make every effort to be bilingual in both English and Burmese. Our mission is to provide a forum for incisive publications that contribute to the knowledge of and in Myanmar, with a preference for open access, accessibility and readability over paywalls, esoteric prose and dense theorization. In order to remain fully independent and publish more fully without fear or favor, the IJBS moved its base of operations outside of Myanmar, to the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development at Chiang Mai University, Thailand, after the 1 February 2021 military coup.

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ဂျာနယ်ဦးကိိုကားျီးတွင်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအရမ်းအလွယ်တွင်ပ်းရပါင်းည့််ခဲ့ပပီးတပ်တကကသိိုလ်၊Open Society Foundationsနှင့်Luce Foundationတိို့န်ပိုရငွမြင့်ဘာသာပြအရကကာင်းအားအလိုပ်ရိုရဆွေးရနွေးပွဲဦးာေးကင်းပကာသိုရတသနစာတြ်ေးဦးကိိုဂျာနယ်အမြစ်ဦးကိိုစတင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
လွတ်လပ်ရသော မြန်မာ သိုရတသနဂ္ဂ နှင့်ဝဘ်ဆိိုဒ်တို့သည် ိုတ်ရဝြောရိုးကိုအဂိုးလိပ်နှင့်မြန်မာဘာသာနှစ်ထောင့်တင်ဆက်နိုင်ပြီး ပြီးသွားညီမြစ်ပပီးခရကကောင်ရင်းတ်ရှုသည်နိုင်ကကိုပြုသို့ ခက်ခဲနက်ရသောစကားရမှာပြုဆိုးရိုးကိုအတတ်နိုင်ဆိုရင်းသွားသည်မြစ်ပပီးပညာပ်နယ်ပွဲမပင်ပြီးသူ့သာလက်လီနိုင်ရသောအသိပညာအဝန်းအဝိုင်းတခိုကိုနီးရပ်စားနည်းည်ပေးနိုင်ရသည်။

၂၀၂၁ခုနှစ်ရာဝန်းကျင်စစ်တပ်ကအာဏာသို့ပပီးရန်ပါဝင်ပြီးလွတ်လပ်ရသောမြန်မာသိုရတသနဂ္ဂာယ်လိုပ်ငန်းရဆာင်တာ့ကိုလိုခခ ိုခခရဆာင်ွက်နိုင်ရစန်အတွက်ပြိုင်င်းခင်းကိုသိိုလ်သိိုးရမပေးွဲ့အရမခစိိုက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။
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In this issue, we bring together critical practitioners, scholars, and writers of Myanmar to examine how the country can build an inclusive society. We started this endeavor with an initial writing workshop at Chiang Mai University hosted by the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development in December 2018. As the military coup on 1 February 2021 ended Myanmar's nominal transition to democracy—which began with the 2010 election—the Burmese state continues pursuing perhaps the most prolonged struggle to consolidate power and build a Westphalian-style “Leviathan” state in Southeast Asia. A Burmese state that is inclusive and reflective of its diverse cultures has never been realized in Myanmar’s history. The current political crisis shines the clearest light on how there was no state to fail, despite what many observers think; the crisis is the most poignant illustration of how Myanmar's struggle for an inclusive state and a new open society persists among diverse ethnic groups, including the non-monolithic Bama population. Analysis of the 2021 coup-induced political crisis and its impact on Myanmar’s democratization process to create an open inclusive society deserves a separate volume. The articles in this volume, which were written before the 2021 coup, do not explicitly address the coup and consequent political crises in Myanmar.

Myanmar stands in the world today as having the longest civil war among the world's 193 United Nations member states since WWII. It is ethnically and culturally the second most diverse country in Southeast Asia after Indonesia, with 135 officially determined ethnic groups and many more going unrecognized by the state. Myanmar faces enduring ethnic conflicts and wars, ethnoreligious conflicts between Buddhist and Muslim communities in Rakhine State and several cities in the country, land-grab conflicts, and conflict within Buddhist communities.
The 1 February military coup makes the political process to build a new and inclusive society less certain. Myanmar's nominal transition to democracy in 2010 opened up much-needed wider scholarly attention across the world. Scholarly attempts to revitalize a rich tradition of critical and independent scholarship on society and politics in Myanmar had only recently begun. We are a part of this endeavor and, in this issue, we devote our attention to whether and how Myanmar could achieve an inclusive, peaceful, and democratic society.

It is essential to understand Myanmar's struggle for a more inclusive society within the contexts of (1) the history of ethnic diversity and conflicts; (2) religion and society; (3) military domination of politics and state-building in the post-independence era; and (4) local-global economic forces. All of these contexts continue to shape the nominal transition to democracy. Careful observation and reading of Burma's history will illuminate how complex forces from these four contextual frameworks shape the struggle to achieve an inclusive society.

Perhaps more than any other historical event in Myanmar's history, the 8.8.88 protests defined and paved the way for a movement toward a more open, inclusive and democratic society. Those nationwide political protests against a one-party authoritarian state and successive political movements against the military regime have been singularly devoted to achieving a democratic federal union in Myanmar. Several student activists and leaders who led the 1988 democracy movement left for Myanmar's border areas after the coup on 18 September 1988 and worked with ethnic minority groups along the border to advance the armed struggle against Myanmar's military rule. The political project that grew out of the 1988 protests in Myanmar, despite its painfully slow beginning—a nullified election in 1990, up to the National League for Democracy victory in the 2012 by-elections, then in 2015, and 2020—is a clear message to military state-builders that the traditional Bama nationalist framework has never reflected the desire and diversity of Myanmar's ethnic and religious communities. Consequently, Myanmar as a state has never committed to seriously achieving an inclusive polity:
it has always, in practice, been defined in more narrow and exclusionary terms by the Bama ethnonationalists at the helm of power, namely, the Myanmar military.

Several articles in this special issue inform us that Bama ethnocentrism and Buddhist nationalism continues to resist the inclusion of non-Bama and non-Buddhist political communities and leaders into significant political decision-making processes. The current political crisis in Myanmar has further amplified that resistance. At the same time, the determination and diversity of the pro-democracy protests against the 1 February coup amplifies the voices of inclusive forces. The articles in this special issue collectively argue that Bama ethnonationalism is still tangible in Myanmar's politics today and continues to serve as a hindrance to making Myanmar an open and inclusive society. It is historically evident that whether building dynastic kingdoms or a modern nation-state, the Bama majority has defined what the nation-state of Myanmar should be and occupied a position of power sufficient to “annihilate” others who do not fit into their political fold. Whether that historical trend will repeat or end permanently as Myanmar's politics develops will be determined by how the forces of inclusion find creative solutions to constitute a new and open society.

Myanmar's various ethnic communities have been struggling for inclusion since Burma’s independence from Great Britain in 1948. However, several ethnic communities included in the official list of ethnic groups in the military’s 2008 Constitution have been politically excluded from the political decision-making framework. Many of these groups have been fighting against the Myanmar military for over half a century for inclusion or secession. Myanmar’s largest case of systematic and violent exclusion at scale is its treatment of the Rohingya people in Rakhine State. As we can see in the map (Map 1), Rohingya might be considered ‘stateless people’ by some, but that does not justify the inhumane treatment they suffer under Myanmar's military and nationalist Arakanese or Rakhine powers. Several articles in this issue deconstruct how the 2017 Rohingya crisis un-
folded and whether there is a systematic exercise of racial, religious, cultural, and political exclusion of Rohingya in Myanmar’s political processes.

Map 1

Ethnicity and Racism in Burma

Scholarship on ethnicity, ethnic politics, and ethnic conflicts in Burma is well developed, but scholarship on race and racism is less so. The analysis of Burmese nationalists’ and the military’s point of view on Rohingya people indicates that the case of the Rohingya falls into the racism category. Rohingya themselves want to define the case as legitimate ethnic conflict, and ethnic discrimination against their deserved citizenship of the country and, thus, terms like “ethnic cleansing” or “genocide” were applied by journalists and international observers. Articles by Michael Charney and Tharapi Than nine in this special issue analyze both historical and contemporary complexity surrounding

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1 Asrar, 2017.
ethnicity and race in Myanmar's politics to imagine an inclusive society. The challenge for scholars is whether the case of the Rohingya should be analyzed as a part of ongoing ethnic conflict and civil war or whether it should be treated differently from the analysis of war in Kachin, Karen, or Rakhine states. The root of this problem is defining the “indigeneity” of ethnic groups in Myanmar. The complacency or lack of criticism among other ethnic groups and ethnic leaders against the Myanmar military’s inhumane treatment of the Rohingya suggest that those ethnic leaders and groups agree, more or less, with the Myanmar military’s view that Rohingya are immigrants or ethnic groups that belong to Bangladesh and South India, or that they fear that any expression of overt sympathy for the Rohingya would jeopardize their desires for full inclusion. This distinction is crucial because it legitimizes the essence of the 1982 citizenship law and the military’s 2008 Constitution to exclude certain groups from the official list of 135 ethnic groups.

A careful reading of the 1982 citizenship law and the 2008 Myanmar Constitution would support the analysis that the military and Burmese nationalist leaders recognize the legitimacy and theoretical inclusion of 135 ethnic groups from the list they developed in Myanmar's politics. However, Myanmar denies the existence of the Rohingya as an ethnic group in its state historical records before 1824. This is the first order of distinction that needs to be understood to appreciate why Aung San Suu Kyi, State Counselor from 2016-21 and at the time of writing a political prisoner once again, was hesitant to raise the question of the 1982 citizenship law and the classification of Myanmar’s 135 ethnic groups. She seemed to accept that Rohingyas are members of communities in Rakhine State and could be citizens if they do not use the term Rohingya to describe their ethnicity in their citizenship paperwork. She failed to acknowledge Rohingya as an ethnic minority in her International Court of Justice speech in the Hague on December 11, 2019.

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2 Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 2017.
The domination of the Myanmar military in Burmese politics punctuated recently by the 2021 coup should also remind Western journalists and headline makers, who forcefully reported the failure of Aung San Suu Kyi’s explicit defense of Rohingya people, how complex the local historical context and political climate is in which she has to maneuver. The assassination of U Ko Ni, who led the process to reform the military’s 2008 Constitution for the National League for Democracy (NLD), at Yangon Airport on 29 January 2017, was a clear signal sent to Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD leadership. It is one thing to criticize players in the field from the perspective of the spectator but it is quite another thing to be a player on the field. The complexity of Myanmar politics, rooted in its history and power dynamics among groups, foretells how challenging the path will be to achieve an inclusive and open society in Myanmar. For Myanmar in 2021, neither the military nor the NLD alone can bring a permanent peace and inclusive society without the meaningful participation of other diverse ethnic and political groups.

**Buddhism and Inclusion/Exclusion**

The question of inclusion and exclusion in the formation of Myanmar’s polity necessarily requires us to deconstruct the role of religion in Myanmar’s history and politics. It also inevitably raises the further question of how Burmese Buddhist concepts could ever be used to justify the actions of Myanmar’s successive military governments, which cracked down violently on people’s protests in 1988, Buddhist monks’ protests in 2007, committed the crimes against the Rohingya people in Rakhine State, and since the 1 February 2021 military coup again more blatantly perpetrate large-scale arbitrary arrest, torture, and murder of peaceful protesters and civilians. It requires outright politicization of religion to find justification in the tenets of Buddhism for the exclusion of any member of society, let alone violently expel them. Articles by Htet Min Lwin and Shae Frydenlund and Shunn Lei in this issue engage with religion and inclusion/exclusion questions.
Several scholars of Buddhism in Myanmar have unraveled the critical and contentious role of Theravada Buddhism in Burmese politics and political thought.³ It has even been argued that “in order to understand the political dynamics of contemporary Myanmar, it is necessary to understand the interpretations of Buddhist concepts that underlay much of modern Burmese political thought”.⁴ It sounds plausible to judge and portray a society's foundation through the majority's religion and values, but it unintentionally decimates the intellectual role of minorities. The problem with a narrow and glamorized version of a country or ethnic group seen only through the lens of the majority is a tragedy of intellectual zeal that makes one’s subject unique and one’s question the only one worthy of pursuit. In this sense, the inclusion and exclusion problem regarding religion and society begins with intellectual exclusion of the existence and value of the minority by sentimentalizing the majority. From this angle, Htet Min Lwin's article on Mahāgandhārum Sayadaw, Moe Htet Nay’s article on Myanmar culture, and Joshua’s article on religion and politics in the Kachin conflict contribute to diversifying the view of religion and politics in Myanmar beyond Buddhist tenets.

For some Burmese citizens, because they live in Myanmar and Buddhism is the majority's religion, anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic sentiment is taken almost as a right that they should exercise. This might explain why most Myanmar citizens do not question or even consider the inhumane treatment of Rohingya by the military as a dent in their moral universe. However, such perceptions are reportedly changing in the wake of the Myanmar military’s indiscriminate violent arrest, torture, and killing of protesters and civilians in urban areas during the crackdown against 2021 democracy protests. The majority of urban citizens in Myanmar are suffering the same type of violence inflicted upon Rohingya and other ethnic minorities for years. It is important to note that while most citizens may not pose questions

⁴ Walton, 2017, p. 3.
about the military’s brutal campaign against the Rohingya, the majority did not seem to believe the propaganda campaign against the Rohingya launched by Nay Pyi Taw through Facebook and social media in Myanmar. Whether the 2021 political crisis in Myanmar has significantly altered the majority of Myanmar citizens’ views on the Rohingya and the Myanmar military—and how responses to the crisis will contribute to realizing a new inclusive society—is an important question. Do most Myanmar citizens unanimously view the military dictatorship as a common threat to realizing an inclusive society and thus a threat to peace in Myanmar? The emerging evidence and the unified determination among different groups and generations of democracy protesters against the 1 February 2021 military coup suggests an affirmative answer to this question.

**Facebook Campaign Against Rohingya**

When technology and ideology are deployed skillfully in public media campaigns on today’s social media platforms, a democracy can either thrive or suffer from the attendant rise of factual and/or fake information. Myanmar’s nominal transition to democracy from 2010 to 2020 occurred during the high point of global communication technological transformation. The Myanmar Tatmadaw, which learned its engineering and technological skills from Russia in order to wage cyber warfare, deployed the Russian model in dealing with open media. Using Facebook, the most popular social media platform in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw and its enablers deployed fake information in a far-reaching campaign. Wai Moe’s article and Aiden Moe’s article expertly investigate and report findings on the deployment of fake news about the Rohingya crisis. Among other things, they found that 700 military personnel devoted to the Cyberwarfare Department monitor all social media; these findings reveal how the Tatmadaw fabricates fake news against the Rohingya to gain supporters in the Myanmar Facebook world. Their articles are central to this issue as they are independent research papers about the Rohingya crisis exposing how the Myanmar
Tatmadaw deploys social media to justify and support its actions.

At the same time, skillful Myanmar Facebook users, citizen journalists, and local conventional journalists are shedding light on the power of social media in democracy during the protests against the 2021 coup in Myanmar. This movement was led early by Generation Z and illustrates what one might call the “digital democracy movement,” an unprecedented dynamic in world history. The creativity, diversity, scale, and reach of the democracy movement throughout Myanmar is inspiring. The daily live feed on Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok that allows for the intermingling of information about Myanmar local protests, crackdowns, virtual global protests, fundraising events, and Zoom webinars on political issues all illustrate social media’s power in creating an open and inclusive society.

**The Transition from Monocentric History to Inclusive Society**

The 1988 democracy movement provided a political platform for Aung San Suu Kyi. She admirably and symbolically led the movement with steadfast determination to transition Myanmar to a democracy before the 1 February 2021 coup. She gained an international reputation as a champion of human rights and freedom. The Saint-like image of Aung San Suu Kyi throughout the 1990s and 2000s as promoted by the mainstream Western media ended with her silence on the Rohingya crisis. As she walks through Myanmar's history, on the one hand as the champion of democracy and on the other hand as a state leader (as she defined herself and her role in the Hague speech), it is a reminder that Myanmar's own contradiction between its past and its present deserves careful interpretation.

Michael Charney's article provides an insightful rendition of Myanmar's postcolonial history and urges scholars to decolonize Myanmar's history to embrace a more inclusive framework for historical analysis. Charney investigates the historical context of Myanmar concerning the Rohingya crisis and issues a
pointed critique. He argues for freeing Myanmar history and historical analysis from colonial impositions. Only then can Myanmar rethink the inclusive framework in its intellectual interpretation. Charney writes, “Regardless of what solution is found to the present crisis, Rakhine will continue to be subject to genocidal conditions and there will be further episodes of murder and flight. This goes beyond the need to abandon the citizenship laws and the Taingyintha paradigm; Myanmar needs to radically reinvent itself on a new basis, if it is to end its continued problems not just with the Rohingya, but with all of its ethnic minorities”. Charney argues this new basis is a new intellectual understanding of Myanmar's genuine but neglected ethnic histories that were systematically ignored or incompletely examined in existing scholarship.

Through its articles this special issue collectively presents shreds of evidence for the need to decolonize the analysis of Myanmar's political development, not only from the British imposition on Myanmar's history, but also to deconstruct the Eurocentric imagination of a state that validates the majority's position and the winner's narratives in Myanmar and beyond.

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Der Kampf gegen die Dummheit ist gerade erst begonnen.
Militarization in Northern Rakhine State: How, Who and Why

Wai Moe

Abstract

This article discusses the violence against Rohingya people in northern Rakhine State in 2017, contextualizing the premeditated campaign by outlining the region’s militarization and the Tatmadaw’s entrenched warfare practices. It attempts to shed light on the five commanding officers most responsible for the pogrom and also explains the role that soldiers’ education at Tatmadaw institutions plays in shaping the thinking and culture of regular soldiers. Not only are soldiers indoctrinated with Buddhist Bamar nationalism, but a select few are also increasingly educated in advanced information warfare techniques from foreign countries. While the Tatmadaw’s propaganda department has existed for seventy years, the effective use of hate speech and misinformation by the Tatmadaw increased exponentially following the National League for Democracy’s by-election win in 2012, contributing to the national context behind the man-made ethnic cleansing disaster in 2017.
အိန်းရပ်သူအဆင့်မြင့်အာ ိငါးဦးကိုြီေးရြာင်ေး ိုေးမပသကာတပ်ရတာ်အင်စတီက င်းြ ာေး စစ်သာေးြ ာေး၏ပညာရ ေးအခန်းကဏ္ဍသည် သာနစစ်သာေးြ ာေး၏ရတွေးရတာစဉ်ဆင်မခင်နိိုင်ြှုနင့်ယဉ်ရကာ ြှုတိိုှံ့ကိိုပ ိုသွင်ေးတွင် အရ ေးပါရကကာင်ေးကိိုလည်းင်ေးလင်ေးမပသာေးပါသည်။ စစ်သာေးြ ာေးသည် ဗြာလူြ ိေးနင့် ဗိုဒဓဘာသာအရပေါ်အရမခခသည်် အြ ိ ေးသာေးရ ေးဝါဒကိိုအဓြမရိိုက်သွင်ေးာေးခရိုသာကို အ ူေးရ ွေးခ ယ်မခင်ေးခ သည့်် စစ်သာေးအခ ိ ွဲ့ြ ာစစ်ရ ေးနည်ေးပညာြ ာေးဆိိုင် ာအဆင့်မြင့်ပညာပ်ြ ာေးကိိုနိိုင်ငမခာေးတိိုင်ေးမပည်ြ ာေး သင်ယူလာကကသည်ကိိုလည်းရတွွဲ့ပါသည်။ တပ်ရတာ်မပည်သူူ့ဆက်ဆရ ေးနင့်စိတ်ဓါတ်စစ်ဆင်ရေးဌာနသည်နစ်ခိုနစ်ဆယ်ရကာကာတည်ခဲ့ပပီေးတပ်ရတာ်၏ အြိုန်ေးစကာေးနင့်သတင်ေးအြ ာေးြ ာေးမြနှံ့်ခမြှုသည် ၂၀၁၂ခိုနစ်ကကာေးမြတ်ရွေးရကာက်ပွဲအတွင်ေးအြ ိ ေးသာေးဒီြိိုကရ စီအ ြွဲွဲ့ခပါတီ (NLD)အနိိုင်ခဲ့သည့််ရနောက်ပိိုင်ေးတိိုေးမြင့်လာခဲ့ကာ ၂၀၁၇ခိုနစ်အတွင်ေးလူသာေးြ ာေးက ေးလွန်သည့်် ြ ိ ေးနွယ်စိုင်ေးလင်ေးရစစ်ာဝတ်ြှုကကီေးအာ က ေးလွန်ရစန်မြစ်ရပ်လာရစသည့်် နိိုင်ငရတာ်အဆင့်ရနောက်ကွယ်အရမခအရနကိိုြ ာေးစွာအရာက်အပ ့်မြစ်ရစခဲ့ပါသည်။
Introduction

This article discusses how and why the military crisis in northern Rakhine State in 2017 unfolded as well as who was most directly responsible. Following attacks on 30 police and military installations in northern Rakhine State\(^1\) on 25 August 2017 the Myanmar armed forces, or Tatmadaw, carried out aggressive military operations in civilian areas that were officially termed “clearance operations”. Both the Government of Myanmar then headed by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi and the Tatmadaw alleged that the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) bore responsibility for the attacks and declared it a “terrorist organization”\(^2\). During the Tatmadaw’s “clearance operations” in northern Rakhine State, thousands of Rohingya people were killed and 700,000 fled to neighboring Bangladesh according to the United Nations and Bangladesh officials.\(^3\) The United Nations called the 2017 atrocities against the Rohingya a textbook example of ethnic cleansing and international human rights groups claimed it to be genocide.

There were four main contexts for the aggression and swiftness of the Tatmadaw’s operation. The first was Myanmar’s militarization in western Myanmar since the late 1990s, second was the Tatmadaw’s reliance on its infamous “Four Cuts” counterinsurgency doctrine, third was the military leadership and command behind the Rohingya operations, and fourth was how the Tatmadaw used social media to create hate speech and disinformation against their political opponents and the Rohingya minority. This article runs through these contexts sequentially, first discussing militarization in Rakhine State in the 1990s, the kinds of troops and troop numbers deployed there, and then the events leading up to 2017. Following that, the 2017 deployments behind the “clearance operations” are described, focusing on the fact that mass deployments were premeditated weeks before

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\(^1\) According to Myanmar government and military state media announcements (Myanmar News Agency).
\(^2\) Myanmar Anti-Terrorism Central Committee, 2017.
\(^3\) Safi, 2007.
the attacks. The Tatmadaw’s methods are then detailed with a discussion of the infamous “Four Cuts” strategy. The article details five of the high-level Tatmadaw personnel behind the 2017 atrocities before concluding with a discussion of the Tatmadaw’s information warfare practices.

**Militarization and Key Rakhine State Events in the 1990s**

Since Rakhine State neighbors Bangladesh and the Bay of Bengal and is of economic and geopolitical interest to China, it is a very important military strategic zone. Before the 1990s, the Tatmadaw did not mobilize troops often in Rakhine State. Back then, the region hosted only offices of the Western Regional Military Command (RMC) and the Danyawaddy Navy Command. But the Myanmar military junta’s\(^4\) program to modernize its military throughout the 1990s saw Tatmadaw troops more than double in Rakhine State.

Military operation commands (MOCs) were introduced to the Tatmadaw in the 1990s. A MOC is the same as a Light Infantry Division (LID) and is also composed of ten battalions. It is commanded by brigadier general or colonel ranking officers. The Tatmadaw established three MOCs in Rakhine State: the MOC-15 in Buthidaung Township, the MOC-9 in Kyauktaw Township, and the MOC-5 in Toungup Township.\(^5\) The Tatmadaw also created a regional operation command (ROC) in Sittwe Town, the capital of the state, after the Western RMC was moved to Ann Township in the mid-1990s. ROCs are subregional military commands. They control four infantry battalions and are commanded by a brigadier general.

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\(^4\) Following decades of military and one-party rule, a new military junta ruled Myanmar from 1988 to 2011, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council from 1988 to 2007 and then the State Peace and Development Council from 2007 to 2011.

\(^5\) Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, p. 80.
The Rohingya crisis in 1992/93 was related to the Myanmar military regime expanding its troops along the Burmese-Bangladeshi border in northern Rakhine State. At that time, between 210,000 and 250,000 Rohingya refugees\(^6\) from Maungdaw and Buthitaung townships fled to Bangladesh when army commands were set up in the area.\(^7\) During that operation, there were claims of rape, torture, summary killings, confiscation and destruction of homes, property and mosques, physical abuse, religious persecution, and forced labor by the armed forces.\(^8\)

General Khin Nyunt,\(^9\) the then-third ranking general and military intelligence chief of the military junta, designated a project to create non-Muslim villages in northern Rakhine State under the title of border development. Hundreds of prisoners including criminals were granted amnesty if they chose to live in northern Rakhine State. The state provided them with two cows, a bicycle and other sundries for setting up their new lives there. Some who were resettled to northern Rakhine State went back to their original homes, as they felt they could not live there.

Another controversial event during the Rohingya crisis in the 1990s was giving birth control doses to women in the Rohingya community. Under the command of General Win Myint, the commander of the Western RMC, military medical units injected birth control drugs into Rohingya women without their acknowledgement or consent. For running this birth control operation, Win Myint gained favor from the junta head Senior General Than Shwe. He was made one of the top generals in Myanmar when Than Shwe appointed him as secretary-3 of the military junta as well as the head of the powerful military firm, the

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\(^6\) UNHCR, 1992.
\(^7\) Former government officials, personal communications, 2017.
\(^9\) General Khin Nyunt was powerful from 1988 to 2007 when he and his military intelligence officers were purged from the junta.
Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. General Win Myint was later dismissed for corruption in 2003.

**Troops and Troop Numbers in Rakhine State**

Since the establishment of the military commands in Rakhine State in the 1990s, the Tatmadaw gradually deployed approximately 46 infantry battalions in Rakhine State, excluding navy personnel and border police force. Sixteen infantry battalions are under the Western RMC including four battalions under the ROC in Sittwe Township while thirty infantry battalions are from three other MOCs.

Although a standard military infantry battalion is supposed to have 778 troops, observers of the Myanmar military reported to the author that battalions have far fewer troops than 778 and there are presently only around 250 troops within a battalion.\(^\text{10}\) By this logic, Rakhine State hosts more than 11,000 fully armed troops and at least 81 military officers at lieutenant colonel rank and above. Apart from army troops, Myanmar also deploys at least three “Combat Police Battalions” (CPBs) in Rakhine State. Police forces serve under the military according to the military’s 2008 constitution. Police battalion No. 12 is based in Sittwe Township and Nos. 2 and 13 are in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships. Since a combat police battalion is formed with 400 police personnel, at least 1,200 individual police are deployed in the region. A police operation command in Sittwe Township headed by a police colonel oversees the three CPBs\(^\text{11}\) and a police brigadier general ranking officer is commander of all police forces in Rakhine State. CPB police forces are formed and trained more like military troops than as regular police. Military operations in northern Rakhine State since the 1990s have had CPBs deployed alongside Tatmadaw troops.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^{10}\) Military observers, personal communications, 2017.  
\(^{11}\) Information obtained from official documents on police structure in Rakhine State.  
\(^{12}\) A former senior military officer, personal communication, 2017.
Militarization and Events Leading up to August 2017

After the 1992 Rohingya exodus to Bangladesh, sectarian conflict in northern Rakhine State was relatively quiet until May/June 2012. Overall, Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims lived and traded together peacefully. The situation dramatically changed in late May and early June 2012. Brutal sectarian violence struck northern Rakhine State following the rape and murder case of a Rakhine woman allegedly committed by three Muslim men. The initial violence killed at least 300 and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. At that time, ex-General Thein Sein’s government mostly used CPBs backed by the army to control the situation and the transitional government was seeking legitimacy at home and abroad following the 2010 election. In other words, the Thein Sein government only used Rakhine State-based CPBs and 46 army battalions to contain the violence in the region. The government did not use extra troops based outside of Rakhine State.

The situation of northern Rakhine State worsened when Myanmar security forces responded to the unknown attackers who attacked three border police posts in Maungdaw and Rathedaung townships on 10 October 2016. On the following day, the Tatmadaw launched “clearance operations” in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships, which triggered 80,000 Rohingya Muslims to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. In addition, summary executions, civilian casualties, and burning of villages were reported.14

Although the government and the military announced Rohingya militants were responsible for the attacks on police posts, some Rohingya community leaders said it might have been revenge from drug gangs on the Myanmar-Bangladeshi border as 40 million methamphetamine pills were seized15 by the Bangladeshi police in 2017 alone. During an interview in an IDP camp

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13 Former General Thein Sein was President of Myanmar 2011-2016. He was also chairman of the military proxy party the USDP.
14 Wai Moe, 2016.
in November 2016, the late Rohingya community leader and former political prisoner, U Kyaw Hla Aung, said he had learned the attacks on police posts there were not related to the Rohingya resistance movement.\(^\text{16}\) This alternative narrative was repeated by other Rohingya community leaders.

The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also noted escalating drug issues in their 2017 report stating: “Drug trafficking through Rakhine – typically following the route from eastern Myanmar, via Maungdaw and Buthidaung, to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh – seems to have increased significantly in recent years”.\(^\text{17}\) The commission report also stated that the drug trade in northern Rakhine State funded non-state armed groups such as the Arakan Army (AA) and ARSA and Myanmar government officials were also alleged to be involved. AA officials denied involvement in the drug trade in interviews with newspapers prior to the Commission’s report.\(^\text{18}\)

Like the 2012 operations, the 2016 military operations were not as large as the 2017 operations, with less militarization and no extra LIDs brought to Rakhine State.

**Military Deployments in Northern Rakhine State in August 2017**

Myanmar’s largest military operation in Northern Rakhine State in decades started following the killing of ethnic Mro\(^\text{19}\) villagers in the Mayu mountains area in early August 2017. State-owned media reported that Myanmar troops had discovered six bodies: “The villagers, all members of the Mro-Arakan ethnic groups, had been killed with machetes and gunshots by violent attackers,”\(^\text{20}\) and the incident was soon reported by private Burmese

\(^{16}\) U Kyaw Hla Aung, personal communication, November 2016.

\(^{17}\) Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 2017.

\(^{18}\) Ye Mon, 2016.

\(^{19}\) Mro is one of the ethnic groups identified by the government in Rakhine and Chin states.

\(^{20}\) Six villagers killed, 2017.
media, with photographs. Many Burmese shared the reports on social media, particularly Facebook, and public outrage escalated within a few days.

At that time, the commander-in-chief of Myanmar’s armed forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, was in Japan for an official visit. On his return, Min Aung Hlaing prepared for “clearance operations” in northern Rakhine State and held a meeting with leaders of the Arakan National Party (ANP)\(^{21}\) including Dr Aye Maung\(^{22}\) on 9 August in Nay Pyi Taw. General Min Aung Hlaing’s Facebook page posted a short note on the meeting stating it was to discuss cooperation for the sake of “tranquility and development” in Rakhine State.\(^{23}\) After the meeting, Aye Maung told reporters: “We planned to submit a proposal to the Lower House and Upper House regarding the security situation of Rakhine State. But the parliament rejected our initial proposal. So, we decided to approach the Tatmadaw. We accept the security management of the military”.

General Min Aung Hlaing elaborated with Rakhine politicians on the details of security operations in Rakhine State at the meeting, according to Aye Maung.\(^{24}\) Although General Min Aung Hlaing held the meeting with Rakhine politicians, the military chief did not meet with Aung San Suu Kyi, the de facto head of state and government, to brief them on the upcoming military operations in Rakhine State. Instead, he used two key liaisons between himself and Aung San Suu Kyi: the deputy commander-

\(^{21}\) The ANP was formed from a merger between the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party (RNDP) and the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) in 2015. The RNDP formed by Rakhine nationalists won many constituencies in the 2010 elections and the ALD was the biggest political party in Rakhine State during the 1990 elections. The ANP is extremely electorally popular in Rakhine State.

\(^{22}\) Aye Maung is a controversial Rakhine nationalist and member of parliament who once said he would throw Rohingya Muslims into the Bay of Bengal.

\(^{23}\) General Min Aung Hlaing’s official page was removed by Facebook in August 2018 after Mark Zuckerberg testified about hate speech against the Rohingya population on the social media platform at the US Senate in April.

\(^{24}\) Ye Mon, 2017.
in-chief of the armed forces, Vice Senior General Soe Win and Defense Minister Lieutenant General Sein Win to “inform” her on the planned operations. When asked about the meeting between the State Counselor and the liaison generals, Aung San Suu Kyi’s spokesman Zaw Htay told a Burmese media outlet that the meeting was about “labeling” the ARSA “a terrorist organization”. Following that meeting with the liaison generals, on 11 August the State Counselor’s office released a statement noting 59 people, reportedly village authorities or those who worked with authorities, had been killed and 33 missing in northern Rakhine State in August 2017. The statement also confirmed the government’s approval for militarization in the area and granted special powers to the military in operations against “extremists”. Myanmar’s State Counselor’s Office issued a statement saying:

To protect the innocent civilians, security enforcement will be in the region...the Government is working together with Tatmadaw security forces to quell these stepped up terrorist acts including the issuance of a Section 144 curfew in necessary areas in order to establish and maintain peace, stability and security in the region.

According to reports and photos in the Burmese language media and on Facebook of military accounts and pages, the Tatmadaw

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25 General Sein Win has been the minister of defense since August 2015. He was reportedly set to retire in 2017, but there has been no official announcement yet.
26 Diplomats and other officials, personal communications, 2017.
27 Zaw Htay is a former major ranking military officer. He has served as spokesman for both Aung San Suu Kyi and Thein Sein. He was also director-general of the State Counselor Office.
28 Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not martial law. Myanmar’s colonial era Penal Code states “whoever, being armed with any deadly weapon, or with anything which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, is a member of an unlawful assembly, shall be punished with imprisonment of their description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both”.
sent troops from two LIDs to western Myanmar on 10 August 2017, the day following General Min Aung Hlaing’s meeting with the ANP. Military observers noted troops were deployed by airlift, considered unusual as the Tatmadaw conventionally uses road convoys for troop mobilizations. Officials and those related to military members in Sittwe Township posted photos on Facebook of fully equipped LID 33 infantry troops landing at Sittwe Airport. The LID 33 was then airlifted further west and six battalions under two tactical operation commands of the LID 99 were sent over by navy vessels. International TV network and line agencies reported massive troop deployments in early August 2017.

LID troops were deployed in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Rathedaung, and Kyauktaw townships in Rakhine State and to Paletwa Township in Chin State. By 11 August, more than 70 battalions had been deployed to Rakhine State – 16 battalions under the Western RMC in Ann Township and the ROC in Sittwe Township, 10 battalions from the MOC-5 headquarters in Toungup Township, 10 battalions under the MOC-9 headquarters in Kyauktaw Township, 10 battalions from the MOC-15 headquarters in Buthidaung Township, four battalions from the ROC in Pyay Township, four battalions from the South-West RMC headquarters in Pathein Township, the No. 274 Light Field Artillery Battalion and Nos. 9 and 818 Signal Battalions. These deployments were in addition to at least three navy vessels deployed along the coast of northern Rakhine State at that time. The likely reason for deploying navy vessels in addition to ground troops was the Tatmadaw’s Army, Navy, Air Force coordination strategy

30 The LID 33 headquarters is near Mandalay. The LID 33 has been involved in military offensives in Northern Shan and Kachin states. It is notorious for human rights violations.
31 The LID 99 headquarters is in the military town of Meiktila. It has also been involved in offensives in Kachin and Northern Shan states in recent years and is infamous for human rights violations.
32 Military observers, personal communications, 2019.
33 Agence France-Presse, 2017.
and the Tatmadaw’s deployment of so many troops early in August 2017 shows it was preparing for “clearance operations” weeks before 25 August 2017.

The Four Cuts Strategy

The Tatmadaw’s use of the Four Cuts strategy has its root in Myanmar’s long enduring history of wars against ethnic insurgencies. Shortly after Myanmar’s independence in 1948 and throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Tatmadaw faced powerful insurgencies across the country. In the Tatmadaw’s propaganda, it proudly says it survived and saved the country despite being a so-called “Yangon government”.34

Although the Four Cuts strategy is now best known for its use in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw first adopted the notorious tactic from the British who pioneered it during counterinsurgency operations in Malaysia from 1949 to 1960. At that time, the British army fought against Malay communist guerrillas.35 The Four Cuts strategy refers to terminating and controlling insurgents’ resources such as food, finance, manpower/recruitment and information. Forced relocation and control of freedom of movement is also a part of the Four Cuts strategy.

The Tatmadaw started using the Four Cuts effectively during the 1970s-80s campaigns against Burmese communist guerrillas and Karen ethnic rebels in the Bago Region mountain ranges under General Ne Win’s Burma Socialist Programme Party regime. Two well-known commanders, General Tun Yi and General Than Tin, were leading proponents and developers of the Burma Four Cuts strategy. By classifying pro-insurgent areas as white, brown, or black, the Tatmadaw zoned territory and practiced the strategy in the Bago Mountains. The counterinsurgency operation was named Alin Yaung or “the light”. Hundreds

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34 The so-called “Yangon government” refers to the situation in the 1950s. At that time, Burma’s government faced massive multiple rebellions across the country and the government and Tatmadaw only controlled mainly Yangon areas.

35 Komer, 1972.
of thousands of people in offensive areas were believed to be affected during the Alin Yaung operation.

Both the Four Cuts strategy and the Alin Yaung operation are in textbooks taught from and used at Myanmar military schools. According to a textbook titled “Subject of the Rooting Up Insurgency” used as a part of the curriculum of the General Staff College, the Four Cuts strategy was successfully practiced during the Alin Yaung operation. The Four Cuts’ strategy includes cutting off insurgents from supplies, finance, communication, and recruitment, with the text clearly stating, “executing insurgents.”

The current military leadership, including commander-in-chief General Min Aung Hlaing, learned the Four Cuts strategy with its execution paradigm before they even became a colonel.

Meanwhile, Min Aung Hlaing told US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in Nay Pyi Taw on 15 November 2017 that the Rohingya exodus became so large because family members of “terrorists” fled, denying that the more than 600,000 Rohingya refugees were innocent civilians: “ARSA extremist Bengali terrorists were not successful in attacking security outposts, and they fled to Bangladesh for fear of retribution from the security troops. As the terrorist took their families together with them, the number of people who fled became large.”

It seems the Four Cuts strategy in northern Rakhine State in 2017 targeted the entire Rohingya community by branding them terrorists and associates of terrorists. This tactic drives out people and destroys the rest of the community and villages in operation areas in order to prevent insurgency and to prevent them from returning. A critical question is whether displacing more than 600,000 Rohingya since August 2017 (and more than

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36 The General Staff College is one of Myanmar’s military graduate schools for tactical officer candidates of colonel rank.
37 According to a copy of the textbook shown to the author by a military officer.
38 Posted on Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s Facebook page on 15 November, 2017 and subsequently removed by Facebook.
800,000 since October 2016) to Bangladesh is part of a policy to decrease the Rohingya population by 40/50 percent in the area.

During my interviews, a military observer who spoke on condition of anonymity said: “The tactics in Rakhine operations aim: 1) to make it empty by clearance operations, as part of the Four Cuts; 2) to deploy more troops in the areas for security reasons and to fence the area off to prevent the flow of people from Bangladesh; 3) to create more land for the resettlement of native Rakhine people in the name of development and so on—especially to balance the ratio of population at least 40 percent of Rakhine and 60 percent of Rohingya; 4) to accept back the fleeing refugees under the scrutinizing process of the 1982 citizenship law; and 5) to show the international community that they are very cooperative”. The “clearance operation” achieved some of these aims, especially one, two and three.

There was also acknowledgement in 2017 from a senior government official of the dramatic population decreases in the area. The spokesman of the State Counselor’s office, Zaw Htay, admitted during a press briefing in Nay Pyi Taw in the second week of September 2017 that 176 out of 471 villages in northern Rakhine State targeted by the military’s “clearance operations” were now empty and 36 others were abandoned, although the government information committee previously denied the United Nations’ allegation that approximately 40 percent of Rohingya villages were burned down in the area.

In fact, driving off or containing the Rohingya population has been an agenda of extreme nationalists for years. Aye Maung said in July 2012 amid sectarian violence:

We have been asking for thorough verification in accordance with the 1982 Myanmar Citizen Law and to have the people who illegally came into our country stay in refugee camps. Just like refugees in other countries, feed them with the UNHRC’s support and there’ll be third countries

40 Holmes et al., 2017.
who sympathize with them and are willing to provide them with citizenship in their countries.\textsuperscript{41}

The above sentiment was echoed by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing who talked about “local ethnics” (non-Muslim) resettling northern Rakhine State when he visited Maungdaw Township in September 2017:

It is necessary for local ethnics not to abandon their places and villages and return there without fail. The Tatmadaw will prioritize their security. The Union government and the state government will be advised with regard to the resettlement of villages. The current population ratio of local ethnics to Bengalis is totally reversed compared with that of the past. Regarding possession of businesses, Bengalis were previously hired workers when native people owned the businesses. But due to various reasons, they have become owners now. Therefore, it is required to consider the long term by taking lesson from this.\textsuperscript{42}

Another point in the Four Cuts strategy in counterinsurgency operations such as those in northern Rakhine State is the “People’s War” strategy.\textsuperscript{43} A Tatmadaw academy textbook clearly states the People’s War means “people themselves defend, terminate and execute insurgents”\textsuperscript{44}. People’s War means using paramilitary forces to terminate insurgents and their supporters alongside regular troops. But there are no guidelines or rules of engagement for paramilitaries in operation areas. People’s

\textsuperscript{41} Nang Mya Nadi & Aye Nai, 2012.
\textsuperscript{42} Posted on Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s Facebook page and subsequently removed by Facebook.
\textsuperscript{43} Sighted in The Brief History of Myanmar and Tatmadaw’s Role from 1948 to 1988, published by the Myanmar military, in Burmese.
\textsuperscript{44} According to a military textbook seen by the author. The military textbooks in Myanmar are highly classified and not available publicly.
War could cause human rights violations and atrocities in northern Rakhine State and other operational areas, providing a layer of protection or tactical excuse for the Tatmadaw. A military source told the author many atrocities and villages burnings in 2017 were committed by ethnic Rakhine villagers who went to Rohingya villages with security forces. The source also emphasized that the paramilitaries “were difficult to control during the operations there.”

The Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) or Doctors without Borders announced on 12 December 2017 that based on six surveys in Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh at least 9,000 Rohingya people died within the month of 25 August to 24 September. Of these, 6,700 were killed during violence and 730 were children. At the time of writing, the Myanmar government and Tatmadaw had not responded to the MSF’s statement. But the office of the Tatmadaw commander-in-chief announced on December 18, 2017 that a mass grave was found in Indin village of Maungdaw Township, saying “the security forces were ordered to follow ‘rules of engagement’ and anyone found breaking the rules of engagement will have action taken against them according to the rule of law and if security forces were involved in the incident, they would be prosecuted by law.” However, up to the end of 2017, Myanmar still did not allow any independent investigation and international investigators were not allowed to travel to northern Rakhine State. This makes it hard to evaluate whether the security forces followed the rules of engagement emphasized in the military’s 18 December statement.

Backgrounds of the Commander-in-Chief and the Commanding Line

Although more than a dozen military officers at colonel ranking and above were involved in the military operations in northern

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47 Statement posted on the Facebook page of the office of the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw. Facebook removed the page in August 2018.
Rakhine State, Burmese military sources expressed to the author that it was “General Min Aung Hlaing’s War” and that he was the person who ordered the “clearance operations”. It is possible Min Aung Hlaing was considering his political ambitions when he did so; he is also reported to be superstitious and regularly visits fortunetellers like other military officers.

Min Aung Hlaing was born in Dawei, Tanintharyi Division in southern Myanmar, but grew up in Yangon and went to a downtown high school. After graduating from school, he briefly studied law at Yangon University, then joined the Defense Services Academy (DSA) in Pyin Oo Lwin in 1974, graduating in 1977 in cohort 19. As a low-ranking military officer, he first served in Mon State. He became commander of the LID 44 headquartered in Thaton Township, Mon State in 2001.

However, the general is no stranger to Rakhine State. After his posting at the LID 44, he was promoted to commander of the Western RMC in 2004. He was also chairman of the Rakhine State Peace and Development Council. After two years he was shuffled to command the Triangle RMC in Kengtung, Eastern Shan State in 2006. He was then promoted to chief of the Bureau of Special Operations (BSO)-2 overseeing operations under the military’s northeastern Regional, Eastern and Triangle commands in Shan and Kayah states.

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48 Tay Za is the Tatmadaw’s Officer Training School for non-graduated young men. Commanders involved include Western RMC’s commander, Major-General Maung Maung Soe, from DSA intake 27, the Southwestern RMC’s commander, Major-General Tay Za Kyaw of officer training school intake 73, Commander of the Sittwe ROC Brigadier-General Hla Myint Soe, Brigadier-General Myint Aung, graduate of Tay Za 11, LID 33 Commander Brigadier-General Aung Aung, LID 99 Commander Brigadier-General Khin Hlaing who graduated from Tay Za 17, Brigadier-General Khin Maung Soe, commander of the MOC-15; Colonel Aung Aung of Tay Za 19, commander of MOC-9; and Brig-General Aung Zayar of Tay Za 22, commander of MOC-5.


50 Wai Moe, 2014.

51 The Daily Eleven’s interview with Min Aung Hlaing in 2015, no link available.

52 There will be three gateways, 2004.

53 Funds for treatment, 2006.
General Min Aung Hlaing was low profile before he was appointed chief of BSO-2. He became a well-known figure in the media following a Tatmadaw snap offensive overrunning the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) at the Sino-Burmese border town of Laogai (Laukkaing Town) in August 2009. The Tatmadaw troops easily took Laogai in only three days. There was looting and as many as 37,000 Kokang-Chinese refugees fled to the Chinese border area.\(^5^4\) As chief of BSO-2, Min Aung Hlaing oversaw the success and received the favor of top junta generals Than Shwe and Maung Aye. A year later, he was promoted to joint chief of staff of the armed forces, considered the third-highest post in the Tatmadaw. During the junta’s transfer of power to Thein Sein’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government when Than Shwe officially stepped down at the end of March 2011, Min Aung Hlaing was named commander-in-chief of Myanmar’s armed forces.\(^5^5\)

With backing from the retired Than Shwe,\(^5^6\) General Min Aung Hlaing created an iron grip on the Tatmadaw. He sacked or forced to retire at least four high ranking generals from DSA cohort 22: Lieutenant General Kyaw Pyoe, Lieutenant General Tin Ngwe, Major General Tun Than and Major General Hla Myint Shwe, who reportedly challenged him.\(^5^7\) In mid-2017, General Kyaw Pyoe may have attempted to sue General Min Aung Hlaing for sacking him in 2011.

Min Aung Hlaing went on to move his confidants into key positions in the military such as deputy chief of military intelligence and general secretary of Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. Since Myanmar’s retirement age for government staff was sixty at that time, most of his contemporary generals were already out of military uniform, and most contemporary

\(^5^4\) Over 30 gov’t soldiers killed, 2009.
\(^5^5\) Wai Moe, 2011.
\(^5^6\) Military sources in 2017 said Min Aung Hlaing still visited Than Shwe regularly and reportedly listened to advice from the old general (personal communications, 2017).
\(^5^7\) Another Military General, 2011.
Tatmadaw commanders are at least ten years younger than Min Aung Hlaing.

Min Aung Hlaing tried to rebuild the Tatmadaw’s public image as a national guardian at home, and as a reformer abroad, traveling to capitals in Europe and Asia. While in Brussels in November 2016, a symbolic location for western democracy, he addressed a speech to military representatives from the European Union and defended the military’s role in Myanmar’s politics. He has also showed his public support for the Bama Buddhist nationalist movement, visiting extreme nationalist Buddhist monks including the controversial Ashin Wirathu and offering donations to them. He also attended the ceremony marking the 100th anniversary of the death of King Thibaw’s family in Ratnagiri, India in 2016. It was unusual that a military chief attended an event of the former Burmese monarchy. He was seen there with the chairman of the State Sangha Committee Bamo Abbot Bhaddanta Kumara and Vice President ex-Lieutenant General Myint Swe. Shortly after his trip to India, he went to meet a well-known nationalist monk Sitagu Abbot Ashin Nyanisara.

Min Aung Hlaing is married to Daw Kyu Kyu Hla who is an ethnic Rakhine from southern Rakhine State. His son is owner of the Yangon Gallery and Aung Myint Mo Insurance Company. Controversially, Myanmar military personnel have to buy insurance from the Aung Myint Mo Company. The company is alleged to be involved in arms brokering for the Tatmadaw, helping purchase aircrafts from Pakistan and other strategic arms from former Soviet countries and Israel. The business community in Yangon guessed Min Aung Hlaing’s family wealth was worth $800 million in 2017.

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58 Unspecified article in the Global New Light of Myanmar, November 6, 2016.
59 Wirathu is an extreme Buddhist monk from Mandalay who makes public anti-Muslim racist talks.
60 King Thibaw (1859-1916) was the last king of the Konbaung Dynasty. He was overthrown by the British in 1885 and deported to India, where he died.
61 Ceremony marking 100th anniversary, 2016.
Leading up to the 2017 atrocities in Rakhine State, then-State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and commander-in-chief General Min Aung Hlaing’s relationship was in question. During the first one and a half years of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government, there were no regular meetings between the two. Under Myanmar’s current military constitution, there is a regular meeting point between the civilian and military leadership in what is known as the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC). The NLD government did not call an NDSC meeting up to 2017, unlike the previous USDP government which called NDSC meetings at least 200 times in five years.\(^63\) The NLD leadership’s reason for bypassing the NDSC is because the military chief has the power to appoint six out of the eleven members of the council while the elected civilian leader can only select five. However, a military source told the author that NDSC decisions were based on consensus rather than majority vote.\(^64\)

There was an institutional dilemma for Aung San Suu Kyi calling a meeting with the military chief. Because Aung San Suu Kyi or the elected President\(^65\) did not attend the NDSC, the general rebuffed her at other occasions. Min Aung Hlaing preferred to send his deputies when requested or when he wanted to brief/inform the State Counselor.\(^66\) In the case of the August 2017 atrocities, Min Aung Hlaing deigned to directly inform the State Counselor, sending his deputies instead to request the government’s approval for martial law in Rakhine State. The negotiation failed and Aung San Suu Kyi only reportedly agreed to a kind of special authority to the deployed military troops and for a declaration of Penal Code 144 and a curfew. Some military sources said the military had to use maximum force in the Rakhine State operation because the government only approved the special authority in Rakhine State for two weeks (but later

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\(^63\) According to several interviews with senior officials working with both the USDP and the NLD governments.

\(^64\) Military source, personal communication, 2017.

\(^65\) According to the military’s 2008 constitution, the President has the authority to call a meeting with the commander-in-chief.

\(^66\) Civilian and military sources, personal communications, 2017.
the government expanded the period of the special military power).  

Another tension between Aung San Suu Kyi and the military leadership was over her close relationship with General Shwe Mann. Although Shwe Mann is called a “traitor” by the military leadership, Aung San Suu Kyi trusted him. As a candidate for the USDP, Shwe Mann was defeated in the 2015 elections to the NLD party candidate in his native town, Pyu. But shortly after the NLD came to office, Suu Kyi appointed Shwe Mann as chief of the Parliament’s Special Commission on Reviewing Laws. There was a rumor in Naypyidaw that Shwe Mann was a potential replacement for then-President Htin Kyaw if he resigned in 2017.

Apart from Min Aung Hlaing and according to Myanmar’s military protocols, the deputy commander-in-chief, Vice Senior General Soe Win, the joint chief of staff General Mya Tun Oo, and the BSO-3 chief Lieutenant General Aung Kyaw Zaw were the ranking commanders that oversaw the “clearance operations” in Northern Rakhine State from the War Office in Nay Pyi Taw. Another key officer at the War Office during the atrocities against the Rohingya in 2017 is Lieutenant General (then-Brigadier General) Kyaw Swar Lin, the general staff officer at the commander-in-chief’s office.

**Vice Senior General Soe Win**

General Soe Win graduated from DSA cohort 22 in 1980, starting at the military academy as a junior student when Min Aung Hlaing was a senior final year student. In his military career, as lieutenant colonel, he was tactical commander in the LID 88 that Than Shwe used to command in the early 1980s. He was posted as commander of the LID 99 in Meiktila, Mandalay Region, was

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69 Former staff of Aung San Suu Kyi, personal communications, 2017.
70 According to military documents seen by the author.
head of the officer training school in Bahtoo, Shan State and MOC-21 in Bahmo Township, Kachin State from 2004-2008.

The 2008/2009 time was when the Burmese military junta was pressuring all ethnic ceasefire groups to transform into Border Guard Forces (BGFs) under Tatmadaw command, which sparked new iterations of civil war, particularly along the Sino-Burmese border. All the large ethnic armed groups such as the United Wa State Army rejected the military junta’s pressure saying it was a plan to disarm them before a political solution was found in the country. Then-General Soe Win was promoted as the commander of the Northern RMC that confronts one of the biggest ethnic armed groups, the Kachin Independence Army.

Like Min Aung Hlaing and other junior generals, General Soe Win was promoted while older generals took off their uniform and prepared for the 2010 elections in the military shuffle in August 2010. Soe Win became chief of BSO-6 overseeing the capital Nay Pyi Taw and surrounding areas. In March 2011 he replaced General Maung Aye as deputy commander-in-chief. After the NLD took office in March 2016, Soe Win served as a key liaison between the State Counselor and the commander-in-chief until 2017.

**General Mya Tun Oo**

Currently the third-highest ranking general of the Tatmadaw, Mya Tun Oo is at least six years younger than Min Aung Hlaing. He graduated from cohort 25 of the DSA. He was general staff officer-1 of Military Affairs Security, the renamed Military Intelligence unit, after the removal of General Khin Nyunt and his intelligence officers in October 2004. Mya Tun Oo was at that time a key negotiator with the Karen National Union (KNU), the oldest ethnic rebel group in Myanmar. In February 2008, he was alleged to be a mastermind of the assassination of Pado

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71 Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, p. 213.
72 Wai Moe, 2009.
Mahn Sha Lan Pan, the then-general secretary of the KNU.\textsuperscript{74} Later after the incident, he was promoted to commander of the LID 101 in Pakokku Township, central Myanmar, then to a commandant of the DSA in August 2010.

In late 2010, he became commander of the new Central-Eastern RMC in Kolam, Southern Shan State. During the military junta era, he was called a “golden boy” by senior generals tipping him to become a potential general. In 2012, he was appointed to three posts within the military: chief of staff of the army, chief of Military Affairs Security and chief of BSO-6. In August 2016, he became the joint chief of staff of the army, navy, and air force.

**Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun**

General Moe Myint Tun was chief of staff-army when the Tatmadaw launched the “clearance operations” in western Myanmar in the summer of 2017. He was a key senior military officer in the commanding War Office, implementing the orders of the commander-in-chief and the deputy commander-in-chief.\textsuperscript{75} As a lieutenant general, he was chief of BSO-5 in early 2017 and was promoted to chief of staff-army in May 2017, just three months before the “clearance operations”,\textsuperscript{76} becoming the youngest ever chief of staff-army. Before that he was promoted to commander of the Nay Pyi Taw RMC in 2015.\textsuperscript{77} He graduated from intake 30 of the DSA and was favored by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, being promoted after Min Aung Hlaing became military chief in 2011, with military observers tipping Moe Myint Tun as his possible successor.

Moe Myint Tun worked as a Staff Officer role during the 1988-2011 military junta period rather than commanding battle-

\textsuperscript{74} Intelligence (April 2008), 2008.
\textsuperscript{75} Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{76} Moe Myint Tun, 2018.
\textsuperscript{77} အငယ်ဆ ိုေးတိိုင်ေးြ ေး စစ်ဦေးစီေးအ ာ  ိခ  ပ်မြစ်လာ၊ ၂၀၁၇။
fields. In this way, he became familiar with supreme commanders including former commander-in-chief General Than Shwe and the former deputy commander-in-chief, General Maung Aye, at the War Office. Like Min Aung Hlaing, Moe Myint Tun used to be personal staff officer to Maung Aye. After the Rohingya operations, he was promoted to lieutenant general and after the coup on February 1, 2021, Min Aung Hlaing made him chairman of the powerful Myanmar trade council, now named the “Working Committee on Ensuring the Swift Flow of Trade and Goods”.

**Lieutenant General Aung Kyaw Zaw**

In the overall military structure, as the head of BSO-3 covering Rakhine and Chin states, Ayeyarwady and Bago regions and some parts of Karen State, Lieutenant General Aung Kyaw Zaw most directly oversaw the “clearance operations” in Northern Rakhine State. As a lieutenant colonel ranking officer and the general staff officer-1 of the LID 77, Aung Kyaw Zaw was in Yangon Region during the crackdown on monks in September 2007 when dozens of protesters were believed to be killed by security forces. It seems it was a turning point for Aung Kyaw Zaw and other junior military officers as they were then noticed by senior generals and tipped for promotion.

After his post at LID 77, he was promoted to commander of the LID 33 in 2009. During his time at the LID 33, he achieved closer relations with General Min Aung Hlaing, especially as the LID 33 took part in the 2009 military offensive against the MNDAA in August 2009, described earlier. Aung Kyaw Zaw was promoted to commander of the Northeast RMC headquarters in

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78 Military source, personal communication, 2017. Min Aung Hlaing was the PSO to commander of Eastern RMC, General Maung Aye in Taunggyi, Shan State for two years. Moe Myint Tun was the PSO to deputy commander-in-chief General Maung Aye in 2005-2007.


Lashio Township, Northern Shan State in the August 2010 shuffle ahead of the election in November that year. During his time commanding the RMC, ceasefires broke down in northeast Myanmar and wars broke out along the Sino-Burmese border between the Tatmadaw and four armed groups representing the Kachin, Kokang, Ta’ang/Palaung and Rakhine ethnicities. There were reports of human rights violations in conflict zones\(^81\) and martial law was imposed in the region.\(^82\) This was his last legacy in the area before he was promoted to be one of the top generals. Alongside other regional military commanders, Lieutenant General Aung Kyaw Zaw was promoted to chief of BSO-3 overseeing areas including Rakhine State at the time.\(^83\)

### Lieutenant General Kyaw Swar Lin

During the “clearance operations” in 2017, Kyaw Swar Lin was the general staff officer (brigadier general)\(^84\) at the office of the commander-in-chief. The general staff officer has to communicate between the commander-in-chief/deputy commanders-in-chief and the commanders in the field.\(^85\) Shortly after the “clearance operations”, he was promoted to major general rank and commander of a key region, the Central RMC, headquartered in Mandalay, in 2018. He graduated from DSA intake 35 and is said to be one of the rising stars among younger generals aged in their late 40s. Two years after his regional commander promotion, he was upgraded again to a higher position,\(^86\) quartermaster general, and head of a military conglomerate, the Myanmar Economic Corporation Ltd.\(^87\) Therefore, he became one of two

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\(^{81}\) One year on, no justice, 2016.

\(^{82}\) Myanmar declares martial law, 2017.

\(^{83}\) Military reshuffle, 2015.

\(^{84}\) The general staff officer post at the War Office was upgraded from colonel to brigadier general rank in 1988 (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009, p. 73).

\(^{85}\) Maung Aung Myoe, 2009.

\(^{86}\) Htet Naing Zaw, 2020.

\(^{87}\) Myanmar Economic Corporation is another military-managed economic organization. It is perhaps the most secretive business organization of the Tatmadaw (Maung Aung Myoe, 2009).
generals who had significant promotions in a single decade along with General Moe Myint Tun.

Social Media and Hate Speech in the Rohingya Atrocities

Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg was called to give testimony at the United States Senate in April 2018 about issues that included the Tatmadaw’s hate speech and disinformation with genocidal purpose against the Rohingya people. The Tatmadaw has a long history of psychological and propaganda warfare in Myanmar, using psychological warfare in the 1950s to fight against insurgent groups, particularly the Communist Party of Burma, who were very good at counter-psychological warfare. The Tatmadaw’s first Directorate of Education and Psychological Warfare was formed in 1950 with assistance from the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency. The main purpose was to counter the strong communist movement in rural and urban populations and foster a better relationship between the army and the public. Senior General Than Shwe is an expert in psychological warfare and all officers of the Tatmadaw have to learn psychological warfare tactics. A tactic of psychological warfare is to mix 25 percent of ‘accurate’ information with 75 percent of ‘inaccurate’ information.

The internet has become a new platform and tool for psychological warfare. In the early days of the internet, Myanmar’s online media were not free, and the state agencies monitored citizens’ internet usage. Using the internet freely was an elite privilege until the political reform process from March 2011, when the internet opened for citizens. Likewise, the Burmese generals used to tightly control the media through the censorship board but decided to abolish censorship in September 2012. The government allowed two international telecom corporations, Qatar’s Ooredoo and Norway’s Telenor, into the country in 2013-2014.

88 Maung Aung Myo, 2009; Mozur, 2018.
89 Former Tatmadaw officials, personal communications, 2017.
90 Current and former Tatmadaw officials, personal communications, 2017.
For the Burmese ruling generals, there are two role model authoritarian states for understanding how to combat dissident movements online – Russia and the People’s Republic of China. Chinese authorities block social media networks and websites from western democracies such as Facebook and employ their own social media networks such as Weibo and WeChat. Russian authorities, instead of closing the internet, leave it open so the Kremlin can pursue its own agenda with many information technology technicians and psychological warfare experts hired. The Tatmadaw-backed government chose Russia’s model during its first step of liberalization.\(^{91}\)

Facebook was founded in 2004. It began to be popular among overseas Burmese, particularly from Singapore, the US and Russia around 2007-2008. Facebook rapidly became the most popular social media platform in Myanmar in September 2011.\(^{92}\) In response, the Tatmadaw leadership immediately decided to use Facebook more in 2011, with many troll accounts, pages and groups created since 2012,\(^{93}\) though military officials had been opening real and fake Facebook accounts since 2007. After mobile phone SIMs became more readily available in 2013-2014, Facebook only became more popular. The Tatmadaw commander-in-chief’s office opened Facebook pages for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the office of the commander-in-chief, and other official military accounts in 2013 in order to craft a positive public image for the general and to facilitate more interactive relations with the general public.\(^{94}\)

Before 2011/12, cyber warfare mostly consisted of online arguments between Aung San Suu Kyi’s supporters, particularly in exile, and Tatmadaw students in Russia. This changed after the by-elections in April 2012 when the NLD party won. Suddenly, there was an immediate rise in print and online hate speech

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\(^{91}\) Former Tatmadaw officials, personal communications, 2017.

\(^{92}\) Poetranto, 2012.

\(^{93}\) Officer in the Public Relations and Psychological Warfare Department, personal communication, August 2018.

\(^{94}\) Tayninga Institute of Strategic Studies officials, personal communication, 2017.
against Muslim/Rohingyas. According to my interviews with military sources, this hate speech is a central long-term strategy of the military and military-backed political parties such as the USDP. Because the Tatmadaw commander-in-chief appoints 25 percent of the seats in the Hluttaw under the 2008 military constitution, the pro-military party and alliances only have to win 26 percent of Hluttaw seats to form government. The Tatmadaw and pro-Tatmadaw parties were confronted by popular opposition and the widespread favorability of Aung San Suu Kyi. The Tatmadaw and pro-Tatmadaw parties found an alternative doctrine to counter this opposition in Burman Buddhist nationalism, which had already been propagated at military academies for decades and in propaganda books and other outputs.95

Case Studies

During my interview with sources, a former senior official of the USDP explained:

Shortly after the elections (in April 2012), the military and the USDP leadership met with the senior general (Than Shwe). We all were shocked by the result of the by-election and the senior general scolded us over the result. He instructed us to prepare for the next elections. In May, the USDP formed its Buddhism committee. The main purpose of the Tatmadaw’s psychological warfare on Facebook is to promote the Tatmadaw’s main doctrine of Burman Buddhist nationalism. It could promote hatred against Muslim minority in a conservative Buddhist country.96

Attempts at portraying Rohingya/Muslims as “alien” by calling them Bengali and portraying the NLD party as the pro-Muslim party began on Facebook. Muslims were shown as “rapists” and denouncements were made against “Muslim old men being forced to marry younger Buddhist women under instruction from

95 Unspecified personal communications.
96 USDP official, personal communication, 2017.
the mosque”. Former military officers such as General Shwe Mann, who works with Aung San Suu Kyi, was portrayed as a “traitor of the Tatmadaw,” implying former military officials like him were betraying the Burman race and Buddhist nationalism.

Many troll accounts of Myanmar celebrities were created and some anti-Muslim celebrities such as Shwe Eain Si and Nay Toe were involved in spreading hate speech against Rohingya on Facebook. Usually, troll accounts and other accounts such as fake celebrity accounts post normal news and stories most of the time but are sometimes activated to promote hate speech or attack opponents. Tatmadaw agents create these popular celebrity accounts, pages, and groups and grow them to at least 5,000 followers. Once an account, page or group becomes well-known, troll operations take it over. The troll accounts and pages are not always typical celebrities and can be named for soldiers, monks, government officers, artists and ordinary citizens. Example of Facebook pages and accounts are: Wirathu, Ye Moe, Maung Maung Aung, Hla Shwe, Nay Zin Latt, Ye Htut, and Zaw Htay. The current and former officials involved in cyber warfare operations on Facebook were fed the same propaganda at military academies. They studied and were brainwashed with anti-Muslim nationalism textbooks.

Hate speech and disinformation is systematic and institutionalized. We can even call it state-sponsored hate speech against a particular minority religious group. Four departments in the military play significant roles in the Tatmadaw’s psychological warfare on Facebook, which is known among the military leadership as “cyber warfare”, under the instruction of the commander-in-chief. They are the Directorate of Psychological Warfare and Public Relations, Military Affairs Security, the office of the chief of military training and the Directorate of Computers. In the military’s command structure, the top three men at the center of these efforts are commander-in-chief Min Aung Hliang,

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97 Former Tatmadaw officials who received psychological warfare training, personal communications, 2017.
98 Unspecified personal communications.
deputy commander-in-chief Vice Senior General Soe Win and joint chief of staff General Mya Tun Oo. Under them other key people are Lieutenant General Soe Htut, Lieutenant General Tun Tun Nyi, Lieutenant General Maung Maung Aye and Colonel Aung Khine Soe (as of January 2018). 99

The involvement of the military training department is noteworthy. There is a military think tank called the Office of Strategic Studies under the chief of military training. The think tank is one of the brains of the Tatmadaw’s psychological and cyber warfare on Facebook. At first, the Office of Strategic Studies was formed under the Directorate of Defense Service Intelligence in the 1990s, which was abolished in late 2004. In the late 2000s, it was established again under the chief of military training with generals who were designated as a “reserve force” after Military Intelligence was purged. 100

According to an official who worked at the psychological warfare department:

Coordination and teamwork are principles of cyber operations. For example, when the bodies of Mro ethnic villagers were found in the Mayu mountains, they coordinated the framing of the news and collectively designated the issue a threat to national sovereignty, race, religion and security and launched the ‘Save Myanmar, Save Rakhine’ campaign on Facebook. 101

Hundreds of soldiers have been reported to be working three shifts a day at military units in Nay Pyi Taw, Yangon and Pyin Oo Lwin. The operations are overseen by general staff officers. Approximately 3,000 soldiers have studied in Russia since the early 2000s. Making fake news, hate speech, and character assassinations were a part of the operation, and while staff coordinate with each other, they play different roles—the military intelligence collects information, then based on this information, they work

99 Former high ranking military officer, personal communication, September 2018.
100 Unspecified personal communications.
together to produce and spread hate speech and fake news on social media. During my interviews, a former official who has a wealth of knowledge about the issue said:

*There is up to an estimated 700 staff working for military propaganda on Facebook in Naypyidaw, Yangon and Pyin Oo Lwin ... They were overseen by a general staff officer-1 who is a colonel (also known as ‘Colonel GS-1’). In the operation structure, there are three general staff officers-1 at each department of the military. Hence about 12 general staff office-1 are involved in overseeing the operation.*

The author traveled in late February 2018 to Mrauk-U Township, Rakhine State and met Maung Kyaw Nyunt, a Rakhine village headman. He said he found on Facebook that the photos of a dispute between Rakhine Buddhists in his village were framed as Rohingyas attacking ethnic Rakhines in Maungdaw Township. He stated, “I know the photos are of the issue in my village. That is why I noticed the post was fake. But other (ethnic) Rakhines will believe it is real”.

Spreading misinformation and hate speech across multiple platforms is part of the Tatmadaw’s tactics. The way official pages, media pages and troll accounts portrayed the AA, the new and growing insurgent group in western Myanmar in early 2019, is an example. The AA was framed as having an “alliance” with ARSA. The proposition was first spread by troll accounts, pages, and groups on Facebook. Then the Myanmar Cable Network, founded and funded by the Ministry of Information, did a series of reporting and roundtable talks framing the AA as an ally of ARSA. Then, similar stories were published in other media outlets such as Eleven Media. An independent news outlet, *The Irrawaddy*, also reported the information. The media reports were followed by the State Counselor Office’s spokesman Zaw Htay’s

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102 Unspecified personal communication.
103 Village headman in Mrauk-U Township, personal communication, 2018.
104 MCN TV News Channel, 2019.
press conference and then a Tatmadaw press conference. This loose network of reporting and repeating fake news and disinformation is part of the reason why the campaign was successful in convincing some followers and bystanders.

The pattern of the anti-Rohingya, anti-democracy movement and pro-military trolls accounts and pages on Facebook in Myanmar is very similar to Russian tactics, although the Tatmadaw has reportedly sent students to four countries, Russia, China, India and North Korea, to study information technology. Burmese military students were reportedly in St. Petersburg where many Russian technology companies are based. A noticeable one is the Advanced Internet Agency which is on the US blacklist for making fake news. The Tatmadaw purchases technology from China, particularly from ZTE and Huawei. There was also a news report of Israel helping the Tatmadaw and Myanmar authorities in this regard, including with wartime communication equipment.107

When Facebook deleted several accounts associated with the Myanmar military, the military did not know it was an action by Facebook and first thought it was cyber-attack. The military suspended key generals’ trips on the day and held an emergency meeting. Troll accounts accused the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi of being behind the action. The Tatmadaw uses Telegram and Twitter, but Min Aung Hlaing’s official Twitter account was frozen in May 2019. The Tatmadaw created an account and page for Min Aung Hlaing on Vkontakte, often known as VK, a Russian social media website, but VK also banned his account. An official web page of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing was also created and remains active.108 In early 2018, a brigadier general level official at the War Office was sacked after he posted about a staff reshuffle in a Viber group and now all officials except the commander-in-chief and the deputy commander-in-chief are not allowed to use smartphones while on duty at the War Office.109

106 Gov’t Accuses AA, 2019.
109 Tatmadaw computer department official, personal interview, 2018.
Conclusion

The militarization and military crackdown against the Rohingya people in northern Rakhine State under the title of a “counter-terrorist” campaign remains a man-made humanitarian crisis. As of early 2018, both the government and the military of Myanmar are under escalating international pressure including at the United Nations Security Council. In response, the Myanmar government formed two commissions in October and December.¹¹⁰ A border guard police chief in Rakhine State, Police Brigadier General Thura Saw Lwin was replaced with Police Brigadier General Myint Toe from Mandalay in October after serving one year. The Rakhine State police chief reshuffle was not in response to atrocities but related to providing information directly to the civilian chief minister of the state, rather than to the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs.¹¹¹ The LID 99 which was mobilized in August 2017 was withdrawn from northern Rakhine State in late November that year.¹¹² Commander Major General Maung Maung Soe of the Western RMC was also moved on, but his removal from the commander post was unlikely due to a crisis within the military, and was more likely for failing to defeat the AA in Rakhine and Chin states in later months.¹¹³ U Zaw Htay, the then-State Counselor’s Office Director General who posted fake photos about the situation on government social media pages was moved on to be director general of the Union Peace Making Commission. However, until the time of writing, there has been no proper response to the atrocities and no real action taken on those responsible.

¹¹⁰ The Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State with government officials chaired by then-Minister of Social Welfare, Reliefs and Resettlement Dr Win Myat Aye and the new Advisory Commission on Rakhine State chaired by Dr Surakiart Sathirathai, former deputy prime minister of Thailand.
¹¹¹ Unspecified personal communications.
¹¹² Unspecified personal communications.
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Decolonizing History in ‘Myanmar’: Bringing Rohingya Back into their own History

Michael W. Charney

Abstract

This article makes two main arguments. First, it argues that due to the imperial roots of Area Studies the views of many contemporary states and many scholars on the Rohingya, Rakhine, and Myanmar have been shaped by colonial perspectives. Second, it argues that the Rohingya were erased historically from Rakhine by the British colonial state and this erasure has been reinforced by the country focus of US Area Studies during the Cold War and after. It concludes that societies in the global south may also have to decolonize how they construct and organize knowledge, and what their governments do with it in terms of policy, so they can escape the continual problems caused originally by the colonial administrative convenience.
Introduction

This article begins with two suggestions. First, if everyone who reads this article agrees with its conclusions or does not disagree with them, it will have failed. This article mainly wishes to raise questions in the reader’s mind about things that will be difficult for anyone who has grown up and been educated in the contemporary world to accept right away or ever, at least completely. The systems of knowledge in which histories are produced are systems we all live in and so they are reinforced every day by concepts and images everywhere we go.

Second, the author would also like to begin by suggesting, or admitting rather, that he is pretty clear about who the Rohingya are. Nevertheless, there are many people in Myanmar (and in the West) who say they have doubts about who they are and who they claim to have been. These views are held by many to be legitimate. But, would it seem legitimate to say that the author has doubts about terms like ‘Myanmar’, ‘Rakhine’, ‘Bamar Buddhism’? What if it were posed that these were hazy, poorly defined terms that raise more questions than they answer and create a huge spectrum of burdens of proof for their authenticity? Anyone in the field of ‘Myanmar Studies’ or ‘Burma Studies’ knows that these suggestions would be shocking and raise protest. This is curious, for the things that make ‘the Rohingya’ the Rohingya are no less established than those that make ‘the Rakhine’ the Rakhine (at least so far as we are not talking about people merely living in Rakhine State).
Is there, after all, a Myanmar, a word which has only existed in the English lexicon for twenty or so years; is there evidence that there was a Myanmar, the same as the country that claims the name today, in the historical past? There were political entities in the past that used that name, but it is not clear what their relationship with the military junta of the 1990s actually was, if there was a relationship at all. Rather, we know that the Myanmar military identifies the state they ruled from the mid-1990s (and partially even today) as ‘Myanmar’, but it is unclear what connection there is of any sort with the Myanmar (the kingdom or naingngan) that existed in the historical past. Moreover, we do not have any evidence that ‘Rakhine’ as the name of a district and the name applied by the contemporary state to one group of residents within that state is connected in any way to any population in the distant past. We assume a connection or are told there is a connection, but really that connection where it has been proffered is an artificial construction, the work of historians and politicians who seek to achieve gain from supporting a contemporary political identity.

This article’s approach to the present topic comes in the form of a confession or, rather, an admission that at one time the errors and misunderstandings to which the author is going to hold the field and scholars within it to account were at one time shared by the author. This is the result of the fact that the structure of the Western academy and, in particular, the emergence of Area Studies in the United States, conditions students to view the world of the present and, applying the same cookie cutter view retroactively, view the world of the past through the essentialized physical, ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural contours of how the United States views the world; if these students become professional academics, these perspectives are then institutionalized.
When the author wrote his dissertation on Rakhine in 1999 in the United States at the University of Michigan, the research and final product focused on the emergence of religious communalism in early modern Rakhine, up to the nineteenth century. While overtly emphasizing the historical emergence of Theravada Buddhist identity in Rakhine, to deal with one identity in its historical context required also dealing with the spread of Islam in Rakhine, and so a good part of the dissertation is cited today as much if not more for what it says on the history of Muslims in Rakhine than it does on Theravada Buddhists. The national approach to the problem shaped the limits of the study; this study was very much in line with how one learns to study about a part of Myanmar. After a literature review that mainly focused on studies of Myanmar, the author read all the pesa (Bamar palm-leaf manuscripts) he could find, went through the royal orders of Myanmar, examined traveler accounts and inscriptions, attempting to identify and use everything that referred to Rakhine. New chronicles no one seems to have touched since the 1910s were (re)discovered in the process. And the author began publishing articles on Rakhine history, the Portuguese in Rakhine, and the Mrauk-U in Rakhine, but always with an eye to how these stories fit into Myanmar history, as part of the periphery of Myanmar, rather than as a borderland sharing space with any other country. The author viewed Rakhine as part of Myanmar, treated Rakhine as part of Myanmar, and wrote about Rakhine as part of Myanmar. Any other view would be difficult (and discouraged or at least not encouraged), the author can say confidently in retrospect, from the perspectives

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1 Charney, 1999.
2 A good example is the Rakhine Min-ra-za-grì Arevè-daw sa-dàn (1775 [1784]) palm-leaf manuscript. This had been used first under the assumed title of Old Yakhaing Chronicle by Pe Maung Tin for his translation with G. H. Luce of the Pagan-era parts of The Glass Palace Chronicles of the Kings of Burma (1923), known in Bamar as the Hmannan Yazawindawgyi, and then not used again in major historiography until the present author’s dissertation (Charney, 1999).
3 Charney, 1998; Charney, 2002.
that were shaped by the existing historiography in Southeast Asian Studies at the time. Even the emergence of borderlands research in the decades after encouraged in an indirect way an emphasis on the importance of particular states in shaping life and history.⁴ Even then, it did not until recently begin questioning the validity of Area Studies regionalities.

In line with the kind of topic the author was looking at, religion, he opted not to focus on the emergence of ethnicity, but rather on the question of how religion spread and then how that became the Rakhine Buddhist communalism we see later. To avoid complications in phenomenon examined, rather than a political choice as might today be supposed from looking at the dissertation, he dealt with Islam’s spread in Rakhine rather than with the ethnic term Rohingya, aside from a few introductory references, so Muslims in early modern Rakhine were referred to as Muslims. Unconsciously, this dissertation was framed by paradigms that themselves were informed by colonial constructions of Rakhine and Myanmar. Unintentionally, this dissertation, like most literature produced on Rakhine during the period, has reinforced the constructions of knowledge of Rohingya used against them by the Myanmar state and ethno-communalists.

This brings the author to his first point: contemporary states are in alliance with earlier generations of scholarship and present scholarship that has been shaped by earlier Area Studies paradigms. Knowledge and its use has changed a lot in the hands of academics in the last thirty or so years, but not in the hands of most academics and not so much in the use of certain kinds of knowledge by states. This alliance is so strong because of the foundations of Area Studies in colonialism. Britain provided the template for many, many states that have emerged around what is now known as ‘the Global South’. The colonial administrators who went out to the colonies were charged with identifying what was and keeping an eye out for what something might be-

⁴ Baud & van Schendel, 1997.
come and either encouraging or discouraging one or another development. Colonies, unless sequentially lined up with other colonies of the same power, were supposed to maintain very close relations with the motherland and eye with suspicion forces from the outside and often times from other kindred colonies when politics became portable and transferable to related contexts. Indian laborers were welcome in British Burma, for example, but Indian sedition was not.

We might view the state role in encouraging, sponsoring, and writing historical narratives as a form of turning a particular kind of non-state space into a particular kind of state space. Eradicating local traditions of the past in favor of the royal chronicle or the colonial history (or the nationalist history in the post-independence period) was one tool for helping to level local obstructions for central administration, and anything that supported centrifugal rather than centripetal tendencies was one of the worst kinds of obstructions from the view of the royal court or the colonial secretariat. Successive states taught their constituents pasts that were embedded locally within political borders; the natural flows of people and ideas and culture that makes up the natural historical flow of human intercourse was broken and disengaged in these histories in a process Sujit Sivasundaram has called, in the case of Sri Lanka, ‘being islanded’.

Some people were indigenous or sons of the soil and some were not. Some minorities were naturally kin with the majority populations, like the Scots and Welsh were for the British, and others were indigenous to other lands, and these ideas became etched in mental stone. Historians, ethnographers, epigraphists, archaeologists, linguists and a great many other scholars were put to work for a variety of reasons and by different employers, but generally scholarship replicated in their mental imaginaries the political contours of colonial rule.

Just as colonial paradigms reflected the interests of metropolitan Europe, Postcolonial Area Studies emerged and was funded through the National Defense Education Act of 1958

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5 On state space, see Scott, 2009.
6 Sivasundaram, 2013.
(continued under Title VI of the US Code), to pursue the strategic interests of the United States during the Cold War and after. A taxonomy of the world was provided that identified regions and then slotted into these ‘areas’ individual countries. The slotting in was done in a scientific (i.e. Linnean) manner. This organization of regional and national knowledge about the world allowed scholars and others to quickly ‘know’ a country that might be a potential ally or a potential friend. The schema had a profound impact on how the foundational scholars of postcolonial non-western histories and anthropologies (and politics, etc.) would identify their case studies, frame or limit the spaces of analysis, apply for and receive grants to undertake research, and set up and teach their classes, so this way of approaching the world became self-producing.

As a Southeast Asianist, the author is conscious that he may be offering a historical narrative of the emergence of Area Studies that only explains how the area of ‘Southeast Asia’ evolved. There is evidence that different regions within Area Studies have had unique experiences and that each looks at the phenomenon of Area Studies differently. It may be that the artificiality of Area Studies is clearer in Southeast Asia than elsewhere because ‘Southeast Asia’ only emerged as a concept in World War II. Hence, unlike critiques of Area Studies in other areas, within Southeast Asian Studies, the Area Studies critique emphasizes the artificiality of the region as Cynthia Chou has argued. It might also be that because the final political boundaries of Southeast Asian colonial or colonial-era states and what are said to have become today nation-states were so arbitrary and late, that emphasizing national characteristics as meaningful seems especially misleading.

The United States’ approach to Area Studies as it was applied to Southeast Asia caught hold everywhere in what at the

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10 Chou, 2006.
time as called the ‘Free World’. Europe was in retreat in the early post-war decades, modern university education systems were recovering and still underfunded in post-war Asia, and, outside of the communist bloc(s), the wealth of the United States meant that at this critical point as the world was shifting from colonialism to the postcolonial world, the analytical template built on the interests of the United States dominated academic research through and about the world. The world had become, research-wise, how the United States viewed the world and this perspective, shaped by then current ideas about the American ‘melting pot’, a neglect of the contributions of ethnic minorities (which lagged behind the civil rights movement), an emphasis on a single ‘national’ language (English in practice), a single national identity (American), a single historical narrative about the emergence of the modern nation, and at a general level the commitment to the idea that there was a single national religion (however many subdivisions there might be, America was a Christian country, and anyone else was a tolerated minority).

II

This brings us to the author’s second point: the Rohingya were erased historically from Rakhine by the British colonial state for political reasons. British scholarship on the non-western world has had political utility for British power as long as there have been British scholars in the non-western world. But they served different projects in different periods. All of the grand accounts of Myanmar produced by British visitors between 1757 and 1857 were in fact the records of embassies sent by the East India Company to secure concessions or acquire intelligence that would be useful to the Company in its trade or for its security.

At one time, Rakhine was and might have remained a part of Bengal. The British East India Company had acquired Rakhine as a result of the Treaty of Yandabo in 1826, but they had done their research mainly on Myanmar. Rakhine had only been ruled for about ten years or so when Francis Buchanan visited Myanmar in 1795 (and Southeastern Bengal several years later) and
began thinking about Rakhine and other territories on Myanmar’s periphery as areas that the East India Company might move into and exploit, to use as potential allies against what they viewed as warlike Myanmar or to annex and rely upon as indirectly ruled buffer states.\textsuperscript{12} And Buchanan ran into Rohingya, recorded their ethnonym, and took down words from their language, and later published this information. Naturally, as the ONLY informant who wrote a substantial account of his visit to this area for the next few decades,\textsuperscript{13} general texts relied upon his authority and repeated this information. For all the British knew, they might eventually need to ally up with the Rohingya as well as with others in a future war with Myanmar.

British approaches to the area changed again because of the activities of Thomas Campbell Robertson in the 1820s and Sir Arthur Phayre in the 1840s.

Since the 1790s, large numbers of Rakhine, many of them Buddhists, had fled Bamar rule and had taken refuge in Cox’s Bazaar and other places. Robertson recognized that they would be a useful pool of manpower for impending war with the kingdom of Myanmar and organized them into the Mug Battalion.\textsuperscript{14} It is not necessary to go into details here, but in brief, the British won the war in 1826, annexed Rakhine under the terms of the Treaty of Yandabo (1826), and the Mug Battalion veterans and their families, many of whom had lived elsewhere in Bengal for decades, came to live in Rakhine and became the new indigenous elite in the colony beneath the small numbers of British officers. Incidentally, Robertson’s intelligence gathering on the Rakhine refugees when they still remained in British Bengal would include English précis made with the help of a Bengali interpreter of a manuscript history of the Buddhist Rakhine, given to him by a Rakhine Buddhist priest.\textsuperscript{15} This précis would then be enlarged and republished by Charles Paton in 1828. This included

\textsuperscript{12} Buchanan makes this clear (n.d.).
\textsuperscript{13} Buchanan, 1799.
\textsuperscript{14} Collis, 1923c.
\textsuperscript{15} Robertson, 1853.
many Islamic titles for the kings of the Mrauk-U Dynasty.\footnote{Paton, 1828.} What did not dawn upon Robertson or Paton was, first, why a Buddhist Rakhine monk would be motivated to share with the British his own historical view of Rakhine (and thus whose historical narrative he was competing with), and second, why a Buddhist monastic history of Rakhine of the time would not yet have found it desirable to expunge Islamic royal titles. These references would still be prominent in the précis made by his own Rakhine Buddhist interlocutor, discussed below, in later decades, but would not be relevant to the larger British agenda for constructing a history of Rakhine as part of the Myanmar they would gradually and incrementally annex.

In view of the possibility of future wars with Myanmar, the local Rakhine claim that the Rakhine were the forefathers of the Bamars and civilizationally superior to them inspired one of Rakhine’s administrators, Phayre, to ask a local Buddhist, Nga Mi, to provide him with a historical narrative on the basis of which Phayre could write a racial history of Rakhine and later of Myanmar.\footnote{Phayre, 1841; 1844. See also his extension of such views to Myanmar’s history generally in: Phayre, 1869; 1882; 1883.} This kind of collaboration between Buddhist Rakhine scholars and British scholars on writing Rakhine history became somewhat of a pattern. Maurice Collis and G.E. Harvey, would do the same thing, turning to another Buddhist Rakhine, San Shwe Bu, to instead provide a précis of Rakhine historical sources in Harvey’s case,\footnote{Harvey, 1925.} or to collaborate on numerous projects, providing English summaries of sources, in the case of Collis.\footnote{Collis, 1923a; Collis, 1923b; Collis & San Shwe Bu, 1925.} As a result, the British got what they needed, “a” history of Rakhine, but always through the intermediary screening of a Rakhine Buddhist scholar. Although we know that Muslims were recorded at many junctures in the pre-British past to have been the majority of the population of Rakhine, they thus begin under the British to be erased from the historical record and identified solely as immigrants into the region.
In the early 1850s, the British annexed Lower Myanmar (called by the British Pegu) and had grown increasingly confident that it would be more convenient to put Rakhine south of the Naf River together with Tenasserim and Lower Myanmar into a new province, the Province of British Burma in 1862. They did so on the basis of predominant Buddhism and Bamar language usage, on the one hand, and to leave northern Rakhine, north of the Naf River, which was predominantly Muslim and Bengali speaking within Eastern Bengal. Buddhist, Bamar-speakers north of that line were viewed as historical migrants beyond their homeland in the south. Muslims south of that line were viewed similarly as migrants out of their homeland north of the Naf River. Of course, British and later Bamar data-gatherers often noted that Muslims in certain areas of Rakhine had been there since the sixteenth century and that Rohingya was their local name.

Nevertheless, colonial data-gatherers were instructed not to bother with local detail and to follow the Indian register of ethnic names for people identified as non-indigenous. And as Indians had already been assigned to the subcontinent, they too could not also be indigenous to Myanmar. Through the colonial census, Muslim identities were fixed in stone as one of the language groups that made up the British racial imaginary of “Indians” and as belonging to the subcontinent. The Rohingya became Bengali and their dialect an offshoot of Bengali. They were then de-indigenized through the abusive violence of British officials and state documentation, in particular the colonial census. The results for the Rohingya have gradually gone from unfortunate to inconvenient to catastrophic (to the extent of possibly being existentially significant) under Bamar governance since 1948, but especially after 1962.

III

This brings the author to his third point: Myanmar’s tatmadaw-led governments since 1962 have ensured the continuity of the use of colonial forms of knowledge by the state to continue to
de-indigenize the Rohingya. For a brief period of about a decade from 1954, when the government was in the midst of a civil war and needed allies, it relaxed its stance on official British ethnic paradigms and began to recognize local populations for how they saw themselves. Government documents and speeches recognized that the Rohingya were in fact Rohingya. But things took a dramatically negative turn with the establishment of the Revolutionary Council government of General Ne Win from 1962, followed by a series of other military governments under various names and guises, whether the Burma Socialist Programme Party Government, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, the State Peace and Development Council, the Thein Sein government, or the nominally civilian government under the NLD and de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

The Rohingya once again became non-indigenous and foreign, they lost state recognition and citizenship. Military raids of the border in 1978 forced many into Bangladesh and the citizenship laws of 1982 formally announced that Indians like other groups who were considered to be foreign to Myanmar by the British in 1824, were considered to be so by the state under the Myanmar military as well. A population group had to be present in Myanmar by 1823 to be considered a native race. This is why it is so important for anti-Rohingya campaigners to deny certain interpretations of pre-1823 references to the Rohingyas or even simply to Muslims per se in Rakhine. The Rohingya became the subject of a campaign of genocide and after military attacks last autumn, most live without documents in refugee camps in Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{20}

Contemporary scholarship has sometimes confused the Taingyintha paradigm as Bamar inspired.\textsuperscript{21} Certainly, Bamar literati had nominal ideas about population groups formed on the basis of vicinity, political loyalty, religion, kith and kin, and other modes of group assignment.\textsuperscript{22} What scholarship has missed, however, is the essentially colonial roots of the

\textsuperscript{20} The author visited the largest of these camps at Cox’s Bazaar in July 2018.
\textsuperscript{21} Cheesman, 2017.
\textsuperscript{22} Charney, 2006.
Taingyintha paradigm and its emergence not from the flexible and fluid identities of the early modern era, but from the racialism and essentialism of the post-Enlightenment British colonial state. Ne Win’s “Burma” or “Myanmar,” like other “Burmas” or “Myanmars” since, poses itself as anti-colonial but in fact is a departure in its dependence on colonial governmentality from the intermediary Nu government.

Although anecdotally interesting to point out the great affinity that Myanmar’s post-Nu leaders have had for the British way of life and British friends, especially Ne Win and Aung San Suu Kyi, it is more sanguine to point to the continued use of colonial publications, laws, and gazetteers for everyday governance in Myanmar, even into the twenty-first century. Bamar governance, its patterns of rule, its attitudes, ethnic paradigms, and ways of viewing history have since 1962 represented a continuation rather than a discontinuation of the British colonial model. The closest that Myanmar has ever come to departing from that model was under Nu’s rule and his attempts to make Buddhism the state religion.

One solution may be to reconsider the ‘decolonize’ agenda and direct it at places like Myanmar where the state still uses colonial paradigms against the people within their borders. The merits of the decolonizing agenda cannot be overstated; it intends to undo the colonial biases that have worked against Black and Middle Eastern populations not only in employment and the authors that students read, but also to undo the very disciplines that organize our thinking at the university level. The great problem of this approach, however, is its limited perspective regarding the continuity of colonial perspectives. It is arguably the case that more people have been killed and more people have suffered globally from the implementation of Western methods of organizing people and identifying indigeneity and belongingness by non-western states, states that had inherited these tools from the colonial past than at the hands of the original European colonial motherlands. And it is the use of ideas organized around colonial-era thinking by these second-generation “colonial” states that is in desperate need of fundamental change. We need
to ask big questions—How, for example, do societies in the global south decolonize themselves and how they construct and organize knowledge, and what their governments do with it in terms of policy?

Until Myanmar finds an answer to these questions and a change in the way Bamars look at people within their society, problems similar to those we see today will continue. Regardless of what solution is found to the present crisis, Rakhine will continue to be subject to genocidal conditions and there will be further episodes of murder and flight. This goes beyond the need to abandon the citizenship laws and the Taingyintha paradigm; Myanmar needs to radically reinvent itself on a new basis, if it is to end its continued problems not just with the Rohingya, but with all of its ethnic minorities.

Conclusion

The next chapter of the state history of Rakhine is being written right now. There will not be a new history of Rakhine per se, however, one that changes the narrative and the antagonist only if Myanmar and its study can finally be decolonized. Rakhine history from start to present will have to be re-written from scratch, giving as equal a voice to the Rohingya as that given to Rakhine Buddhists. This should not result in a collage-like ethnic narrative but rather an account of how a religiously and diverse ethnic kingdom that did not view the Muslim aspects of the early modern Mrauk-U Court as artificial only. It should also be a history that directs more attention to what Muslim settlements were doing along the Kaladan River between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries where the Buddhist annals have ignored them. Moreover, this new start to Rakhine history needs to come to grips with the three-fold colonization of Rakhine by the Bamars, the British, and Tatmadaw-led governments since 1962. The more important chapters should be focused on the disastrous endpoint of the present and explain to current generations how divisive governing paradigms were applied to Rakhine history, society, and identities that ultimately
turned Rohingya and Rakhine against each other. It should explain how this application made the Rohingya invisible to state registers. Further—and this will require rewriting some of the general histories of Myanmar—we need to better understand the phenomenon in which colonial governmentality passed through the first decade of independence and then resurfaced under military leadership and subjected the Rakhine and Rohingya to forms of subjectivity in the case of the Rakhine and exclusion in the case of the Rohingya. This will certainly counter the argument made by historian of Myanmar Michael Aung-Thwin that 1962, not 1948, marks the true end of colonial rule.23 In a sense, the colonial manner of ruling has not ended, it has restrengthened after the hiatus of 1948-1962.

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Religious Inclusion in the not-too-far Past, as Understood by Mahāgandhārum Sayadaw

Abstract

Many of the sermons by Buddhist monks in Burma today, if not all, include discourses which could be regarded as textbook examples of hate speech and hate mongering. Prominent scholar monks like Sitagu Sayadaw talk about justification of violence in the name of religion using the Sinhalese mythical history of King Dutthagāmani. Buddhist monks, being culturally and religiously influential and authoritative in a “law-of-status” society like Myanmar, means laypeople’s understanding of religious inclusion and tolerance could become very narrow. Was this always the case in modern Burma/Myanmar? In fact, Myanmar had an inclusive historical past, be it religiously or culturally; a time when people of different faiths could live a socially harmonious life with high religious tolerance. This article analyzes and discusses several discourses by one of the most eminent scholar monks of modern Burma, Janakābhivamsa (21 Feb 1900 - 27 Dec 1977), famously known as Mahāgandhārum Sayadaw. This article argues that in spite of being a strong nationalist monk, Janakābhivamsa’s quintessentially Buddhist sermons use the cosmic and moral understanding of Buddhism and prophecies about the future-Buddha to be inclusive of people of other faiths and teach a form of religious inclusion and tolerance.
ကကားသည်ပညာတတ်ဘိုန်းရတာကကီးြားသည်ပင်လျှင် ဘာသာအယူဝါဒကိုအရကကာင်ေးမပကာ အကကြ်ေးြက်ြှုကိုခွင့််မပသည့်စကားာေးအာေးဟာဝသကြေးြလာ၊ သီဟိုဠ်ဒိုဋ္ဌဂါြင်ေးအရကကာင်ေးပိုဒဏ္ဍာမြစ်သည်ပိုဒဏ္ဍာီစကားကိုဥပြာရပေးကာရဟာရမပာခဲ့ပါသည်။

(အိန်အဝါကကီးြာေး၏နှုတ်ွက်စကားာေး ဥပရဒကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ကကီးစိိုေးသည့်)မြန်ြာမပည်တွင် ိုေးဓရလ့်အာေးမြင့််သာြက၊ ဘာသာရေးအပါဩbaruအိန်အဝါကကီးြာေးသည်မြစ်ာဒကာ၊ ပါဝင်ြှုနင့်သည်ေးခြှုသည်အလွန်ပင်ကဉ်ေးရမြာင်ေးလာြဟာပျေလ်ပါရတာ့်သည်။

မြန်ြာနိိုင်ငတွင် ိုေးဓရလ့်အာေးမြင့်မြစ်ရစ၊ ဘာသာယိုကကည်ကွယ်ြှုအမြစ်ရစအကပါဝင်နိိုင်ြှုိရသာအတိတ်သြိိုင်ေးြာေးဟုသည်ပါသည်။

ယခိုစာတြ်ေးတွင်ဟာဂနဓောရိုဆာရတာ်ဟိုင်ဟန်ေးပိုဂ္ိတပါေးမြစ်ရတာြဟာဂနဓောရ ိုဆာရတာ်အင်နကာဘိဝသ (၂၁ရြရြာ်ဝီ၁၉၀၀-၂၇ဒီင်ဘာ၁၉၇၇)ရဟာကကာေးရတာြခဲ့သည့် တာေးရတာြအခိွဲ့ကိိုသိုေးသပ်ရဆွေးရနွေးတင်မပါသည်။

ယခိုစာတြ်ေး၏ဆိိုလိိုင်ေးြာေးသာေးရေးစိတ်ဓာတ်က်သန်သည့်ဘိုန်ေးရတာြကကီးတစ်ပါေးမြစ်လင့််ကစာေးဟာဂနဓောရစာရတာြ၏ဗိုဒဓဝါဒအတွင်ေးြရသွြီသည့်တာေးရတာြာေးသည် ဗိုဒဓဝါဒ၏ရလာကတည်ပို၊ကိိုယ်ကင့်သီလဆိိုင်ာအယူအဆြာေးနင့်)
Introduction

As democratic transitions in Myanmar brought a certain degree of civil and political freedom, space for civil society, and freedom of expression,¹ a lot of sermons and discourses by monks were rife with what could be regarded as textbook examples of hate speech and hate mongering.² With the rise of the nationalist ‘Mabatha’ movement in 2012, which was, in fact, a network of existing groups,³ the discourses and sermons of many monks are, to say the least, ‘not inclusive’. One of the characteristics of these discourses has been how Muslims, the target of criticisms, can be a danger to the existence and propagation of Buddha sāsana, an integral theme being used as a motive for major social and political movements in Myanmar since colonial times.⁴ At one point, Wirathu of Mandalay Masoyein monastery said Muslims were ‘ungrateful dogs’, implying the moral obligations Muslims have to Buddhists as they are supposedly guests and not indigenous to Myanmar. With the outbreak of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacks and subsequent clearance operations which reportedly targeted Muslims in Rakhine State, prominent scholar monks like Sitagu Sayadaw even talked about the justification of violence in the name of religion, using the mythical Sinhalese history of King Dutthagāmani. Buddhist

¹ Holliday, 2013.
² For reproductions and more information, see Fuller, 2013; Freeman, 2017; Goldberg, 2017; Lawi Weng, 2014; Mratt Kyaw Thu, 2017; Htet Min Lwin, 2016.
³ Htet Min Lwin, 2016.
⁴ Turner, 2014.
monks being culturally and religiously influential and authorita-
tive in a ‘law-of-status’ society like Myanmar, the laypeople’s
understanding of religious inclusion and tolerance has become
very narrow. Even state officials like the Union Minister for re-
ligious and cultural affairs publicly said hateful messages that
Muslims would take over the country.

This article concerns the question of religious inclusion or
exclusion in the recent past in Myanmar. In the history of My-
anmar, during the times of the kings, people of different faiths
from Islam and Christianity served important roles at the Bur-
mese court. It was not that Burma/Myanmar always had crude
racial and religious tensions among ethnic and faith communi-
ties. Very often, there were peaceful periods concerning differ-
ent faiths. These became significant only during the colonial pe-
riod due to the demographic changes caused by labor migration
from the Indian subcontinent, the racial and religious tensions
among communities were increased, resulting in riots. Taking
religion as a discursive category, i.e., what is regarded as a reli-
gion at a point of time depends on the interpretative discourses
of that time, this article conjectures that there were perhaps in-
clusive elements in religious discourses of the past that have en-
abled majority Buddhists to live in religious and social harmony
with people of other faiths. In other words, whether we take the
hateful speeches and sermons of the Mabatha monks as triggers
(causations/explanatory variables) or manifestations (re-
results/response variable) for recent rises of racial and religious
tensions, or both are at the same time-dependent and independ-
ent variables, this article takes the position that there might be
inclusive elements in the discourses in the past for those peace-
ful days. By analyzing several discourses and related writings by
Janakābhivamsa, one of the most eminent scholar monks of
modern Burma, famously known as Mahāgandhārum Sayadaw,
this article argues that despite being a strong nationalist monk,

5 Maung Maung Gyi, 1983.
6 Coconuts Yangon, 2018.
Janakābhivamsa’s quintessential Buddhist sermons use the cosmological and moral understanding of Buddhism and prophecies about the future-Buddha, and thus preach a framework to be inclusive of people of other faiths and teach a form of religious inclusion and tolerance.

Why We Need to Discuss the Discourses

Much has been wondered and written about how a religion such as Buddhism can be used to justify violence. In other words, how Buddhism has been betrayed and how things that are perceived to be not religious or that cannot be associated with religion can be said and done in the name of religions. Abeysekara argues that this confusion arises from a failure to understand the discursive nature of religion. In his sociological conceptualization, religion is, in fact, a discursive category, i.e., what is regarded/accepted as a religion at a period is actually the product of authoritative discourses. These discourses are produced, reproduced, modified, and shifted by people or institutions with religious influence. He argues religion should be understood as “historical concepts whose meanings shift, that is, the ways in which specific persons and practices are authorized, enabled, and indeed obliged to come into (central) view and fade from view, to appear and disappear, to become centered and decentered as Buddhism and non-Buddhism, religion and violence”.

Thus, it is a matter of competing discourses that have to respond to one another by modifying, shifting, and remaking or losing. Once discourses become authoritative, they form the mainstream understanding of religion.

This dynamic view of religion refutes the essentialist idea of religion as always peaceful, good, and non-violent. At the same time, it focuses on discourses as social realities rather than arguing over the doctrinal aspect(s) of Buddhism. This dynamic

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11 Ibid., p. 5.
view allows us to understand the fluidity of religion and appreciate the importance of discourses on religion in the public sphere. It sheds light on the important role of authoritative discourses which persist as the current interpretation/explanation of religion as such in the society vis-à-vis counter-discourses which debate, challenge, justify, and falsify those authoritative discourses. Hence, it paves the way to understanding the passage of periods of religion as different understandings over time. Looking at how discourses shift, we can observe the interdependent nature of discourses and society—how society impacts discourses and how discourses can have an impact on society. However, discourses take the lead as religious authority. This leads us to the important question: if ‘exclusive’ discourse can be framed within Buddhism, can ‘inclusive’ be framed within Buddhism as well in Burma/Myanmar?

There is one more reason why Buddhist discourses are an important category to examine for this article. Walton and Hayward have suggested counter-discourses/counter-narratives against the Mabatha in their study. Their work researches Buddhist scriptural teachings and provides tentative suggestions on the idea of four Brahma viharas and how Buddhism can be inclusive. They argue that primarily due to monks’ general nature of reluctance to criticize fellow monks, especially senior ones, there is a lack of quick response to construct a counter-narrative within Theravada Buddhism. From the perspectives of the scriptures, they thus provide or construct a narrative within the eight-fold noble path, point out the need to test claims, and present the attitude of Asoka (among other suggestions) as possible counter-frames against the Mabatha movement (Walton and Hayward 2014). A significant gap is that unless what is in scriptures gets to the discourse level, it is hard to identify them as social realities: they remain in the books, not in the world of the day-to-day practice of Buddhists.

In other words, academics suggesting something to Buddhists is naturally very different from sermons by authoritative

12 Walton & Hayward, 2014.
leaders of the religion. Discourses delivered by monks are very powerful due to the unique nature of the delivery. Regarding the powerful nature of discourses, Walton and Jerryson (2016) suggested the cultural authority of the Buddhist monks gives them the moral right to legitimize their claims, use them to define the religion, and determine what the Buddha means through sermons.13 As sermons can have different interpretations and thus different meanings—how they are put in the context for the laypersons, the cosmological understanding of what is happening, and what will happen, these different interpretations and levels of their authority have a significant impact on what is religion at a certain point of time, in other words, the prevailing discourse or the correct discourse(s). The very exercise of preaching sermons serves this purpose—the way monks recite the Ga-thas (Pali verses), the way they interact with the audience in an authoritative way, and the lack of critical reflection are all the more reasons how discourses can have a tremendous amount of influence on the audience.14

A thorough look at the discourses by the extreme nationalist Mabatha monks will reveal that they frame their extreme nationalist sermons within the Buddhist framework.15 In other words, they have to assure the audience that what they have been preaching is in accord with the Buddha’s teaching. This is what is different from the case in Sri Lanka, where Sri Lankan monks blatantly said the violence was not Buddhist but you had to put down Buddhist morality and ethics when the religion was in danger.16 In contrast, monks in Myanmar still maintain the Theravada tradition; they still have to legitimize their frames anyway to be in accord with the Buddha’s teaching. However, this does not necessarily mean that they are more Buddhist than the monks of Sri Lanka. Maybe they have to make it clear to the audience what they are teaching is in accord with Buddhism because otherwise, the audience might not believe and support the

sermons. This has even got to the stage where Sitagu, the former vice-chair of the now renamed Mabatha movement, referred to Ven. Janakābhivamsa (whose discourses this article discusses) in one of his sermons to the military, and legitimized his teachings as in accord with the teachings of the senior Sayadaws within the tradition. This is advancing the master frame which used to be that “to protect race and religion is in accord with the Buddha’s teachings” to a level where it also frames that to protect race and religion is in accord with the Theravada tradition and respected senior monks within the Burmese order. This is another reason to dig up the inclusive discourses of the past to counter such claims and to reclaim the way discourses have been framed and consequently resulted in narrow-minded and ruthlessly racist accounts.

To this end, this article explores the nature of inclusive discourses by one of the most preeminent scholar monks of the Buddhist clergy, Ven. Janakābhivamsa (Mahāgandhārum Sayadaw) of Amarapura. I also intend that if people understand that there used to exist this kind of inclusive interpretation, they will be able to reflect on the current hateful messages and be able to live in social and religious harmony. As the discourses are by Janakābhivamsa, a highly revered authority on Buddhism in Myanmar, and are quintessentially Buddhist, it will be easy for Buddhists to accept more than the multicultural discourses of the west and liberal democracy. What I am trying to explain here is an organic discourse(s) by Buddhist monks about religious inclusion. This is neither a suggestion nor explicitly mentioned in the scriptures, but what was said and argued at the discourse level.

**Mahāgandhārum as Nationalist**

It is essential to understand that being a strong nationalist monk does not necessarily translate to being racist, xenophobic, and intolerant to other faiths and cultures. This section tries to show

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17 Htet Min Lwin, 2018.
how Mahāgandhārum Sayadaw was a strong nationalist and yet this did not prevent him from being a tolerant and inclusive person. Looking at Mahāgandhārum’s writings and others’ opinions of him,\(^{18}\) it is clear that he was a strong nationalist and reformist of the sāsana. His reformist ideas are quite similar to the 1902 State Sangha act and the preceding reformist ideas by King Mongut and Wachirayan in Thailand, another Theravada Buddhist country.\(^{19}\) Mahāgandhārum writes, “the reform of the sāsana should aim for the case that boys and girls of Buddhist faith can work for the benefits of race, religion, and sāsana and also be able to get Nirvana in the next life”.\(^{20}\) He has been praised as ‘unique’\(^{21}\) for his love of “race, religion and sāsana” as he wants his religion and sāsana to be perfect, and he desires that due to the sāsana and Buddhism the country and people will get a better life, a better socioeconomic situation.\(^{22}\) Thanwaralinkara, a strong, vocal critic against activities of the Mabatha movement, in his preface for the compilation of excerpts from Janakābhivamsa’s writings, further claims that out of the three most preeminent Sayadaws of his age, namely Mahāgandhārum, Mahāsi, and Mingun, Mahāgandhārum is the most outstanding for his love of country, race, and religion, as is evident in Mahāgandhārum’s prolific writings which are almost always centered on these themes. In his foreword to အနောဂတ်သာသနောရ ေး, he writes that it is pressing for Sayas (here Sayadaws) and lay persons to support and thus make the sāsana prosper as the country had gained independence.\(^{23}\) In his sermon to the military in 1950s, he writes “the country should be able to rely on the military and the sāsana”.\(^{24}\) Moreover, he

\(^{18}\) See နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်၊ ၂၀၀၀ က၊ ၂၀၀၃ သော်လကဂာ ኢ၊ အင်,

\(^{19}\) See Tiyavanich (1997) for comparison.

\(^{20}\) နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်၊ ၂၀၀၀ ။ ၂၀၁၇ ၊ ၆၂၅ ၊ ၂၀၀၃ ၊ ၁၊ ၃၅၂။

\(^{21}\) သူြတူ။

\(^{22}\) See နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်၊ ၂၀၀၃။

\(^{23}\) See နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်၊ ၂၀၀၀ ။ ၂၀၁၇ ၊ ၆၂၅ ၊ ၂၀၀၃ ၊ ၁၊ ၃၅၂။

\(^{24}\) စစ်တပ်နင့်သီသနီသည် နိိုင်ငရတာ်၏ အာေး ာေး ာမြစ် ိိုက်ရကကာင်ေး။
sees the propagation of the Buddha’s sāsana as a unifying force and talks on how in the birth stories of the lives of the future-Buddha, he sacrificed for the race. Yet the difference between Mahāgandhārum and today’s extreme nationalist monks of the Mabatha movement (or those similar to them) is that the former had a multicultural mindset whereas the latter have a monocultural mindset, being called ‘racists’ and hatemongers.

**Mahāgandhārum’s Writings**

The following discusses how Mahāgandhārum became a person with a multicultural mindset and how he frames inclusive discourses within an understanding of Buddhism.

**Buddhānussati With Elements of Religious Inclusion**

Buddhānussati (recollection of the Buddha) is a kind of meditation practice that has its focus on awareness (annusati) or recollection on the exalted qualities of the Buddha. This has been a traditional practice in Myanmar as it is in other Buddhist countries, especially those with a Theravada tradition. The Buddha himself talks about it in Anguttara Nikaya, Mahanama suttas 1 and 2 where he emphasizes that for those who recollect the noble qualities of the Tathāgata, his mind will not be obsessed “by lust, hatred, or delusion” and will be “simply straight, based on the Tathāgata” and thus connected with the Dhamma. This disciple should be called ‘a noble disciple who dwells in balance amid an unbalanced population, who dwells unafflicted amid an afflicted population. As one who has entered the stream of the Dhamma, he develops the recollection of the Buddha’.

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25 [Htet Min Lwin](https://example.com), 2018.
26 [Htet Min Lwin](https://example.com), 2018.
27 As outlined in [Htet Min Lwin](https://example.com), 2018.
28 [Bhikkhu Bodhi](https://example.com), 2012b.
29 Ibid., pp. 1564–65, 1569.
meditation practice has a significant place in the Theravada tradition as one of the four protective meditation techniques for it prevents the practitioner from “listlessness and dissatisfaction”\(^\text{30}\).

Mahāgandhārum being an exceptionally devout Buddhist and coming from a tradition of meditators of buddhānussati,\(^\text{31}\) he particularly emphasizes this particular type of meditation practice and writes/preaches extensively about buddhānussati; he wrote one dedicated book and several others with a significant emphasis on it. In the book entitled Buddhānussati, he incorporates elements of religious inclusion as he writes:

for someone who practices well and regularly the buddhānussati bhāvana, s/he starts to admire the Buddha so much that she also begins to admire his lives even before he becomes the Buddha in his final life. Moreover, the person forms an admiration for people who are like the Buddha-to-be, doing good for the benefit of many, not differentiating depending on any sect, or if s/he is a monk/recluse. If that person is a layperson, she can still admire his/her deeds without any differentiation on race and religion. Thus, I, as a thorough practitioner of the buddhānussati bhāvana, can form a deep admiration of Jesus Christ as he has taught compassionate love, sympathetic joy, truth, and tolerance, among others. So, I have excellent relations with the disciples of Jesus Christ.\(^\text{32}\)

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\(^{30}\) Bhikkhu Bodhi, 2012a.

\(^{31}\) Note that his mentor upajjhāya, the first Mahāgandhārum Sayadaw of the Sagaing Hills, also strongly emphasized this practice of the recollection of the Buddha (နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်၊ ၂၀၀၀၊ ၁၃၇)।

\(^{32}\) In Burmese: “ဗိုဒဓါနိုဿတိဘာဝနောကိိုေးရကာင်ေးစွာပွာေးြ ာေးရသာ ပိုဂ္ိ လ်သည်် ဗိုဒဓမြတ်စွာကိို ပါ ြီမြည့််စဉ်ကစ၍ ကကည်ညိ လ ရသာရကကာင့်် ဗိုဒဓမြတ်စွာ၏ နိုစဉ်အခါကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ပ ဟိတရဆာင်ရနရသာ ပိုဂ္ိ လ်ြ ာေးကိို မြင်ကကာေး ရသာအခါဟန်ေးသ ဃာမြစ်လျှင် ဂိိုဏ်ေးဂဏြရ ွေးဘဲ ရလေးစာေးရသာစိတ်မြစ်နိိုင်၏ လူဝတ် ရကကာင်မြစ်လျှင်လည်ေး အြ ိ ေးဘာသာြရ ွေး ပိုဂ္ိ လ်ြရ ွေးဘဲ ရလေးစာေးကကည်ညိ နိိုင်
This can also be related to another concept formulated by Sayadaw in his eminent treatise on the reform of Buddha sāsana (အနောဂတ်သာသနောရ ေး) where he writes:

It is scarce in the world that those people who act (exceptionally) for the good of the community, region, or country without any selfishness or self-regard, based on goodwill and good motivation. If ever there emerges one like that, s/he must surely be one of the future to-be(s), either the Buddha-to-be (bodhisattva) or agga-sāvaka-to-be, mahā-sāvaka-to-be or pakati-sāvaka-to-be or paccekabuddha-to-be.33

Thus, connecting these two concepts in comparable context, it can be inferred with certain confidence that the Sayadaw might see Jesus as one of those future ‘someones’34 as will be shown in the following discussion. Here, it is fair to conclude that for the Sayadaw, people of other faiths who are doing meritorious deeds

33 In Burmese: “ရလာက၌ စိတ် င်ေး ရစတနော င်ေးရကာင်ေးန င့်် ပ်က ိ ေး ွာက ိ ေး နယ်က ိ ေး တိိုင်ေးမပည်က ိ ေးကိို ရဆာင် ွက်သူတိိုှံ့ကာေး အလွန်  ာေး၏၊ တစ်ရယာက်တရလ ရပေါ်လာလျှင်  ိိုသူသည် (ဗိုဒဓအရလာင်ေးရတာ် လာေး၊ အဂ္သာဝက နာဟာသာဝကန င့်် ပကတိသာဝကအရလာင်ေးရတာ်လာေး၊ ပရစစ ကဗိုဒဓါအရလာင်ေးရတာ်လာေး) တစ်ပါေးပါေး၏ အရလာ င်ေးအလ ာရတာ့် ဧကန် မြစ်ပါလိြ့်် ြည်၊...” (ဗိုဒဓသင်တန်း်ကား အခြား၊ ၂၀၀၃၊ ၁၂၁)။

34 This is in turn proved by one of his writings where he mentions Jesus as a disciple of the Tibetan tradition of Buddhism (ဗိုဒဓသင်တန်း် အခြား ၁၀၀၀၇၊ ၁၈၁–၁၉၇၊)။
are indeed the to-be of people who will get enlightenment in the future. This is how the Sayadaw can transcend beyond race and religion and be inclusive.

**The Decline of Buddhism and People of Other Faiths**

A persistent discourse in Myanmar since the colonial era has been anxiety regarding the incursion of ‘modern’ or ‘western’ values and how these might affect the sāsana.\(^{35}\) Mahāgandhārum also writes extensively about how modernity has a considerable impact on Buddha’s sāsana. His ideas on how to overcome these hurdles, however, are very different from today’s discourses. One of the tenets of exclusive discourses today is if people of other religions are enemies of the Buddha sāsana. For the Sayadaw, the decline of Buddhism will always be from ‘within,’ never from outside.\(^{36}\) He sees the decrease in the number of students (lay students) in the monastery as the very basis for the decline of future sāsana. Certainly, he does not think the decline will be due to people of other faiths. If people of other faiths are doing their job very well, indeed their religion would and should prosper. He writes in the book “ဘာသာရသွေး” (*The Blood/Spirit of the Religion*):

Prepared this book makes me think about people of other faiths. They have very high regard for their religion. Monks and nuns of other religions are content with ordinary meals and modest clothing and yet work hard for the propagation of their religions. Thus, their religions prosper and propagate more. ...we should be sad that now people have low regard for Buddhism. Thus, we should reform the religion with *badha-thwe* as a fundamental basis.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{35}\) As discussed by Turner, 2014; Walton and Hayward, 2014, p. 46.

\(^{36}\) Mahasi also talks about this.

\(^{37}\) နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်းင်၊ ၁၉၉၂ ။ ိိုသိိုးစီစဉ်ရသာအခါ ဘာသာမခာေးတိိုးကို သွာေး၍ သတိ ပါသည်၊ အမခာေးတိိုင်းသာေးအမခာေးဘာသာဝင်ြာေးသည် သူတိိုး၏ ဘာသာကိို
Again, for him the spirit of religion means belief in Buddhism, efforts for dāna (donation), sila (morality) and bhāvana (the practice of good quality of mind), efforts to honor the religion, critical positive thinking of things related to Buddhism, and a high regard and readiness to defend the religion. He also writes:

I try to observe the ways how nuns of other faiths live. They teach children. They seem to-be proficient in vocational things such as tailoring. Those who know medicine treat people. According to my knowledge, the way these senior nuns treat people is with great mettā (loving-kindness) and karunā (sympathy). Some even treat people with leprosy. Due to their mettā, karunā, people naturally have high regard and respect for them. They rely a lot upon them. The mettā and karunā also reflect/respond to them. Thus, they are bound to-be prosperous. Thus, the convent in Mandalay is full/crowded with people who would like to learn from them.
He also praises in another book how Christians are organized and disciplined.\textsuperscript{40}

I must admit here that people of other faiths that Mahāgandhārum is mentioning are mostly Christians, and there is research suggesting why they have better socialization than Muslims in Myanmar.\textsuperscript{41} Notwithstanding that fact, what I am trying to present here is, in essence, the way Mahāgandhārum frames the concept of inclusivity “within” quintessential Buddhism. In other words, how Buddhist understanding of the universe and the cosmos can also be inclusive in comparison to the current liberal discourse of multiculturalism, democracy, and human rights.\textsuperscript{42}

**Mahāgandhārum’s Experiences with People of Other Faiths**

One of the reasons why Mahāgandhārum teaches inclusive elements/discourses and his inclusive Buddhist outlook may be due to the socialization he had with people of other faiths since his young days. When he was living in Yangon, he was praised for his evening chantings of Buddhist sermons by people of other faiths, and he proudly mentions this in his book.\textsuperscript{43} His encounters with U Pe Maung Tin, a Pali professor and later rector of

\textsuperscript{40}  \textit{Seen here: နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင် ၂၀၀၀ ၁၈၀၄}  
\textsuperscript{41}  Kyaw Yin Hlaing, 2013.
\textsuperscript{42}  I am not saying the current discourse/NGO movement for inclusion and multiculturalism is of no use.
\textsuperscript{43}  \textit{ကြည့်အတွက် အချင်ပြည် ၂၀၀၀၃}
University of Rangoon, resulted in mutual respect and profound admiration on each other. U Pe Maung Tin, a Christian by faith, had the translation of Visudhi Megga as his magnum opus, and it was claimed that U Pe Maung Tin happened to listen to Mahāgandhārum’s discourse on the first sermon and Anatalakana sutta and was incredibly impressed (တားဓြမစကကာ).

That was the reason U Pe Maung Tin came to see Mahāgandhārum for several long and engaging discussions on the Buddhist notion of non-self and the two became very close. By U Pe Maung Tin’s recommendation, an archbishop visited Mahāgandhārum, was profoundly impressed by the Sayadaw and said later he got a lot of satisfaction and joy out of the respect and attention the Mahāgandhārum provided. Another encounter with a Buddhist abbot from Korea was also one of the noted encounters. An encounter with a Hindu sadhu made the sadhu comment at a press conference how it was pleasant to meet with Janakābhivamsa.44

One thing to consider is that monks of the younger generations and today’s generation also have these kinds of encounters, if not more often, than what Mahāgandhārum experienced. But those who have extensive experience meeting with people of other faiths, and travel extensively cannot or do not incorporate the inclusive ideas (look at Sitagu, for example). For Mahāgandhārum, he had never traveled outside his country and yet showed his broad-mindedness based on Buddhist teachings. Perhaps it is his inclusive understanding of Buddhism which enabled him to become a person with a multicultural mindset.

Discourses of the Sayadaw

The Idea/Concept of “Past Kamma”

For Mahāgandhārum, the concept of “past kamma” (Sanskrit: karma) is an important one for he has broadened the classical
understanding of past kamma in Buddhism to an extent where it is used as a concept for inclusiveness. In one of his sermons, he preached, “For me, I met those laypersons whom I met out of very few odds in this life. Therefore, I believe I must have met them before. Maybe you might think it is a bit strange of a thought. However, the way I see it is that when I meet them now, I will try to pay back my gratitude which I owed before (i.e., in previous lives)...For people with past connections, I have the responsibility to preach them well”\(^\text{45}\) (၇၄၄၂၇, ၁၆၉၇). When Mahāgandhārum met a professor from England, his first words of greetings were, “I am pleased to-be informed that you would visit me. Though we meet each other only now, according to the Buddha’s teachings, we have met cordially in past lives. Thus, take it as we have been good friends since previous lives and ask any question whatsoever without holding back”.\(^\text{46}\) Thus, his Buddhist teachings guided him to treat whomever he met—be it from different faiths, as cordially and friendly as possible, for he believed he had met them in past lives, consequently transcending from exclusivity to inclusivity.

\(^{45}\) In Burmese: “ကြားများငါ့ကြီးဘား “ကြားများငါ့ကြီး အတွက် အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ” မျှ သိရှိပါတယ်။ အတွက် အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ သိရှိပါတယ်။ အတွက် အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ သိရှိပါတယ်။ အတွက် အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ သိရှိပါတယ်။ အတွက် အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ သိရှိပါတယ်။ အတွက် အိပ်ချင်သောကြားများ သိရှိပါတယ်။

\(^{46}\) Emphasis in original (ကြားများငါ့ကြီး အတွက် ဗားက တံ-ခါး)
Mettā (loving-kindness) and Mahāgandhārum

Sayadaw Mahāgandhārum talks about myitta (Pali: mettā meaning loving-kindness), which is one of the four Brahmmaviharas. Myitta has become a household word in Myanmar. Walton and Hayward, in their proposed counter-narratives to the discourses of Mabatha, mention the importance of the four Brahmmaviharas. As an integral part of the Buddha’s teaching, Buddhist monks almost always discuss mettā in their sermons, and yet it has not resulted or taken shape as a moral value toward inclusiveness. One common satirical joke on how the myitta of Buddhists excludes Muslims illustrates the multi-layered nature of anti-Muslim hatred in Myanmar. It says, “May all beings be happy, except crows and ka-la because they have black skin”. Thus I emphasize in the following section how Mahāgandhārum frames an inclusive discourse on myitta, and relates it to the prophecy of enlightenment at the first sermon of the future Buddha. I would like to emphasize again that these are not at the doctrinal level but at the discourse level. I argue that the way Sayadaw frames this is organic, his arguments and discourses originating from his understanding of Buddhism.

Discourses as Such: The First Sermon and People who Achieved Enlightenment

In 1970, Mahāgandhārum delivered a sermon on myitta on the auspicious occasion of the centenary birthday celebrations of the ninth most supreme leader of the Shwegyin sect. This is an

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47 Walton & Hayward, 2014.
48 ‘Ka-la’, also frequently spelled ‘kalar’, in contemporary expression is a derogatory term for Muslims whereas it did not have derogatory and insulting meaning in the past but was simply a term for foreign people from the west of Myanmar, including but not limited to people with origins from India, Persia, Arabia and Europe. For detailed discussion, see Thant Myint-U (2017).
49 ြာနိတသိ ီ၊ ဥ ေး န င့်် နနဒြာလာဘိဝ သ၊ ဥ ေး (2015).
important sermon for two reasons: Sangin Sayadaw (စိန်စိန်ဆိုရတာ) was one of the eldest monks alive in that period (100 years old at that occasion); and being the supreme leader of the much-respected Shwegyin sect, he was one of the most influential monks in the history of the Myanmar sāsana. Thus, Mahāgandhārum delivered this sermon to an audience of hundreds if not thousands of monks, nuns, and laypersons who came to the celebration in Mandalay. While talking about myitta, Mahāgandhārum reminds the audience of the Buddhist concept of paramis, how people of collected paramis now exist in the world, and how people will get enlightenment (the prophecy of enlightenment) at the first sermon of the Mettaya Buddha. He was saying how Buddhists should practice loving-kindness meditation all the time, quoting the verses from Karaniyametta sutta. In a powerful, influential, and convincing style of a traditional Buddhist sermon, he recited verses from the karaniya mettā sutta and explained them in vernacular.

To emphasize the fact that his interpretation/frame/understanding of the concept is different and necessarily inclusive, different translations by different Pali scholars are first provided, followed by an analysis of Mahāgandhārum’s discourse. The original Pali verse is a short one:

Etam satim adhittheyya
Brahmam etam viharam idhamahu.

This is translated into different versions by different translators:

And while he stands or walks or while he sits

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50 For more details see Than Tun (2019).
51 For an English translation of karaniya mettā sutta, see Acharya Buddhharakhita (1995). For explanations in Myanmar, my preference is ဝါရသဋ္ဌာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်၊ ၂၀၁၁ မုန္.
52 ကေကေကေကားထားကောင် လျင်းဗုဗာ/ဗုဗိုဗြဆာဦး
Or while he lies down, free from drowsiness,
Let him resolve upon this mindfulness:
This is Divine Abiding here, they say.\(^{53}\)

Whether you are staying in one place or traveling, sitting
down or in bed, in all your waking hours rest in this mind-
fulness, which is known as like living in heaven right here
and now!\(^{54}\)

As you stand, walk, sit or lie,
So long as you are awake,
Pursue this awareness with your might:
It is deemed the Divine State here.\(^{55}\)

Standing, walking, sitting or reclining, as long as he is
awake, let him develop this mindfulness. This, they say, is
'Noble Living' here.\(^{56}\)

Whether standing or walking, seated or lying down
Free from drowsiness, One should sustain this recollection.
This is said to-be the sublime abiding.\(^{57}\)

Janakābhivamsa interprets this as:

Idha: in this world of saintly people living for collection of
their paramis, Etam viharam: sustaining the practice of rec-
collection of loving-kindness whether standing or walking,
sitting or lying down; this way of living is known as, brah-
mam viharam: abiding of the sublime, the divine like the arahants, like the Brahma, ahu: as is recognized by saintly peoples like the Buddhas.\footnote{His interpretation is different as he translates or expands the word “idha” which simply means here that “in this world of saintly people living for collection of their paramis” and the word “Brahma, ahu” as “recognized by saintly peoples like the Buddhas”. This interpretation becomes a broad interpretation, unlike translations mentioned above, for by “idha” he aims to include people of other faith and connect this Buddhist sermon with the prophecy of enlightenment and by “ahu” his understanding of saintly persons transcends the limits of Buddhist saints.

Within Buddhist thought, people who achieve enlightenment have to fulfill parami to become fully enlightened in their final life.\footnote{The Pali canon elaborates on how long a person has to fulfill parami depending on which kind of enlightenment they wish to attain.}

\footnote{In Burmese: “ဣဓသူရတာ်ကိုယ်စီ ပါ ြီမြင့်် လ ည့််လည်ရနကက ဤရလာက၌၊ ဧတဝိဟာ-သွာေး၊ ပ်၊ ိိုင်၊ ရလာင်ေး ရန ာရမပာင်ေးလည်ေး၊ စိတ်ရကာင်ေးြရသွ ဤရြတတာမြင့်် ရနမခင်ေးကိို၊ မဗဟမဝိဟာ-အ ိယာရန၊ မဗဟမာရနသိိုှံ့၊ စိတ်ရနသနှံ့် င်ေး၊ ရကာင်ေးမြတ်ရသာရန ိိုင်မခင်ေးဟူ၍၊ အာဟို-ဘို ာေးစသာေး၊ ပိုဂ္ိ လ်ြ ာေးတိိုှံ့၊ ရဟာ ာေးညီတူ၊ ြိနှံ့်မြွက်ရတာ်ြူကကရလကိုန်ပပီ”.

See the ten paramis (perfections) in Buddhism in the classical text “Buddhavamsa” translated by Morris (1882, p. 97). See also Bhikkhu Thanissaro (2010) and Acariya Dhammapala (2005) for contemporary interpretations on the ten paramis.

There are five kinds of enlightened persons: the Perfectly Enlightened Ones or the All-seeing Buddha (the time for them to fulfill parami is four infinite number of great aeons or incalculables (asāṅkhya-yas) and a hundred thousand great aeons (mahākappas), the Solitary-Buddhas or Pacceka-Buddhas (two incalculables and a hundred thousand great aeons), the Chief Disciples (Agga-sāvakas) - over one incalculable and a hundred thousand great aeons, the Great Disciples (Mahā-sāvakas) - over a hundred thousand great aeons, the ordinary disciples (Pakati-sāvakas) with over a hundred great aeons, or over a thousand great aeons (Ledi Sayadaw, n.d.).}
In his sermon on mettā, Janakābhivamsa explains, “Do saintly people live like this (live with mettā meditation)? They, of course, do. They indeed do. All the Buddhas teach thus. Arahants teach thus. Saintly persons teach thus”. And then he connects this with the prophecy saying:

We do not know how many people will get enlightenment at the first sermon of the future-Buddha. But we can make a guess; for the Gautama Buddha’s first sermon, it was 180 million who were enlightened. Only one human being was there. This is for the first sermon alone. With the Buddha’s sermons, a great number of people—humans, devas, and other deities, achieved enlightenment. (And for the future-Buddha) there will also be people who will become agga-sāvakas, mahā-sāvakas, pakati-sāvakas and pacceka-Buddhas in this world, fulfilling paramis as this is the world of the future Mettaya Buddha already ... At this point, the combined population of five Theravada countries did not add up to 180 million. So we must ask, where are all those people now?62

61 In Burmese: “အာေးလိုေး အာေးလိုေး မြတ်စွာဘိုေး ာေးြ ာေးလဲ ရဟာရတာ်ြူတာပဲ၊ အိယာြရ  ်မြတ်ကကီေးရတွလဲ ရဟာရတာ်ြူတာပဲ၊ အာေးလိုေး အာေးလိုေး သူရတာ် ရတွလဲရဟာရတာ်ြူတာပဲ၊ ဒီလိို ရနလိိုက်ကကသလာေးဆိိုရတာ့် အိိုေး ဒီလိိုရနလိိုက်ကကတာ ြနည်ေးဘူေး၊…” နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အ င် ၁၉၇၀/၁၃၃၂ ။
62 In Burmese: “လိုေး-လိုေးစြာ သူရတာ်ကိိုယ်စီ ပါ ြီမြင့်် လ ည့််လည်ရနကက ဤရလာက၌၊ ပတ်ဝန်ေး က င်ကရလေးကိို ြကကည့််ပါနဲှံ့။ ကြ္ာကကီေးဘယ်ရလာက်က ယ်ဝန်ေးပပီေးရတာ့် ဘယ်ရလာက်သူရတာ်ရကာင်ေးရတွြ ာေးြလဲဆိိုတာ ရတွေးကကည့််စြ်ေး။ ဘိုန်ေးကကီေးက ရမပာရလ့်  ိတယ်၊ ရတွေးရလ့်  ိတယ်၊ ဗိုဒဓမြတ်စွာပ ိနိဗဗာန်စ သွာေးပပီ။ အဂ္သာဝကြဟာသာဝကနဲှံ့တကွ ဘို ာေးရက ာင်ေးတကာ ရက ာင်ေးအြရတွ အကိုန် လ ိုေးတ ာေး တဲ့် သူရတွ ကက၊ ပ ိနိဗဗာန်စ တဲ့်သူရတွ စ သွာေးကကပပီ။ ဟိို ဘိုန်ေးကကီေးတိိုှံ့ ရက ေးရတာြ ာ သ ဃာစင်ရပေါ် လူကကီေးလူရကာင်ေးရပေါ် လာမပန်တာပဲ၊
စာစကားရမပာကကမပန်တာပဲ။ ဒီလူရတွဆိုသွားရတာ့်ရကာ၊ ြလပ်ပါဘူးရန်ပ်လာမပန်တာပဲ။ အဲသလိုပဲ ဘို ာေးပိုဗိဗာန်စသွားရတာ့်၊ အိရြရတတယ ဘို ာေးအရလာင်းက ပွင့်ရတာြယ်လိိုှံ့အဆင်သင့််၊ အိရြရတတယမြတ်စွာ ဘို ာေးအရလာင်း လွဲ့အဂ္သာဝက၊ ြဟာ သာဝက၊ အဂ္သာဝိကာြ၊ ြဟာသာဝိကာြရတွကဟနတောမြစ်ြိိုှံ့န်အဆင်သင့််။ ခို ပပပီေးပပီ။ ဘာမပလိိုှံ့တိုန်ေးဆိိုရတာ့်ရလေး သရခဂနဲှံ့ကြ္ာတသိန်ေးပါြီမြည့်တဲ့်ပိုဂ္ိလ်ရတွက ဒီကြ္ာရာက်၊ ဒီကြ္ာပွင့်ကကရတာ့်ြယ်။ သူတိိုှံ့ပါြီမပည့််လိိုှံ့  ိပပီ၊ နတ်လာေး၊ မဗဟမာြလာေး၊ လူြ ာလာေးမြတ်စွာ ဘိုနိိုင်ဘူး။ အဂ္သာဝကရတွတသရခဂနဲှံ့ကြ္ာတသိန်ေးပါ ြီမြည့််ကကတယ် သူတိိုှံ့ဒီကြ္ာရာက်ရနပပီ။ အဂ္သာဝကရတွတသရခဂနဲှံ့ကြ္ာတသိန်ေးပါ ြီမြည့််ကကတယ် သူတိိုှံ့ဒီကြ္ာရာက်ရနပပီပွင့်ကကရတာ့်ြယ်။ သူတိိုှံ့တ ာေးကကရတာ့်ြယ်။ သူတိိုှံ့  ိရနပီ။ တခါ ြဟာသာဝကရတွ၊ ကြ္ာတသိန်ေးပါ ြီမြည့်် တယ်၊ ဘို ာေးကကီေးကကာရတွရတွေးပီေးရတာ့် အိို ကိိုယ့််ကိိုယ့်ခ ည်ေးအင်ကကီေးြရနနဲှံ့။ ဘို ာေးအရလာင်းရတွ ဒီရလာကကကီေးြိိုင်။ အဂ္သာဝက၊ ြဟာသာဝကအရလာင်းရတွပါ ြီ င့််ပပီေးပပီ၊ ိရနကကပပီ။ ဗိုဒဓမြတ်စွာတ ာေးဦေးဓြမစကကာတ ာေးဦေးရဟာရတာြရတာ့်ကိို ဆယ့််စ်ကိုရေကျွတ်တြ်ေးဝင်တယ်။ ဆယ့််စ်ကိုရေဆိိုတဲ့်အရအတွက်ဟာမဗဟာခ ည်ေးရတာင်ရမပာတယ်၊ ဘိုန်ေးကကီေးကပါလိြ့််ဦေးြယ်။ လူကမြင့်် လူအရ အတွက်က ငါေးပါေးပဲပါတယ်။ အဲဒီငါေးပါေးဲကတပါေးပဲကျွတ်တြ်ေးဝင်တယ် ပ ြတ ာေးပွဲြ ာ။ နိိုင်ငလိုေးစိုရတာင်ြမပည့််ရသေးဘူး။ ဟိိုြာ ပ ြတ ာေးပွဲကျွတ်တြ်ေးဝင်ြဲ့်အရလာင်းအလ ာရတွဟာ ဗြာတနိိုင်င လ ိုေးစိုရတာင်ြမပည့််ရသေးဘူး။ အဲရတာ့်တကယ့််သူရတာ်ရကာင်ေးရတွ ဘယ်ြ ာလဲ။ ရပါ ့် ရပါ ့် ဆဆ ရန ိိုက်သလာေး၊ အြ ာေးကကီေး ရပါ ့် ရပါ ့် ဆဆ ရန ိိုက်သလာေး။ ဟိို ယိိုေးဒယာေးတိိုှံ့၊ ကရြ္ာဒီေးယာေးတိိုှံ့၊ လာအိိုတိိုှံ့၊ သီဟိိုဠ်တိိုှံ့ ဒီဗိုဒဓဘာသာ ွန်ေးကာေးတဲ့် နိိုင်ငရတွစိုရတာင် ။
By this, Janakābhivamsa openly says the current Theravada Buddhist population is not enough for the future prophecy, but as this is already the world of the future-Buddha, those who will achieve enlightenment in the future must be somewhere either as human beings or as deities. He mentions this frequently in other books as well, emphasizing the number and thus saying many people must be fulfilling paramis in this world of five Buddhas ‘bhadrakalpa’.

He also implies that people of other faiths may be included in the crowd who will get enlightenment at a later point of time, thus reminding the audience they should not be passive or disinterested about it. In one sermon, he also mentions, “myitta has been the discourse/sermon of the Buddhas, the arahants, and saints”. Again he did not differentiate saints by religion. Here I would like to draw attention to how he mentioned that Jesus Christ taught the discourse of myitta.

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63 This is the world of five buddhas and four buddhas have emerged. The future buddha will be the fifth one by the name of Metteyya Buddha, Buddhavamsa. For more details in Burmese, see စကကဝတတိသိုတ်, ၂၀၁၁, and in English, Bhikkhu Thanissaro (2002).

64 See ဒီလိိုရပါ့် ြတိြ်ေးြယိြ်ေးရနကကြ ာပဲ။ အဲဒီသတတဝါရတွဟာ အခို အဆင်သင့််၊ ကျွတ်တြ်ေးဝင်ြိိုှံ့ န် ဒီကြ္ာြ ာ အဆင်သင့်် သို့် ဆိုြနဲှံ့ ရနကက်သလာေး။ တိိုှံ့တရတွ အြ တ်တြဲ့်နဲှံ့ သွာေးလာ စာေးရသာက်ပပီေးရတာ့် ရဟေးလာေးဝါေးလာေးနဲှံ့ ရန ိိုက် သလာေး။ တိိုှံ့တရတွဟာ သတိ ာေးပပီေးရတာ့် ြရန ိိုက်ပါဘူေးလာေး။ အကယ်၍ ဆိုြ ာေး ကကီေးရနလိိုှံ့ြ ာပဲ။
This discourse is, in fact, an important concept where he tries to incorporate the inclusive angle into the Buddhist framework relating to the prophecy of the coming Buddha, the Mettaya. This can be connected to the discourse mentioned above again that those people who serve with goodwill and self-sacrifice must be the future-to-bes, and also the fact that he can form an excellent admiration of those people, regardless of race and religion. Thus he reminds his audience that as they cannot expect all of the people of five Theravada countries to get enlightenment, there must be a lot of good people waiting for the future in the outside world.

**The Sermon at the Military Barracks**

Janakābhivamsa was invited to Mingaladon garrison in 1951 to give a talk to the military rank and file and their families. That sermon, renowned as ‘Siq-taq-táya-daw’ (စစ်တပ်တရားတွေ, the sermon to the military), shows his values regarding the morality and integrity of military people and how they should respect other faiths.\(^{65}\) Out of those teachings, I would like to show a few striking examples here.

In this sermon, Mahāgandhārum talks about Dutthagāmani as well, but his sermon, unlike the one by Sitagu in which he misquotes Mahāgandhārum,\(^ {66}\) does not at all mention the infamous comment by Sinhalese monks: “You killed only one and a half beings”.\(^ {67}\) Instead, he urges the rank and file to respect establishments and places of worship of other faiths as much as possible. He says, “Do not offend civilians with over-pride of being a soldier. When some bad monks did improper things, people tend to condemn ‘these monks, these monks’ - the same thing will happen if one soldier in uniform did terrible things”.\(^ {68}\)

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\(^{65}\) Htet Min Lwin, 2018.

\(^{66}\) Ibid.

\(^{67}\) For background information, see: The Mahavamsa, 2007.

\(^{68}\) “စွြးနိုင်သြျှရလေးစာေးကကပါ”,
Conclusion

This article tries to present a history of inclusive discourses which had their foundation in the understanding of Buddhism. This has been explored by analyzing sermons and different writings of Janakābhivamsa. I argue that Janakābhivamsa’s two beliefs—that this world is full of people who will get enlightenment in the future-Buddha’s time, exceeding the total number of Theravada Buddhists at that future point; and those good-natured people working for the benefits of the society and the community, regardless of race and religion, are those disciples-to-be of the Buddhas—make him a person with an inclusive mindset.

It cannot be said with numerical accuracy how many people in contemporary Burma/Myanmar have read or listened to his writings and discourses, but looking at the fact that these books are still available in the market and sell well, it looks like people still read these discourses, and that there still is a readership for inclusive discourses within the understanding of Buddhism. These sermons, discourses, and writings must have had a stronger impact when Sayadaw himself was alive, when Sayadaw himself delivered the sermons live to a Buddhist and occasionally non-Buddhist audience, between fifty and seventy years ago. The idea or concept of inclusiveness must have had an impact on those audiences. Hence, it will be fair to draw the inference that these inclusive discourses (and also the idea that the enemies of the sāsana are from within) could have been one of the contributing factors to the absence or relative lack of communal tensions and racial/religious hatred against people...
of other faiths. I would even go further to state that the prevailing discourses of those times were inclusive, and thus it is not surprising that the idea to protect sāsana had nothing to do with people of other religions. Of course, more work should be done to prove this broad claim.

To answer why Janakābhivamsa delivered these kinds of inclusive discourses, we can draw tentative conclusions that he was socialized to people of other religions, had contacts/encounters/exchanges with people of other religions although he grew up in a religiously and ethnically homogenous environment of Upper Burma and its monasteries. However, what is more important is how he understands the concept of inclusiveness within the Buddhist framework. Maybe this can be a starting point for people of the Buddhist faith, civil society, and advocates for social and religious inclusion to spread his quintessentially Buddhist ideas of inclusion for the future social and religious harmony in Myanmar. Researching and making these kinds of inclusive discourses publicly known is an attractive way to refute the hateful speeches and discourses that try to scapegoat religious minorities in the country for what some people think is the resentful situation Buddhism might have encountered throughout history in Myanmar. Janakābhivamsa’s inclusive discourses pave the way for more inclusive discourses by Buddhist monks and society at large and for more research on similar inclusive discourses in history.

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ရြတတာဘာဝနောတာေးရတာ်  (MP3)

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oneSayadawAshinJanakavamsa/DVD-01/075-
AshinJanakabhivamsa-MyitaBawanar.mp3

နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်။ (၁၉၉၂)

ဘာသာရသွေး (ပဉ္စြအကကိြ်)

ဆက်ပိေကပ ိုနိပ်တိိုက်။

နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်။ (၂၀၀၀)

တစ်ဘဝသသာသနောရေး (တတိယအကကိြ်)

ဆက်ပိေကပ ိုနိပ်တိိုက်။

နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်။ (၂၀၀၆)

ဓြမစကကာတာေးရတာ်နင့််အနတတလကခဏသိုတာေးရတာ် (ပဉ္ဏြအကကိြ်)

ဆက်ပိေကပ ိုနိပ်တိိုက်။

နကာဘိဝ သ၊ အင်။ (၂၀၀၃)

ကဉာဏ်ဝီိယမပည့််စိုြ (ပါြီစာရပ။)
မိုးမိုင်စိုက်စိုမြန်း စာပို့ရေးနုစာရေးနင့်စာရေးကိုယ်လျားချင်သူ

မိုးမိုင်စိုက်စိုမြန်း စာပို့ရေးနုစာရေးနင့်စာရေးကိုယ်လျားချင်သူများ

Law and Statelessness:  
A Case Study of the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar

Nikita Gehlot

Abstract

This study deals with the citizenship issues of Rohingya people and looks into the causes of their statelessness. It argues that the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law is crucial to the Rohingya’s persecution and their being deprived of Burmese citizenship. There are 135 ‘national races’ in Myanmar which are known as ‘citizens’ or ‘indigenous people’. The government of Myanmar excludes the Rohingya from this list of national races and uses the 1982 Citizenship Law as a weapon against the Rohingya people. Demarcations among citizens, associate citizens, and naturalized citizens are perceptible in the law. Additional restricted norms have been espoused for associate citizens and naturalized citizens. These norms compel Rohingyas to live as stateless people. This article seeks to answer four major questions: (i) What are the factors that led to the establishment of the 1982 Citizenship Law in Myanmar? (ii) How does Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law specifically affect Rohingya Muslims? (iii) Are Rohingyas specifically targeted by the government? (iv) Is the 1982 Citizenship Law expanding statelessness? By tackling these complex issues this article provides opportunities to better understand ethnic politics, conflicts and statelessness.
မှူးကိုင်းစိုးဖ်းတိုင်းကိုးက အချိန်မှာ ကျောင်းသားလူး ေး ၁၃၅ ေး ကျောင်းသားအနက်၊ မြန်းေးကိုးကျောင်းသား ရိုဟင် ဂားကိုးကျောင်းသားဟု ဌာရန်စိုးဖ်း ေးြယ်က ဉ်းပီး ၁၉၈၂ ခုနှစ် မြန်းသားဥပရဒကို ရိုဟင်ဂားကျောင်းသားအရပ်ကို လက်နက်အမြစ်အသိုးမပိုးချခြင်း ပါသည်။ ၁၉၈၂ ခုနှစ် မြန်းသားဥပရဒအနှစ်အစား ေးကိုးမြစ်ြှုအတန်းအစား ေးကိုးခိုးသတ်တ် တွင် မြန်းသားမြစ်ြှုကို အမပည့််အဝိုင်းသည် ဧည့်နိုင်သျင်န င့်် နိုင်သီးမပိုင်းသူဟူသည်အတန်းအစား ေးပါဝင်ရနသည်ကို ရတွေးက ပါသည်။ ဧည့်နိုင်သျင်နိုင်သီးမပိုင်းသူအရပ်တွင် အခွင့်အရေးာမြင့်ကန်ှံ့သတ်ြှုြား ြည်းသတ်ခွဲမချေးာေးသည်၏ အဓိကအရကကာင်းပင်မြစ်ပါသည်။ ဤသိရတသနစာတြ်ေးကရမြဆိိုန်ကို ေးပြ်းေးရသာသိရတသန ရြေးခွန်းကကီးရလေးခိုး ာ ၁-၁၉၈၂ ခုနှစ် မြန်းသားဥပရဒ ရပ်လာရစသည်အရကကာင်း င်းပင်မြစ်ပါသည်။ ၁-၁၉၈၂ မြန်းသားဥပရဒသည် ရိုဟင်ဂားကျောင်းသားကို ြည်းသိိုှံ့ြည်းပို အက ိေးက်ရာက်ရစသည်နည်း၊ ၃-၁၉၈၂ မြန်းသားဥပရဒတွင် ရိုဟင်ဂားကျောင်းသားအစိိုေးြ ေးပစ်ြတ်ာေးြိနိပ် ာေးပါသလာေး၊ ၄-၁၉၈၂ မြန်းသားဥပရဒသည် ရိုဟင်ဂားကျောင်းသားနိုင်သျင်မြစ်ြှုကိုပိိုြိိုဆိိုွာေးသွာေးရစပါသလာေးတိိုှံ့မြစ်ပါသည်။ ဤရှုပ်ရွေးရသာကိစစ်ပ်ာေးသည်လူးေးအရမချခမပိုး ေး၊ လူးေးပေိပကခြေး ေးန င့်် နိုင်သျင်မြစ်ြှုကို နောေးလည်သရဘာရပ်က်လာက်နိုင်သည်မြစ်ပါသည်။
Background

Before formally defining statelessness, the article introduces Rohingyas and their apartheid stateless condition in short to provide an idea of the prevailing situation in Myanmar. Rohingyas have been living in Myanmar for centuries, but they are still being excluded from the nation by the government of Myanmar. In order to do so, the government of Myanmar established the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law, which divides the people of Myanmar on the basis of their ethnicity. Rohingyas have never been accepted as an indigenous people by Myanmar; rather they have always been referred as “Bengali” or “illegal migrants”.

In Myanmar the Rohingya are not included in the 135 national races defined by the government. Rohingyas experience ethnic discrimination in their daily life based on the 1982 Citizenship Law. Consequences of this include crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing, brutal burnings of villages, visible religious hatred, population control and restrictions on marriage, forced labor, confiscations of land and property, inadequate medical facilities, barriers to receiving humanitarian aid, forcible transfer, denial of women’s rights, and more. Hence, in order to analyze the statelessness of Rohingya people, this article critically analyzes the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law and its severe impacts on them. It tries to understand the formal meaning of statelessness.

Objectives

(i) To identify the factors that led to the establishment of the 1982 Citizenship Law in Myanmar.

(ii) To identify the effects of Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law on Rohingya Muslims.

(iii) To investigate the specificities of the 1982 Citizenship Law that make the Rohingya a targeted community by the government.
(iv) To investigate the reasons behind the expansion of statelessness due to the 1982 Citizenship Law.

**Methodology**

This article adopts an interpretive method to analyze the text of the law and its social lives and study implications for larger geopolitical issues. This study adopts qualitative techniques and a narrative style as well as a deductive method, as it goes from general understandings to particular details. The article is mainly based on information derived from secondary sources, e.g., books, articles, newspapers, international and national magazines on the themes of the Rohingya refugee crisis, the Myanmar state, human rights, and similar.

**Part I: Theories Behind Statelessness**

In 2003, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) conducted a survey which affirms that no domain in this world is free from those grounds which lead to statelessness.\(^1\) Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention describes the definition of a stateless person as “an individual who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law”.\(^2\) Statelessness is not only a matter of legal trouble but also of social and individual trouble. In modern day nation-states where government services are tied to citizenship, people who are unable to get citizenship face numerous problems. The consequences that emerge compel people to live at risk of long-term detention in a foreign country, particularly when that country is unable to

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\(^1\) UNHCR, 2005.

\(^2\) After the Second World War the problem of refugees was predominant and it became essential for international governments to take action on refugees and their welfare. As a result, the 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (‘1954 Convention’) came into existence, and this convention shares the same vision as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘1951 Convention’), for more, see UNHCR, 2018.
secure the citizenship status of that particular individual to repatriate him/her to his country of origin.³

Parekh admits that in the boundaries of international law “ethics of admission” are significant, but she argues that we (the people of the nation-state system) should elaborate our understanding beyond the “ethics of admission”, and for that she incorporates two vital reasons.⁴ First, she throws light on de jure and de facto stateless people. De jure stateless people are the people who met the criteria of admission in a country, i.e., those who are affiliated for resettlement by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); de facto stateless people are those who do not meet the criteria of admission and therefore have lost their nationality. Parekh argues that “ethics of admission” mainly works for de jure stateless people and leaves behind those de facto stateless people who are also in need. Arendt has called de facto stateless people the “core of statelessness” and claims that the international world mainly focuses on de jure stateless people and neglects the de facto stateless.⁵ The 1954 Convention focuses on de jure stateless people, but there is an uncountable number of de facto stateless persons in the world, which remain out of focus from the 1954 Convention.⁶

The second reason Parekh identifies for the need for enhancing understanding of the “ethics of admission” is that admission ethics do not include those stateless persons who are living outside the political community—in other words, those outside the state boundary that legalizes its citizens by providing them citizenship.⁷ Those who do not have citizenship are compelled to live on humanitarian aid. She adds that the harm of statelessness for those who are living outside the political community for many years has not yet been taken seriously, and although normative philosophers consider it morally vital, they study the issue of statelessness in a more legal manner—e.g., in

⁴ Parekh, 2013.
⁵ Arendt, 1976.
⁶ Blitz & Lynch, 2011.
⁷ Parekh, 2013.
terms of the loss of nationality—and forget to include another dimension which Parekh says is the “ontological” harm of statelessness.\(^8\) Parekh conveys that there are two sorts of harms associated with statelessness: one is the political harm of statelessness and another is the ontological harm of statelessness. To study statelessness in a more prominent manner, we have to put apart the two angles, or the ontological harm and philosophical harm of statelessness, so that we can better understand the root of statelessness.

According to the UNHCR, lacunae in nationality laws are the most important cause of statelessness.\(^9\) Each and every country has its own rules and regulations as to how a national obtains citizenship, and how the state can withdraw it. Some countries have a system of offering citizenship on the basis of descent, which affords citizenship to those children born as nationals whose birth took place in the marked territory of that country (or children born in a state’s territory as nationals of another state).

The movement of people from one country to another makes the issue of statelessness even more complex. If a child was born in a foreign country, her foreign birth can put her nationality in danger if that country does not offer citizenship on the grounds of birth alone. In addition, if the home country of the parents of someone born abroad does not allow them to pass on their nationality to their children through family linkage it can also lead to statelessness. Furthermore, some countries have discriminatory laws that outline who can and cannot transfer their citizenship. For example, in around 27 countries in the world, citizenship laws are biased against women: women are not permitted to transfer their nationality. In addition, some countries provide citizenship only to certain races and ethnicities. India and Myanmar are such countries.\(^10\)

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\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) UNHCR, 2018.
\(^10\) UNHCR, 2014.
The emergence of new states and shifting of border lines provide another reason for statelessness.\textsuperscript{11} In several cases, certain communities or groups have to give up their nationality even when a new state provides citizenship to all ethnic races and minorities: that state might suddenly withdraw the citizenship rights from a particular group when they cannot prove their ties to the newly-formed state. In countries where nationality can be transferred only by descent from a national, statelessness will be passed on to the next generations; we can call it “Intergenerational Statelessness” (UNHCR).\textsuperscript{12} Sokoloff and Lewis claim that denial of citizenship prevails in those states where state-building programs were executed in conjunction with homogenous/monoethnic practices, and state-succession procedures adopted different national identities from the previous state without considering the subsequent consequences, e.g., loss of citizenship, identity, culture, religion etc.\textsuperscript{13} Denationalization is often a consequence of fragile states pursuing biased policies to address poor public health, political or economic systems and strengthen national harmony in order to assemble support for the country’s leadership.\textsuperscript{14}

The inclusion and exclusion of particular ethnic cultures in the process of nationalization and denationalization can provide an account of emergent civil liberties and their respective prices. Ethnic identity and cultural markers delineate the course of action for nationalization and denationalization. Scholars such as Horowitz call this phenomenon “ethnic politics”.\textsuperscript{15} The procedure for denationalization starts from the making of minority groups; majority groups then might be produced by creating a situation of mass migration, for instance the mass exodus of Tamils that occurred in Sri Lanka during the Sri Lankan civil war.

\textsuperscript{11} Rürup, 2011.
\textsuperscript{12} UNHCR, 2010.
\textsuperscript{13} Sokoloff & Lewis, 2005.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Horowitz, 1993.
There are also instances where groups are forced to migrate and resettle again in other parts of the world. One such example is the Crimean Tartars, an ethnic Muslim minority in Russia which was resettled in Uzbekistan. Horowitz elaborates that inclusion or nationalization of certain selected parts of the populace of a given state might impact the allocation of “important material and nonmaterial goods”.

In the making of new states, politics is crucial. The evolution of states often follows from a naive belief in democracy to a selectively chosen path of democracy by guaranteeing the rights of some special communities or groups and denying the rights of others. One of the latter groups is the Rohingya, who find themselves unable to flourish to their full potential under the so-called patronage of the government in Myanmar. The Rohingya are a group of people who are targeted on the basis of ethnicity and are being excluded from the country and from participation in its political system. These methods of selective choosing of the vulnerable group are called “politicization of group membership/ethnicity”. It simply means that when culture gardens or when the state allows certain ethnic identities to be more dominant than others—rather than different groups with their distinct identity markers being equally accepted—the sense of a ‘political subject’ arises. These political subjects then experience inclusion and exclusion from the state and society. The politicization of political subjects affects their sense of citizenship or nationality.

Part II: Critical Analysis of the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law

The expression “citizenship”, though recognized worldwide, has diverse applications. Citizenship is not only an expression
but also a concept propounded by the nation-state system which incorporates different disputing ideologies. In simple words, citizenship is a give-and-take relationship between a person and state. The state gives protection to the person, and in return the individual is obliged to express honesty, honesty towards the discharge of their duties in favor of the nation.

Citizenship follows the framework of inclusion and exclusion: the inclusion of those who bear the traits of a so-called ‘citizen’, and the exclusion of those who do not fall in the definition of ‘citizen’. The entity and the people who frame the characteristics of a so-called ‘citizen’ are known as ‘the state’ and ‘the statesman’. Statesmen keep the power and authority to run and rule the state, and they are the only ones who are responsible for any biases (if there are any) under the premises of ‘citizenship’. The statesman is a biological being, and he is not immune to discrimination, either as the subject of discrimination or as its perpetrator. From here arise the opportunities of unfairness and inequity which includes the threads of race, religion, ethnicity, and other aspects of identity. As Keyes states, ethnicity becomes important when politics and distinct cultural traits of different societies coincide, and especially when they are linked to national ideology.\(^{21}\) Hence, the essence of citizenship lies in the fact that citizenship is a model, designed on the basis of the relationship a person has with a particular race, religion, or ethnicity, and how that particular race/religion/ethnicity is used to define the society in which they live.\(^{22}\)

Citizenship refers to the ‘power’ assumed by the state and statesman to legitimize the people living in the territory of the state. Citizenship refers to the right of inhabitants to inhabit a state, which makes the inhabitants ‘legal’ and legitimizes the actions that they perform.\(^{23}\) To legitimize its inhabitants, the state creates nationality laws mainly based on two concepts: *jus sanguinis* (law based on blood), and *jus soli* (laws based on land).\(^{24}\)

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\(^{22}\) See Kanapathipillai (2009, p. 42).

\(^{23}\) See Gehlot (2018, p. 9).

\(^{24}\) Beydoun, 2005.
States that have an increasing population and are unable to address rising economic insecurities in their country, like Myanmar, often opt for jus sanguinis. Nations that possess vast areas of land compared to the inhabiting population go with jus soli to grant citizenship to the populace—for instance, Brazil, the United States, or Canada.  

When countries use jus sanguinis to grant nationality, it enables discrimination that can lead to inter-ethnic violence and statelessness. The criterion of jus sanguinis is problematic because not every individual can prove his or her ancestry. A foreigner cannot acquire Burmese nationality without proving his/her close family ties to people within the country, because Myanmar adopts jus sanguinis as the basis of citizenship.

Burmese society is an intensively divided society. This divided society has led to numerous complex issues, e.g., inclusion and exclusion, ethnic conflicts, and identity politics. In this divided society, integration remains difficult and the risk of expulsion is high for certain communities such as the Rohingya. In order to analyze the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law critically, this article asks why only selected ethnic groups are entitled to citizenship and consideration as ‘nationals’. Why does the 1982 Citizenship Law not incorporate the Rohingya, an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority group in Rakhine State who profess Islam and share cultural features with Chittagonians, in the list of eight major groups, which are subdivided into 135 ethnicities?

The Burma Citizenship Law was first introduced in 1948 and amended in 1982. The amended version of the Citizenship Law was laid before the nation on the 21st of April 1982 and it was passed by the People's Assembly in October. It classes Myanmar

26 Horowitz, 1993.
28 Kin mentions that the law was enacted with unusual publicity and preparation (1983, p. 93).
nationals in three different categories: “citizens”, “associate citizens” and “naturalized citizens”. The “citizens” of Burma are those who resided in the country before 1823 A.D. “Associate citizens” are the individuals who were born in the colonial period of Burma and have resided for eight years since 4 January 1948. It means that individuals who were residing in Burma before its independence who also applied for citizenship are associate citizens. The last category is “naturalized citizens” which includes people who applied for citizenship after 1948, when Myanmar achieved independence.

The Burma Citizenship Law includes the Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhine and Shan, and other “ethnic groups” who settled in Myanmar before 1823 AD. These ethnicities are divided into 135 races based on the languages they speak. These races are national races entitled to Burmese citizenship and deemed ‘citizens’. As the Myanmar government does not consider the Rohingya community as being settled in the country before 1823, the Rohingya are not entitled to citizenship. Burmese authorities do not acknowledge Rohingya Muslims by the name Rohingya; instead, they are called “illegal Bengali immigrants”. Ibrahim says the racial categories used in 1982 to deny citizenship to Rohingya were based on 1948 Citizenship Law. The consecutive Burmese governments have used the 1948 Law, which was later updated to the 1982 Citizenship Law, to deny citizenship to an estimated 800,000 to 1.3 million Rohingya people, discriminating against the Rohingya and excluding them from the 135 races of Myanmar.

‘Burma Citizens’ as ‘Supreme’ in Myanmar

29 Ibid.
30 Ho & Chua, 2016.
31 See section 2.3 of Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1982).
32 Ibrahim, 2016.
33 Burke, 2016.
Nemoto mentions that in the Konbaung Dynasty (1752-1885), the final Burmese kingdom, there was ‘harmony’ among the various religions, e.g., Hindus, Muslims, and Christians, living together under the rule of Theravada Buddhist Burmese kings. The royal authority never categorized the various religions on the basis of ethnicity. Instead, the authority preferred to group people according to their services to the King.\footnote{Nemoto, 2014.}

The idea of dividing people on the basis of ethnicity was only introduced at the time of British rule in the nineteenth century in Myanmar. The trend toward considering Burmese (i.e., Burman or Bamar) culture as supreme was reinforced by people who completed their education under British rule; some of them also learned about ethnicity from the core of Burman nationalist literature, which promoted the idea of the Burmans being superior to other minorities, particularly ‘kala’ or foreigners. This kind of literature was popular during the rise of the independence struggle.\footnote{See Burke (2016) and Nemoto (2014).}

Haque examined the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law and described three main causes that led to its establishment.\footnote{Haque, 2017.} Haque assumes that the reflections left by immigrants such as Indian and Chinese people on the memory of Burman people were the stepping stone for the establishment of the 1982 Citizenship Law. These reflections include the establishment of a prominent place of Indians and Chinese in Myanmar’s economy, procurement of land in Myanmar, and confrontation with indigenous people, which activated general public dislike against Indians and Chinese.\footnote{See Min Zin (2012) and U Myay Kyaw (1958).}

During British rule many Indians immigrated to Burma as agricultural workers, but many of them returned to India. Some South Asian people (e.g., Indians and Chittagonians) who were residing in Burma owned properties and were engaged in business. Chettiarss engaged in finance. They financed farmers but
levied heavy interest amounts: 15 percent per annum with security, and 60 percent per annum without security.\textsuperscript{38} In addition, Chettiar did not lend money to those farmers who wanted to become landowners, and those farmers who were not able to return the money were marked as living on land owned by absentee landlords.\textsuperscript{39} These oppressive practices by South Asian people drove hatred among the Burmese, which led to the commencement of intense anti-Indian riots in 1938 in Burma.

The fear of being dominated by Muslims in the western part of Burma, alongside general fears of the country being crowded with Muslims, filled some Burmese with hatred and non-acceptance. Kei Nemoto has also mentioned how the adoption of “Wahhabism”\textsuperscript{40} by some Muslims in Myanmar played a key role in spreading extreme dislike against Muslims.\textsuperscript{41} After operation Naga Min in 1978\textsuperscript{42} and the first Rohingya refugee exodus, the Burmese government realized that the 1948 Citizenship Law failed to manage citizenship and immigration issues. After three decades, the Government of Myanmar recognized that all these elements were interrelated and thus it promulgated the establishment of the 1982 Citizenship Law.

Getting a National Verification Card (NVC) is one of the crucial steps to citizenship in Myanmar. Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh confirm that they have been pressured by the government of Myanmar to accept the NVC. The NVC is a temporary

\textsuperscript{38} Nemoto (2014).
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} According to Wahhabism, founded by Muhammad ibn Abd-al Wahabi, Islam has diverted from its original teachings and needs to be reformed (Shipoli, 2009).
\textsuperscript{41} Nemoto, 2014.
\textsuperscript{42} The year 1974 marked constitutional and legal changes which enhanced the level of violence in the country towards Rohingya people and contributed to the decision of many to flee to Bangladesh. The well-known operation “Naga Min” was launched in 1977 with its aim to identify every individual in Myanmar as either a citizen or a foreigner. Operation Naga Min was used as a tool to commit crimes against the Rohingya by the Buddhist community and army in Rakhine State. As a consequence, more than 200,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh for shelter, but most of them were repatriated back to Myanmar by Bangladesh authorities (Ibrahim, 2016).
document to demarcate verified and unconfirmed migrants that makes them eligible to apply for citizenship later. No religion or ethnicity is mentioned on the NVC.\textsuperscript{43}

Foreigners cannot acquire citizenship in Myanmar without proving their close ties with relatives who are citizens of Myanmar. Each type of citizenship is afforded different entitlements and is evidenced by specific documentation only. “Burma citizens” are entitled to the pink Citizenship Scrutiny Card, whereas the other two groups, namely, “associate citizens” and “naturalized citizens”, are given blue Associate Citizenship Scrutiny Cards or green Naturalized Citizenship Scrutiny cards. Associate citizens and naturalized citizens are secondary to Burma citizens since the pink cards confer privileges in government employment, contractual transactions, and domestic travel.\textsuperscript{44}

The 1982 Burma Citizenship Law states that if a father or mother who is an associate citizen or naturalized citizen loses their identity, then their child will face the risk of statelessness (sections 29 and 51). This means the citizenship is designed by the government of Myanmar in a way that there is minimum probability of Rohingya and their offspring becoming citizens. For an associate citizen to acquire citizenship, it is mandatory to appear before an organization prescribed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, and affirm one’s citizenship; however, this requires that one’s parents are also associate citizens, and it is impossible once a person exceeds the age of eighteen (sections 24, 27, and 49). Hence, the 1982 Citizenship Law programs intergenerational statelessness.

People from remote and hard-to-reach rural areas reported additional barriers—such as hilly terrain, long walks, and shortages of money—that made it difficult to get themselves registered for citizenship documents. Also, there are a range of gender-specific barriers that work to hinder women’s access to citizenship documentation. An applicant for citizenship and citizenship documentation is usually required to provide evidence

\textsuperscript{43} Mahmud, 2017.

\textsuperscript{44} Ho & Chua, 2016.
of the citizenship of both of their parents. This means that children born to fathers who are unknown or otherwise absent face significant difficulties in acquiring and confirming citizenship.⁴⁵

Before a child reaches eighteen, he or she must obtain Burmese citizenship. If the child crosses this age bar⁴⁶ or fails the verification process,⁴⁷ then he or she might not be able to obtain citizenship. Failing the verification process can take multiple forms, including: an inability to prove parents’ citizenship; missing verification documents; problems with their mother’s or father’s citizenship status; finally, the verification process might fail if an applicant is unable to reach the verification venue on time. This article also finds that if one parent is an associate citizen or a naturalized citizen, and the other is a foreigner, then the death of the associate citizen or naturalized citizen would also become a cause of statelessness for his or her offspring.

The 1982 Burma Citizenship Law has been designed in a manner that enables discrimination between citizens, associate citizens and naturalized citizens. One perilous clause of the law states that in order to achieve naturalized citizenship, the aspirant should be of “sound mind”; however, the law does not clarify or properly define the concept of sound mind. This article argues that the term ‘be of sound mind’ has been deployed to deny Rohingya of citizenship, even if they are eligible under one of the three categories outlined in the law.⁴⁸ According to the Union Citizenship Act, 1948:

Any person acquiring a Burma Naturalization Certificate issued under section 5 of the Burma Naturalization Act and whose name is included therein shall be of good character and unless such person is under a disability, he may apply for a Burma Naturalization Certificate, if he declares before the first day of April 1955.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Norwegian Refugee Council et al., 2018.
⁴⁶ Ibid.
⁴⁸ See S. 44 of Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1982).
Before the enactment of the law according to the 1948 Constitution, if a person was under any disability, he or she might not acquire naturalized citizenship; after the enactment of the law, the language about “disability” was replaced with the criteria of “sound mind”. The Burmese government never explained why this criteria is only applicable to those persons who aspire for naturalized citizenship. Why does it not apply to Burma citizens and associate citizens? This clearly shows that the government of Myanmar has applied a disability exclusion to the Rohingya.

The process of official documentation is so arduous in Myanmar that it often causes individuals to fail to obtain citizenship. The documentation process includes proving one’s parents’ citizenship, and a lengthy document verification process; this process often involves paying illegal fees in order to get the verification done. Sometimes, an official might demand three times the amount of money of a one-month salary; poor Rohingya people cannot bear these costs. Furthermore, the documentation process often requires applicants to travel to their birth village to obtain relevant information as to their ancestors’ citizenships. For both men and women, the ability to pay ‘unofficial fees’ was described as the most efficient way to overcome all of the above mentioned barriers, but it is obviously only a strategy for those with disposable income.\(^{50}\) If any changes occur in the households regarding family size, all Rohingyas are obliged to inform the Na Sa Ka,\(^ {51}\) known officially as the Border Area Immigration Control Headquarters, composed of army and police officers as well as customs and immigration officials.\(^ {52}\)

The unofficial fees which people pay when they go to register births and deaths differ from place to place and range in amount from 1,000 to 8,000 Myanmar Kyat. A Rohingya family has to pay 7,000 to 8,000 Myanmar Kyat in order for the event to be registered in their family list. This analysis of the 1982 Burma

\(^{50}\) Norwegian Refugee Council, et al., 2018.
\(^{51}\) Hossain, 2021.
\(^{52}\) Htet Naing Zaw, 2013.
Citizenship Law shows that the government of Myanmar is taking every possible step to prohibit the Rohingya from acquiring citizenship. The discriminatory nature of the citizenship law enlarges the gap between ethnicities. This denial of citizenship puts limitations on movement and access to education, as well as to the loss of land holdings which made thousands of Rohingya homeless.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{53} Ibrahim, 2016.
Part III: The Statelessness of the Rohingya

In the words of Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, a stateless person is a “political subject” who is demanding personal and communal rights. Rohingya are stateless people and appear to be unwanted by the Myanmar government. The years 2012-2019 have been the cruelest on the Rohingya in terms of their political and social situation; seven hundred thousand Rohingya had to flee to Bangladesh for shelter. The Myanmar government framed the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law in a manner that caused the Rohingya to lose everything, most importantly their nationality and their right to be called nationals of Burma. Citizenship is a legitimate linkage between citizens and the state which enables the citizen to represent himself/herself and connect to his/her country at the international level; in this regard, citizenship obliges a state to afford political protection to its citizens. Nationality symbolizes the identity or identities present in the territory of any state.

The UNHCR records the number of stateless people around the world at 10 million; stateless people who are denied citizenship are also often denied the basic things that they need for survival. They remain weak, helpless, exposed and defenseless. Agamben calls this “bare life”. This bare life strips them of political rights and leaves them susceptible to human rights violations.

According to a report by Amnesty International, Rohingya people living in Rakhine State are struggling with several unfair situations, including biased citizenship laws. In this systematically organized apartheid condition, the rights of the Rohingya are being violated, including the right to citizenship, freedom of movement, and the basic right to life. This condition can be seen through the lens of history which provides a plethora of

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54 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016.
55 UNHCR, 2019.
56 See Batchelor (1998, p. 160)
57 Agamben, 1998.
examples of the persecution of the Rohingya. For instance, the Government of Burma chose to discriminate against the Rohingya by replacing National Registration Certificates with Foreign Registration Cards.\(^5^9\) The next step the Government of Burma took in order to extinguish the Rohingya’s rights was the establishment of 1982 Citizenship Law.

**Ethnic Violence as a Consequence of Citizenship Law**

Systematic and organized crimes against the Rohingya community are consequences of multiple issues, but the Burma Citizenship Law plays a crucial role among them. Amnesty International calls the Rohingya a “targeted community” in crimes against humanity occurring in Myanmar.\(^6^0\) Ibrahim explained another side of the repetitive violence against the Rohingya.\(^6^1\) He notes that it is remarkable that the attacks on the Rohingya in 2012 appeared at the time when the economy of Myanmar was strangulated, and the government wanted to divert the awareness of the populace. Ibrahim has called the Rohingya a “target of opportunity” and expressed that the Rohingya are a trouble-free and harmless target for the Myanmar administration because they are not equipped with arms and ammunition.

In 2017, the outburst of violence against Rohingya people erupted due to the systematic attack performed by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on 30 military checkpoints.\(^6^2\) In response, the government military launched a mass killing operation against Rohingya in the form of genocide and ethnic cleansing along with several violent acts i.e. rape against women and minor girls, systematic burning of villages, encampment of Rohingya, confiscation of properties of Rohingya, abduction of people, killings of men, women, and children, deportation of Rohingya, etc.

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\(^{5^9}\) Ibrahim, 2016.

\(^{6^0}\) Amnesty International, 2017.

\(^{6^1}\) Ibrahim, 2016.

\(^{6^2}\) Norwegian Refugee Council et al., 2018.
Crimes Against Humanity\textsuperscript{63}

Crimes against humanity are prohibited, but they have been committed around the globe. “The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” defines crimes against humanity in Article 7. The words of the Rome Statute are as follows:

For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack ... Article 7(1) lists 11 crimes, or “acts,” including “[m]urder”; “forcible transfer of population”; “[t]orture”; “[r]ape”; as well as “[p]ersecution against any identifiable group” on any “grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”\textsuperscript{64}

Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing\textsuperscript{65}

The United Nations has said the persecution of the Rohingya ‘bears all the hallmarks of genocide’, but the government of Myanmar denies the allegations made by the UN and says the military performed the attacks in response to the brutal attacks conducted by Rohingya on 30 military checkpoints. It is worth noting here that many essential parts of Rakhine State are off limits to journalists, NGOs, and human rights activists.\textsuperscript{66} The deliberate killings of masses of people is called genocide. The term ‘genocide’ might indicate the pursuit of some state, political or religious interest. The term ‘genocide’ supports the terminologies like ‘organized attack’, ‘systematic attack’, and ‘mass murder’.

Al Jazeera reports that due to the mass killing of the Rohingya, the United Nations has accused the Myanmar military of

\textsuperscript{63} Fortify Rights, 2017.
\textsuperscript{64} Amnesty International, 2017.
\textsuperscript{65} Calamur, 2018.
\textsuperscript{66} Doherty, 2018.
committing crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{67} Amnesty International mentioned an interview with ‘Foyzullah’, age 32, who said the following:

\begin{quote}
The military came to our village and started firing; I heard the noise coming from my home. The military opened fire. I took my family with me and went towards the hill. We came across the military. People were getting hit by the bullets. My brother's wife and my daughter got hit by the bullets and we had to run, but we came back when the military left. I dug a hole with my brother to bury our relatives. But we did not have enough time to bury them properly.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

Fortify Rights interviewed many eyewitnesses to the mass killings performed in three Rohingya villages located in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships. The mass killings in these villages occurred during the second wave of violence starting in August 2017. N. Islam, (51), told Fortify Rights about a mass killing that he witnessed at the Purma riverbank: “some small children were thrown into the river... They hacked small children who were half alive. They were breastfeeding-age children, two years, three years, five years”.\textsuperscript{69}

This evidence should be enough to get the perpetrators sanctioned with proper penal actions, but when the authorities are the culprit, one cannot do anything. In 2018, authorities acknowledged for the first time that Burmese security forces committed ten unlawful killings in Inn Dinn Village near Maungdaw.\textsuperscript{70} The government of Myanmar arrested two Reuters reporters, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, on 12 December 2017 for allegedly revealing the country’s secrets related to Rakhine State and charged them with allegations of disobeying the country's Official Secrets Act. However, the reporting agency says that their reporters were arrested due to their discovery of the

\textsuperscript{67} Husein & Khan, 2017.
\textsuperscript{68} Amnesty International, 2017.
\textsuperscript{69} Fortify Rights, 2017.
\textsuperscript{70} BBC, 2018.
massacre of ten people in Inn Din village. A report produced by Human Rights Watch in 2018 condemns the “2013 Telecommunication Act” for restricting free reporting and criminalizing some broad categories of online speeches.

**Brutal Burnings of Villages and Visible Religious Hate**

To clear northern Rakhine State’s villages of Rohingya, Burmese military forces set them ablaze. Rohingya people lost everything in the burnings: beloved ones, their belongings, property, and most importantly, their memories. A displaced woman named Zubairia said to reporters that in 2018 she visited her home in Myin Hlut and she was shocked to see the empty village: “everything was gone, not even the trees are left”. Shafiq, another man who told his story to Al Jazeera, said that “[the military] burned my home and went around raping women in our village. They burned my shop”. Religious hate is widespread in Myanmar. Shafiq said that “[military personnel] hate any marks of Islam—my beard, my cap, my dress”. In 2001, a mob attacked 28 mosques and religious schools; they destroyed each and every building, but state security did not do anything—rather, they joined them and demolished all the mosques.

**Population Control and Restriction of Marriage**

The Government of Burma has tried to limit every aspect of life for the Rohingya. They have chosen the tools to restrict the Rohingya population in terms of their movement and their rights to

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71 Doherty, 2018.
74 Doherty, 2018.
75 Husein & Khan, 2017.
76 Husein & Khan, 2017.
77 Lowenstein, 2015.
78 Abbamonte, 2018.
observe their religion and faith. The Rohingya people are compelled to get a marriage license before getting married and to follow a ‘two-child policy’.\(^7\)

A report from Yale Law School authored by Lowenstein reveals the fact that for Rohingya to get a marriage license it is necessary to take a picture which should be without a beard for men and without a hijab for women.\(^8\) A beard for Muslim men and a hijab for Muslim women represents their culture, and they keep faith in them. Na Sa Ka\(^9\) makes it essential for women to have a pregnancy test before issuing a license for marriage; and Na Sa Ka officials also demand illegal fees to process the marriage documents. Hence, it becomes difficult for Rohingya women to get a marriage license and follow the official procedures.

**Forced Labor**

To put a stop to forced labor, the government of Thein Sein signed a memorandum of understanding\(^10\) on 16 March 2012 to jointly develop action plans for the total elimination of forced labor by 2015;\(^11\) instead, Rohingya are still compelled to work and forced into labor jobs, including the following: road construction/rehabilitation, other infrastructure construction, camp maintenance, animal husbandry, cultivation and plantation work, collection of logs and bamboos, pottering, sentry duty, and more.\(^12\) The practice of forced labor is ongoing in Rakhine State. Security forces have conscripted Rohingya to do forced labor, including sanitary duties, cleaning of roads, and some camp related jobs.\(^13\)

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\(^7\) Human Rights Watch, 2013.

\(^8\) Lowenstein, 2015.

\(^9\) The Na Sa Ka, known officially as the Border Area Immigration Control Headquarters, comprises army and police officers as well as customs and immigration officials (Htet Naing Zaw, 2013).


\(^12\) Ibid.

\(^13\) Lowenstein, 2015.
Instances of forced labor amongst Rohingyas in Yan Aung Pyin village, located in Maungdaw Township, are very common. Min Min and Moe Aung reported that the chairman of Yan Aung Pyin compelled 40 Rohingya men to labor in constructing the border guard police check post.\textsuperscript{86} The Rohingya men were made to work without being paid any daily allowances and without being provided any food.\textsuperscript{87}

**Confiscations of Land and Property\textsuperscript{88}**

Confiscations of land and property are also being done by the military in Myanmar by using temporary verification documents provided by the Burmese authorities to some Rohingya. Shamsu Alam, a Rohingya refugee from Myanmar reached Bangladesh and told the *Dhaka Tribune* that his NVC made him ineligible to own property worth more than 50,000 Myanmar Kyat. He also mentioned that many Rohingya are being threatened to be killed if they refuse to accept the NVC. Shamsu affirmed that the NVC is used to give temporary citizenship to the Rohingya without confirming ethnic identity and properties are confiscated in the process.\textsuperscript{89}

According to Human Rights Watch’s World Report for 2019,\textsuperscript{90} the National League for Democracy quasi-civilian government put some effort in to resolve land confiscation issues but many were unresolved. According to the World Report many farmers were arrested for protesting and demanding their land for farming. ‘Illegal’ trespassing for farming land near a special economic zone that had been seized in 1996 also made 33 farmers appear blameworthy and run afoul of the law in May 2018.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{86} Min Min & Moe Aung, 2015.
\textsuperscript{87} Chakraborty et al., 2015.
\textsuperscript{88} Yeung, 2019.
\textsuperscript{89} Mahmud, 2017.
\textsuperscript{90} Human Rights Watch, 2019.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
Barriers on Free Movement and Inadequate Medical Facilities

One factor behind Myanmar’s stagnant growth is the limitation on the free movement of Rohingya people. When movement without barriers is denied, then it shuts the doors of business, development, education and employment. The Rohingya are bound to take permission before travel.\(^9^2\)

In this apartheid condition, the Rohingya are mainly dependent on international humanitarian aid, which is also obstructed by security forces. In February 2014, the government expelled the global medical care organization Médecins Sans Frontières from Rakhine State, charging them with allegations of being biased towards the Rohingya. This step, taken by the government, deprived the Rohingya of the only medical care they could access. In March 2014, many international nongovernmental organization offices were damaged and looted by the security forces. The security forces displaced more than 300 humanitarian workers and disturbed medical services available for the vulnerable Rohingya. This resulted in inadequate medical facilities for those both in and outside of camps.

In Balukhali camp, Bangladesh, there were many Rohingya people without access to proper medical facilities in 2017. The so-called ‘local doctors’ say that they are trained doctors, but only had a Local Medical Assistant and Family Planning qualification, which is not a qualified degree for therapeutic medicine. Al Jazeera reported that Rohingya refugees have been living in Bangladeshi camps since the 1970s, and the number of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh at that time varied from three lakh (300,000 Myanmar Kyat) to five lakh (500,000 Myanmar Kyat).\(^9^3\)

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\(^9^2\) Ibid.

\(^9^3\) Husein & Khan, 2017.
The Denial of Women’s Rights

Edward writes that gender discrimination spoils the rights of women and girls and can be a cause of their displacement.\textsuperscript{94} Discrimination against women can also happen during movement, which includes departure, stay and restoration. Women in Myanmar suffer a variety of issues, which include societal, legal, and cultural difficulties. Women in Myanmar cannot access the rights that have supposedly been granted to them. Under the brutality and unfriendly behavior of some Burmese ethnicities and the government of Myanmar, women are compelled to live a persecuted life. A Norwegian Refugee Council report conveys shocking figures of the women who are not enjoying legal rights.\textsuperscript{95}

Almost 33 percent of people in Myanmar do not possess any identity card, and among who do not have identity cards, five percent are women without proof of citizenship. As of 2017, 700,000 Rohingya people had fled to Bangladesh and are now residing there. Among them, 14 percent were single mother households, and half of the refugee population were women.\textsuperscript{96}

Part IV: Conclusion

The 1982 Burma Citizenship Law violates the civil rights of the Rohingya people in the modern Burmese political system. This is intriguing enough to make one enquire about the foundational basis of discriminatory nationality laws around the world and also compels one to study the politicization of identities. Politicization is a political behavior which is bound to political norms of the state. Extreme politicization does not abide by laws; hence, it can alter the laws in the process of dehumanizing and excluding certain ethnicities and races which ultimately leads to conflict.

\textsuperscript{94} Edward, 2009.
\textsuperscript{95} Norwegian Refugee Council et al., 2018.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
Knuters argues that when Rohingya are denied citizenship, they are automatically denied the most basic human rights. He has introduced the term “Political Buddhism”, which describes an identity-driven force for the unrest in the country; along with political Buddhism, poverty and inequality are other reasons for violence in Myanmar. A report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2018 says that a lack of proper accountability and complaint mechanisms has been the reason for the continuation of violence, unrest, and disagreements among the people. Hence, human rights violators take advantage and escape punishment.

In this regard, the institutionalization of proper complaint mechanisms becomes an important factor. South says that there is need for public education enabling minorities to show their ethnic values to the majority and asks the authorities for a national conversation on the nature of citizenship. The education system also needs to make the public aware of different ethnicities in the country and teach all students to respect mutual diversity. Further, South argues that in conflict-ridden countries like Myanmar, education that merely focuses on mutual respect will not be adequate. In such situations, state capacity, accountability, and rule of law should be pooled together with the value of locally-rooted legitimacy. This can be attained by better recognition, certain mutual understandings, and the sharing of benefits through proper channels.

On a positive note, this article seeks a coming future that will bring certain good happenings for the Rohingya and concludes that the Rohingya issue is complex to understand and is an important opportunity to study citizenship and statelessness further, the understanding of which is of immense importance to establish peace in Myanmar.

97 Knuters, 2018.
98 Stokke et al., 2018.
99 South, 2018.
100 Ibid.
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Hate Bait, Micro-publics, and National(ist) Conversations on Burmese Facebook

Elliott Prasse-Freeman

Abstract

Social media’s role in violence against Muslims in Myanmar has been emphasized extensively. The often implicit argument is that uncontained ‘hate speech’ circulating across Facebook in a ‘viral’ fashion has incited incidents of intercommunal and mass violence in Myanmar by deceiving an ignorant and credulous public into believing the worst about their Muslim neighbors. While this cannot be dismissed, this article presents a fuller account of Burmese Facebook by exhibiting a wider array of content (messages, memes, and cartoons) and shows how users are able to parse claims, endorse metaphorical (rather than literal) truths behind content, and espouse political orientations, illustrated through the ‘hate bait’ subgenre of texts. Texts so classified do not cast hatred on their objects but associate those objects with hate and danger. Hate bait encourages readers to take an active part in (re)arranging indexical connections between various tokens, specifically taking Muslim subjects of Burma (neighbors, acquaintances, or colleagues who are more or less Burmese) and resignifying them as also tokens of an ostensible global Muslim threat.

In this way, social media has abetted a general project of demonizing Muslims and ratifying mass violence against them by creating the discursive and symbolic environment in which Muslim claims to political membership (and even decent treatment) in Myanmar are rejected. This rejection is made possible by the active participatory role that the technology affords the average user: by circulating warnings about “radical Islam,” a user indexes his/her subjective stance, while also co-producing knowledge of the potential Muslim threat to the nation. The article closes by proposing that ‘micro-publics’ conjoin with a ‘national’ conversation about national identity, bringing average
people into a position of generating and ratifying that new identity, a rare and empowering opportunity for subjects long excluded from Myanmar’s ‘public’ sphere.
Introduction

It has become axiomatic that a causal relationship exists between the ‘hate speech’ that circulated on Myanmar social media from 2011 to the time of writing, and events of mass violence up to and including the Rohingya genocide that transpired proximate to that speech. Investigative journalism pieces with unequivocal headlines\(^1\) metastasized into journalistic explorations\(^2\),

\(^1\) Such as: McLaughlin, 2018; Mozur, 2018a.
\(^2\) For example: Reed, 2018; Safi & Hogan, 2018; Stecklow, 2018.
'hot-take' style punditry, pullulating nongovernmental organization (NGO)/think tank reports, and endless academic commentary, culminating in a piece de resistance, in which Marzuki Darusman, the chairman of the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, told media that Facebook had played a “determining role” in the genocide, having “substantively contributed to the level of acrimony and disension and conflict... within the public”. Taken together, the weight of so many mutually reinforcing voices on the topic has allowed it to congeal into conventional wisdom, diffusing into mainstream news shows in the United States, from self-serious Frontline to comedian John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight, the latter of which featured the host using a quotation by a Burmese activist that described Facebook as a toilet.

The basic argument, often implicit, in many of these texts is that malign actors, acting either clandestinely or overtly, have capitalized on the affordances of a new technology—Facebook (and the platform’s promotion of the most excretory of human behavior)—to manipulate benighted masses who had access to, but not the competence to adequately maneuver and comprehend, that new technology. The narrative is convenient because it dovetails with identical descriptions of events across the globe—particularly vis-à-vis Russia’s alleged use of social media to undermine the USA’s 2016 elections—and nests within hoary dystopian interpretations of rapid digital advances.

The story told here is admittedly compelling and the instinct that social media has borne some relation to the racist violence against Muslims in Myanmar since 2011’s opening seems apt. However, the particular relationship between the variables (social media causing violence) has remained undertheorized

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3 Solon, 2018.
5 Alex Aung Khant, 2017; Jaeck, 2018; Kinseth, 2018.
6 Miles, 2018.
7 Noted by some Burma commentators (Dowling, 2019; Jaeck, 2018).
and poorly explained, perhaps in the rush to establish the general correlation. Not only is Myanmar’s social media relationship with ultimate outcomes (genocide, mass violence) simply asserted, rather than demonstrated, but any effects on intermediate variables that may have in turn precipitated those heinous ends—specifically, the altering of collective subjectivities from tolerant to hateful, thereby making them receptive to mass violence waged by the state—are not isolated and developed. Did social media somehow create the hate that flowed through it? If not, if the hate emerged from elsewhere, we might ask—after inquiring into why it emerged—whether social media had a role in turning it into a more potent poison than it already would have been. Such lines of inquiry remain unexplored.

The following article addresses these questions directly, arguing that the hate speech argument summarized above relies on a central presumption about Burmese Facebook users: that they are ignorant, poorly educated, and hence more or less incapable of critical thought, thus susceptible both to hoaxes and then to outbreaks of spasmodic violence (either in physical or symbolic terms) befitting their benighted status. The article will critique that assumption, first presenting research on how Facebook users themselves parse texts, and then presenting an array of texts that have circulated on Burmese Facebook that complicate the picture of Burmese Facebook as a simple ‘echo chamber’ of hate. Central to this argument is the insistence that discussions of race and ethnicity in Burmese social media must be disaggregated into distinct types. These range from the spurious language or hoaxes that directly attempt to mobilize immediate violence; to hate speech, which directly demeans and denies the humanity of various minorities; to a third underappreciated kind: ‘hate bait,’ defined here as attempts to politicize race by (re)arranging indexical relations between various social emblems, such that the actions of specific Muslims elsewhere (tokens) are taken to be iconic and representative of behavior of all Muslims (qua type), so that potential actions of Muslims in Burma are made into further tokens of that common type. This builds interpretive frameworks (e.g., Muslims as potentially, if
not inherently, violent), that compel people to resignify former associations, hence justifying eventual violence.

To develop this argument, the article first discusses the inadequacies of current versions of the hate-speech-caused-genocide thesis, analyzing the kinds of texts that have circulated across Burma’s social mediascapes and exploring hate bait through specific examples from Burmese media. The article concludes by considering how social media users have formed ‘micro-publics’ to which they contribute and hypothesizes that those micro-publics link with ‘macro’ conversations, allowing average people to feel like they are contributing to a re-formation of the contours of the Myanmar nation.

Did Facebook Cause Genocide? Disaggregating Hate Speech

Hate Speech as Causing Violence?

The ‘strong’ definition of hate speech—as speech that leads directly to “imminent lawless action”8—has been mobilized with regard to Myanmar in assertions, such as in Darusman’s, that social media itself had a “determining role” in Myanmar’s 2017 ethnic cleansing campaign. However, such theories have been only declared rather than substantiated. In the Rohingya case, given that the military prosecuted the mass violence, the only logical explanation that follows is that either generals designing strategy or low-ranking soldiers carrying it out were incited to deviate from either security concerns or following orders, respectively, to carry out atrocities. This is certainly possible. Yet, as military historian Andrew Selth points out:

If the commander-in-chief, Tatmadaw headquarters, the Western Region commander, LID [Light Infantry Division] commanders, and MPF [Myanmar Police Force] headquarters gave strict orders that atrocities were not to occur, then

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8 Quoted in Benesch, 2014, p. 21.
there would most likely be far fewer cases reported. From all the evidence emerging from the refugee camps, however, such orders have never been given.¹⁹

Selth acknowledges that command-and-control can break down—soldiers can go rogue, as it were—but cites evidence that Rohingya abuses took place on such scale and in such patterned form as to suggest a systematic program.¹⁰ Knowledge of generals’ objectives and psyches is far too incomplete to argue plausibly that they were affected by hate speech (especially given that, as Wai Moe shows in this IJBS special issue, they were creating much of it).

Proponents of the strong version of the theory, however, often describe other, ‘smaller’ cases—ones that were either thwarted or resulted in smaller amounts of violence—as a way to establish a basic model, implying that it could have also been at work in the vastly larger-scale case of Rohingya genocide. Multiple discussions of mob violence in Mandalay insist that social media played a catalytic role, describing how a rape hoax circulated on Facebook was followed by—and correlated with—an eruption of mob violence that led to multiple deaths.¹¹ Three problems are apparent with the argument, however. The first is the issue of the counterfactual: those machinating to instigate internecine violence have done so effectively in the past in Myanmar without needing social media.¹² The second, related issue is mis-inferred causality: reports assert that social media was the independent variable leading to violence, or that the government’s decision to sever access to the internet “put a stop to the clashes”, but both these claims are difficult to determine; further, the ultimate legal conviction of five people for conspiracy to foment the riot—combined with the fact that not all par-

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¹⁹ Selth, 2018, p. 33.
¹¹ CA4DS, 2016; McLaughlin, 2018; Ye Myint Win, 2018.
participants in the riot reportedly learned about the putative offense online—indicate that social media was epiphenomenal.\textsuperscript{13} Third is the issue of scale: the two deaths pale in comparison to the thousands in the Rohingya expulsion.

This relates to another oft-mentioned case: the 9/11 Facebook Messenger mass message hoax that ‘warned’ Buddhists of impending Muslim violence even as it did the same for Muslims about imminent Buddhist attacks.

\textsuperscript{13} A Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) report is representative of the inadequate inference of causality. It writes about the right-wing monk-led ‘969’ movement: “969 is widely alleged to have helped fuel the violence. A report by the NGO Justice Trust that examined the ‘hidden hands’ behind the June 2012 Rakhine violence found a ‘recurrent pattern,’ with 969 sermons preceding anti-Muslim riots,” (2016, p. 6). But the cited Justice Trust report identifies its “main finding” as “the Mandalay riots were designed to appear as a spontaneous outbreak of mob violence, but in fact were perpetrated by an organized gang of armed men brought in from outside Mandalay to enact a pre-determined script written and stage-managed by hidden hands for political ends” (Justice Trust, 2015, p. 1). In other words, the citation did not allege that 969 fueled the violence, but rather suggests the opposite, or at least something more complex: conspirators orchestrating the hate speech and then ultimately carrying out the violence themselves are the cause, and at most social media provided the discursive context that conspirators could point to (‘look at what has happened!’), “providing the perfect cover story to deflect attention from the dirty work of hidden hands” (Justice Trust, 2015, p. 4). For explanations suggesting that the fascist monk Wirathu orchestrated the attacks, see Min Zin, 2015, p. 389.
The incident became memorable not for its success—no deaths resulted from the circulating messages—but because Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, in an interview with Vox.com, attributed the incident’s resolution to the vigilance of his ‘system’, only for an open letter from Myanmar civil society watchdogs\textsuperscript{15} to point out that (a) they were his ‘system’; (b) they were not resourced or equipped to be systematic in their monitoring; and (c) the mass message circulated for four days before it was even flagged, after which point it took even longer for it to be removed. Yet, despite the bad optics for Facebook, the reality remains that notwithstanding the inability for Facebook’s ‘systems’ to adequately identify and stop the spread of the hate speech, the effects of the hoax were minor.

**Hate Speech as Resubjectivizing?**

While direct claims that social media caused violence have gone unsubstantiated, other versions of the argument have implied an indirect causality in which social media hate speech incited violence by making Rohingya in particular, and Muslims in general, into objects of dehumanization. Such arguments implicitly draw on analytical frameworks, such as Susan Benesch’s conception of “dangerous speech”, in which speech has the “potential

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\textsuperscript{14} 9/11 Mass Messenger Hoax message, as cited in Phandeeyar et al., 2018.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
to catalyze collective violence” when it (1) targets a group, (2) either demeans the group as sub-human or polluting or suggests it constitutes a threat, and (3) contains a call for action.\footnote{Benesch’s work (2012) as discussed in the Burmese context by Fink (2018).}

Examples of such dangerous speech abound. The C4ADS report includes multiple examples, such as in figure 2.4, in which a threat is identified and a call to action is made.\footnote{C4ADS, 2016.} A report by Pen Myanmar also includes dozens of examples,\footnote{Pen Myanmar, 2015.} such as figures 2.1 and 2.2, which make direct calls to banish Muslims or to not socially associate with them. Others feature Muslims as dogs or other animals, in literal attempts to dehumanize, while countless more invoke the Myanmar Immigration Department slogan “The earth will not swallow a race to extinction, but another race will.” Harn Lay, long-term satirist of the regime,\footnote{Brooten et al, 2019.} has one of the more hateful cartoons in figure 2.3 given its particularly graphic representation of weaponized procreation, in which reproduction rates, illegal migration, and Rohingya victimhood are linked.
In English, “Get Out Muslim”, and in Burmese, “Because you are living here, our country is not at peace” (Pen Myanmar, 2015).
“Better to marry a beggar than a Muslim” (Pen Myanmar, 2015).

Cartoonist Harn Lay’s 2017 piece on illegal immigration.
But what has been the collective effect of such hate? The *Times* investigative report introduced above (Mozur, 2018a) and elaborated in Wai Moe (this issue) suggests a great deal. They uncovered a massive military program devoted to filling Burmese Facebook with hate, hoaxes, and racist nationalism: 700 soldiers working in shifts infiltrated innocuous public Facebook pages (such as those for celebrities) with such content. This reporting confirmed the existence of an amount of ‘dark matter’ operating behind the scenes that many had long suspected, and when

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23 A meme with a call to action: “Because I am a Burmese Buddhist, if my race and religion are assailed, I should and will be rough and rude” (C4ADS, 2016).

24 Short, 2018.
taken together with data analysis done on Twitter, a picture emerged of a vast effort by the state to influence the minds of Burmese netizens.

While the existence of the program has been established, the effects of this effort have remained more difficult to assess. This is firstly because the Times reporters do not delve into the specifics of how these trolls constructed their claims. And while other studies have observed the actions of what appear to be fake accounts—so identified by the thinness of their personal detail (from profile picture to friends) and how they insert identical comments into the threads of multiple different pages, attempting to seed particular political messages (the impotence of the democratic political; the threat of Muslims; support of the military)—neither those other studies nor the Times article have yet established the consequences of these efforts. For instance, Mozur, the lead journalist on the Times investigative report, made in a subsequent tweet a claim about the putative impact of the uncovered military program: “Several researchers estimated two-thirds of the hate speech, hoaxes, [and] vitriol began with the military”. Moreover, he also conceded that “far more study is needed” and fell back on the equivocal, “everyone believed it made ethnic divisions in the country far worse”—which stands in stark contrast to the conclusion screamed from the headline. Mozur here inadvertently points to a larger issue in this literature: none of the reports on social media in Myanmar provide insights into the entire universe of hate speakers – were those 700 military men a drop in a much larger bucket, and

26 Aung Kaung Myat, n.d.
27 Ong and Cabañes (2018) wrote a fascinating study of trolls-for-hire in the Philippines, but the objectives were quite different in that market context and it is difficult to know if the military trolls in Myanmar drew from the same repertoire of tactics.
28 Mozur, 2018b.
hence merely magnified messages already circulating in society?  

Or did they truly change the ecology, meaningfully deepening the levels of hate circulating online?

**Hate Bait: Rumors, Conspiracy Theories, Reassessments**

One reason why such questions mostly go unposed is that the effects of these trolls and hateful Buddhist clerics are taken as self-evident, given the presumed nature of those whom they are manipulating. Here the social-media-caused-genocide arguments rely on a theory of Burmese social media dominated by the trope of the credulous and gullible Burmese user. This user is incapable of differentiating fake from real news and is particularly susceptible to hate speech because of his/her general ignorance. The insistence that a decimated education system leads to an entire society of people untrained in “how to think” is promoted in academic discourse, in academic blogs, in casual discourse, and by Facebook itself. Such arguments never explore, however, the multiple domains in which ‘education’ occurs, not engaging through ethnographic study, for instance, Gramsci’s famous argument that “organic intellectuals” emerge from the “education” generated through material existence.

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29 While the *Times* report installs the military as central, others describe the extensive networks and media machines run by prestigious nationalist monks; it is unclear where these two populations overlap, if at all.

30 Min Zin suggests that “hate speech” and its eager reception has changed “norms, practices, and the very lifestyle of society at large” (2015, p. 384).

31 This comment was made by an anonymous peer-reviewer for a 2014 Myanmar studies article of mine.


33 Allen, 2018.

34 Learning to Think, 2015.

35 Deevy, 2019.

36 Gramsci, 1971, pp. 9-12.
Instead, the argument is blithely adopted by the social media analysts as the perfect (and perfectly convenient) explanation for why the masses have been fooled by hate speech. The C4ADS report is emblematic of much commentary when it writes that while “much of the information” that circulates on Burmese Facebook “is false or taken out of context”, it “is still regarded as true among many in Myanmar’s still relatively unsophisticated media audience, who, after decades of media isolation, often lack an understanding of basic media biases and photo manipulation techniques”. The Myanmar Center for Responsible Business also makes the link explicit, writing:

Myanmar’s education system, which is based on rote learning, rather than critical thinking and analysis, does not generally build the skills needed to debate the ethics of the complex societal issues which arise from ICTs (information and communications technology), and identify appropriate rights-based solutions.

Here, the Myanmar people are presented in the main as innocent and agency-less victims of the current changes: given their recent emergence from military rule, they have been ill-equipped to manage the dual challenges of learning the wiles of both the new technology and a new political system—both of which allow for immensely greater freedom of expression than previous modes. As the Fact-Finding Mission puts it, “as elsewhere in the world, the internet and social media platforms have enabled the spread of this kind of hateful and divisive rhetoric. The Myanmar context is distinctive, however, because of the relatively new exposure of the Myanmar population to the

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37 Jaeck writes that “decades of military rule,” meant that “critical thinking was strongly suppressed and completely absent from the curriculum – even at the university level” (2018).
38 C4ADS, 2016, p. 10.
Internet and social media". Hence, it is the Facebook “monster”—so described by United Nations Human Rights special rapporteur Yanghee Lee—that has chomped up and spat out Myanmar’s polity following the reckless ‘move fast and break stuff’ modus operandi of the company’s founders. The monster does not, alternatively, come from within.

And yet, it is not simple leftist posturing to insist on the Gramscian argument for examining how normal people’s daily lives taught them how to make sense of data constructed about their worlds. Specifically, the presumptions that Burma’s masses are passive receptacles to hate speech are complicated when we consider their ability to parse and often reject the military regime’s propaganda during the years of military domination. Jennifer Leehey’s work on information during that era shows that the regime did not try to convince people, and the people did not allow themselves to be convinced:

The authorities are much more concerned with producing a facsimile of public opinion than with convincing people, affecting their inner lives in some way. [...] For the most part, I would emphasize, people pay little attention: newspapers go unread, and TVs are turned down during the news and turned up when the Chinese movies come on afterwards.41

While more research must be conducted to tease out how that propaganda which was explicitly enregistered and metapragmatically marked as propaganda (texts, such as those that described Aung San Suu Kyi as a traitor, that were not meant to persuade but to call attention to the sovereign prerogative to not persuade) interacted with the more banal information flowing from the state (such as that which presented Muslims as dangerous as a by-product of coverage of the Global War on Terror)42,
it is noteworthy how rarely analysts today have conceived of the military years as at least in part a master course in debunking fake news, with public as pupil.\(^{43}\)

**Sophisticated Users, Sophisticated Texts**

A closer examination of the texts circulating on Burmese Facebook is hence warranted. First, while some surveys of ‘dangerous speech’ find nearly all of it to be directed at Muslims,\(^{44}\) it is relevant to mention that the Pen report finds hate speech being leveled against *multiple* objects: not simply religious and ethnic minorities (Muslims, and particularly Rohingya), but political parties (both the National League for Democracy and the Union Solidarity and Development Party), the military, ethnic armed groups, political activists, female politicians, and even ‘the people’ itself have all been objects of hate speech. In my own research on and catalogue of popular Burmese cartoons, I collected dozens of cartoons that defamed and demeaned the Chinese in similar ways: as stealing resources and women, colonizing the country, and leading to penury for Burmese people.

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\(^{43}\) Alex Aung Khant comments on how fast Myanmar people have shifted their distrust from local to foreign media but does not explain why this has occurred (2017).

\(^{44}\) Myanmar Center for Responsible Business, 2015, p. 146.
Cartoonist Shwe Moe’s 2016 cartoon features a caricatured Chinese figure stealing Myanmar women and resources while nationalists sing a song directed at protecting against Muslims.

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45 Cartoonist Shwe Moe’s 2016 cartoon features a caricatured Chinese figure stealing Myanmar women and resources while nationalists sing a song directed at protecting against Muslims.
Cartoonist Thura’s 2016 cartoon features a caricatured Chinese figure singing of his exploitation while standing on dam and SEZ sites.
We [Chinese] did not contest the election, no? However, [we] just [won] a landslide!

Figure 3.3

47 A caricatured Chinese figure comments on the friendly relations with the new government, conjures up the landslides in the China-linked jade industry (source unknown).
Way Yee Taungyi’s 2014 cartoon without text portrays caricatured Chinese figures colonizing Myanmar.
Moreover, Chinese and South Asian / Muslim caricatures are often included together in cartoons that critique the special privileges exacted by undeserving ‘foreigners’.\(^{49}\)

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\(^{49}\) For discussion, see: Prasse-Freeman & Phyo Win Latt, 2018.

\(^{50}\) Cartoonist Htoo’s 2015 cartoon features caricatured Chinese and Muslim figures attempting to ‘pass’ as nationals but being betrayed by their accents.
Cartoonist Biruma’s 2015 cartoon features Chinese and Muslim figures, from the safety of their domiciled perches, commenting on the homeless problem that plagued Yangon in 2015.
Cartoonist Harn’s 2015 cartoon is one of many that feature both Chinese and Muslims together that contrast their putative culture of hard work hard work against Burmese sloth.
Cartoonist Biruma’s 2015 cartoon features a Muslim commenting to a Chinese about Bama squandering their wealth on beer.
In cartoonist Aung San Kyaw’s 2017 cartoon, while Muslim and Chinese shops remain perpetually open, a Burmese shop finds many reasons to close (1, 2), before closing for good and announcing its sale (3).
Myanmar’s most famous living cartoonist, Maung Maung Fountain, whose complex work will be discussed below, features a parrot in a tea-shop squawking out complaints about Chinese, ‘kalar’ (Muslims), and the police in the same breath as it intones tea orders, implying that such complaints are dreadfully common and banal.

The general point of this section is to show that not only do Chinese experience much of the same kind of symbolic derogation as Muslims, and not only are Chinese and Muslims often presented together as equals in the exploitation of the country, but there are also texts that support these groups, critiquing chauvinism implicitly, or in figure 7, nationalist movements explicitly.

Figure 6

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55 Cartoonist Maung Maung Fountain’s 2017 cartoon.
Burmese Facebook even has its own ‘shitposting’ community. A mild qualitative difference can be marked between shitposting and ‘trolling’ – in which the latter advances an attack on a direct object, trying to destroy or torment it, out of which “amusement is derived from another person’s anger”, whereas shitposting is designed to observe the ludicrous and bizarre in the social world, and then play with representative signs (reinterpret them, comment upon them, juxtapose them) in creative ways so as to build a community of others who appreciate the play. Burma’s young shitposting scene organizes itself around Burmese Uncensored Memes-I (BUMi), a Facebook group with 100,000 followers; the group has a terms of membership that includes progressive values, with prohibitions against “sexual Harassment; Sexist and heteronormie bullshit; Distasteful 13 Year

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56 Cartoonist Biruma’s 2016 cartoon showing protesters for dignity protesting without dignity.
58 For Burmese memes generally, see: Patton, 2018.
59 https://www.facebook.com/groups/TheBUMi/
old Sex jokes; racism, Islamophobia, fascism, pro-war, anti-LGBTQ; Rape Joke... Porn or Memepification [sic] of revenge porn related, Celebrity bullshit, Inappropriate screenshots”—violation of which can earn a member a temporary or permanent ban.

Burma’s shitposting scene made international headlines for a post (figure 8) declaring “WE NO NEED COFFEE ANNAN HE GO AWAY”. Kofi Annan, then the chairperson of an independent commission on the Rakhine State violence, had been the object of racist scorn by Burmese Facebook (figure 9) below, and the meme in question added an additional layer of ignorance by using Hollywood actor Morgan Freeman’s photograph rather than Annan’s.

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Figure 8

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60 Morgan Freeman as Kofi Annan, source unknown.
The meme was picked up by American news service Associated Press as an example of Burma’s ignorant racists, after which the meme’s page announced the hoax, a fact that also became news. The effect of the meme was to simultaneously poke fun at Burma’s nationalists – by designing a text that used excess to call attention to their general ignorance – and to note the willingness of international press to see only that ignorance.

Reinterpreting the ‘Hate’

By acknowledging the existence of other such possibilities in texts circulating on Burmese Facebook, the interpretation of

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61 Cartoonist Banthu Aung’s (date unknown) caricature of one Chinese and Kofi Annan acting as Myanmar Immigration officers (so identified by the slogan behind their heads), implying that China and the International community had usurped Myanmar's sovereignty.

particular exemplars of hate speech morphs in turn. Take an example in the C4ADS report:

Pieces of misinformation can border on absurdity. One post depicts ‘Bengalis as cannibals’, using fairly obvious fake pictures of ‘human butcher shops’ that were originally from a video game marketing stunt in London. This post was ‘liked’ over 9,100 times and shared almost 40,000 times, as of October 2015.\(^{63}\)

While C4ADS implies that liking and sharing serves an epistemological function (in which Burmese Facebook users assess the truth value of a statement and then share it to inform others), this is only one possible interpretation, foreclosing on the possibility that Myanmar people understand and make liberal and creative use of metaphor. Specifically, here the report presumes that the users take the story of Bengalis as cannibals as literal, rather than a distillation of a ‘deeper’ truth: that Bengalis (and Muslims more generally) devour other people (and, as we are constantly reminded, the Immigration Department slogan is about a race swallowing another race, after all).

In another example, a Facebook user with a Burmese name posted an entire fake New York Times story, including fake quotes from multiple local imams, ‘uncovering’ the extensive penetration of Rohingya militant group the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) into Rohingya villages (hence establishing the entire Rohingya population as legitimate object for military expulsion). The level of sophistication is reflected all the way down to the syntax:

Excerpts from the interview by New York Times investigative journalist with the refugees in Bangladesh revealed how widespread the ARSA tentacles had reached in nearly every Rohingya village and how intertwined the villagers are with

\(^{63}\) C4ADS, 2016, p. 10.
ARSA militancy often with the local cleric as the coordinator.

Figure 10

When challenged by readers to produce the link to the actual *Times* article, the user admitted the ruse, arguing that honesty is not necessary in defending one’s country.
Noteworthy here is how what seems to be an effort to establish an epistemological claim (by using the world’s paper of record, going to the effort of making up names of imams, giving them quotes, etc.) is disavowed. While this could simply be a way of the user insisting s/he had not been shamed into silence (reinforced by the inclusion of the three winking emojis), it also suggests that the aesthetics of truth, the construction of a truth that is deeper than facts, is what is more important here.

Even posts that more directly approach the theme of protection of the country against external threats often use elision, humor, and irony to distance themselves from the theme of violent defense. In figure 12, in a meme that was shared over a quarter of a million times from 2016 to 2018, generated 3,200 comments, and accumulated 50,000 ‘likes,’ five young women stand side-by-side across a dirt path while bearing long knives and staring (faux) menacingly at the camera. Text above them declares, “Do not come and insult our race, our religion, and our religious community!” The text below reads, “If you are real Myanmar, share it!”
The meme incorporates a number of features that makes it a successful member of the genre. In addition to its use of Burmese internet slang (using “shey”, the vernacular loan-word for “share”) the text poses several vertiginous juxtapositions to amuse the viewer. First, the women themselves construct a wonderfully polysemous sign: as Burmese women they are tokens of the icon of the threatened nation—the source of racial purity and the guarantor of racial propagation, both of which are under direct threat from foreigners intent on miscegenation. The four recently enacted race and religion protection laws\textsuperscript{65} explicitly make the women’s body the site of legal protection and control, indexing racial and nationalist anxiety with women’s bodies—as in the above meme. However, the specific bodies of the women in the meme, brandishing weapons and gathering together in strength, defy that image of passive victimhood. In this

\textsuperscript{64} “Do not come and insult our race, our religion, and our religions community! If you are real Myanmar, share it!” (source unknown).

\textsuperscript{65} Walton, McKay, & Phyu Phyu Thi, 2015.
sense they indicate that the threat is so great that *even* women will defend the nation; but in so doing they indict the machismo masculinity as unnecessary. Second, while some of the women appear resolute, others smirk with metapragmatic recognition: together they are simultaneously joking and serious, providing a mimesis of the social media consumer who is both serious about defending the nation even with violence and is yet reticent about articulating that desire out loud. Such features of play allow distance from actual invocations to violence while also allowing viewers to partake in it.

Further, we can consider Maung Maung Fountain’s infamous “Me First” cartoon, in which a faceless, nearly naked (suggesting culture-less) individual labeled “boat-person” jumps in front of a line of people adorned in clothing styles representing various Myanmar ethnicities, declaring that he is first (figure 13).

![Figure 13](image)

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66 “Me First” by Maung Maung Fountain (2016).
The cartoon generated condemnation from those who objected to its racist imagery, becoming the topic of at least one article and a central feature in others. The cartoon, as might be expected, spurred alternative interpretations from Burmese audiences: Ye Ni, the Burmese edition editor who approved the cartoon, told the Financial Times that, “I understand the message that the cartoonist wants to say: Myanmar is a very fragile country with many other issues—civil war, economic development—not only the Rohingya issue”. Kyaw Swa Moe, co-founder of the Irrawaddy, Burma’s independent paper of record—which has lent its imprimatur to many of the hate baiting cartoons circulating widely across Myanmar cyberspace—differentiated the Irrawaddy’s reporting from that which the international community is interested in, saying “we are trying to portray the real situation of Myanmar, and also the very complex situation of Rakhine in this issue”. Maung Maung Fountain himself explained the cartoon by saying, “I meant to say that some people want more and more rights and opportunities”.

Such commentary points beyond the dismissal of the Rohingya and their putative scheming to the broader national context—and it is here that a critique of the entire system of exclusion, or rather deferred inclusion, for everyone in the country emerges. By presenting Burmese people as standing in a line, the cartoon suggests that people have to wait to get justice or recognition, and that their belonging is itself postponed. It also presents slightly more privileged subjects as having established a barrier keeping out the Rohingya. And given that, as just mentioned, signs are polysemous, even if the cartoonist was actively attempting to be racist, the text still enacts these other semiotic effects—as relayed to me by Burmese readers of the cartoon.

The fact that entire articles were written about foreigners’ responses to the cartoon stands as a way of substantiating an

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67 @etakatetakate, 2016.
69 Reed, 2018.
70 Ibid.
71 Myanmar cartoonists, 2017.
additional point made by many Burmese social users: in the policing of content as ‘hate speech’, important political commentary and even actions can be foreclosed. A piece by the cartoonist Joker that ran in a local newspaper in 2017 included the perceived threat to the nation, and then incorporated the ostensible silencing of those calling attention to that threat (figure 14).
It is here that we can turn to the broader discussion of ‘hate bait’ and the political mobilization messages that I believe

Figure 14\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{2} Cartoonist Joker’s 2017 cartoon features a snake devouring an icon of a Myanmar citizen who is admonished to not say ‘hate speech’ by the man saving him.
are the most critical aspects of Burmese Facebook. As Matt Schissler, Matt Walton, and Phyu Phyu Thi put it:

By recognizing the narrative of Muslim threat as a ‘master narrative’ in Myanmar at present, we also recognize that hate speech is not necessary in order to construct a narrative of Muslim threat. In our interviews, respondents expressed anti-Muslim sentiments not through overtly hateful or dehumanizing speech, but rather through reference to ostensibly reasonable and credible sources such as international news coverage of global events.\(^{73}\)

Indeed, much of the nationalist rhetoric on Burmese Facebook cannot be construed as ‘hate speech’ *per se*. Rather, Schissler underscores that “news from Muslim countries... (is) regularly discussed in Burmese on Facebook”—in which “atrocities by ISIS in Syria and Iraq; abductions and murders committed by Boko Haram; violence in the Central African Republic” are relayed—in one sense “just news stories, neither false nor the virulent hate speech that attracts international media attention”, and yet, “they nonetheless support a presentation of Islam as violent and threatening”.\(^{74}\) In other words, the predominance of the rhetoric does not qualify as hate speech in the sense that it rarely (a) conveys new information about the actions of (b) an identifiable enemy against which (c) violent response is incited. Instead, most of the content should be understood as ‘hate bait,’ in which readers are beckoned or encouraged to draw conclusions about local conditions by assembling indexical connections between items as part of broader processes of arranging ‘orders of indexicality’,\(^{75}\) such that various metonyms are attached together so as to ultimately bind general phenomena or specific actions *elsewhere* to political circumstances *in Burma*, so as to construct stereo-

\(^{73}\) Schissler, Walton, & Phyu Phyu Thi, 2015, p. 17.

\(^{74}\) Schissler, 2015, p. 14.

\(^{75}\) Silverstein, 2003.
types of both object and subject (the sharer of the text). As conveyed in the examples above, the phenomenon can be conceptually rendered as follows:

actions of specific Muslims elsewhere (tokens)  
→  
behavior of Muslims (qua type)  
→  
potential actions of Muslims in Burma (as tokens of type)

Figures 15 and 16 serve as useful illustrations of this phenomenon. The first was cited in the Pen report\(^\text{76}\) and presents images of bloody incidents as representative of Islam writ large; the second adorns an article in the Ma Ba Tha journal Tha-gee Thway (“Buddha’s Blood”) entitled “Nationalism and Human Rights” that advances a spirited critique against the hypocrisies of the human rights regime while elaborating on the putative aggression of Islam. Figure 16’s image itself contains the innocuous description “A sight of a punishment under Sharia law in Sudan”.\(^\text{77}\) When posted on Tha-gee Thway’s Facebook page (since taken down), the image itself was free to be circulated and re-textualized. The dry description of the evocative scene illustrates an additional difference between hate speech and hate bait genres: whereas hate speech generates a response of a similar qualitative type (meeting violence with violence; contesting the hatefulness of Muslims with Buddhist hate), hate bait performs decorous civilized conduct, reiterating the distinction between ostensible Buddhist sophistication and Muslim baseness.

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\(^{76}\) Pen Myanmar, 2015, p. 29.  
\(^{77}\) In Burmese: “ဆူဒန်နိုင်ငံတွင် ီယာဥပရဒမြင့််အမပစ်ရပေးရနေသာ နိုင်ငံတော်တွင် မြင်ကွင်ေးတစ်ခို”.
THOUSANDS OF SIKHS CAPTURED THROUGHOUT PUNJAB REGION & BROUGHT IN A PROCESSION BOUND IN IRONS. ALL CAPTURED SIKHS WERE ASKED TO ACCEPT ISLAM & BE RELEASED OR ELSE BE SLAUGHTERED IN PUBLIC. ONE BY ONE EACH ONE OF THEM CHOSE DEATH BUT REMAINED A SIKH TO THE END.

1749-1753, LAHORE HORSE MARKET, PUNJAB
Manna Sadi Bdr, Ashin Mannu De Boye.
Jion Jion Manna Vedhda, Ashin Doone Chaone Hoje.
Mannu Is Our Sickle And We [Sikhs] Are His Crop,
The More He Slaughters Us, The More We Grow.

Figure 1578

78 Pen Myanmar, 2015, p. 29.
These texts work to compel Myanmar subjects themselves to reorganize their understanding of the world. Schissler et al. convey the compelling finding that informants who identified Muslims as an active threat to Myanmar nonetheless described this identification as a realization—i.e., a new perspective—and that in the past, inter-religious conditions between the groups were amicable. While there existed historical ambient animosity between Burmese (as type) and Muslims (as type), semiotic linkages with past animosity were often dampened to the point of non-existence. But now, in the context of political-economic dislocations and general social upheaval associated with ‘transition’, right-wing interventions are recalling historical tensions and reanimating texts (songs, slogans) from those earlier peri-

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79 Author’s photo of article from Thagee Thway, 2015.
80 Schissler et al, 2015.
ods of animosity, redrawing an unbroken line dividing the communities. They are encouraging people to access these previous chains, revivify them, and hence resignify their everyday interactions with Muslims in these newly activated interpretive contexts.

For instance, Schissler shows how, in the context of communal tension during a period of rumors of imminent Muslim violence in western Yangon in 2013, a group of Burmese friends found their Muslim neighbor’s status as part of their group suddenly ambiguous: “Htoo Lay interrupted another friend at the table and ended the conversation abruptly – our friend Tin Win was approaching with his wife and son. Tin Win is Muslim, his wife is Buddhist; the table looked at me with eyes full of pointed significance”. Before this period of tension, Tin Win inhabited a token of one type (neighbor, Myanmar person, etc.); here, he was inserted into a different indexical chain: Muslim, token of common type of dangerous Muslims who want to destroy the nation. This is perhaps not a simple process of recodification, in which the previous set of associations is subsumed, completely effaced by the new indexical chain: hence the ambiguity conveyed in Schissler’s ethnographic rendering, in which the actors do not know quite what to make of their Muslim neighbor (and it is to Schissler's credit as an ethnographer that he allows the ambiguity to remain unresolved, as he seems to sense that it remained that way for his interlocutors). Here, while the previous set of signs (actual camaraderie, friendship, manifest non-violence over thousands of previous interactions) is not fully resignified as a lie or subterfuge, it is at least put into question: Tin Lin may continue to operate consistently with his previous behavior, but given this other set of associations, it might be beyond his control, his fundamental irrefragable Muslim-ness (as an overpowering essence) might emerge to betray the better angels of his nature. Or at the very least, to be a good citizen, protector of the community, it is incumbent for his friends to at least publicly perform such vigilance.

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81 Prasse-Freeman, 2017.
82 Schissler, 2013.
As this anecdote suggests, conspiracy theories fit within the hate bait framework, in that they compel people to rearrange previous associations, so as to entertain and remain vigilant to the possibility of alternative trajectories of causality as governing the true organization of social life. Burmese Facebook is, unsurprisingly, full of such tropes. The United Nations, previously an arbiter of truth, is reimagined as being run by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Likewise, the United States, long Burma’s savior, is reimagined as a cynical foe, exaggerating the Rohingya crisis as part of a Great Game-style containment strategy vis-à-vis China.\(^{83}\) posts with Rohingya leaders posing with US elites (such as ex-President George W Bush) are circulated as evidentiary of collusion in broader conspiracy to take over Myanmar. It should be added that the National League for Democracy is implicated in the same field of associations, as Rohingya or Muslims are presented as an agent of pollution in which simple proximity leads to political infection.\(^{84}\) Behind many of these imaginaries is a lurking Muslim—identifiable by markers of militancy, piety, or radicalism—who funds or otherwise influences global procedures (figure 17).

\(^{83}\) Selth, 2018, p. 23.

\(^{84}\) Inaccessible Facebook post from 10 July, 2019, on file with author.
Nesting within these broader conspiracy theories about Islamists seeking world domination are specific localized examples—particularly of wealthy Muslims paying Burmese co-religionists for every additional Buddhist bride taken, or plans by Bangladesh specifically and the Muslim world in general to use the pathetic images of encamped Rohingya to generate international sympathy and resources that can be redeployed (such as through bribing corrupt state officials) to colonize Myanmar territory. Prominent monks, for their part, circulate descriptions of their dreams, conveying ominous visions of territorial displacement or religious annihilation. Hence, where the explicit conspiracies provide specific detail, the monks’ vaguer narratives serve to undergird the general sentiment in trusted and revered sources. Here Aung San Suu Kyi’s shameful line, “Global Muslim power is very great and certainly, that is a perception in many parts of the world and in our country as well”

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85 Returns on investments, illustrated (Awzathee, 2017).
86 Siddique, 2013.
can be perceived as functionally similar. Suu Kyi here draws legitimacy from the rest of the world—and as Schissler shows, Burmese believers form bonds of solidarity in bigotry with “Islamophobes and Holocaust deniers” the world over, while those more skeptical of the conspiracies and their full logics and implications can at least recognize that the same concern is shared globally.

**What is a “Like”, Anyway?**

Hence, rather than being purely epistemologically driven, meant to convey information about the world, we might instead perceive social media behavior as socially and politically determined or at least partially motivated/inflected: Burmese Facebook members are not just consumers of data but active participants consciously arranging themselves in relation to the political content of particular messages, imbricating themselves within networks of other participants.

This conscious process became apparent when I met with technology NGOs in Yangon who deployed teams of monitors to track and assess social media content. I inquired as to whether they had ‘mapped’ the networks of hate speech or and nationalist rhetoric, attempting to determine the parameters of the hate bait social network—particularly in terms of nodes in nested networks: how did messages circulate? Were there ‘influencers’ with tens of thousands of followers magnifying certain messages? The staff relayed that unlike in other contexts (for instance the Middle East’s ‘Twitter Revolution’, so-called for Twitter’s role in ostensibly aiding protesters in Iran’s Green Revolution and Egypt’s Arab Spring uprising to communicate information and generate support), Burmese Facebook users do not simply forward content, rather they copy/paste the content and then make an entirely new post, often citing the source of info (‘source: internet’) before grafting on their own content. This

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87 Schissler, 2016.
makes it difficult to trace the provenance of messages in the efficient ways favored by quantitative sociology.

Yangon tech firm staff interpreted this phenomenon as the Burmese Facebook user having determined that new posts will attract more likes than forwards – that users have figured out a key aspect of the way the system works, have got a “feel for the algorithm”. In this sense the users are conducting a ‘semiotics of the “like”’ and have determined that it is phatic: an index of how many eyeballs come to rest upon a post. But if we assume a ‘like’ is not only phatic but also affirmative (both “emotive”—calling attention to the liker—and “conative”—focusing attention on the recipient—to use Roman Jakobson's terms), then we reorient our focus away from the spreading of a particular message, and to the subjectivity of the sender. Then we can begin to think of what is being affirmed: not only the post and its message, but the laborer himself, as the one who has invested the nationalist labor in which the person creates his own post not simply to spread the message more effectively but to get more likes for his subjective stance (this also indicates the importance of paying close attention to how Burmese Facebook users themselves give meanings to signs such as ‘likes,’ something that can be accomplished through ethnographies of social media).

Social media participants are marking their subjective stance: the kind of person who would protect the nation, even as they co-produce, actively participate in, that defense of the nation.

Hence, particularly in this environment in which there is an absence of public faith in standard sources of data, based on longstanding and enduring distrust of elite media, individuals

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89 Reich (2015), Markham (2013) and others have begun outlining participant observation methods for conducting this kind of research.
91 Alex Aung Khant, 2017; Leehey, 2010.
92 Phandeeyar, 2019, p. 29; Eaint Thiri Thu, 2019, pp. 232-33, 235.
are interpellated to assemble and reinforce various semiotic signatures to construct common narratives about the world. What many of these accounts demonstrate is how little trust there is of any sources—and so when people share things, they do so if it comes from someone they are aligned with (a religious figure, a community leader) in what can be called “provisional belief”. In this context, where the actual epistemological truth value of statements is always subject to revision, what takes precedence is the alignment, the choice of what to believe.⁹³ (The importance of these networks throws the mass messenger hoax described above—the hoax that Facebook did not have the systems in place to thwart—into critical relief: when a user received a message from a name/number s/he did not recognize, it is likely they were not only more suspicious but less likely to feel called to join).

Hence, if the internet is the terrain, users construct the infrastructure: embedding themselves into the routes of nationalism, indicating that one can get there through them, and get to other like-minded nationalists as well. Hence, in a fractally recursive way—from elites’ networks to villagers’—people do not only consume nationalism but produce it. And this why the more subtle nationalist arguments in hate bait are insidiously effective: they require a certain amount of engagement. This engagement, and the mass participation of micro-publics, allows a new theorization of the ‘virality’ metaphor: not in its now-classic sense of a sign’s rapid reproduction, circulation, and saturation of a network, but rather virality as viral load: the repetition of the sign from multiple sources that produces an accretion of the shared elements of that sign, leading to a rearrangement of common sense around those elements.

**Conclusion: New Public Conversations**

From the beginning of Facebook’s adoption in Myanmar, reporting emerged on the particularly political nature of its use.

⁹³ I have described this kind of orientation to truth as endemic to America as well (Prasse-Freeman, 2011).
Whereas the social networking platform had come to dominate many other parts of the world by providing avenues for endless pet photos and individual expressions of narcissism, in Burma it included—in addition to those things, certainly—a deeper socio-political inflection, often creating the news in the country as much as simply providing a space for reflection upon it. As early as 2013, for instance, journalist Yen Snaing highlighted the positive political opportunities provided by the space, featuring crowd-funding initiatives for charity work and an opening vignette in which a betel seller on the streets of Bago identified 93-year-old former freedom fighter Thakin Hla Kyaing begging at Pegu Bridge and used Facebook to raise the equivalent of 10,000 USD for him. The article also contrasts these edifying initiatives to observe the fraught nature of the platform, as hate speech thrived in an environment in which it could not be tracked, given the prevalence of anonymous accounts.

But the Hla Kyaing crowd-sourcing stands as more than simply an example of ‘local’ uses of a global technology: it also had national implications. The Facebooker who identified Hla Kyaing not only harnessed the platform to raise funds, but he created news of genuine, while mild, historical resonance (representing to the Myanmar public the last living member of the independence era). The fact that this story could be told speaks to a certain thinness of critical institutions in Myanmar: both the state, and its inability to provide for its war heroes, and the under-capacitated media, in which such stories could be fallen on by a road-side betel seller. The incident indexes an openness to Burma’s national story itself.

This article concludes by proposing an argument for why social media is such a novel space in Myanmar, conjoining the virality argument introduced above with the question of why this kind of hate has emerged at this particular historical juncture. Social media not only allows for active participation in localized discursive networks where one’s words and opinions matter, but as the example above shows, contains the potential

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94 Yen Snaing, 2013.
to link with ‘national’ conversations.\textsuperscript{95} We can use Benedict Anderson’s theory of print capitalism and nationalism,\textsuperscript{96} but go beyond the heuristic of “the imagined community” to focus on Anderson’s implicit semiotic argument: collectivities of certain linguistic practices become infrastructural for development of new political communities, by developing mutual joint attention around a new object—the nation.\textsuperscript{97} The argument is that while Anderson perhaps oversold his concept,\textsuperscript{98} experiences such as the current Burmese one perhaps realize it adequately for the first time. First, cartoons, memes, and other texts with high ratios of images to content are more easily circulatable than their seventeenth-century cousins (the novel and the newspaper), as the former display a high degree of ‘platform promiscuity’: a Burmese cartoon will be published first in print, to then be circulated on digital platforms, to be then re-presented at festivals, at rallies, on t-shirts, etc., producing a virile virality.

Second, and more importantly, given the distrust of elite media, combined with the new affordances of digital platforms, social media opens a space for joint-participation in the production of the symbolic material that will re-form the nation. This kind of participation stands as an intensified version of “unisonance”, the term Anderson used to describe the collective effervescence felt in singing along to a national anthem. But here not only do people reproduce the nation in mimesis, they produce it in the first instance. To put this in Erving Goffman’s terms,\textsuperscript{99} where those singing a national anthem are animating a text that someone else wrote, in this case, the anthem itself is written and refined by the singers of the song: they are by turns co-authors and ratifiers of the nation’s new texts, installing an immediate relationship between themselves and the nation’s narratives.

\textsuperscript{95}See also: McCarthy, 2018a; Min Zin, 2015, p. 379; Nyi Nyi Kyaw, 2019.
\textsuperscript{97}I thank Joe Errington for introduction to this semiotic reading of Anderson, as part of his Yale University course “Language, Power, Identity,” for which I served as a Teaching Fellow in 2016.
\textsuperscript{98}Given his presumptions of literacy and monolingualism that did not reflect contemporaneous realities – see Hobsbawm, 1996.
This construction of the nation compels a final reflection on what can be done about the hate bait scourge. While it is laudable that academics are looking for solutions, by encouraging “training” either to heighten “citizenship skills”, “communication skills”, \(^{100}\) or to promote “genuine religious education”, \(^{101}\) such a focus mis-appreciates the ways in which knowledge is being co-produced in Myanmar through the application of collective labor. These participatory aspects, and the affect they generate, help explain why epistemological interventions (about truth of information) are impotent to dampen the xenophobia forged online and offline (and in between). Perhaps one hope is that the memers, the shitposters, and the progressive cartoonists will invest alternative narratives of the nation with the same kind of affect. If so, onward, to the digital barracks!

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\(^{101}\) McCarthy 2018b, p. 181.
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Religion and Politics in Kachin Conflict

Joshua

Abstract

The centrality of religion in the making of modern Kachin ethnic identity must be understood in the context of political crisis arising from the complex interplay of religion and politics. Kachin theologians understand and explain their people’s conflict through a biblical lens and the Kachin are likely to continue armed struggle until they enter the promised land in which justice and genuine peace embrace each other. This means that the Kachin Independence Army is unlikely to return to the politically unsettled peace that characterized the period prior to the 1994 ceasefire agreement with the Tatmadaw. More broadly, political instability, economic stagnation, ethnic insurgency, and humanitarian crises will continue to paralyze Burma unless the historically legitimate interests of the Kachin and other ethnic minority groups are respected and protected.

1 Pseudonym.
Kachin History

The ethnic Kachin, much like other upland people in Burma, never learned how to read and write until the late nineteenth century, when Christian missionaries came to their country and invented a writing system for them. This is why they had no written history describing how they settled in what they now call Kachinland in the northern frontier of contemporary Burma. Kachin oral history, according to which the ethnic Chin and Kachin were blood brothers, suggests that they possibly came from the Tibetan plateau that they call Major Shingra Bum. In his extensively cited work on the Kachin, Herman G. Tegenfeldt, who lived in Kachinland for decades, states that the term ‘Kachin’ covers six sub-dialectic groups: Jinghpaw, Rawang, Maru, Lashi, Atsi, and Lisu. While precisely portraying Kachin social structures, Maran La Raw, a Kachin scholar, contends that despite their linguistic differences, the Kachin “share notions of common ancestry, practice the same form of marriage system,

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have an almost homogenous customary law and social-control system, use only Jinghpaw for ritual purposes, and are largely polyglots, in the full sense of the term”.

Historically, the political leaders who mapped and determined the collective fate and destiny of the Kachin as a single people—before the British occupation of their ancient homeland—were not monarchs, but chiefs (Duwas) who effectively defended their country and sovereignty from any external adversaries. This is evidence that the Kachin never lost their independence and country to any one of their neighbors. Despite the historical record of a certain degree of sociopolitical encounter and interaction between the Kachin and their larger neighbors, they were widely known to have effectively protected their ancestral domain and independence against any form of interference from any outside powers, therefore implying that the lowland Burman was not ever able to exert political power over Kachin country. When aptly describing this historical episode, Tegenfeldt asserts that the Kachin “refuses to bend the neck to Burmese, Chinese, or Shans”.

The reasoning behind deploring and accusing British colonialists and American missionaries as being historically responsible for the bitter ethnic division between the Kachin and Burman is false. Kachin country was historically not ever part of ‘Burma’, and the Kachin never called Burma their home before 1948 when they, along with the Chin and Shan peoples, willingly became the new citizens of the state of Burma as a historical consequence of the Panglong Agreement in 1947. Maran La Raw’s work underscores the necessity of looking at various components of Burmese political history from a variety of angles, rather than just blaming British colonialism alone for all the problems related to ethnic minorities; he also closely examines the intricacy of ethnic conflict in modern Burma. He sharply

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3 Maran La Raw, 1967, p. 133.
5 Maran La Raw, 1967, p. 140.
6 Tegenfeldt, 1974, p. 432.
criticizes some Burma scholars who believe that all responsibility for ethnic division between the Burman and ethnic minority groups should be placed on the British. For example, Maran La Raw upbraids Kyaw Thet for condemning the British for maintaining the status quo and not taking concerted steps to politically and culturally integrate the Kachin into mainstream Burman civilization:

When the British were annexing Upper Burma, the Kachin had already risen en masse against the Burmese king. It took the British more than ten years after the fall of the Mandalay Empire to subdue the tribesmen, and the Kachin did not finally give up resistance against the British until 1935. It, therefore, becomes absurd to insist that the British colonial government should have begun immediate steps to assimilate the Kachin tribes in these circumstances.\(^7\)

That the Kachin had direct social interactions with other ethnic groups such as the Chinese, Burman, and Shan while increasingly exposing themselves to the broader world could lead us to expect a marked influence of these groups over Kachin society. However, historical evidence reveals the hostile relations between this ethnic group and their neighbors, especially the lowland Burmans. In underlining the importance of grasping a long history of awkward interactions between the two groups, Tegenfeldt writes in his work that what historically defined the dealings between them was aggression, citing the brutal fighting between the two groups in 1877 and the sack of Bhamo by the Kachin and Chinese in 1884.\(^8\) These historical facts seem to explain why the king of Burma reportedly told William H. Roberts: “So you are to teach the Kachins! Do you see my dogs over there? I tell you, it will be earlier to convert and teach these dogs. You are wasting your life”.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Maran La Raw, 1967, p. 129.
\(^8\) Tegenfeldt, 1974, p. 98, 107.
The twists and turns of Burman and Kachin historical experiences during World War II appear to have polarized them even further. For example: whereas Kachin fighters consistently provided the British and Americans with critically important intelligence and military assistance, Burman fighters—under the magnetic leadership of Aung San—fervently backed the Japanese in driving the British from Burma and subsequently occupying it, a difference that sheds considerable light on the fallacious nature of the narrative of ethnic unity between the two groups in the fight for independence in the 1940s. It must also be noted here that Kachin guerillas played a militarily important role in containing and beating the Japanese endeavoring to seize British India: Burma scholars like Donovan Webster pertinently maintained that when Kachin soldiers stupefied the Japanese, “the first true guerrilla fighting of World War II emerged”. The Kachin only reluctantly fought alongside their Burman counterparts in ousting the Japanese from Burma after March 27, 1945, when Aung San ordered his men to turn against their former ally.

The hard reality of the rapidly shifting political situation in Burma after the end of the war seemingly required the Kachin to wonder how to chart and shape their collective fate and future destiny as a single independent people, and their leaders voluntarily joined the Burmans in founding the modern state of Burma in 1948 after they extensively deliberated and unanimously agreed to the basic terms of the historic Panglong Agreement in 1947. The symbolic and political magnitude of this agreement should be considered and understood in the politically turbulent context of the first years of national independence. As some of the original co-founders of the new state, they steadfastly maintained their political allegiance to Burma and unequivocally made a significant military contribution to protecting their shared new country. This came to a head when the

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10 Webster, 2004, p. 50.
11 Lintner, 2011, p. 29.
12 Kachin Research Group, n.d., p. 3.
rapid escalation of political violence and armed insurgency effectively paralyzed and confined the central government in Rangoon, consequently proving that when the new state was in real danger of disintegration, the Kachin played a decisive part in averting it.\textsuperscript{13}

Instead of enhancing and buttressing Kachin political loyalty to Burma, U Nu took measured steps to ostracize and undermine the Kachin in the years that followed, which inevitably left them feeling intensely betrayed. U Nu failed to respect the terms and conditions of the landmark agreement between Kachin leaders and Aung San, while also neglecting the northern frontier of the country. He exacerbated these factors by bringing religion into national politics. Held together, U Nu’s actions not only explicitly undercut the political support of the Kachin for the country, but also sidelined and radicalized Kachin young nationalists to stage an armed insurgency against the state. In 1961 the tyranny of his racial arrogance, cultural callousness, religious fanaticism, and political absurdity finally triggered a political tsunami of anti-Burmanization in northern Burma. Zaw Aung, citing the rise of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), told me that their undisputed political loyalty to Burma was severely tested and finally ended when U Nu crossed the red line by making Buddhism the state religion. It is, however, remarkable that while U Nu and his administration blatantly promoted Buddhism from 1950 on,\textsuperscript{14} Kachin leaders seem not to have objected until 1960 – even more remarkable considering the secular nature of the state and the historical gravity of Christianity in Kachin society.

When members of an inquiry commission were sent by the U Nu administration to Myitkyina to seek Kachin public opinion, they understandably faced what U Nu himself called “a rough reception by the Kachin Christians”.\textsuperscript{15} In describing this sour episode in Kachin memory, Zaw Aung vividly said, “I was old enough to remember that day. My father joined thousands of

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{13}] Htin Aung (1967, p. 317) and U Nu (1975, p. 194).
\item[\textsuperscript{14}] Steinberg, 2006, p. 62.
\item[\textsuperscript{15}] U Nu, 1974, p. 204.
\end{itemize}
our people, including students, furiously protesting and blocking the train bringing members of that commission. That incident was especially deep, intense, and emotional.”

We must recall that historically the two primary factors for the formation of the KIA on 5 February 1961 were the handing over of three Kachin villages to China and the making of Buddhism the state religion. Balawng Du, a Baptist pastor, was the father of three Kachin nationalists, Lahtaw Zau Seng, Zau Tu, and Zau Dan, who are credited with the formation of the KIA, and their father was widely thought to have had a significant influence on them when they started the Kachin armed insurgency against the state; this perhaps reflects at least partially the interaction between religion and politics. It should be underscored that Christianity began gaining political importance in the late 1940s in the long course of fostering pan-Kachin ethnonationalism.

The inevitable impression is that this extreme and dangerous step U Nu took ignored Kachin interests and explicitly supported the racially chauvinistic policy of Burmanization, essentially leading to the crumbling of the pillars upon which national unity in Burma stood. It is, hence, safe to say that U Nu left the Kachin with practically no choice but to end their political allegiance to the state of Burma; however, it cannot be said that the KIA has been necessarily fighting only in the name of religion. Although Christians never constituted more than 40 percent of the entire Kachin population in Burma by 1960, they seem to have played an outsized role in the collective life of their people, especially considering that the young nationalists and intellectuals who shaped and impacted Kachin history and society after 1948 were mostly, if not exclusively, Christians. In sum, the centrality of religion in the making of modern Kachin ethnic identity must be understood in the historical context of political crisis arising from this complex interplay between religion and politics. In the analysis that follows, let us examine the prominent role of religion in nurturing and advancing Kachin life.

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17 Linter, 1994, p. 164.
Kachin Christianity

Kachin scholars digging into and scrutinizing Kachin religious history universally agree that there was no historical indication that their ancestors ever adopted any established religions like Buddhism, Islam, and Hinduism, but continually practiced Kachin cosmic religion before 1877. After 1877, American missionaries initiated evangelization activities in Kachin country. Prior to this, the Kachin tended not to convert to Buddhism, and the perceived influence of the ethnic Burmans in lowland Burma on religion in Kachin society was insignificant. In 1877, the first American and Karen missionaries arrived in Kachin country and started the labor of evangelizing them as a direct outcome of special appeals from Josiah N. Cushing, a missionary in Burma, to the American Baptist Missionary Union (ABMU). In a positive response to his passionate appeal, the ABMU sent Albert J. Lyon, a native of Minnesota, to Burma in 1877, but he worked among the Kachin in Bhamo for less than two months as his life was cut short.

Then, the ABMU replaced him with William H. Roberts, a native of Virginia, who arrived in Bhamo in 1879 and baptized seven Kachin on March 19, 1882, thereby marking the beginning of Kachin Christianity. Though Christians represented just a tiny minority of the entire Kachin population, Roberts acted as their holistic patron and was possibly aware of the importance of having a single religious body for all Kachin Christians for the purpose of promoting social advancement, national awakening, and Kachin unity. Thus, he conceived of forming the Kachin Baptist organization as early as 1884. Church meetings and conferences ostensibly provided an essential space for nurturing the notion of oneness and unity among Kachin Christians as they came to recognize and embrace each other as brethren, boosting political and national consciousness among different linguistic

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19 La Seng Dingrin, 2013, p. 113; N’ngai Gam, 2004, p. 77.
20 Tegenfeldt, 1974, p. 97.
groups of the Kachin and finally leading to the formation of the Kachin Baptist Association (KBA) in 1910.\textsuperscript{21}

The emergence of the KBA was historically remarkable. For the first time in their history, the Kachin had a single religious organization representing all Kachin Christians, slowly but steadily embodying their ethnic identity, increasingly animating the soul of Kachin nationalism, and markedly unifying Kachin inside and outside their ancestral homeland just as they entered the wider modern world at the turn of the twentieth century. It should be stressed here that the man who fundamentally transformed Kachin history forever was Ola Hanson, a Swedish-American missionary, whose enormous knowledge of Swedish, English, German, Greek, and Hebrew led him to Bhamo in 1890, where he conducted linguistic and literary work for the Kachin. Living with the Kachin for nearly four decades, he indisputably made a fantastic contribution, considering that he was singularly credited with formulating Kachin orthography using the Roman alphabet in place of Burmese, creating a grammar of Kachin, a Kachin-English dictionary, and translating the entire Bible into Kachin (in addition to many other religious books).\textsuperscript{22} Another noted missionary who joined him in 1892 and worked with and for the Kachin was the German-American George J. Geis.

While the key roles that Roberts, Hanson, and Geis played in the shared life of the Kachin in the early years of the evangelization enterprise in Kachin country were astonishing, the first missionary who had direct contact with the Kachin was Eugenio Kincaid, who arrived in Burma in 1830. Kincaid worked in Ava from 1833 to 1837 as a missionary and went as far as to Bhamo in 1837 where he saw upland Kachin people. He was supposedly impressed by what he witnessed and optimistically recorded in his journal that they would almost surely convert to Christianity without much difficulty, if and when evangelized, primarily due to some essential theological similarities between their religion and Christianity. Then, he was forced by political turbulence in Upper Burma to leave for lower Burma in July of 1837 and never

\textsuperscript{21} Tegenfeldt, 1974, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{22} Tegenfeldt, 1974, p. 118.
Joshua came back to Kachin country, let alone converting any Kachin.\(^{23}\) He lived long enough to see his dream realized, though, as his fellow missionaries started mission work among them after 1877.

With other missionaries arriving and working among the Kachin in the years that followed, nearly all Kachin adopted Christianity as their new religion within a century. What Kincaid predicted over a century ago became historical reality. Christianity has not just animated and nourished the soul of the Kachin, but also has become intertwined with their ethnic identity, consequently attesting to the indispensability of Christianity in the collective life of the Kachin as a single people with a distinct ethnicity, religion, literature, and history.

Just why they converted en masse to Christianity has fascinated scholars perusing the complicated interplay between religion and politics in contemporary Burma. When carefully analyzing some possible reasons for the choice of religious conversion among their ancestors, Kachin scholars generally observe that, though a fusion of education, literature, economic life, Kachin religion indeed played a primary role, and the political setting and social change set the broad circumstances for religious conversion to Christianity.\(^{24}\)

Karen and American missionaries continued undertaking the pastoral roles of the Kachin church until 1901 when the first Kachin pastors were ordained, but as the number of Christians steadily increased, church leaders keenly wanted to establish a local Kachin seminary for the future of Kachin Christianity. With the solid backing of its member churches, the KBA thus sent Lahpai Zau Tu together with two others as its representatives to attend the general conference of the Burma Baptist Convention (BBC), which took place in October of 1930. Kachin representatives initially faced difficulty in convincing BBC leaders of what they needed, but insisted on being given official consent to start a seminary in Kachin country. Zau Tu was so adamant that the

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\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 82-83.

BBC finally relented its earlier opposition and allowed the KBA to establish a separate seminary for Kachin students, and the KBA consequently founded the Kachin Theological College and Seminary (KTCS) in Myitkyina in 1932.\textsuperscript{25}

As the number of church members swelled over the years and church leaders acutely recognized the pressing need to work together for the enduring vitality of Kachin Christianity, the Baptist associations under the KBA assembled in 1954 and formed the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC). Foreign missionaries simultaneously selected seven new leaders for special theological training for the future of the KBC, as they fully knew that they could be expelled from Burma at any time. The KBC has been a pillar of Kachin society ever since.\textsuperscript{26} As we will see in what follows, religious institutions have been so indispensable to the collective life of the Kachin that Burman politicians often ended up meeting with KBC leaders for help whenever they pushed for peace talks with the KIA. Brang Shawng, a Kachin student, explained to me during our conversation in Lashio that the KIA and KBC are essentially two sides of the same coin, adding that the KIA will almost certainly not sign any agreement with the Tatmadaw (armed forces of Myanmar) unless the KBC supports it. His analysis appears to explain why ex-leaders Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi each met with Reverend Hkhalam Samson twice.

When examining what role Kachin Christianity seems to have played in the political history of the Kachin at the dawn of Burmese independence in the late 1940s, Maran La Raw makes an observation that perhaps seems odd. When faced with the soul-searching question of whether the historically independent Kachin should join the future state of Burma, the Christian Kachin who once trained at mission schools in Bhamo supported the idea: “when in 1947 Kachin witnesses gave their approval for a state of some sort within the independent Union of Burma, all but one of the witnesses were products of the Bhamo missionary

\textsuperscript{25} N-Gan Tang Gun, 2009, p. 48.
\textsuperscript{26} Reverend Zaw Aung, personal communication, September, 2018.
schools. These were the people who decided that the fate of the Kachin should be with the rest of Burma”.27

With the veiled support of the Chinese authorities, the Burmese leaders of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) invited KIA leaders to China. They ostensibly promised them all the firearms they needed if they accepted the leadership of the CPB, implying that the communists placed pressure on them to cut off any historical and religious ties with the West, particularly the United States. Their arrogant hosts also allegedly told them that if they refused what was offered, for whatever reason, they would receive nothing and be considered nothing but “running dogs of American capitalists and bourgeois minded”.28 The communists entirely failed in seducing the Kachin soul to break off all bonds of connections between the Kachin and the United States, for KIA leaders made it crystal clear to the CPB that they would not be lectured on their future and that they would not succumb to anyone. When asked why they refused to submit to CPB leadership, Zaw Aung explained to me in no uncertain terms that KIA leaders rejected them, essentially because the Kachin were Christians. He went on to tell me that when Naw Seng, a Kachin himself, came back to Burma with the CPB, the Kachin public similarly rebuffed him for the same reason.29

Even when KIA leaders made a strategic alliance with the CPB after 1976, Christianity continued to play an essential role in the collective life of the KIA, according to renowned Burma expert Bertil Linter.30 This historical experience seems to resonate with the observation of a Kachin student I met in Mandalay. In characterizing how their newly adopted religion changed their collective existence as a single person, they said on condition of anonymity that Christianity “has been the historical

source of Kachin advancement, and there cannot be the Kachin without Christianity”.

The New Kachin War

When the controversial 2008 constitution officially became ratified, it mandated that all ‘ceasefire groups’—that is, non-state armed groups who signed ceasefire agreements with the government—must become Border Guard Forces (BGFs). Kachin leaders immediately held open consultations with the public, and reportedly 99 percent of the Kachin public solidly agreed after serious deliberations that the KIA must refuse to accept the enforced government policy of the BGF. The KIA consequentially rejected both the BGF plan and the 2008 constitution, and the Tatmadaw swiftly responded by undertaking a series of rapid preparations for the renewal of armed conflict in Kachin areas. The KIA, in return, started recruiting, training, and arming a new generation of guerilla fighters, in addition to mobilizing its veterans for the imminent battles with the Tatmadaw. The brutal warfare that continues to devastate the northern frontier of Burma finally started in 2011 when the Tatmadaw attacked KIA soldiers.

Why did the Tatmadaw impose ruthless war on the Kachin while the government in Naypyidaw called for peace talks with all other ethnic armed groups in the country? It is entirely possible that the string of successes by the former military regime in undermining the KIA militarily and politically between 1994 and 2011 led to a feeling by Thein Sein that the Tatmadaw could do practically whatever it pleases in Kachinland. It seems that before they declared a new war on the KIA, the Tatmadaw did not fully grasp the attitude shift in Kachin society that came with the consequences of the ceasefire. There has been a profound convergence between why the Kachin universally urged

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31 Kachin student from Myitkyina, personal communication, September, 2018.
the KIA to refuse the BGF policy, and how the Kachin concurrently perceived the stunning costs of the ceasefire agreement—which did not even address the root causes of the political problem. Respected and popular Kachin academic and author K. Zau Nan cogently contends in an article in *Theologies and Cultures* that the Burma Army, alongside Chinese companies and some KIA elites, outrageously used the ceasefire as a means to plunder the wealth of Kachinland in the name of sham development. He concludes that the only outcome “for the local people was the loss of their privileges and the natural environment, followed by various kinds of social problems”.

All of the Kachin interviewed for this paper mentioned that they have been deprived of natural resources from teak to jade and gold and treated almost as aliens in the very homeland of their ancestors. In their view, this is a direct result of what many of them poignantly call the “curse of the ceasefire”. Many Kachin also accused the Tatmadaw of deliberately instigating a racially-targeted drug war against them by destroying the collective life of Kachin young men as part of the ethnic cleansing policy in upland Burma. They claim that government agents brought and distributed drugs in Kachin communities without any legal restrictions. Indeed, everyone who has happened to visit Kachinland after 2000 hardly, if ever, fails to notice the dangerous level of drug use in Kachin society and its sociopolitical consequences. A Kachin student from Myitkyina speaking on condition of anonymity claims drugs are not only available but also practically legal everywhere in Kachin areas. In contrast, government agents usually prohibited young Burman men from accessing drugs, adding that the number of Kachin young men who died of drugs hugely outnumbered KIA fighters killed in battle. Stressing how drugs had already devastated Kachin communities and threatened the very existence of the Kachin as a people, Brang Shawng asserts that roughly 80 percent of Kachin young men became addicted to various kinds of drugs before

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33 K. Zau Nan, 2013, p. 91.
Joshua

2011. Likewise, Hkalam Samson openly accuses Burman military rulers and some KIA elites of corruption when reflecting upon the dynamic effects of the ceasefire on the collective life of the Kachin. He calls this period “the tragic phase of degeneration for the entire Kachin population socially, economically, and ethnically”.

Kachin theologians also pointedly accuse the military regime of perpetrating and perpetuating deliberate and systematic steps to Burmanize their homeland, citing the immense number of pagodas across Kachinland. They charge that the Burman-controlled government continuously protects and promotes the Burman race, religion, and literature while methodically curbing and erasing Kachin history, culture, and literature. By erecting pagodas on nearly every mountaintop in Kachin regions against the backdrop of local opposition, the government does not merely disregard the interests of the Kachin, but also bolsters the presence of the Tatmadaw; the government has been persistent in effecting the longstanding policy of Burmanizing ethnic areas such as Kachinland. Another impact that allegedly came along with the ceasefire was a demographic shift, caused by hundreds of thousands of lowland Burmans reportedly resettling in Kachinland after 1995; and some were said to have become spies for the Tatmadaw after the renewal of the conflict in 2011.

While the Tatmadaw effectively controlled significant urban centers like Myitkyina, Bhamo, and Kutkai, the KIA presumably wielded almost unchallenged military muscle over Kachin areas before 1994. This situation epitomized the undisputed restriction of the so-called national armed forces and the military power of Kachin insurgency. The KIA nevertheless found itself forced to increasingly abandon many of its militarily and strategically important posts after 1995, as the Burman generals disgracefully but successfully carried out the policy of undermining the might of the KIA politically and militarily by penetrating

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36 Layang Seng Ja, 2017, p. 205.
previously unknown terrain and militarizing Kachinland. Benedict Rogers stresses the extreme and dangerous level of Tatmadaw militarization in Kachin areas during the ceasefire: “since the regime broke the ceasefire, the number of Tatmadaw battalions in Kachin and the northern Shan States has risen to at least 150, a dramatic increase in an already heavily militarized area”. 37

Most Kachin concur that the KIA seemed unprepared, at best, for the possible repercussions for the Kachin public—socially, economically, and politically—when the KIA finally signed the ceasefire deal with the military regime: the reader will remember that most Kachin now call this bundle of consequences the ‘ceasefire curse’. It must indeed be pointed out that some Kachin politicians doubted the honesty of Than Shwe and his generals as early as the late 1990s, considering the formation of the Kachin National Organization (KNO) in January of 1999. In casting some light on why many veteran Kachin politicians seriously questioned the wisdom of that ceasefire and eventually founded the KNO, Duwa Mahkaw Hkun Sa wrote, “the KNO was formed by a highly respected group of people with long experience in Kachin politics, who had a clear sense that the Kachin movement was being manipulated by a Burmese regime that had no intention of keeping its promises for justice and equality”. 38

The prospect of durable peace in the northern frontier of Burma remains elusive despite numerous meetings and conferences between Naypitaw and Laiza. In a public message to the Kachin population, Lanyaw Zawng Hra, former Chairman of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), for instance, urged all Kachin fighters and civilians to remain firmly united in defending their ancestral homeland. He emphasized the innate right to exist as a distinct single people against what he called the genocidal policy of the state to wipe out the ethnic Kachin from the face of Burma. By stressing the historical necessity of their armed struggle while eulogizing the astonishing level of public support for the KIA, he seemed to enchant a new generation of

37 Rogers, 2012, p. 94.
38 Mahkaw Hkun Sa, 2016, p. 334.
Kachin nationalists to continue their ongoing revolution. In an indirect reaction to Aung San Suu Kyi continually urging ethnic nationalists to stop dwelling on the past, he continued, “taking the wrong step in politics in the past has cost us 70 years of hardships; therefore, we must carefully wade through the current political waters. Although people are generally encouraged to leave the past behind and move forward, this is not something we must easily forget.”

The ravages, costs and effects of the war in northern Burma on Kachin people could persist for generations after the cruel fighting between the KIA and Tatmadaw finally ends. Analyzing the full consequences of the outrageous conflict, K. Zau Nan contends that the Kachin “have experienced bloodshed, violence, torture, rape, murder, burning villages, and fleeing from homes to refugee camps.” M. La Rip, a respected Kachin intellectual and Myanmar Institute of Theology (MIT) scholar, presented a paper at the third conference of contextual theology at the MIT in January of 2018. As a scholar steeped in Old Testament Studies and as a Kachin religious leader with in-depth knowledge about Kachin political history and extensive connections to his suffering people, his words carried weight and sentiment not just for Kachin students but also for other MIT students from numerous ethnic groups. The impact was obvious when he directly accused the Tatmadaw of using rape as a weapon of war in his native land systemically and deliberately. When stressing how rape survivors coped with the rest of their devastated lives, he continued to say that many sadly committed suicide while others died from unsafe abortions.

In Lashio, October 2018, I spent several days with many Kachin—both pastors and laypeople—from Kachin State and northern Shan State, exploring and understanding the depth of armed conflict in Kachin society. An elderly Kachin pastor from Myitkyina was fighting back the tears as he told me, “I recently went to Laiza and saw the ruins of numerous churches all down

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39 Tsa Doi La, 2017.
40 K. Zau Nan, 2016, p. 98.
41 M. La Rip, 2018.
the line. There were over four hundred churches under the KBC, but over 60 of them became ruined”.42 The large scale of this violence intensified the determination of the Kachin to continue their political struggle, given that the level of public support for the KIA has been historically unparalleled and the difference between KIA fighters and Kachin civilians sometimes becomes blurred. For many Kachin, the ongoing war between the KIA and Tatmadaw has been essentially a public war of resistance for survival. In deftly depicting how a representative culture of public debate and consensus in Kachin society enhanced the vigor of their political struggle, Hkun Sa asserts:

We have traditionally practiced a form of debate in our communities that is highly inclusive. Important decisions are typically made with a relatively high degree of public consultation; this has undoubtedly enabled us to move forward collectively, despite disagreements, with greater consensus than in some other communities, and this has been a reason for the strength of our struggle.43

My impression, after a series of extensive conversations with many Kachin, is that the Kachin public backing the KIA shall continue their unfinished revolution to defend their ancestral homeland and their innate right to exist as a single people against the evil being embodied by Burmanization. Hkhalam Samson explicitly told me during our conversation that the problem of ethnic conflict and armed insurgency will continue to paralyze the country as long as the Tatmadaw protects the 2008 constitution, thus implicitly implying that the Kachin shall never surrender their armed revolution unless and until their interests are well respected and protected constitutionally. In this particular respect, Martin Smith correctly argues, “the ceasefire breakdown rapidly became a defining event in modern

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42 Kachin Baptist pastor in Lashio, personal communication, October, 2018.
43 Mahkaw Khun Sa, 2016, p. 332.
Kachin history, furthering the determination of a younger generation of leaders to continue their struggle, however difficult, until a real political solution could be reached”.

Kachin Public Theology

I explore in what follows how Kachin religious leaders perceive political violence shattering Kachin society, and how their outlooks and actions effectively impact and shape the nature of this protracted conflict. We cannot fully understand the depth of this political crisis without understanding the major roles religious leaders play and the enormous moral authority they wield in Kachin society. All Burman military rulers deliberately and systematically imposed restrictions on Kachin literature, culture, and language as part of the state policy of undermining (and eventually destroying) the presence of cultural and ethnic diversity by Burmanizing the Kachin and their native land. In direct reaction to what many church leaders increasingly refer to as an existential threat from the Burmans to the historical existence of the Kachin as a single people with distinct ethnicity and culture, the KBC has been running what the Kachin fondly call myu shalat jawng (Kachin national schools) aimed at protecting and promoting their distinctive ethnic identity against Burmanization. A Kachin pastor asking for anonymity recently told me that the core subjects at myu shalat jawng include the Bible, English, Kachin history, language, and literature, because the successive governments chronically deprived Kachin students of the chance to learn their mother tongue and history at public schools in the homeland of their ancestors.

The aforementioned KTCS has been one of the most popular destinations for the most talented young men and women from Kachin communities across Burma, impacting and vitalizing Kachin history and politics alike. By offering more subject courses like Kachin history, Kachin politics, Kachin literature, English,

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44 Smith, 2016, p. 90.
45 The military regime, indeed, placed many restrictions on all ethnic and religious minority groups in Burma.
and western literature apart from the usual regular theological courses while recruiting, teaching, and preparing young leaders for new generations of their people, KTCS scholars have played a pivotal role in fostering the deep sense of Kachin ethnonationalism against the background of the Burmanization process across the northern frontier of Burma. In underscoring the symbolic and political importance of the KTCS in modern Kachin history, Zaw Aung told me that the KTCS “has been historically indispensable to protecting and promoting Kachin ethnicity, religion, literature, and language. It has been the heart and soul of the Kachin collectively”. I have no reason to doubt that the KTCS has been a fertile hotbed of Kachin nationalism and a breeding ground for Kachin resistance.

Moreover, many Kachin church leaders suspected the military government of intentionally allowing unrestricted access to drugs in Kachinland as part of a covert policy of demoralizing and killing young Kachin men in realizing the apparent final goal of what Sang Raw and many Kachin call “slow genocide”. I was told while in Lashio that drug abuse has been part of life for young men in that part of Burma, mostly because the Tatmadaw has allowed militias and BGFs to grow and distribute drugs freely. Samson told me in this particular respect that the level of the growing drug problem has been so severe for the collective existence of the Kachin that virtually all Kachin churches under his leadership finally initiated what has become known in Kachin as Pat Ja Sa (PJS). PJS members have been energetically involved in the mission of destroying opium fields and reducing the drug problem in direct reaction to what they usually call the “existential threat” of drugs. When carrying out their drug eradication operations, PJS members often found themselves being challenged and confronted by Burma Army-backed militias and the BGF, which perhaps explains why Kachin leaders in

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47 Kachin church leaders from Lashio, Kutkai, and Myitkyina, personal communications, October, 2018.  
general and Kachin pastors, in particular, have accused the Tatmadaw of waging a drug war on Kachin young men.

Likening the history of Kachin political struggle for the full realization of self-determination, equal rights, and freedom for Kachin people to the biblical story of the sociopolitical emancipation of Jews from their long enslavement in Egypt, Kachin theologians have reasoned and justified the cause of their political revolution. Kachin scholars such as Layang Seng Ja, K. Zau Nan, Lahpai Fanang Lum, and Hting Nan Zau, called upon Kachin churches to resist the forces of social injustice, religious persecution, and ethnic cleansing being perpetrated and perpetuated by Tatmadaw against the Kachin population, articulating that resistance to the evil of political oppression and social injustice has been the sacred duty of all Christians biblically, morally, and historically.49 Echoing what these theologians stood for, Zaw Aung told me: “we, the Kachin, are by nature fond of independence and nourished by the profound notion of freedom and equality in the Bible, so much so that we always resisted and will continue to do so any form of intrusions”.

The centrality of Christianity in the public life of the Kachin perhaps left Tatmadaw generals and government politicians—including Min Aung Hlaing, Thein Sein, and Aung San Suu Kyi—with the impression that the KBC is indispensable in the making of peace talks with the KIA. In our recent phone conversation from Myitkyina, Hkalam Samson recalled, “They urged me to help negotiate with the KIA for the possibility of reaching a truce accord between the two parties, for they consistently reasoned that the KBC has decisive moral authority over the KIA as most KIA fighters are indeed KBC members. I, however, told them that the KBC has a long-existing church policy of mass meeting for any important decisions and the Kachin public refused to return to the unstable peace of the past. I am, then, called a hardliner.”50 As to a series of high-profile meetings he held with top leaders of the state of Burma in the past, particularly Aung San

Suu Kyi and Thein Sein, he continues to say that both the central government and Tatmadaw generals held the view that the KIA and KBC have increasingly become intertwined.

Though the historically complicated role of China in the Kachin conflict is not the central focus of this paper, I feel the urge to discuss this issue briefly here, as it is closely associated with the existence of strong religious ties between the Christian Kachin and the predominately Christian United States. It has been an open secret all along that the Chinese authorities repeatedly asked the KIA leaders to end ties with the United States in return for weapons by reasoning and articulating that China and Kachinland are geographically destined to be eternal neighbors. Kachin leaders, and especially KBC leaders, apparently refuse to succumb to that pressure, as they continue deepening their religious ties with their American counterparts, thus perhaps rebutting the mainstream accusations that China has controlled the KIA. During his recent visit to the United States, Hkalam Samson, for instance, met with some church leaders with strong ties to crucial American senators. Yun Sun is, therefore, right when she argues that the Chinese never fully trusted the Kachin, with their deep historical ties with the United States.\(^5\) China was, after all, not pleased with the public statement of opposition from the KBC to the Chinese Myitsone Dam project, according to Hkalam Samson.

In all, the Kachin shall likely continue their armed struggle, not because of, but despite all difficulties, until they enter the promised land in which justice and genuine peace embrace each other. The KIA shall not ever return to the politically unsettled peace similar to that of the ceasefire agreement in 1994. It must be stressed here that political instability, economic stagnation, ethnic insurgency, and humanitarian crisis will most likely continue to paralyze Burma unless the historically legitimate interests of the Kachin and other ethnic minority groups are respected and protected.

\(^5\) Sun, 2012, pp. 76-78.
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Scar of Association: Repercussions of the Great Depression and Xenophobic Nationalism on Indian Migrants in Burma

Ritesh Kumar Jaiswal

Abstract

The Great Depression was a moment of rupture and dispossession in the history of the plantation economy and colonial Indian migration in the Bay of Bengal. The developments of this period provide important insights into the shifting patterns of Indian migration, labor regimes, (im)migrant-native relations, and the rise of xenophobic politics in the region. Given the historical importance of migration and the persistence of xenophobia in Burma, a study of migrant labor within the emerging nationalist politics of the interwar period is crucial. This period witnessed provocative but well-established questions concerning Indian migration: whether Indian migrants were supplementary or surplus, whether they were filling a void or generating local competition, whether colonial policies regarding Indian migration and their work and life in the colony were exclusionist or assimilatory, whether Indians shared a harmonious relationship of peaceful co-existence with the ‘indigenous’ community, and whether they were ‘well off’ in Burma. This article focuses on the interwar interactions between empires, colonies, and capital in the Bay of Bengal rim and transatlantic economies, as well as the intersections between the reordering of the global economy, ethnocentric nationalism, migrants’ changing lives and the patterns and system of Indian migration. The intersections between emerging nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiments reflected in the many ethnic riots of this period provide historical precedents to the persisting alt-right politics, xenophobia, ethnic injustice, and racial-religious bigotry perpetrated against minorities and migrants in Burma - the Rohingyas being a major target of this xenophobic nationalism.
စာတမ်းအကျဉ်း

စဉ်းစားပေးခြင်းကို ပျော်ရွှင်းပေးခြင်းကို နိုင်ငံရေးသို့ ကနိုးယုံကြည်ခြင်းကို ကြားရှွေးခြင်းကို ယုံကြည်ခြင်းကို အဓိကမြစ်ရသော စာတမ်းစားရေးကို ငါးနောက်မှာ လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ စာတမ်းပေးရေးကို မြောက်လေးကို ဆိုဆိုက်ဝံးစဖြစ်သော စာတမ်းစားရေးကို ပြောပြခြင်းကို လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ မြောက်လေးကို မြောက်လေးကို နိုင်ငံရေးသို့ မှားမတ်မှုကို ပြောပြခြင်းကို အကြောင်းသြပ်သင်္ခြင်းကို ထိန်းချုပ်ပါသည်။ စာတမ်းစားရေးကို မြောက်လေးကို ဆိုဆိုက်ဝံးစဖြစ်သော စာတမ်းစားရေးကို ပြောပြခြင်းကို လိုအပ်ပါသည်။
သင်သည် အရာဝန်ယူသည့် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၊ ဗုဒ္ဓဟူးနိုင်ငံ အလိုပ်သား အဖြေရပ်ပွဲများနှင့် ပတ်သက်သည့် ကိုလိုနီအစိုးရဝန်ကြီးနှင့် ဝတ်စုံစောင်းရမှုရှိသည်။ အရာဝန်ကြီးများက သူတို့ကို ယုဏ်ကြည့်ရစနိုင်မခင်ေးသော်လည်း မြို့ရှိသည် သို့ရှိတဲ့အခါ အရာဝန်ကြီးများကို အသေးစိတ်ရစနိုင်နိုင်သည်။ အရာဝန်ကြီးများကို မြစ်ရစသရလာ၊ အိနဒိယနွယ်လိုပ်သား၏ အလိုပ်သားသားများနှင့် ပြိွဲရတားစီးပွားရေးသားလာရာများမှာ စီးပွားရေးကာလတွင် ကျွန်ုပ်၏ အရာဝန်ကြီးများကို အဓိကရလ့်လာရာများသည်။

ပထမဦးစွာ ကျွန်ုပ်၏ အရာဝန်ကြီးများကို အသေးစိတ်ရစနိုင်နိုင်သည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်၏ ဆက်လက်စွန်ုစဥ်အသစ်နှင့် ရေးအခင်းအက င်းြားများသားဆိုသော ဗားများသည်ကျွန်ုပ်၏ စီးပွားရေး၏ အဓိကကြွေးများကို ဆိုသည်။ အသေးစိတ်ရည်ရွယ်ကာလများပြောင်းလဲသော လက်ရာများသည် ဆက်လက်မြစ်ပွားရန်သော လက်ရာများကို အက်းသည်တွင် ဆက်လက်ထိခိုက်ရာများဖြစ်ပါသည်။
Introduction

The significance of Burma to the history of labor and migration lies in the fact that Burma accounted for nearly 50 percent of total Indian emigration (approximately 15 million recorded journeys) between the years 1850-1940. The study of the Indian migration to Burma under the maistry system is crucial as it shifts our focus from the overarching shadow of indentured sugar colonies in the Caribbean, Pacific and western Indian ocean, which have been the dominant regions of study of Indian migration, towards the British colonies in the Indian Ocean’s Bay of Bengal rim which was the recipient of the bulk of colonial Indian migrations.\(^1\) The study helps challenge the parameters which have conventionally defined the characteristics of Indian migration during the nineteenth and twentieth-century and complicates the Eurocentric narratives on non-European migration within the framework of global migration studies.\(^2\)

It is important to note that Burma was turned into a province of the British Indian empire for more than a century, i.e., from the first Anglo-Burmese war which ended in 1826 until 1937 when Burma was finally separated from British India and granted a new constitution and self-government under the Government of India Act 1935.\(^3\) Burma was clubbed with British India for administrative, military, and economic convenience.\(^4\) But

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1. The total emigration from India from 1834 to 1937 has been estimated at 30 million, from which emigration to Burma, Ceylon and Malaya, which took place largely through Kangani and maistry systems, accounted for over 90 percent of the total (Davis, 1951). See Northrup for further discussion on volume of migrants (1995, p. 64).
3. From 1826-1862, Burma was administered by a commissioner for each of the annexed regions, i.e., Arakan, Tenasserim, and Pegu. The Chief Commissioner of ‘British Burma’, within British India, governed lower and upper Burma, after the third Anglo-Burmese war, until 1897. In 1897, Burma was made into a (major) province of British India governed by a Lieutenant-Governor (Hinners, 1951, pp. 7-13; Scott, 1934).
since Burma was carved into a province of British India, this stream of migration was devoid of legal regulations, unlike other streams of migration from India like the indenture system. Indian migration to Burma remained informally regulated by a network of ‘kin-intermediary’ recruiters and supervisors called the ‘maistry’ and was claimed to be “free migration”.5 Although India and Burma had a long history of shared cultural-religious practices and inter-regional mobility, mass migrations of the scale and pattern that occurred during nineteenth and twentieth century British rule were distinct new phenomena.

Indians of different classes and professions coming predominantly from peninsular India formed the bulk of migrants to Burma during the British period. Most of them were Telugu, Tamil and Uriya laborers coming from Ganjam, Godavari, Vizag, Ramnad, and Tanjore regions of southern India.6 The majority of the Indian migrants belonged to the depressed and ‘untouchable’ castes and the agricultural class viz. Mala, Madiga, Pallar, Paraiyah. At the other end of the spectrum were the Chettiar, who were merchant-bankers and moneylenders. The Burma Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee stated that Chettiar were the mainstay of agricultural finance and that without their support, the internal and external trade of the country would break down and the rice crop would not even be produced.7 Despite being numerically few, they had immense economic strength in Burma. For example, nearly 83 percent of the bankers and moneylenders in Rangoon in the early twentieth century

5 The term ‘maistry’ is derived from the Portuguese word mestre meaning master. Maistries were, supposedly, Indian men of higher or good castes who learnt to speak fluent Burmese and enjoyed an influential position in their native land as well as their place of work. Maistries exercised a multi-layered relationship with the migrant laborers, British employers, and colonial officials and Indian merchants at each step of migration viz. recruitment, shipment, and work and life in the colony. For a detailed analysis of the maistry system see Jaiswal (2018, pp. 41-80).

6 Emigration to Burma, 1882; Pillai & Sundaram, 1934; also see Part IV of Burma: Control of Immigration, 1935.

7 Grantham, 1930.
were Indians, predominantly Chettiar. Furthermore, the networks of this community were not only confined to Burma but spread out to Malaya, Ceylon, Java, Sumatra, Siam, Mauritius, and Cochinchina.\(^8\)

Indian migration to Burma was distinct from other streams of colonial Indian migration. The Indian indentured labor migration to colonies in the Caribbean, Pacific and western Indian ocean was dominated by northern Indian Bhojpuri migrants while the kangany system of migration to Ceylon and Malaya was dominated by Tamils. Furthermore, though approximately 75 percent of the Indian migrants in Burma were laborers, mainly unskilled,\(^9\) unlike other destinations to which Indians migrated, Burma had fewer laborers engaged as plantation laborers or cultivating tenants in the thirteen major rice-producing districts in deltaic Burma. They were numerically insignificant relative to the Burmans in those areas, and also when compared to total annual migrations or settled migrants.\(^10\) In a confidential letter, the Department of Indian Overseas of the Government of India (GOI) asserted, “The bulk of labor in both those countries (Ceylon and Malaya) is estate labor, whereas estate labor in Burma constitutes but a fraction of the whole”.\(^11\) Migrant Indian laborers largely transported the harvests, manned industry, dealt with transport development, cleared the streets and built the

\(^8\) There were about 700 Chettiar offices in Malaya, 450 in Ceylon and 105 in Cochinchina. However, the economic stake of the Chettiar in Burma far exceeded that in all other countries put together (Mahajani, 1960, pp. 17-22).

\(^9\) Tinker showed that 66 percent were unskilled and semi-skilled laborers, and 10 percent skilled labor of all kinds. The remaining 24 percent comprised of traders and shop assistants, clerks in public offices, professional men and landlords with high income (Tinker, 1977, p. 142).

\(^10\) The Place of Indian Labor in Burma, 1933, pp. 15, 26, 32, 35. Baxter showed that the combined percentage of Indians (excluding Arakan) involved as non-cultivating owners, cultivating owners, tenant cultivators and agricultural laborers was 2.7 percent of the total agricultural population (Baxter, 1941, p. 26). Less than 60,000 of the total Indian population of 680,000, as per 1921 census figures (excluding Arakan), or less than 1/10\(^{th}\), was the sum of those involved as agricultural laborers and cultivating tenants (Andrew, 1933, pp. 25-26).

\(^11\) FO 643/36/14, 1943.
sewage systems in the cities of Burma. Indian laborers worked as unskilled and semi-skilled laborers in urban industrial establishments like paddy processing industries, mineral oil refineries, sawmills and timber yards, ports and harbors, railways, rickshaw (Lanachas) pulling, sweeping and scavenging. Thus, the demand in Burma was not mainly for agricultural/plantation labor but urban labor, not for raising a crop, but for its disposal and the large commercial and industrial needs of the town.

Though the Indian laborers were not involved in huge numbers in the development of plantation agriculture, Burma owed the contemporaneous rice plantation development to Indian enterprise and capital leased out to agricultural Burmans by the Indian money lenders and financiers—the Chettiars. The Chettiars’ contribution in upholding the rice economy of Burma, through their financing and money-lending activities, played a crucial role in defining Burma’s global image as a leading producer and supplier of rice. Chettiar capitalists and entrepreneurs not only added an immense value of indigenous/non-European commercial and agricultural capital to the colonies where they migrated but also played a crucial role in financing the functioning of the maistry recruiters thereby stimulating the flow of laborers to Burma.

Another important feature of Indian migration to Burma is highlighted through a quantitative analysis of the annual migrations and settlement ratio. Between 1900-1938, a total of 11.5 million Indians migrated to Burma. Overall, between the years 1840-1940 approximately 15 million journeys were recorded from India to Burma, but the 1941 census showed merely 674,000

12 See the unofficial note in FNo 43/39-Os (1940); Harvey (1946, p. 15). Tinker also stated that Indians were the backbone of the labor force in the rice mills (1974, p. 35).

13 Andrew stated (emphasis added): “generally the contractors did not ask for or accept advances (from the employers) as they were able to finance the undertaking themselves having acquired capital during their past operations, or they experienced little difficulty in getting it from their friends or Chettiar”, (1933, p. 37).

14 The figure is compiled from Part III of Burma: Control of Immigration (1938, pp. 144-298).
Indians settled in Burma (excluding Arakan). The total migrations include double-counting as most classes of laborers oscillated back and forth usually after three to five years of work in Burma. Irrespective of the circulatory nature, the migration-to-settlement ratio of Indian migrants remained significantly low. Thus, the Indian migration to Burma was ephemeral and fluid in pattern, the migrants were circulating and unsettled, and the nature of work was seasonal, precarious and temporary. An explanation for this pattern, which shows us yet another pertinent characteristic of Indian emigration to Burma, was the desire of many laborers to “earn and return”. This desire was shaped not only by the prevalent labor regime, nature and type of work in Burma, the functioning and nature of the maistry system, and the dynamics of separation from family and women.

Most of the Indian migrants were young males aged between 15-40 years old and migrant women never formed more than 10 percent of the annual migrants to Burma, leading to an imbalanced gender ratio. The ratio for Indians born outside of Burma was 19 women to every 100 men (19F:100M) overall, with the most extreme case being Oriyas (2F:1000M) and Chittagonians (9F:100M), and the most balanced, the Tamils (43F:100M). The reasons for the imbalance lay not only in the living and working conditions in Burma and the societal, religious, moral and patriarchal conventions in India but also employers’ ‘concerns’ over family wages and maistry recruiters’ desires for a non-reproductive, unsettled immigrant labor force that would ensure greater profits. Moreover, unlike the indentured colonies where Indians migrated to, Burma did not have legislation requiring an annual migration quota of 40 percent females.

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15 Census of Burma, 1941.
16 Amrith notes the statistics are notoriously imprecise but in the century between 1840-1940 about 2-15 million Indians migrated to Burma of which a varying but large proportion, well over half, returned to India within three to five years (2013, p. 104).
17 Memorandum of Information (1882).
18 Baxter (1941).
The imbalanced sex ratio coincided with increased instances of conjugal relationships between Burmans and Indian migrants, though ties between Indian men (predominantly Muslims) and Burmese women were despised by the Burmese. One of the main reasons was that the offspring adopted their father’s religion, losing ‘their religion’ which induced a sense of religious and cultural loss among the Burmese. This emerged as one of the major issues of contention and provided fertile grounds for racial-religious tensions and the anti-Indian riots during the Great Depression decade.

**Chettiar and the Burman and Indian Agriculturalists: Repercussions of the Depression on Commodity Production and Circulation**

The 1930s Great Depression had a major impact on the price of rice, which went down by more than 50 percent between 1926-1934, while cash wages were reduced by 25-30 percent by 1933. However, the volume of exports increased from an average of 2,841 to 3,165 thousand metric tons of cleaned rice between the periods 1926-30 and 1931-35. The increase in rice exports was not the result of the expansion of the cultivated area and increase in production or productivity in the delta region. In fact, between 1926-36 rice productivity as well as production both declined while the population rose by 10.8 percent.

Burma also witnessed a reduction in per capita rice consumption. The annual average per capita utilization of rice in Burma fell from 149 kilograms between 1926-30 to 115 kilograms between 1931-35. The rice export to production ratio was 50 percent between 1921-25, 58 percent in 1926-30, and 65 percent in 1930-35. The lowest five-year average of per capita domestic rice utilization corresponded with the highest ratio of exports to production between 1931-35.

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19 Wickizer & Bennett, 1941, pp. 320-321.
20 Wickizer & Bennett, 1941, pp. 314-319.
Thus, the redirection of output away from domestic consumption with the background of falling rice prices played an important role in sustaining and increasing exports. Brown asserts that rice cultivators consumed less in order to sell more and protect their money income. The cultivators’ determination to “protect his money income” also involved multiple other strategies ranging from surreptitious evasion to repudiation and resistance against the claims made by the landowner, money-lender or tax collector.\(^{22}\) Brown extensively discusses the ‘flexibility’ of colonial administrators on the tax demands during the Depression and his work broadly attempts to challenge Scott’s idea that the Depression of 1930 led to a collapse of the rural cash economy, a subsistence crisis and consequent rebellions.\(^{23}\)

However, the actions and agency of the Burman agriculturist in the form of resistance and repudiation of landlords’ demands as well as the ‘generous response’ of the landlords and state agents in the form of remission, reduction and postponement of impending debts cannot be generalized as a Burma-wide phenomenon. Brown acknowledged this when he pointed out that “there may have been marked variation in the administration’s flexibility district by district and in the cultivator’s resistance by class”.\(^{24}\) Moreover, factors like the rising power of the landlords, exhaustion of cultivable land frontiers, enforcement of the property right by the state through courts and/or militias, and the increased land revenue to be paid in cash by the landlords to the state need to be accounted for while discussing the agency and actions of the agriculturalists and landlords in Burma.\(^{25}\)

\(^{22}\) The *Hanthawaddy Settlement Reports* showed surreptitious selling of paddy by tenants across the settlement area in an attempt to evade the high rent demands of the landlords. By this, the cultivators managed to mislead the landlord into thinking that the crop was much smaller than it was and paid what he could afford or said he could afford while the unpaid balance was written off as bad debt (Brown, 2005, pp. 4-5, 72-73, 75).

\(^{23}\) Scott, 1976.

\(^{24}\) Brown, 2005, pp. 4-5, 75.

\(^{25}\) Scott, 1976, pp. 94, 118, 120.
Wickizer and Bennett, whose data Brown borrows from, asserted that the redirection of output away from domestic consumption was largely a result of the increased burden on the producers to meet their financial obligations and for sustenance.\(^{26}\) The economic recession and falling rice prices ‘pushed’ the delta agriculturalists to consume less and sell more, therefore, more than a strategy to maintain or “protect his money income”, it was the agriculturalists’ struggle to meet their exigent obligations. A top to bottom pressure was generated on various social actors of the Burmese agricultural economy in the process of the exaction of rents and revenues. The inability to fulfill these financial obligations and the consequent frustration and pressure often provoked “surreptitious evasion”, fight, and flight. For example, violent confrontations between the Chettiar landlords and moneylenders and the Burman agriculturalists and the flight of Burmese tenants and agricultural laborers to urban areas in search of alternative unskilled ‘lowly’ work is noticeable throughout the 1930s.

Several inter and intraregional developments and transformations during the 1920s and 1930s also played a crucial role in defining the Burmese rice price and its global demand and circulation.\(^{27}\) For example, in August 1927, the Japanese government imposed a duty on the import of foreign rice, and then a complete ban from March 1928-December 1932 on the import of foreign rice not only in Japan but also in their colonies of Korea and Formosa (now Taiwan). In between 1914-28, the area under rice cultivation increased by 49 percent in Siam, 45 percent in French Indochina, and merely 16 percent in Burma. Given its higher price, Burma’s rice also faced competition from Siam and French Indochina, especially for exports into the markets of Straits settlements and the Federated Malaya States. In 1933, the

\(^{26}\) They assert, “when prices fall and remain low, growers and dealers feel pressure to market larger lots, in hope of maintaining incomes at levels sufficient to meet inescapable financial obligations and to purchase commodities regarded as indispensable” (Wickizer & Bennett, 1941, p. 216).

\(^{27}\) This section is developed using the Report on Maritime trade in Burma, 1930s as cited in Brown (2005).
import of foreign (Burmese) rice into Java was restricted and then prohibited by the Dutch East Indies administration. They also banned foreign rice imports to the Outer Provinces by arranging the supply of rice from Java and Bali.28

On the other hand, various developments propped up the demand and circulation of Burmese rice in other markets. In between 1929-32, despite the fall in prices, the volume of Burmese rice exports held steady owing to the floods and famine in various parts of China. Strong demand from Shanghai boosted rice exports from Burma to China by almost three times, i.e., 350,000 tons of rice as compared to 125,000 tons (the annual average between 1927/28-1929/30). At the same time, the export of Burma’s rice to India soared from 1.046 million tons in 1932 to 1.789 tons in 1933/34. This was the result of several factors: first, reduced prices, which was due to the economic recession and intense competition from neighboring rice-producing countries, namely, Siam, French Indochina as well as Japan;29 second, in 1935, crops were damaged due to extensive flooding and an earthquake in Bihar which created a shortfall of supply of food grains; third, India’s rapidly rising population; and fourth, since Burma was a province of British India it had the advantage of no foreign duty unlike the rice imported from French or Dutch colonies.

These factors were compounded by the intense promotion of “Empire products” in Britain through pamphlets, advertisements and commissioned paintings. For example, one of the posters by Artist Dora Batty promoting rice from British India read: “When you buy Indian goods, you help India and increase employment here...Empire buyers are Empire builders”.30 Thus, the global market and the geopolitics of the 1920-30s marked by the economic recession, impositions of custom duty and bans,

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28 Furnivall, 1944, p. 439.
29 In 1933, Rangoon merchants accused the Japanese of seeking to offload a substantial volume of rice, half of which was bought from Burma, onto the Indian market at prices below the existing level which pushed the prices of rice further down.
30 Dora Batty, 1926-39.
price competitions and changing cultivation patterns in different regions of the world all impacted the demand and circulation patterns of Burmese rice so as to prevent either a sharp contraction or expansion.

With that said, rice production, price and circulation in the aftermath of the Depression cannot be fully understood without analyzing the structure of the agrarian economy and the role of the Chettiar moneylenders and financiers. Chettiar largely came from the Chettinad region in Madras and had long served as money lenders and financiers in the southern parts of India. In the nineteenth century, they spread their networks and activities widely across the Indian Ocean colonies of the British and other European empires. With the colonization of Burma and increased opportunities there, a wave of Chettiar migration to Burma took place. Besides banking and money-lending, the Chettiars in Burma also owned shops, factories, sawmills, paddy mills, and more industrial facilities. Until the 1870s, they were largely concentrated in Moulmein and Rangoon and financed the trade between India and Burma.

With increased immigration, rising population, and competition for paddy land in Burma there was a rise in the prices of land, wholesale paddy, as well as agrarian goods and services. There was an increase in demand for capital and agricultural credit which the Chettiars fulfilled by expanding their operation from Rangoon and other urban centers into the rural districts. In 1923, the Nattukottai Chettiar firm was formed with 1498 members. In 1930, about 1,655 Chettiars firms were functioning in Burma with a working capital of 750 million (50 million pounds). Initially, Chettiars provided indirect loans to the Burmese money lenders, paddy brokers and big landlords who in turn loaned money to Burmese agriculturalists. By the late nineteenth century, Chettiars were lending money to the Burmese agriculturalist both directly and indirectly, long and short-term.

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31 Adas, 1974b. There were a dozen offices in the excluded areas but 7/8th of them were in the delta where there was one Chettiar office to every 5,000 people (Harvey 1946, p. 55).
They provided long-term loans to the Burman agriculturalists for bringing new lands under cultivation and the purchase of work animals and agricultural tools. Short-term loans were to cover the costs of cultivation and the daily expenses for the cultivator and his family. Repair of dikes and embankments, purchase of bullocks, deficiencies in rainfall, floods, cattle diseases and other emergencies were some of the prime reasons for borrowings by the tenant-cultivator. The Report of Burma Provincial Banking Enquiry estimated that by the end of the 1920s, Chettiar moneylenders provided more than half of the total value of crop loans in lower Burma directly. If direct and indirect Chettiar loans are combined, they composed two-thirds of the total crop loans in lower Burma. The direct loans were much higher in certain districts like Hanthawaddy and Tharrawaddy.

Besides agricultural financing, the Chettiars also provided interest-based finances to the up-country mills which had appeared by the early twentieth century. The rice mills in Burma were almost exclusively owned by the Europeans until the end of the nineteenth century (41 of 49 mills in 1881), with just a few mills owned by Chinese, Indians and Burmans. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, many small up-country rice mills appeared, most of which were owned by Burmans. In between 1930-39, the mills rose from a total of 622 to 692, of which Europeans owned 27, Chinese 164, Indians 190, and Burmans 311. Several mills had to close with the onset of the Depression, but this did not prevent the erection of new mills over the 1930s. In 1936, the average number of employees in Burman-owned mills were about 38, while in the European mills it was 496. Over 80 percent of the mills were small and had less than 100 workers. In the smaller mills about one-third of workers were Burmese while in the larger European-owned mills the proportion of Burman workers was negligible. These up-country smaller mills were often unable to secure their financial needs at reasonable rates from the European banks or local moneylenders and were largely dependent on loans from

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33 Grantham, 1930.
34 The number of small mills in the interior rose from 27 in 1900 to 151 in 1914, then 260 in 1920 and 528 in 1930 (Furnivall, 1948, pp. 189-190).
the Chettiar. Chettiar interest rates were generally modest when compared to other loaning agencies in Burma.\textsuperscript{35} While little of their capital came from the European banks, the rates at which they borrowed capital from the foreign banks—like Lloyds, The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, and The National City Bank of New York, among others—compared well with the rates at which they loaned to Burmese cultivators. This enabled them to make huge profits.\textsuperscript{36}

Regarding Chettiar loan payments and retrievals, the Report of the Burma Provincial Banking Enquiry noted that: first, the loans were generally advanced by the Chettiar on the security of land or promissory note plus land security or valuables. About 70-75 percent of their loans were against valuable property (Table 1). Valuable collateral as security for loans passed the risks in the operation largely on the borrower; second, the payment of interest on the loans and repayment of the principal amount was only accepted in cash; and third, though the Chettiar had the legal rights to the repayment of loans on demand, the general practice was that for short-term or annual crop loans the date for full settlement of loans was generally fixed after the harvest, and the long-term loans continued for several years as long as the borrower kept paying the interest on time and in full.\textsuperscript{37} An important point here is that the land administration in Burma did not restrict the alienation of agricultural land or land being owned by non-Burmese or non-agriculturalists.\textsuperscript{38} With the onset of the Depression and the sharp fall in rice prices, this setup had lethal consequences for the agricultural economy of Burma.

\textsuperscript{35} Harvey, 1946, pp. 54-55. Sa-ba-би loans to the cultivator-tenants or to small landowners, which were short-term loans advances by local landlords or shopkeepers, charged exorbitant interest rates of up to 250 percent (Furnivall, 1931, pp. 130-147); Jacoby, 1949, p. 88.

\textsuperscript{36} Relations with these banks were so good that many times they received loans at rates of 10-12 percent merely on promissory notes without collateral (Siegelman, 1962, pp. 236-237); Grantham, 1930, pp. 216-17.

\textsuperscript{37} Grantham, 1930, pp. 76, 89, 174, 212, 238.

\textsuperscript{38} Brown, 2005, pp. 17-19.
Table 1: Conditions of Advances by Chettiars (1935-42)\textsuperscript{39}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Security</th>
<th>Interest per annum</th>
<th>Percentage of market value lent</th>
<th>Relative importance of loans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) On-demand Promissory Note (short-term loans of up to one year)</td>
<td>18-24%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>25-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) On-demand Promissory Note plus collateral security, i.e., Title deeds of houses, etc. (loans for one to five years)</td>
<td>12-15%</td>
<td>50-75%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Valuables/jewelry (short-term loans of up to one year)</td>
<td>12-15%</td>
<td>70-90% of the melted down value</td>
<td>10-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Immovable Property e.g., mortgages of land under registered deeds (long-term loans of more than 10 years)</td>
<td>9-15%</td>
<td>60-75%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proprietors were generally unable to pay back their loans after a succession of bad seasons and poor harvests—following such

\textsuperscript{39} The type 1 loans security covers both trade and agricultural loans while type 4 loans were exclusively for agricultural purposes and varied from small loans to loans up to 300,000 rupees (U Tun Wai, 1962, p. 48).
conditions, they lost their lands to the Chettiar. However, it was the crisis of the Great Depression and the sharp fall in rice prices which led to the fall of the mutual understanding on loans and rise in demands for immediate settlement. Cases of non-retrieval of loans led to the transfer of land ownership rights to the Chettiar money lenders leading to large-scale land alienation in Burma. In Minbu District, Chettiar had an outstanding advance of 2,500,000 rupees of which they could retrieve only 400,000. Large-scale foreclosures, which followed the inability to repay the agricultural loans, led to the transfer of agricultural land from the Burmese peasant proprietor to non-residents and non-agriculturalists. In between 1930-38, while the Chettiar population remained almost constant, their agricultural land ownership increased from 570,000 acres to 2,468,000 acres, which was about 25 percent of total agricultural land in the thirteen major rice-producing districts of Burma, and 50 percent of the total land held by non-agriculturalists in these thirteen districts.

However, the defaulting on loans by the Burmese agriculturalist and subsequent land alienation was a continuous process persisting since the pre-Depression period. In the early 1900s, almost $1/5$ of the total occupied land in the thirteen major rice-growing districts of lower Burma was owned by non-resident non-agriculturalists. In 1910, about 23 percent of the occupied area in thirteen principal rice-growing districts was owned by non-agriculturalists. Moreover, the area occupied by Burmese agriculturalists increased by merely 5 percent between 1914/15 and 1924/25, while that of non-agriculturalists, mainly the Chettiar, by 35 percent in the same period. Lands changed hands freely both among tenants and landlords. Referring to the pre-Depression period Furnivall wrote:

> Much of the land registered as held by agriculturalists is cultivated by men who are heavily indebted to the money-lender from whom they have bought the land and to who

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41 Andrew, 1933, p. 32; Cheng, 2012, p. 270; Couper, 1924, pp. 4, 10, 27.
they have to surrender it. The effective owner of such land is the money-lender and the nominal owner differs little from a tenant, except that he pays interest on his loans instead of rent. Thus, the area of land held by non-agriculturalist is much larger than the statistics indicate.\(^{42}\)

Thus, a large amount of land was held by absentee landlords since the pre-Depression period. However, what was different in the 1930s was the shortage of new/eager buyers of defaulted land. The money lender found it impossible to sell land at rates approximating to the value of loans and the land registers began highlighting the actual proportion of the problem.\(^{43}\) Thus, we notice a shift from \textit{sub-rosa} to de facto land alienation, and consequently, the Chettiarers turned into absentee landlords. Generally, Chettiarers were unbothered what the landowner spent the borrowed money on. For the Chettiar, the larger the debt—assuming the presence of sound security—the more profitable the transaction. More loans meant more foreclosures, more resale of the land, more mortgages, and still more loans. However, the ready availability of the Chettiarers’ loans and the over-extension of cultivators’ meagre resources were themselves important factors in making land alienation inevitable with the economic crisis of the 1930s.\(^{44}\)

The Depression also marked a dent on the credit system of the Chettiarers for several reasons: inability to pay back short-term loans taken from European banks pushed some Chettiar firms into bankruptcy and many into serious losses; new advances were further handed to landowners for loan retrieval in the next agricultural season; increased responsibility of land revenue collection with the possession of land; and reduced interest rates. Though long-term loans would have been profitable

\(^{42}\) Furnivall, 1931, pp. 62, 80-81.

\(^{43}\) It appeared that practically half of the land in lower Burma was owned by absenteees and alien landlords, and in the chief rice-producing districts from two-thirds to nearly three-quarters (Furnivall, 1948, p. 87).

\(^{44}\) Harvey, 1946, p. 55
for all - the Chettiar, the cultivators and the economic system of Burma - they were rarely granted.

With the increased transfer of land ownership to the Chettiars there was a change in the socioeconomic composition of the producers as well as the urban laborers of Burma. In the rural economy, we notice a steady rise of Indian tenants who replaced the Burmese agriculturalists. Since the pre-Depression period, several Indian migrants were involved as seasonal agricultural labor for planting and harvesting and then moved to mills or other sectors of employment for the next period. A. J. M Lander, Deputy Commissioner, Maubin conveyed that in between the prosperous years of 1924-29 more Burmans reached the tenant class and were inclined to employ the Indians to do the hard manual labor. Moreover, since the early twentieth century, there was a noticeable increase in the number of Indian tenants in Burma. The Season and Crop Report, 1914 stated the Burmese landlords preferred Indian tenants as “[...] they pay larger rents and do not give the landlords such an anxious time when the grain is on the threshing floor”.

After the Depression, however, Burman agriculturalists preferred Burmans for agricultural works. The reasons for this shift included the reduced cost of cultivation, acceptance of payment in kind by Burmans, delayed payment, etc. The Burman family emerged as a crucial labor unit for reaping to reduce costs of production in certain regions like Pyapon, where the Deputy Commissioner conveyed:

In Pyapon district it is possible to do without Indian labor as was proved in 1932 when a large number of women and even grown-up boys and girls took part in the reaping, threshing and winnowing processes, thus reducing the cost of cultivation as coolies had not to be engaged and the work was done by members of the household.  

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The Township Officer at Pantanaw pointed out that the low market price of paddy encouraged the employment of Burmans and Karens for reaping, unlike before, for which they were paid not in cash but in kind. The Deputy Commissioner of Maungmya conveyed that Burmans were content to wait for payment in cash or kind until the harvest was completed, provided they received small advances to cover current expenses. Indians wanted ready cash and did not accept payment in kind, as they wanted to move on. Therefore, the number of Indians employed on Burman land as tenants and agricultural laborers decreased as the Burmans took up the available work.

However, in the 1930s, with the increasing transfer of land ownership to the hands of non-agriculturalist non-residents, mainly the Chettiars, there emerged an increased preference for Indians as agricultural laborers and tenants. For example, in the southern parts of the Maubin District—which had large holdings under the control of Chettiars—the Coringhis, Uriyas and Tamils were mostly employed as reapers. Chettiars’ preference for Indian tenants and laborers was supposedly based on their docility, cheapness, better efficiency, and willingness to pay higher rents given the comparatively lower standards of living. For example, the Labor Commissioner stated “[...]in order to finish the reaping of an area within the specified time, more Burmans are required than Indians...Indians are better reapers as they do not lose so much grain.” W. L. Barretto, Deputy Commissioner of Pyapon, pointed out in 1933 that a Burman takes about three days to reap an acre while an Indian takes two days. The remuneration for reaping was not in tune with the proclaimed efficiency of the workers of different races. The Deputy Commissioner of Pyapon pointed out that for an acre of land Burman reapers obtained Rs. 4.80/- before the economic Depression came. In

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46 General Department Letter No. 134/2M, 1933, p. 21.
47 General Department Letter No. 2762/3A, 1933, p. 10.
48 Extract from the weekly notes of the Labor Commissioner, Burma (Burma Gazette, 1935-6).
49 General Department Letter No. 2297/3A-2, 1933, p. 40.
50 Ibid.
1933, Burmans were paid Rs. 3.80 per acre while the Indians worked for Rs. 2.80 per acre. Nevertheless, by the Depression, Indians were mostly employed as reapers in large gangs in extensive areas owned by non-agriculturalists. Smaller gangs working on smaller plots of land generally owned by Burmans consisted of family labor.

Simultaneously, the 1930s recession brought a change in the socioeconomic composition of Burma’s urban space. Citing various reasons official reports and administrators asserted that the Burmans generally took up those urban works where the profile and the working conditions suited them, while the migrant Indian laborers were “the toiler and the drudge” and were found in all those occupations labeled “disrespectful” and forsaken by the local Burmans. 51 While Burmans, who were considered more proficient in intricate work, were more interested in the better paid skilled artisans’ positions in the urban sphere than to take up the ‘lowly’ unskilled works. Until the twentieth century, the migrant Indian labor was, therefore, largely supplementary rather than an alternative to Burmese labor. Indians merely filled up the economic spaces the Burmans generally rejected or for which they were insufficiently available.

However, there was increased movement of agricultural Burmese from the delta hinterland to Rangoon, since the 1910s and 1920s, for various kinds of unskilled works which had for long been dominated by Indian migrants. 52 This shift accelerated with the 1930s Depression. Discussing the Rangoon Labor Housing Bill in 1931, E.P Pillay mentioned “...there has been during the past year a very large influx of Burmese labor into Rangoon, so much so that a fifty-fifty basis has been introduced between Indian and Burmese labor”. 53 The Hindu newspaper pointed out:

51 Baxter, 1941, pp. 85-87; Dorman-Smith, 1943, p. 31; Rao, 1933, pp. 61-62. Some colonial reports pointed that since the Indian laborers’ standard of living was low, they could afford to do hard work on low wages (Report of the Joint Select Committee, 1919, pp. 433, 473). Also see Andrew, 1933, p. 31; Bennison, 1928.
52 Adas, 1974a.
53 Burmese came in direct competition with Indian laborers for work as well as housing, especially in Rangoon (Extract from the Proceeding, 1931).
When it is a question of competition between Burmans and Indians as unskilled laborers, the inescapable facts are: both the Indians and the Burmans accept the same low wages for this type of work; that at this wage an apparently unlimited supply of Indian labor is forthcoming year after year, whereas only a small, varying, and irregular number of Burmans are prepared to undertake such labor; that this low wage is sufficiently attractive to a large number of Indians to induce them to leave their villages and families, whereas the equivalent wage is only accepted by Burman as a last resort and induces in them a feeling of rebellious discontent at times issuing in riotous action.  

Thus, the 1930s Depression accelerated the blurring of the existing racial segregation of workspace and the class of work. By the 1930s, an increased number of Indians were employed as tenants and laborers especially with the Chettiar taking up the role of absentee landlords, and simultaneously, an increasing number of Burmese agriculturalists were now available for unskilled work in urban spaces. This reshuffling in the socioeconomic composition of the rural and urban landscape of Burma created a sphere of intense economic rivalry, competition and conflict which was fueled by the press, politics, and propaganda, and affected the existing plural society of Burma.

Press, Politics and Propaganda: Repercussions of the Depression on Indian Migrants

Since the British occupation of Burma, Indians were often stigmatized by Burmans as associates and allies of the colonial government as Indians were employed in various spheres of life, from rickshaw pullers and laborers to doctors, lawyers, police, administrative officials and engineers. Over the years, anti-In-

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54 As cited in Employment, 1942, p. 198.
dian immigrant sentiment took root in various forms: the religious tensions between Buddhist Burman and Indian Muslims, mostly Chittagonian, especially on questions of intercommunal marriages; the economic competition and hostility against Indian laborer’s desperation to toil on low wages which reduced the bargaining positions of the Burmans; antagonism against the increasing intrusion of Indians in administration, police, army, military, etc., and their image of being ‘colonial collaborators’ (as Indians helped in the annexation and colonization of Burma, suppression of rebellions, ‘restoration’ of law and order, and imposition of the Indo-British system of administration).

The long-brewing anti-Indian and anti-immigrant sentiment exacerbated the economic effects of the Great Depression. The consequent economic competition borne out of the reshuffling of the rural-urban labor division was accompanied by the rise of politically constructed antagonisms spread through generations of ambitious young nationalist politicians. The popular antagonism and reactions against the conditions created by the Depression and the ubiquitous and unrestrained mobility of Indians became a crucial element for the crystallization of Burmese nationalism. The Burmese politicians not only used but fueled the prevalent anti-Indian and anti-migrant sentiments using the press and propaganda. It was on this foundation that the Burmese politicians rested their anti-colonial movement as well as larger political goals of separation from British India and self-government.

Burmans used the press in multifarious ways to flare anti-Indian sentiments. One was to construct a fear of the ‘Indianization of Burma’, of Burma being swamped by a wave of Indian immigrants given the continued unrestrained Indian mobility.\textsuperscript{55} Press propagandized the image of Indians not only as colonial collaborators and economic competitors but also as overcrowding infiltrators. A public opinion was created that the economic distress created by the rising number of unemployed Burmans could be relieved only by restricting Indian immigration.\textsuperscript{56} In

\textsuperscript{55} Burma: Control of Immigration (1938, pp. 486a, 537, 643).
\textsuperscript{56} The Place of Indian Labor in Burma, 1933, p. 11.
the construction of the fear of the Indianization of Burma, Rangoon played a very important role as it was there that the Indian population was double the size of the Burmese population by 1931. It was the major port of Indian entry and exit, and soon even became a hostile ground for open confrontation. Rangoon in the 1930s accounted for 40 percent of the total Indian population in Burma and this was used by the Burmese nationalist to justify ‘congestion’ caused by Indian ‘intrusion’ in Burma. The Royal Commission of Labor 1931 pointed out that:

In Rangoon factories, 95 percent of the unskilled and 70 percent of the skilled labor were reported to be Indians in 1928, and that position does not appear to have changed since then. Until 1930, the port of Rangoon was worked entirely by Indian labor, and although events in that year brought about some modifications of that position, it is still true in the main. India also supplies the bulk of tramway workers and of the *sampanwallas*, all the rickshaw pullers and hand-card pullers, and nearly all the general labor of other kinds. In fact, the economic life of Rangoon and the Industrial activity of Burma are generally dependent on the labor of Indians.  

However, the census figures clearly showed that the total population of settled Indians in Burma never exceeded six percent of the total population. The Agent of the GOI in Burma conveyed that the volume of immigration was decreasing, the surplus was decreasing and so was the total Indian population; and there was no fear of Burma being swamped with Indians. Thus, the idea of Indians over-populating Burma was a misleading political construct. Burmese nationalists used it not only to highlight the gravity and roots of the social and economic concerns generated by the Great Depression but amplify the persisting popular re-

58 Burma: Control of Immigration (1938, p. 240).
sentiments against unrestrained Indian migration and settlement and create a mass base for the anti-colonial movement in Burma.

Burmese politicians and press also played an important role in the construction of fear and flaring of hatred against migrant Indians over the question of intermarriage between the Buddhist Burmese women and the Indian men, especially Muslims. Racial, religious, cultural and national concerns and debates were raised over this issue by the 1930s. The union between Burmese women, who were constructed into a symbol of the nation, and the lower class ‘racially inferior’ Indian migrant laborer came to be highly polarized by the 1920-30s. This union was seen to induce a sense of cultural degeneration, religious loss, dilution of racial purity and kabya pyetthana (half-caste problem).  

While the Indians were referred to as kala which is etymologically derived from the Sanskrit word Kula, the caste man or kala or black man; and the children of mixed marriages were called zerbadis or Child of Gold. The zerbadis, however, preferred to call themselves Burman-Muslims to distinguish themselves from the Burmese in religion but identify with them otherwise. Slogans were raised against such marriages (“Do not take Foreigners, Oh Ye Burmese Women!”) and formed fertile grounds for racial-religious tensions. Moreover, since the marriage was not legally recognized, the women and children had no property rights in case of divorce or death of the partner.

During the 1930s, Burmese nationalists extensively used the press to propagate their animosity against interracial mar-

59 Mazumder, 2013, p. 205.
60 The term Zerbadis is believed to be derived from the word Zar (Gold) and Baft (Brocade). Indians in Burma were often objects of derision and even referred to as Kwe-Kala (kwe meaning dog in Burmese) (Chakravarti, 1971, pp. 11, 125-126; Ferrars & Ferrars, 1901, pp. 159-162; Yegar, 1972, pp. 29-36).
61 Mahajani, 1960, p. 23.
62 The Buddhist Marriage and Divorce Bill failed to pass in 1927 and it was only after the separation of Burma in 1937 that it was reintroduced with amendments and drafted into law in 1939 (Buddhist Women Special Marriage, 1937).
riages. For example, the Journal *Seq-Than* blamed Burmese-Muslim marriage for “ruining Burma’s race and religion”. Moreover, Burmese women also faced public wrath for their tendency to choose Indian (or European) men. During the 1920s and 1930s, the idea of a contemptible Burmese woman was popularized in plays like *The Burmese Wife* by James Ormerod and Saratchandra Chattopadhyaya’s novel *Srikanta*. It propagated the nationalist critique of Burmese women as ones who sold themselves, and concurrently the nation, to foreigners—Europeans and Indians. The idea of degradation of Burmese women was further reinforced by several abolitionist organizations working in Rangoon against trafficking in women and for a complete prohibition on prostitution. With the British occupation of Burma, several Burmese women ended up as concubines to the Europeans who later discarded them and returned home without making any provisions. Prostitution flourished and several women, both Burmese and Indians, ended up in that situation both as professionals and through trafficking, because the Burmese population had been swamped by a vast influx of males from India and other neighboring countries.

Magazines and newspapers in the 1920s and early 1930s popularized the qualities of an ‘ideal Burmese women’ to morally educate them. ‘Digression’ of the modern Burmese women was widely criticized, and they were labeled as ambitious, avaricious and of loose morals at one end, and naive and ignorant at the other. Ironically, at the same time the image of modern Burmese women as Western-educated and liberal was also popularized by nationalists and newspapers to contrast against the “backward and oppressive” Muslim culture and religion, and to avert intermarriage.

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63 As cited in Mazumder (2013, p. 205).
64 As cited in Mazumder (2013, pp. 192-193).
65 Traffic in Girls for immoral purposes, 1884; Illegal traffic in young girls, 1889.
66 The article criticized female Muslim customs like the purdah, their lack of ability to read religious texts, newspapers or anything written in English or to enter a mosque (as cited in Mazumder, 2013, pp. 205-206).
Several inciting articles, speeches and propaganda were used to generate animosity against the Indian migrants. Indian migrants in Burma were accused in the press of “seducing Buddhist women to become their wives and cause dissension”. This has parallels in India where Hindus targeted Muslims with a similar communal discourse which generated polarized narratives and debates on the issues of gender, religion, race, morality, “selective purdah”, the communal division of everyday life and space, and the politics of numbers. In Burma, Mujahed-i-Burma claimed such narratives “as false propaganda regarding Buddhist-Muslim marriages and deliberately inciting feelings against Muslims to drive them away from Burma”. Muslim-Burmese marriages emerged as an important concern and were held as the main reason for the series of riots that broke out in Rangoon in July 1938, as discussed ahead.

The larger aim behind the construction of anti-Indian sentiments over the issue of intermarriages and the Indianization of Burma was not merely to curb down economic competition and restrict unregulated Indian mobility to Burma in the backdrop of conditions created by the Great Depression but, more importantly, to raise and sustain with more vigor the anti-colonial movement and the political demands of ‘separation’ from British India and ‘self-government’ for Burma. In January 1922 itself U Po Bye, Member of Burma in the Indian Council of States moved a resolution “for the appointment of a committee to examine the question of separation of Burma from the rest of Indian Empire”. However, the resolution was withdrawn by the government in 1924, calling it premature. The government stated, “that a demand for separation must follow and not precede the introduction of a reformed constitution in Burma”.

It was in this context that Reginald Craddock, Governor of Burma and Chairman of the Indian Constitutional Reform Committee, called for the introduction of reforms that led to the birth of ‘diarchy’ in Burma (1923-36). This happened even

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68 As cited in Mazumder (2013, p. 208).
69 Memorandum on Separation of Burma, 1930.
though the Montague-Chelmsford reforms and the Joint Select Committee on the GOI bill had not included Burma within the scheme of constitutional reforms, stating “Burma is not India...and its problems are different altogether”. The Joint Select Committee had conveyed “the people of Burma are entirely different from the people of India, they come from a different stock and have a different history, a different religion, different language, different social system, different manners and customs and different ways of life, and that Burma was included as a dominion of India for administrative reasons”. Similarly, the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms highlighted that it was for military reasons that Burma must always remain a part of India. The introduction of diarchy in Burma was merely a colonial plot to delay the Burmese demands for separation from British India. But this position could not be sustained for long in the background of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and rising political consciousness and demands which repeatedly reverberated in form of open conflicts between the Burmans and Indians.

There were a series of violent insurrections against various classes of Indians from the 1920s, which acquired more brutality and force by the 1930s given the prevailing social, economic and political conditions. In the 1920s, there was a rise in revolutionary groups in the delta against the Chettis and other classes of Indians over the issue of loans, debt and land. They often resorted to crimes like robbery, cattle maiming, arson, and even murder. In 1924, there was an outbreak against Chettis led by the bu athins, an inner secret group determined to achieve home rule for Burma. In the Tharawaddy District, the bu athins tried to force Chettiar agents to reduce the debts of cultivators using threats and force. They also used violent assault against the Burmese to force them to join the movement against the financial depredations of the Chettis, which became the “butt of Burmese cartoonists”, “Public Enemy No. 1”, and were described as “shylocks”, “bloodsuckers”, “deceivers”, and “fiery dragons”.

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71 Grantham, 1930; Harvey, 1946, p. 55.
A major conflict occurred in May 1930 in Rangoon among the Indian and Burman dockyard laborers. It began with the issue of a strike over wages, dismissal of Indian workers and their replacement with the Burmans. However, reconciliation and the reappointment of Indian workers infuriated the Burman workers leading to the riots which soon spread to neighboring regions and to a massacre of migrant Indians.\textsuperscript{72} The figures vary but at least 100 people were reported dead and approximately 1,000 wounded. No compensations were given to any Indians as there was “no evidence of who committed the atrocities”.\textsuperscript{73} There was further anti-Indian rioting in Rangoon in 1931 against Chittagonian agriculturalists and the Chettiars, who came to be stigmatized as usurpers of land. In March 1931, there were riots in Pegu and Toungoo districts and in the delta which then spread south into various parts of Hanthawaddy and other districts.

The report on the rebellion attributed its outbreak to the increasing number of Indian cultivators in the Burma delta, and the increased competition due to their lower standards of living. The Saya San rebellion in December 1930 led by Saya San, an ex-monk, folk doctor and nationalist could not be brought under control until 1932. The rebellion constituted a series of insurrections against the landlords and the colonial government. Oaths were taken to “behead the heretic Kala”, and excerpts from rebel documents read “after small towns had been attacked, big towns should be attacked, and finally, Burma should be wrested from kalas” and “when we get back our country, debts due to Chettyars will also not have to be paid”.\textsuperscript{74} The insurrection at the end claimed nearly 1,700 lives and millions of rupees in property damage.\textsuperscript{75} Indian migrant laborers and upper classes in the cities

\textsuperscript{72} Rao, 1930.

\textsuperscript{73} Collins mentioned that “the number of dead were unknown” and “no Burman was sent up for trials except a couple … hundreds of murders passed unpunished, because there was no evidence of who committed them. The massacre was called a riot” (1938, p. 159).

\textsuperscript{74} The Report on the Origin and causes of Burma Rebellion, as cited in Siegelman, 1962, p. 280.

\textsuperscript{75} Adas, 1974a, p. 200.
and rural areas all became victims of communal violence perpetrated by the Burmese. Meanwhile, in a motion regarding the separation of Burma from British India in December 1932, U Pe Maung stated in the Council, “Indians have swallowed up Burma”. In April 1933, U Ba Than, explaining the inundation of Indians in Burma in another motion regarding the separation stated, “if this state of things goes on for a long time, there will be no Burmese women left, and in fact, in ten years we would have to hand them over our women and our money”.

Thus, by the 1930s, the separatist sentiments and diarchy generated a range of serious problems: racial-religious antagonism, hatred for intermarriages and the low standard of (Burmese) living, economic competition, sociocultural distinction, and fear of Indianization. These issues not only widened the gulf between Indians and Burmans but also hampered Burma’s relationship with Britain and the Commonwealth. Given the rising pressure, the question among colonial officials was no longer whether Burma should be separated from India or not, but how to execute the process given the difficulties, and solutions related to various issues: immigration, finances, debts, trade, the military, currency exchange, and constitutional problems. These issues were debated and negotiated subsequently leading to the separation of Burma from British India in 1937. Immigration was set to be governed by the Government of Burma Immigration Order, 1937. The crux of this Order was that there shall be “no restriction on the entry of Indians in Burma for 3 years (until March 1940) or until 12 months have elapsed from giving by the Governor of Burma to the Governor-General of India a notice to terminate the operation of this Order, whichever last occurs”.

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76 Memorandum on Separation of Burma, 1930.
Critiquing the System & Restricting Migration: Repercussions of the Depression on the System of Indian Mobility to Burma

There was a shift in official narratives occurring from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century concerning the characteristics of intermediation and the system of Indian migration to Burma. This migration stream was consistently described as “free migration”, “other migration”, and “unregulated migration” as it was characterized by a “paternalistic” setup where recruitment took place through a network of kin-intermediaries, family and friends and was devoid of any regulation (unlike the indenture system). However, by the twentieth century, it came to be characterized as one of the most exploitative systems of migration and the entire responsibility for it was laid on the maistry mediators. Various contemporaneous official studies and conferences studying the maistry system of Indian emigration to Burma had criticized its functioning and called for its regulation. E.J.L Andrew, based on his personal experience as Assistant Protector of Immigrants and Emigrants, Rangoon, and as Labor Officer, criticized the maistry recruitment system and their supervisory activities. He asserted that if ever a case for legislative actions existed, the case of contract labor in Burma is one such case (1933).

By the 1930s, the Depression and the conditions generated thereof marked increasing hostility against the Indians. There was a pattern of declining Indian migration to Burma and increasing return which automatically regulated the role of maistries at the level of recruitment (Table 2). There was also a radical shift in the official narratives from demanding regulation and reform of the maistry system to demanding its abolition. Pillai and Sundaram in their 1933 Report asserted that the vicious maistry system based on the pivot of contracts should be abolished. The Rangoon Daily News asserted the maistry system

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78 Annual Report of Emigration Department, 1890-1919.
79 Pillai & Sundaram, 1934.
was rotten, to be mended, if not ended, while the *Rangoon Gazette* called the maistry system a scandal and disgrace. Further, a seven-member deputation including A. Narayan Rao, Secretary to the Central Labor Board, Rangoon, and other Indian officials in the legislature discussing Indian emigration to Burma called for complete elimination of the maistries from the engagement, dismissal and payment of labor to maintain a free entry for Indians and improvement of the conditions for migrant laborers already there. It can be asserted that the maistries took advantage of their power and position to earn more profits at the expense of laborers’ wellbeing, but nevertheless, maistries were customized, promoted and expected to perform the way they did through the immense power vested in them by the state and capital. They performed under immense pressure with contractual obligation to employers and fear of legal liability in case of an aberration. However, official narratives in the twentieth century stigmatized the intermediaries as the primary source of all migration evils and exploitation of laborers, while shielding the state and employers of any role in the persisting conditions of the migrant laborers. The stigmatization of the intermediaries and calls for the abolition of the maistry system also helped neutralize the Indian nationalists’ critique of British colonialism as the reason for the abysmal condition of Indian laborers in Burma and their demands for reforms and restrictions.

Table 2: Indian Migration to and from Burma, 1929-38 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Indian Migrants to Burma</th>
<th>Returnees from Burma</th>
<th>Surplus/Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>405.3</td>
<td>371.8</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>368.5</td>
<td>399.2</td>
<td>-30.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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80 Immigration Agreement with Burma, 1935.
81 For more details on the demonizing of brokers/intermediaries as the source of migration evils and drawing attention away from employers, see McKeown (2012).
A step further in this direction were the proposals for the complete abolishment of Indian unskilled migration to Burma. The Royal Commission on Labor in 1931 recommended abolition of the system along with the prohibition of emigration of unskilled labor from India to Burma altogether because the security for employment and standards of housing and labor conditions were not adequate to justify continued migration. Based on the Royal Commission’s Report, the Reforms Office called for power to restrict assisted emigration in general and to allow “free emigration”. In contrast to Ceylon or Malaya which recognized that it was dependent on a continuous supply of Indian labor, there was no general recognition of this sentiment in Burma. The Burmese opinion generally favored the complete cessation of Indian migration.

Several discriminatory resolutions and bills were proposed to reduce Indian influence and bring forth a complete ban on their migration. For example, a resolution was proposed by U Ba Hlaing (Rangoon Non-Indian Labor) to “Burmanize up to 90 percent of the labor employed in all factories, industrial estab-

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82 Views of the Education, 1933.
84 A series of measures were introduced against Indian money-lending and land-owning groups, especially Chettiars, such as the Land Alienation Act, the Land Purchase Bill, and the Tenancy Act. Further there were acts/bills like the Rangoon Municipal Bill and the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage and Succession Act which raised the anxiety of Indians (FNo 43/39-Os, 1940).
lishments, public utility services, docks, wharves and jetties, inland waterways, local bodies, etc., in Burma”. U Lun Maung, sub-divisional officer, Kyaiklat pointed out that the “proportion 90 percent was too much... only at most two thirds of employees should be Burman”.86

The extremity of the anti-Indian agony was again seen in the form of major open confrontations. For example, the July 1938 riots spread northwards from Rangoon to Mandalay.87 A meeting of Buddhist monks and laymen was held at Shwedagon Pagoda in protest of the anti-Buddhist book written by Burmese Muslim Maung Shwe Hpi that had been published seven years before and then republished. The gathering turned violent against Indians, leading to huge loss of lives and property.88 Though the immediate cause of the riots was Maung Shwe Hpi’s book, which contained passages disparaging the Buddha, several other socio-racial, economic and political passions were already at work and were merely unleashed by the book viz. unchecked Indian immigration, a rise in crime rates, collapse of respect for local institutions, the Depression and its attendant unstable agricultural economy, rampant tenancy and rack-renting, the provocative coverage of riots by the press, to name just a few.89 All played a significant role in increasing tensions.

Another riot broke out in Rangoon in September of that same year and further accelerated the loss of Indian lives and property. In January 1939, there were again riots in Monywa in which an Indian owned cotton mill was burned, scores of Indians were assaulted, and shops were looted. In September 1939, there were assaults on Indians in Mandalay by Burmese miners and sappers. The Interim and Final Reports of the Riots Enquiry Committee, 1939 mentioned widespread uneasiness about con-

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85 Burmanisation of Labor employed by Local Bodies, 1939.
86 General Department Letter No. 2141/2M, 1939.
88 About 220 died and 906 were injured (Final Report of the Riot, 1939).
89 Burma Anti-Indian Riots, 1938; Burma: Control of Immigration, 1938, pp. 1-72.
continued Indian penetration in Burma as it led to the unemployment and under-employment of Burmans. There were warnings about the prevailing danger of renewed attacks on Indian lives and property on a wider scale. Hutchings, the Agent of the GOI in Burma stated, “jealousy of Indian success in trade and commerce, the universal dislike of the borrower for the money-lender, the racial incompatibility...in the times of trade depression combined with national and political stimulations broke out into violent actions”.

All these factors ultimately shifted the focus of the government from regulating the system of migration towards restraining migration itself. The near expiry of the time clause of the Immigration Order of 1937 led the Government of Burma to set up a Commission of Inquiry under James Baxter, the Financial Advisor to the Government of Burma. This Commission aimed to devise a sound policy on Indian immigration, to decide its future course and curb the prevailing sentiments.

The Agent of GOI in Burma, the Burma India Chamber of Commerce as well as Professor Bernardelli (Statistician acting as Secretary to the Baxter Committee), through their detailed reports, informed the governments of both countries to be aware of several factors before taking any major steps such as restricting the emigration of laborers, partially or wholly. These factors include the availability of inaccurate statistics made it impossible to understand the complexity of Indian migration flows, the fact that labor migration flow was self-regulating to demands and trade patterns, and that in the past decade Indian immigrant arrivals had declined. Thus, any restriction, they argued, would be detrimental to the economic interests of Burma and could spoil the mutual harmony between the two nations.

On the other hand, the Burmese nationalists at the time were less concerned with tackling the atrocities faced by Indian laborers, functioning of the *maistries*, or regulating Indian mi-

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90 FNo 43/39-Os, 1940; Confidential Note by Dr. H Bernardelli, 1940, pp. 208, 213-14.
91 FNo 43/39-Os, 1940, pp. 72-144.
92 Burma: Control of Immigration, 1938, pp. 144-289.
migration. They persistently advocated for a total break on the immigration of Indians. As a reaction to the prevailing sentiments, Indian nationalists like Tyabji, who was the Chairman of the Central Relief Committee, wrote “to the employer an excess of labor is an advantage because it creates or helps in creating or maintaining the disorganized condition of labor, impermanency of work, maistry system, low wages, bad conditions of life and work; secondly, the landlords in whose premises the labor stays, charges high rent from the labor; thirdly, the shipping companies who enjoy a lucrative trade in carrying”. Therefore, a restriction of unregulated immigration of labor by a reduction of 25,000 immigrants and emigrants each year would be imposed.\(^93\)

In a more radical tone, Hutchings, Agent of GOI in Burma, stated:

> The average Burman, I am convinced, feels in his heart that Indians in their present numbers are a nuisance and ought to be got rid of, that they are sort of persons...who ought to be kicked out...(and therefore) the vital thing in the true interest of Indians in Burma at present is to get them, first of all, respected and secondly wanted rather than be exposed to hatred and contempt from a minor nation for the sake of pittance, and so the restriction on immigration might be used, here as elsewhere, not only to make the true economic position clear but to maintain that prestige.\(^94\) (Emphasis added.)

Baxter’s Committee in its report concluded that based on available statistics there was no evidence of displacement of Burmans by Indians, that Indian labor was largely supplementary rather than alternative, and that there was no evidence of serious excess of Indian labor over the current requirement. However, looking at the anti-Indian immigration sentiments prevailing in Burma, the committee recommended the introduction of passports, visas in the form of employment permits, worker registrations, a regular compilation of immigration statistics, and

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\(^{93}\) Ibid., pp. 72-144.

\(^{94}\) Burma Demi-Official correspondence, 1939.
classifications of Indians in Burma that helped regulate their immigration with a mutual immigration agreement between both the countries. Ultimately, a notice was given, as per the regulation, by the Government of Burma to the GOI for the termination of the Immigration Order of 1937 with effect from 1 April 1941. The Indo-Burma Immigration Order executed between the two governments, which was to come in effect from October 1941, called for strictly regulating the migration of Indians, especially unskilled laborers, through permits, qualifying tests, visas, and passports.

It is important to note that the root of Burman discontentment was not as much against the Indian laborers who had populated the Burman cities and were competing for ‘low works’ as against the prosperous Indian classes, mainly the Chettiar to whom the agricultural Burmese lost their land, towards the prosperous traders overshadowing Burmans, and those Indians who occupied positions of authority in the administration, police or military. Hutchings, Agent of GOI in Burma stated:

It was said to me more than once that Burman feeling is not against the immigrant laborer so much as the settled trader and shop-keeper...outcry against capitalists and landlords at the moment is really against the settled population in the town and Bazaars, more than against migratory laborer.95

And Bernardelli wrote:

It is not the Indian who came here in fair number to do all sorts of useful work in a humble occupation that forms the root of Indian trouble Burma, it is rather some of those who have gained, or who are gaining a foothold in this country and are so conspicuously prosperous, relatively more prosperous than the indigenous inhabitants.96

96 Bernardelli went so far as to compare the situation of Indians in Burma (the trading and propertied classes) to the catastrophe of the Jews in Central and Western Europe (Confidential Note by Dr. H Bernardelli, 1940, pp. 213-16).
However, the immediate hostility, as well as the restrictions, fell upon the most visible and vulnerable migrant laboring class in Burma, the people who labored to develop Burma and bring it global recognition, as they were easy targets to satisfy Burmese discontentment. Rao, member of the Legislative Council, Burma, asserted:

Burma could not have built her splendid railway systems, cleared her inaccessible forest domains and transformed them into smiling fields, operated her factories amidst fumes and high temperature for a miserable poor wage but for these patient, long-suffering, obedient, faithful and grateful but much maligned sons of India. 97

The Immigration Order of 1941 and its various provisions—viz. the high amount charged for different permits, especially Permit A for skilled laborer of Rs. 500, quotas of unskilled labor based on demand to be determined by Immigration Board, the amount to be paid for dependents, qualifying tests, marriage issues, the cancellation of privileged status if one stays out of Burma for more than a year—all generated a wave of protests in India as they violated the promise of protection of Indian interests. 98 Gandhi’s speech blamed the British for creating an unwanted rift between the two countries and he called the agreement as an “An unhappy agreement” and “breaking every canon of international propriety”, “an insult to the whole nation”, “panicky and penal”, and “a brutal reminder that both India and Burma are under British heel”. 99 He was also probably the first one to refer to the separation of India and Burma in 1937 as “partition”. Retrospectively, the separation of India and Burma might be termed as the first partition.

97 Rao, 1933, p. 16.
98 The Burman press was overall extremely favorable to the agreement. Europeans in Burma were reserved but thought that the fees were extravagant (Burma: Control of Immigration, 1938, pp. 536-649).
99 Mahatma Gandhi’s Statement, 1941.
However, before the Order of 1941 could come into force, the Japanese annexed Burma in 1942 amidst the Second World War. The war and occupation are said to have brought about the exodus of approximately 400,000-450,000 Indians from Burma mainly through a difficult land route. This was more than 50 percent of the total Indian migrants in Burma during that time and 10-15 percent of them perished while trekking back to India. Those who remained lost all their wealth and belongings in looting and war damage, while many ended up in forced labor gangs run by the Japanese military. In 1942, the Indian situation was marked by political and economic turmoil manifested through the Quit India Movement, and the Bengal famine of 1943, which made the conditions for returned laborers unsustainable. Thus, the Burmese agitation against ‘surplus’ Indians and their unregulated entry, competition for employment, their grievances against Indians’ prosperity, and official criticism of the maistry system were yet to achieve anything concrete, until world events of the 1940s came to auto-regulate the numbers of Indians in Burma, their mobility, as well as the maistry system of labor recruitment and migration.

Conclusion

This article highlighted the changes in the social and economic composition of the agricultural and urban landscape of Burma in the 1930s. The foundations of this reshuffling were laid down by the Chettiar money lenders and financiers when they turned into absentee landlords. Their rise as landlords was facilitated by Burmese agriculturalists defaulting on loans taken on the security of land and there were few buyers of the defaulted land, unlike before, owing to the Depression. The Chettiar preference for Indians as tenants and laborers led to an increase in their

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100 Dorman-Smith, 1943.
101 The maistry as a supervisor of labor gangs did not cease to exist. They continued to be mentioned in various labor disputes and struggles (Labor Movement and Strikes, 1947).
numbers in agriculture, especially in the rice-producing districts of lower Burma. This preference was not merely guided by racial-religious-regional affinities, but also by the desire for maximizing profits. Indian labor, given their itinerancy and desire to earn and return, were more likely to accept higher rent and worse existing conditions, than the Burmese, and were, therefore, preferred tenants. Consequently, rural to urban migration led to an increasing number of Burmans in urban areas. They now competed with Indians for various ‘menial and lowly’ unskilled jobs in urban areas like Rangoon for which they did not compete for before. Thus, the 1930s Depression blurred the previous racial segregation of labor.

As a result of these shifts and changes in the 1930s, which was more of a pre-Depression continuity at an accelerated scale, there was an increase in hostility against the Indian migrants disrupting the relatively peaceful plural society in Burma. Polarized narratives about gender, race, religion, capital, and mobility of Indians spread through the press and propaganda which guided Burmese nationalists to construct a popular consciousness that was strongly anti-Indian and anti-migrant in its attitude and hostile in its nature. The Great Depression and the spread of anti-Indian and anti-migrant narratives through the press and nationalist propaganda helped the Burmese nationalists widen and strengthen the mass base for anti-colonial struggle and pursue the larger political goals for separation of Burma from British India, self-government, and thereafter independence.

The twentieth century also witnessed shifts in the official narratives on the maistry system of migration: from seeking for its reform and regulation towards demanding its annulment and the complete restriction of Indian unskilled labor migration. The increasing pressure created by Burmese nationalists marked several incidents of violence and discrimination that paved the way for an order restricting the “free flow” of Indians to Burma. However, the order could not be implemented because of the global events of the 1940s, in particular World War II and the Japanese occupation of Burma.
The global and local developments of the 1930s, such as the Great Depression, transformations in the global circuit of capital accumulation and production, and the rise of xenophobic nationalism in Burma, had a crucial impact on Indian migrants and their pattern and system of migration, and Indian migrants and capital were significant to the development of plantation agriculture as well as commercial and industrial enterprises in Burma. Against the backdrop of the socioeconomic transformations unleashed by the Great Depression, this article underlines the role played by Burmese nationalism, the press and propaganda in restructuring the social and economic lives of Indian migrants, both laboring and non-laboring. Indian migrants and non-European capital, mainly that of the Chettiers, played a key role in facilitating the emergence of Burma as one of the largest rice-producing regions of the world, and making rice an important crop for global circulation and consumerism. Chettiers stimulated large-scale Indian labor migration with great success through their financing of the maistry’s recruitment activities and facilitated increased engagement of Indian laborers in the agricultural landscape of Burma during the interwar period. Complicating Eurocentric notions, this article draws attention towards the much-overlooked presence and contribution of non-European actors and capital in regulating colonial migrations, the lives of migrants, as well as materiality in the age of empires.

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Hawkers and Hijabi Cyberspace: Muslim Women’s Labor Subjectivities in Yangon

Shae Frydenlund and Shunn Lei

Abstract

Muslim women’s experiences of exclusion are often at the forefront of academic literature on ethnicity and race in Myanmar. Yet Muslim women’s varying experiences of exclusion involve more than discursive Othering and state violence. Drawing on postcolonial, Marxist-feminist, and border studies perspectives on the relationship between exclusion, inclusion, and labor subjectivity, this article takes Yangon Muslim women’s diverse and embodied experiences of urban space and work as entry points to understand shifting relations between the state, capital, and labor in Myanmar. We argue that capital articulates with social difference to create conditions of violent inclusion in precarious labor markets and the emergence of new labor subjectivities. This ethnographic research also shows that, despite facing exclusions from public space and formal labor markets, hijabi women in Yangon create vibrant communities, new subjectivities, and new livelihoods on the internet, highlighting the ways that Muslim women make lives within and diagonal to spaces of domination.
အကကြ်ေးြက်မခင်ေးတိိုှံ့ကပါ။ ယခိုရဆာင်ေးပါေးတွင် ြယ်ကကဉ်ဆက်ဆမခင်ေးနာင့်အလိုပ်သြာေးာေးအသိုေးခမြစ်ြှုတိိုှံ့အကကာေးဆက်နွယ်ြ ာေးကိိုပိိုှံ့စ်ကိိုလိိုနီအရမခမပက်စ်ဆစ်ြီေးြနစ်ဝါဒနာင့်နယ်ရမြအရမခမပရလ့်လာရေးရှုရာင့်တိိုှံ့ရန၍န်ကိုန်ပြိွဲ့ိ ြွတ်ဆလင်အြိုေးသြီေးြ ာေး၏စိုလင်ကွဲမပာေးရသာမြင်သာင်သာသည့််ပြိွဲ့မပရနာနာင့်အလိုပ်အရတွွဲ့အကကာေး ြာေးအာေးမြန်ြာနိိုင်ငအတွင်ေးနိိုင်ငရတာ်၊ အင်ေးနာင့်အလိုပ်သြာေးာေးအကကာေး ြရမပာင်ေးလဲရနရသာစပ်ဆက်ြှုကိိုနောေးလည်နိိုင်န်အတွက်ရလ့်လာြှုကိိုစတင်ြီေးြ ာေးကိိုနောေးလည်မြစ်သည်။ အင်ေးနာင့်လူြှုကွဲမပာေးြှုတိိုှံ့ရပါင်ေးဆိုကာအလွယ်တကူပပ်က်နိိုင်သည့််အလိုပ်သြာေးရေးကွက်ြာေးအတွင်ေးအတင်ေးအကကပ်ပါဝင်ရစသည့််အရမခအရနြာေးမြစ်ရပေါ်လာသည်ဟိုကျွန်ိုပ်တိိုှံ့သပ်ပါသည်။ န်ကိုန်ပြိွဲ့အတွင်ေးဟီဂ ပ်(ြွတ်ဆလင်အြိုေးသြီေးြ ာေးဘာသာရေးဝတ်ဆင်ရလ့်ရသာရခါင်ေးရဆာင်ေးပိုဝါ)ဝတ်ဆင်ရသာအြိုေးသြီေးြ ာေးြ ာ အြာေးပိိုင်ရန ာေးနာင့်သြာေးရိိုေးက အလိုပ်သြာေးရေးကွက်ြာေးအတွင်ေးနာင့်အပပိ င် ိ ာေးတွင်ြိြိတိိုှံ့ဘဝကိိုပ်တည်ရနကကာင်ေးလှုပ် ာေးသည့််လူြှုအဝန်ေးအဝိိုင်ေးြာေး၊ အသိုေးဝင်ြှုအသစ်ြာေး သက်ရြွေးဝြ်ေးရကကာင်ေးလှုအသစ်ြာေးကိို ြန်တီေးမခင်ေးြ ာေးမြင့် ယင်ေးတိိုှံ့သည် လွှြ်ေးြိိုေးသည့််ရန ာေးအတွင်ေးနာင့်အပပိ င် ိ ာေးတွင်ြိြိတိိုှံ့ဘဝကိိုပ်တည်ရနကကာင်ေးလှုပ် ာေးသည့််лад်ေးသပ်ပါသည်။
Introduction

The Lucky Eleven Facebook page has nearly 12,000 Burmese-speaking followers. Run from the Yangon home of 24-year old Thinn Thinn, Lucky Eleven is the shopfront for her cosmetics business, which features a wide variety of products from brands like Maybelline, Estee Lauder, Bath and Body Works, Labo Labo, and Shiseido. Thinn Thinn posts to her page upwards of 20 times per day, highlighting different brands and products, while also posting “promotions” for special pricing on different products multiple times a week. Her business has a devoted following of Burmese-speaking hijabi (Muslim headscarf-wearing) Muslim women—Thinn Thinn herself is a Rohingya woman born in Rakhine State and raised in Yangon. She also wears niqab, a black two-piece garment that covers the arms and ankles and features a horizontal opening for the eyes. Though her family is from northwestern Rakhine State, her parents and siblings migrated to work in Saudi Arabia. After struggling to obtain a government identity card that would allow her to attend University, Thinn Thinn decided to start her own business selling makeup to the new generation of cyber-connected and cyber-literate Myanmar women who are increasingly interested in global beauty and skincare trends.

Thinn Thinn’s Lucky Eleven Facebook page also features hijab-wrapping instructional videos from other Yangon beauty and hijabi fashion “influencers,” skincare tutorials, and thousands of joyful, emoji-laden comments about the page’s content. Lucky Eleven is one of dozens of similar pages managed by hijabi and niqabi women in Myanmar, selling everything from bejeweled hijabs to snacks and beauty products. Notably, these Facebook pages also serve as a community forum for hijab enthusiasts. Photos praising the religious virtues of hijab-wearing, and the inner and outer beauty of the hijabi or niqabi herself, stand in stark contrast to the anti-Muslim cartoons and social media posts that circulate widely on Burmese Facebook. In fact, Burmese hijabi cyberspace is often the only space where many
young Burmese-speaking hijabis can see and interact with women who look like them, away from discrimination, harassment, or assault.

The decision to wear the hijab, or pa’wa in Burmese, is not taken lightly by Muslim women in Myanmar. Wearing the hijab in Myanmar, especially in Yangon, positions women who may have passed as Buddhist within a thorny web of raced and gendered discourses of belonging and non-belonging across multiple scales. Some women choose not to wear the hijab because they do not feel spiritually ready to make the commitment to wear it consistently. As San San, a 29-year old Myanmar hijabi woman put it:

*I thought about the decision for a long time. Many years. Because it’s a serious commitment. You can’t just take off the hijab if you want to go dancing at the club, because you feel discriminated against, or because it’s too hot. You have to wear it all the time, it’s our religion. You have to be brave.*

Other Muslim women choose not to wear the hijab not because they are not ready spiritually, but because they are scared of being targeted by Buddhist violence or excluded from the institutions where they hope to study or work. The materiality of the hijab, and the embodied experience of being Muslim and being a hijabi or not, are imbricated in broader struggles over belonging in the Myanmar nation and, as we try to show in this essay, Myanmar’s broader political economy of labor.

Hence, apart from their existence as valuable social space for young Muslim women in Myanmar, hijabi social media shopfronts reflect two important structural features of Myanmar nation-building and political economy. First, Muslim hijabi women face both de jure and de facto exclusion from political, social, and economic spaces on the basis of their non-Burman racialized ethnicity, non-Buddhist religious status as Muslims, and

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1 San San, personal communication, 2018.
their choice to visibly display their Muslim-ness as hijabis. Second, this exclusion is accompanied by inclusion in a very specific labor regime: flexibilized, precarious sales and hawking work. Recalling colonial-era stereotypes that continue to represent Muslims as business-savvy immigrants from South Asia, Muslim women in Yangon often turn to online sales and hawking work in the absence of other opportunities to attend university, enter civil service, or the ability to make ends meet with only a husband’s wages. However, in the midst of a proliferation and entrenchment of discriminatory discourses and structures that limit the lives of Muslim women in Myanmar, hijabi cyberspaces have emerged as hybrid spaces of identity affirmation and new economic life, in which the celebration of Muslim womanhood is intertwined with sales work and wages. Additionally, the work of gender activists in Yangon is cracking open spaces of exclusion for Muslim women, specifically educational and political spaces.

This paper examines the interrelated processes of Muslim women’s exclusion and inclusion in Myanmar through a study of their navigation of everyday spaces of life and work in Yangon, based on research conducted before 2019. We begin with an overview of critical theorizations of social exclusion and inclusion in order to foreground our argument about the simultaneous exclusion and inclusion of Muslim women in Myanmar. We argue that racialized and gendered hierarchies in Myanmar articulate with capital to engender the simultaneous exclusion and discipline of Muslim women, and their inclusion in Myanmar’s political economy as “informal,” flexibilized and casualized labor subjects. From there, we outline the extant literature on the historical and geographical specificity of gender, race, and Islam in Myanmar, which is followed by a discussion of our research methods. The fourth section examines Muslim women’s lived experiences of exclusion in the spaces of the Myanmar school, the street, and the government office. The fifth section is a discussion of Muslim women’s varied experiences of hawking and online sales work. We conclude with a discussion of the production of new, positive subjectivities and spaces by
urban Hijabis, highlighting the ways that Muslim women make lives within and diagonal to spaces of domination.

**Theorizing Exclusion and Inclusion**

In the wake of a bloody twentieth century, explaining how human subjects came to be exclude-able and kill-able was a central task of philosophers and social theorists. For Hannah Arendt, Nazi Germany’s horrific crimes against Jews, gays, Roma, and the disabled were predicated on the ability of differentiating between bearers of the rights of citizenship and subjects who were not bearers of these rights—a project that holds lasting significance for understanding how the murder and displacement of Rohingyas has been carried out with impunity.² Arendt’s approach traces the history of imperialism and pan-movements, which incubated racism, solidified the expansion of state power, and created the stateless person that would later be the victim of totalitarian brutality. Her argument culminates with an analysis of the social and political conditions following WWI that led to the separation of Jews from non-Jewish community and nationality, namely the historically the tight-knit Jewish culture sphere, that created the context for their abstraction and expulsion from humanity. In the fractured nature of modern life, race-thinking and totalitarianism encouraged the formation of a rootless mob that could be mobilized as an instrument of thoughtless evil.

In contradistinction to Arendt, Giorgio Agamben examines the relationship between exclusion and *inclusion* to argue that subjects are caught within a juridical-legal framework for the explicit purpose of their expulsion from it.³ Agamben cites the biopolitics of grouping human bodies into a political category (meaning they are included in a political system, but have no agency within it), rather than their removal from a state and space of citizenship. For Agamben, *homo sacer* can be acted on by

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³ Agamben, 1998.
the sovereign when the body becomes the site of politics, arguing that Arendt misses this connection in her own analysis of citizenship and human rights: “yet what escapes Arendt is that the process is in a certain sense the inverse of what she takes it to be, and that precisely the radical transformation of politics into the realm of bare life (that is, into a camp) legitimated and necessitated total domination”. It is not the human that is outside the protection of the state that experiences abstract nakedness, but rather the human that is actively made political and grouped into a state of exception (decided by the sovereign). *Homo sacer* exists within the polity but is rendered rightless in a state of exception.

Although Hannah Arendt notes the relationship between imperialism and hierarchies of race in the production of exclude-able and kill-able subjects vis-à-vis the state, it is postcolonial scholars writing outside of Western Europe who extend Marx to demonstrate how the violence of colonialism engenders the production of specific sets of subjectivities that articulate with states and capital. For Franz Fanon especially, the process of making colonial subjects is inseparable from nation-making and capital accumulation. Where Marx scarcely mentioned the production of subjects in capital through hierarchies of power, his account of primitive accumulation laid the foundation for critical understandings of colonialism as not only a capitalist venture, but a subject-making one. In a famous passage from *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon emphasizes the ongoing process of subject-making that characterizes colonialism:

The colonist and the colonized are old acquaintances. And, consequently, the colonist is right when he says he “knows” them. It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject. The colonist derives his validity, i.e., his wealth, from the colonial system.

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4 Agamben, 1998, p. 120.
5 Fanon, 1963.
6 Fanon, 1963, p. 2.
Echoing Fanon, critical historian Michael Charney has convincingly argued that the experiences of Muslims, especially Rohingyas murdered and driven from Rakhine State with impunity, reflect not the postcolonial politics of Burmese nation-making, but the enduring colonial present and its racial logics—shored up and reproduced by generations of military and state actors who reproduce categories of racialized ethnic belonging at the same time that they accumulate astronomical wealth—in Myanmar. Keeping in mind the continued relevance of colonial structures of domination in Myanmar today, we aim to follow Fanon’s practice of “stretching” Marx to examine the relationship between Bamar supremacy, the Myanmar state, and capital as they shape the subjectivities and material lives of Muslim women in Myanmar.

To this end, it is useful for us to consider the work of Marxist-feminists, anti-racist scholars, queer theorists, and critical border studies scholars that problematizes a focus on citizenship, bare life, and the spectacle of nation-state borders. Their work points instead to the articulation of borders with the state and capital to produce diverse subjects—whether through labor migration programs that include Filipina workers in the nation-state by granting citizenship, but result in de facto exclusion as a result of labor burdens, the use of inclusive and “progressive” sexual politics to exclude certain immigrants, or the inclusive-cum-exclusionary discourses of multiculturalism. For indigenous postcolonial scholars such as Glen Sean Coulthard, inclusion effectively facilitates exclusion through discourses of multicultural inclusion and a “politics of recognition,” which have the insidious effect of excluding indigenous Canadians by erasing experiences of colonial domination in the present. Taken together, theorizations of violent exclusion and its relationship to inclusion sheds light on the predicament of Muslim women in

7 Charney, 2018.
8 Pratt, 2006.
10 Coulthard, 2014.
Myanmar by allowing us to critically interrogate what, on the surface, appears as the production and discipline of exclusionable subjects in relation to the political economy of labor.

In concert with other critical scholars’ theorizations of the relationship between social exclusion and inclusion, Mezzadra and Neilson’s development of “border as method” problematizes simplistic and clean distinctions between inside and outside, inclusion and exclusion, and citizen and non-citizen.11 The authors argue that the multiplication of both cognitive and physical borders in a globalized world does not simply exclude certain populations: they join with, or articulate with, capital to produce a heterogeneity of labor subjects such as the female migrant factory worker and the precarious and flexibilized immigrant worker. When examined from the perspective of the political economy of labor, technologies of segregation and exclusion associated with immigration policies and event detention camps work not as devices of exclusion, but as temporal devices for controlling and pacing supplies of labor. For example, in the case of Indian information technology workers who are casually employed and laid off, or “benched,” by employment agencies who supply immigrant workers to Australia’s vast information technology industry, immigration status is more about controlling the cost of labor than the exclusion of Indian workers from the rights of citizenship in Australia. Being fired or deported for violating strict visa rules on work hours, which entails being sent back to families in India for “holding” until their next contract, reflects the temporal pacing of the labor supply that enables information technology companies to drive up the cost of labor and ensure maximum accumulation, rather than the policing of national borders.

Moreover, building on the work of Marxist-feminists, Mezzadra and Neilson demonstrate that, amid shifting relations between capital and states, in which the composition of living labor stretches across times and the borders of nation-states,

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workers (especially women) experience the intensification of labor burdens at the same time that their working days are being extended. Hence, capital’s articulation with gendered hierarchies and regimes of citizenship enables a “muddying” of Marx’s traditionally inverse relationship between the length of the working day and labor’s intensity. Put another way, where Marx argued that living labor could not survive both the lengthening of the working day and the intensification of production, a diversification and multiplication of labor systems, such as trans-local family support across national borders, the diversification and expansion of women’s unwaged social reproduction work, and women’s double shifts, make both labor extension and intensification possible for capital in new ways.

For the purposes of this study, critical interrogations of “inside” and “outside” from the perspective of race and gender provide fertile ground for understanding the experiences of Muslim women at a particular historical conjuncture in Myanmar, where highly visible practices of exclusion vis-à-vis state discipline and the production of racialized ethnic hierarchies is also accompanied by the emergence of new labor subjectivities. Drawing on critical Marxist-feminist and border studies perspectives on the relationship between exclusion, inclusion, and labor subjectivity, this essay takes Yangon Muslim women’s diverse and embodied experiences of urban space and work as entry points to understand shifting relations between the state, capital, and labor in Myanmar.

**Gender, Race, and Islam in Myanmar**

Historically, not all Muslim minority groups in Myanmar have experienced dispossession and precarity in the same way. As Burma studies scholars write of the relationship between Muslims and the Myanmar state, those who affiliate more closely with Burmese culture are positioned more favorably vis-à-vis state structures, while those who emphasize their non-Burmese
cultures and religious values are targeted for punishment. This exclusion is also explicitly racialized and gendered in ways that affect Muslim men and Muslim women differently and unequally. For example, the putatively sexually rapacious Muslim man is understood not only as a threat to women, but also as a threat to the vulnerable body of the nation, while Muslim women are represented as passive victims of a violent and backward Muslim patriarchy, fertile perpetrators of a population war against Myanmar, or not represented at all.

Reproduction and the body are key sites where racialized discourses play out in Myanmar, where a “Muslim invasion” and fertility are intimately linked to Burman Buddhist ideas of national belonging and security. For example, a now-infamous cartoon in which a Rohingya woman is actively using her fecund womb as a weapon to wage the population war against Burman Buddhist Myanmar. It is also believed that Buddhist women are forced to convert to Islam and give birth to Muslim children, that Muslim men are engaging in a ‘Romeo jihad’ against the Burmese nation, and that Muslim women are forced into polygamous marriages.

Buddhists from a variety of backgrounds, from the firebrand monk leaders of Ma Ba Tha to Rakhine women villagers, cite a fear of Muslim men’s violent virility and Muslim women’s fertility in precipitating the destruction of the Burmese Buddhist nation. This fear is encapsulated by Myanmar’s “race and religion” laws, passed in 2015, which restrict interfaith marriages between Buddhist women and Muslim men, limit the number of children born to Muslim women, restrict conversion away from Buddhism, and outlaw polygamy. The 2015 package of laws follows a decade of similar laws and informal government practices enacted locally in Rakhine state, which surveil

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12 Crouch, 2016; Nyi Nyi Kyaw, 2016; Schissler et al., 2017.
13 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, 2016; Schissler et al., 2017; Walton et al., 2015.
14 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, 2015; 2016; Schissler et al., 2017.
15 Schissler et al., 2017.
16 Ibid.
17 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, 2016; Walton et al., 2015.
and discipline Rohingya women by requiring them to register with Na Sa Ka—the Burmese acronym for the notorious former Border Area Immigration Control Headquarters—for approval of marriages (women are reportedly forced to take pregnancy tests before marriage), and birth registration. For Rohingya women, the birth of more than two children results in fines or imprisonment; thus, women seek unsafe abortions, register children with other married couples, or do not register children at all. Children discovered by authorities are put on a government “black list,” barring them from access to any citizenship rights whatsoever. In the aftermath of the violent pogroms of 2012, 2016, and 2017, discourses of Muslim deviance are continuously taken up by state officials who justify the exclusion of Rohingyas and other Muslim groups.

From her vantage point as a middle-class Bamar woman, co-author Shunn Lei has seen anti-Muslim sentiment grow in Myanmar since 2012, especially with the astronomic rise of Facebook. She also points to a longer, but not abstractly prior, history of discursive violence that has accompanied military and structural violence against Muslims in Myanmar. Burmese children are taught anti-Muslim bias from a young age; elders, teachers, and others in positions of power reinforce anti-Muslim bias in the spaces of the school, the home, and the street.

Shunn Lei recalls that if she misbehaved as a child, parents and grandparents would say “kalagyi pann thwar laint mal,” or (kalagyi is going to arrest you) or “Babugyi cor thwar mal” (Babugyi is going to take you away). Though not always used as a slur, the term “kalar,” or foreigner from the West, became racially coded language to identify people with Indian phenotypes, such as darker skin or narrow nose bridges, as culturally and behaviorally defective. The term’s political charge developed during the colonial period, when large numbers of Indians and Bengalis moved to Myanmar, especially Yangon, which precipitated severe anxiety among Bamars and Burmese nationalists, who

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18 Human Rights Watch, 2013.
19 Ibid.
felt they were becoming strangers in their own country.\textsuperscript{20} In the postcolonial and postwar periods, the term remained in use as anxieties over foreign invasion converged with fear of Muslims, colored by broader, globalized discourses of Islamic terrorism. In Myanmar, anti-Muslim sentiment has been stoked by the inflammatory rhetoric of U Wirathu and the Ma Ba Tha organization, which encourages Bamar Buddhists to “defend” their country from Muslim “invaders,” but state discourses of Muslim invasion and terrorist threats have justified multiple waves of genocidal military operations in Rakhine State.\textsuperscript{21}

Myanmar’s 1982 citizenship law is an oft-cited explanation of Rohingya and non-Bamar Muslim subjugation in Myanmar, though, as Nick Cheesman shows, the law is frequently not read in detail, or is misinterpreted:

In fact, the law contains no reference to the enumerated 135 national race groups nor does it contain any specific sections to deny Rohingya citizenship. Rather, it makes membership in a national race the gold standard for citizenship and the primary basis for determining the rights of someone claiming to be a member of the political community that was then “Burma” and subsequently “Myanmar”.\textsuperscript{22}

By linking citizenship with racial categories, Rohingyas are produced as subjects who can be simultaneously abandoned by the state and capital\textsuperscript{23} and targeted by what Mbembé describes as necropolitical, or make-die interventions by the state.\textsuperscript{24} Rohingyas are also produced as a discrete population opposite a discrete Bamar national population, subject to targeted management and intervention by the Myanmar state, military, police, and other diverse actors. Hence, Rohingya exclusion from na-

\textsuperscript{20} Schissler et al., 2017.
\textsuperscript{21} Nyi Nyi Kyaw, 2016.
\textsuperscript{22} Cheesman, 2017, p. 471.
\textsuperscript{23} Li, 2010; Povinelli, 2011.
\textsuperscript{24} Mbembé, 2003.
national-racial belonging is interlinked with the production of a racialized Burmese national population, and, as we show later, the production of diverse and flexible labor subjectivities.

In the context of Myanmar, existing gendered, ethnic, and racial hierarchies have been multiplied and entrenched with ongoing wars and accelerating ongoing processes of primitive accumulation that have ejected peasants from land but not led to their absorption as wage labor.\textsuperscript{25} For minority and poor women in Myanmar, the country’s “opening-up process” is characterized by new articulations of capital with the Myanmar nation-state and its production and maintenance of gendered and racial hierarchies, resulting in an increase in unwaged labor burdens as the value of the Myanmar Kyat fluctuates, real wages fail to keep up with the cost of living, and wage work becomes increasingly flexibilized, if it exists at all. For example, Daw Khin Mar Mar Kyi’s studies of gender and development in Myanmar show that working-class Burmese women are compelled to “make up shortfalls” in household income through wage work in addition to performing household and care work duties when income from working relatives, agriculture, or a family business proves insufficient.\textsuperscript{26} For ethnic and religious minority women, especially Muslims, conditions of economic hardship interlock with the subjugating effects of sexist, racist, and religious discrimination that proliferate in Myanmar state bureaucracy, institutions, and everyday customs. Shae Frydenlund’s study of Rohingya women’s work lives emphasizes the relationship between military violence, segregation, and increasing labor burdens for Rohingya women in Rakhine State, where those who once worked in the home or on family farms are compelled to sell their labor to local capitalists who profit from Rohingyas’ spatial isolation and desperation, while those who remain in the home must work harder to take care of relatives unable to secure regular wage work.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25} Prasse-Freeman & Phyoo Win Latt, 2018.
\textsuperscript{26} Khin Mar Mar Kyi, 2013, p. 306.
\textsuperscript{27} Frydenlund, 2020a.
At the scale of the body and the everyday, Muslim and hijabi women in Yangon experience the articulation of racial and gender hierarchies with the state and capital through surveillance and discipline in the school and passport office, as physical and verbal harassment by men in the street, and as the material condition of low or unwaged work and poverty. The next section discusses Muslim women’s subjectivities, then their experiences of three everyday spaces they inhabit: the school, the street, and the government office. Each space reveals different moments of articulation of gender and race with the state and foregrounds the articulation of these hierarchies with capital vis-à-vis the production of Muslim women as laboring subjects, specifically, flexible hawkers and sellers.

**Methods**

This collaborative project is informed by the theorizations of Third World feminists, which understand Third World women to have an “epistemic advantage”\(^{28}\) that uniquely positions them as bearers and producers of knowledge about social, political, and economic life. Coming from different backgrounds as a Burmese artist/activist and an American graduate student, we collaborated in the design and writing of inclusive and critical feminist research about minority women’s experiences in urban Myanmar. We used methods of ethnographic participant observation, focus groups, and interviews. We interviewed 15 Muslim minority women, including women from the Myanmar Muslim, Rohingya, and Shi’a communities about their livelihoods, experiences of exclusion, experiences as sellers, and their experiences as hijabis in Yangon. We participated in a two-day hijabi makeup class, conducted twelve interviews as well as two focus groups of eight Muslim women from Burmese and Rohingya backgrounds. Using multiple qualitative methods allowed us to

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\(^{28}\) Herr, 2014.
gain understandings of women’s experiences as they understood them and compare these findings with observations of everyday lived experiences of inclusion and exclusion.

**Double Exclusions**

**The School**

As Muslims face heavy-handed state violence and surveillance, and women of all faiths face significant burdens of poverty and precarity, Muslim women in Myanmar face double, or more precisely, intersecting, exclusions unique to their position as both Muslims and women. Phyu Phyu Oo’s study of education access among Indian Muslim women in Yangon reveals a lack of access to education as a result of both discriminatory government school policies and the patriarchal, sexist views of conservative Muslim community leaders and family members. Conservative Indian Muslims, like other conservative Muslims in Myanmar, prefer to send daughters to single-gender schools or religious schools. Crucially, decisions regarding girls’ school attendance varies considerably between Muslim groups and between urban and rural contexts. Many cite fears of abuse and assault, rather than conservative religious or sexist views, when justifying decisions to keep girls at home.

Urban Muslim hijabis found themselves excluded from government educational spaces, public spaces, and formal wage labor because they are both Muslims/hijabis and women. On one hand, although there is no formal law outlawing hijabs in schools, there are strong de facto prohibitions against wearing hijab or niqab in government schools. This leaves religious schools, often single-gendered, as the only option for women who choose (or who are encouraged by their families) to attend school as hijabis. However, government universities and employers do not recognize degrees from religious schools. Thus,

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30 Frydenlund, 2020a.
Muslim women are excluded from both spaces of higher education and most factory wage work that employs poor Burmese women, as factories far from home or with male supervisors are not considered appropriate for Muslim women. As the third section will show, this exclusion from formal wage labor is accompanied by inclusion in informal hawking and online sales work, which often demand more capital investment, risk, and extended working hours from women. Put another way, Muslim women’s multiple experiences of exclusion facilitate their production as diverse, flexible, and precarious “bearers” of labor power.

Even those who do choose to forego hijab so they can attend primary school may still end up excluded from higher education and other formal institutions due to the difficulties that Muslims (and especially Muslim women) face when trying to obtain government identity cards. When (urban) individuals are denied identity cards, exclusion from higher education and formal wage labor disproportionately affects women who are tasked with filling gaps in household income by working “double shifts” as informal hawkers or wage workers in addition to fulfilling household labor and care work duties. Faced with staggering bribe costs and long waiting periods for identity cards, many pay to secure a card only to find their race listed as “Bengali,” despite their heritage as Burmese Muslims, Indian Muslims, or Rohingyas. Khin San Winn, a 23-year-old Rohingya woman, saved money by selling snacks online for years to buy an identity card for 800,000 kyat so that she could attend university and earn a degree. Notably, one cannot sit for university entrance exams or earn a university degree without an identity card that proves belonging as one a Myanmar taingyinthar, or “national race.”

Dr. Aye, a prominent physician, activist, and educator in Yangon, explained the bizarre contents of her own identity card: “mine has four races! It reads ‘Bamar Pakistan and Bamar Iran,’ even though it was my great grandparents who emigrated – we are from Myanmar, not Iran!” However, Dr. Aye is lucky: “if you
apply for a card these days, it just says Bengali. You can do nothing with this card.” The reason for her luck can be attributed in part to her brother’s quirky passion for their family history, which was originally dismissed as an eccentricity: “When he wrote this ten years ago, we thought it was nonsense! But now we understand the value of this work, thank God we have that history!” Now, more than ever, Dr. Aye is aware of the power that history holds in relation to state categorizations of belonging.

Thazin, a 25-year-old Myanmar Muslim woman, recalled her experience as a student at a government university, where she participated in a freshman welcome event as a singer. Rather than encouraging her and educating students about discrimination based on religion, sex, and race, faculty discouraged her from participating, explaining that her “Indian-looking face” would result in humiliation from the crowd. When Thazin was on the stage, men among the student crowd shouted out to the stage “stop singing!” and “Haray!” In the halls of the university, men her age would say “kalamagyi lar ne be,” or “the Indian-looking woman is coming.” More than a dozen Yangon Muslim women, including Dr. Aye, shared similar experiences of discrimination and harassment, which were overtly colored with sexism, racism, and Islamophobia, as they braved government schools and universities to pursue dreams of higher education.

Compounding the structural violence of Myanmar state bureaucracy and policy, anti-Muslim, anti-woman discourses are (re)produced with terrifying efficacy in the spaces of schools and universities, as the bodies of Muslim women are actively targeted for policing and harassment, invoking what Alison Mountz and Mezzadra and Neilson have described as the inscription of the nation’s borders onto a subject’s body. In public schools, Muslim and hijabis’ experiences of exclusion reflect everyday bordering practices of both the state, in which teachers and administrators embody the state itself in their policing

31 Mountz, 2010; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013.
of Muslim women’s clothing, refusal to punish harassers, and their enforcement of policies excluding those with “Bengali” or other non-Burmese national identity card statuses. Exclusion from public schools and universities in Myanmar is a key process through which Myanmar state practices articulate with capitalism to produce specific labor subjectivities in the form of hijabi hawkers and sellers.

The Street

The street is a fraught space for all women, but is especially challenging for Muslim women in Yangon, where they face harassment from both non-Muslim and Muslim men. Though Muslim women who may be perceived as South Asian often receive racist taunts from Bamar men, Moe Lin, a 25-year old Myanmar Muslim, explains that street harassment is different for Muslim women who wear hijab or niqab:

*When I didn’t wear hijab, Burmese men would yell after me or catcall me, and Muslim men would not notice me because I wasn’t visibly Muslim. Muslim men don’t usually harass Burmese women. When I started wearing hijab in 2012, both Burmese and Muslim men would harass me – Burmese men would say ‘oh look, there is a Muslim woman, she is so arrogant with her hijab,’ and Muslim men would catcall me, tease me, and yell after me. They think ‘oh! A Muslim woman, we own her!’ So it is like this, we are facing oppression from Burman people, the state, and from our own communities.*

Moe Lin is acutely aware of the specific visibilities created by the hijab – Burman men point to her hijab as a marker of difference and deviance in relation to a Bamar Buddhist status quo, where Muslim men deploy misogynist claims over the bodies of Muslim women who “belong” to them and their community. Moe Lin’s

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experience highlights the doubleness of Muslim women’s exclusion – that they are targeted as Muslims in a Bamar Buddhist majority space (the street) and they are targeted by sexist violence in their own communities.

Hamidah, a 19-year-old Myanmar Muslim woman who runs a makeup instruction business and a beauty blog, is passionate about her decision to wear hijab – a choice she made at 14 after a long and tortured period of reflection: “I cried and cried, because I didn’t know if I could be a hijabi and run a beauty blog and business in Myanmar.” This was shortly after 2012, and Hamidah wasn’t sure she could do this, she explained, because Myanmar is a Buddhist country where Muslims aren’t accepted, especially hijabis, since they are very visibly Muslim. She was not only afraid she wouldn’t succeed in her dream of becoming a successful beauty blogger and entrepreneur, but was also afraid of death threats, physical violence, and arrest. After deciding to wear the hijab, Hamidah has plenty of online detractors, but she is not concerned with them. However, she has experienced more street harassment:

Once I was walking in my neighborhood (downtown Yangon), and an older Muslim man was walking in the other direction. As I passed him, he touched below my chest – I yelled at him – how dare you touch me! This is my neighborhood! Another time, a group of Burmese boys grabbed my hijab and tried to pull it off from the back. I scolded them! How dare they!33

Notably, Hamidah’s choice to enter online business was not fundamentally shaped by her lack of access to formal education. She has a diploma from a religious school (not a public school), but as the third section of this article discusses at greater length, her informal work as a seller is precarious (many customers do not pay), relations of power linked to debt (she received a sizeable loan from her father to start the business), and high overhead

33 Hamidah, personal communication, 2018.
costs (makeup is imported and expensive), which limits her ability to make a living wage. She lives with her father. Rather than being a source of income, she explains, the business is about her passion for beauty and teaching other women how to use makeup and become more confident. Her goal is to draw attention to Myanmar hijabis on the international stage as a professional blogger and YouTube content creator.

Neither Moe Lin nor Hamidah framed their experiences of street harassment as traumatic, nor did they express fear of attacks and discrimination, rather, they emphasized their pride and determination to fight for their rights as hijabis and Muslim women who exist in Myanmar but are forcibly disappeared from public space. Moe Lin countered exclusion from higher education with double shifts as a baker, seller, and homemaker. For Hamidah, her experiences of street harassment and the lack of income draw our attention to the everyday material relations of debt and dependence that characterize many Muslim women’s lives in Myanmar, despite their best efforts. While we aim to attend to the women’s strength and dignity in the face of subjugation, we also draw the reader’s attention to the multiple forms of violence that Muslims – especially hijabis – face in their daily efforts to improve their life chances.

The Government Office

The government office is a key space where bureaucrats embody the Myanmar state and Bamar Buddhist nationalism by disciplining and punishing Muslim women. When we asked each research participant whether there were any places they could not go in Yangon, most answered “the government office.” Even Dr. Aye, who is a Shi’a Muslim from a relatively privileged background, recounted incident after incident of profiling, harassment, and embarrassment at various government offices:

*When I went to get my passport photo taken, they asked me to take off my hijab. They said they would not give me my passport if I had the hijab on in the photo. So, I stared at him and I took it off. I kept*
my cap on (points to the tight undercovering that keeps hair in place under the hijab), but tucked it behind my ears so they could see them. He said that I needed to take that off, too! I said, ‘why!’ and he said ‘we need to see your hair’ – my hair! Why do they need to see my hair! They do not need to see my hair. It’s ridiculous. There is no rule about hair for passport photos."34

Dr. Aye’s story not only demonstrates that hijabi women are subjected to embodied violence in state space, but her experience also highlights the role of officers who embody the state and perform the state by disciplining state subjects.35 State officers and employees embody the Myanmar state’s broader anti-Muslim discourse, enacting violence through everyday interactions that complement and extend broader forms of state violence, such as military operations in Rakhine State. Like the passport office, the identification office works as an important space where state employees embody the Myanmar state to police belonging and enact violence through otherwise mundane interactions. San San, a 35-year old Myanmar Muslim woman, recounted her sister’s particularly difficult ordeal at the identity card office:

My younger sister lost her ID, and so she had to go to the ID office. The officer told her she had to take off her hijab to enter the building. He would not let her go inside. She refused to take it off, and didn’t get her ID card. After 2 months, he finally broke down and gave it to her. There are no official rules that say women can’t wear hijab in the office, it’s just discrimination."36

A fellow online food seller and upper-middle class Rohingya woman, Thuzar Khine, 22, recalls her recent visit to the passport office: “they discriminated against me at the office because I wear hijab. They asked me if I could speak Burmese!”37 Thuzar’s

34 Dr Aye, personal communication, 2018.
35 Mountz, 2010.
36 San San, personal communication, 2018.
37 Thuzar Khine, personal communication, 2018.
relatively high class status afforded her the ability to access an identity card but did not shield her from harassment and discrimination by office staff.

While San San and her sister were able to secure Bamar Muslim identity cards with cash, most are not so lucky, especially those from rural or poor households. Fatima, 22, is a Myanmar Muslim woman from Mawlamyine who moved to Yangon in 1999. She attempted to get an identity card multiple times at the local Insein identity card office but was told to leave: “they told me that Muslims do not get identity cards – that we are Bengalis. They told me that I had to go to the regional office if I wanted to get a card. This office is far away and it will cost a lot of money.”\(^{38}\) Fatima wanted to become an engineer, but dropped out of school at grade six when her family was unable to survive with money earned from selling vegetables. Though the identity card is a major barrier to education, her family’s poverty was the more salient issue preventing her from entering higher education and locking her into informal work as a hawker. Fatima’s husband drives a motorbike and earns about 3,000 Myanmar Kyat per day after paying the motorbike rental fee (a nearby Buddhist family has four motorbikes and rents them to Muslim boys in the neighborhood) and gas. To make ends meet, Fatima sells vegetables and aims to start a betel nut stand once she can save 30,000 Myanmar Kyat as capital to buy the betel nut and the cart.

Despite very real barriers to Muslim women’s dignified access to public spaces, education, and formal wage work outside the home, Muslim women’s own decisions regarding education, mobility “outside” the house, and work are often overlooked or dismissed by a focus on state- or community-led cultural and religious exclusion in Myanmar.\(^{39}\) For many Muslim women in Myanmar and elsewhere, religious covering is a deeply held belief, as is remaining within the space of the home as mothers, caregivers, and homemakers.\(^{40}\) For some middle-class Muslim

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\(^{38}\) Fatima, personal communication, 2018.

\(^{39}\) Frydenlund, 2020a.

\(^{40}\) Abu-Lughod, 2002; Frydenlund, 2019; Herr, 2014; Mahmood, 2011.
women in Yangon, for whom education past grade six was economically feasible for families, the choice was clear to attend religious school and forego higher education in favor of full-time motherhood and care work, or home- or internet-based work that aligned with their religious values. However, economic hardship and fear of state violence remain the most salient barriers to Rohingya and Myanmar Muslim women’s education in Myanmar, as most families struggle to make ends meet as farmers or sellers. Reinforcing the centrality of dispossession and reduced or lost access to the means of production in shaping Muslims’ precarity in Myanmar, Dr. Aye recanted a story. Once a friend tried to point to Yangon’s many successful Muslim businessmen to argue that Muslims are more clever and wealthier than Buddhists in Myanmar. Dr. Aye responded by asking: “What is the main source of income for the vast majority of people in this country? Rice and farming. Who owns almost all the paddy and farmland? Bamars! So no, Muslims are not better off”—in short, arguing that a handful of exceptionally wealthy urban Muslims do not erase Muslims’ collective experiences of dispossession and exclusion relative to landholding Bamars. Though control of rice markets is certainly more profitable than control of land and means of production, Dr. Aye’s comments reference the broader structural inequalities that position Muslims as both second class and lower class citizens in Myanmar.

**Labor Market Inclusions and Double Shifts**

Most scholarly and journalistic analyses have located Muslim and especially Rohingya precarity in relation to historically-specific processes of Othering, which justify discursive exclusions from the Myanmar nation-state and “its” structures, such as education and citizenship. Akin to Myanmar’s liberal feminist activists, scholars studying Myanmar generally eschew Marxist analysis. In particular, studies of religious and ethnic exclusion in Myanmar have (reasonably) argued that political economy analyses fall short of explaining how exclusionary practices
come to be accepted or embraced by Burmese people. While understandings of Bamar Buddhists’ support for military violence against Rohingyas and Buddhist women’s support of the “race and religion” laws that would ostensibly harm them are well-served by attention to psychic geographies of fear and anxiety, a close examination of Rohingya experiences of exclusion from the standpoint of labor composition produces an entirely different perspective on the causes and conditions of their suffering, namely, the relationship of labor’s exclusion to its inclusion in newly reconfigured capitalist landscapes. Moreover, this careful attention to the relationship between exclusion and inclusion at a specific historical conjunction in Myanmar must move beyond the space of the factory floor to the spaces and scales of the body, the home, and the everyday to illuminate the gendered, racialized violence of Muslim women’s inclusion in informal labor markets and the extension of unwaged workdays in the home.

Sharifa Bibi and her husband, Mohammed, live in a small wooden house perched on stilts above a river in Insein Township. It was raining hard when we went to visit them, and we eyed the river as it rose. Yes, the house will sometimes flood, Mohammed said, holding his hand up just below his waist. When this happens, they sleep in hammocks. Sharifa and Mohammed identify as Myanmar Muslims, though of course this lineage is mixed. Mohammed explains that his father was a Hindustani Muslim from what is today Pakistan, and that Sharifa has Rohingya relatives in Kyaukphyu and Mawlymine. They both grew up in a village about three hours north of Yangon and moved to Insein in the early 1990s. Their children are spread throughout Southeast Asia– one works at a chicken factory in Kuala Lumpur, one catches fish in Koh Tao, and another works at a factory in Singapore. Mohammed used to be a teacher at a Madrasa, or Islamic school, and gave teachings at the local mosque. Sharifa was ein ma shin, manager of the household or housewife, before increasing hardship led them to relocate to Insein.

41 Schissler et al., 2017.
Their new home’s proximity to Yangon allows them to access more potential buyers for the fried snacks they sell to survive – their town was too small to make a living as hawkers. About 16 years ago, their son noticed a flyer advertising land for sale in a small, mostly Buddhist enclave near a monastery. They bought the land with savings from their sons’ fishery work in Thailand, and he built the house by hand. The house was well-built—on our visit, we were dry and comfortable as a late monsoon storm raged outside. Though Mohammed’s work as a teacher used to provide a living that enabled Sharifa to care for the children and read the Qu’ran, now she gets up at 2am to prepare the dough and cook the snacks. Then, Mohammed takes half the snacks to Sule Pagoda each day. Sharifa remains in the neighborhood and sells the other half the snacks by the monastery gates where the neighborhood street meets the main road. They do not have the capital to run an independent business. Instead, they take a loan of one lakh (100,000 Myanmar Kyat) from a local Muslim businessman every 10 days to buy oil, lentils, and flour for the snacks, and repay the loan after selling enough snacks. After paying the loan and 20% interest (notably interest is forbidden in Islam), they can take away about 20,000 Myanmar Kyat per month, barely enough to survive.

Muslim women in Myanmar have diverse, and often contradicting, views of what it means to live a good life with respect to home, work, and family. Yet there is also a key theme that unites them: the dignity and agency of Muslim women who strive to reproduce the home as a space for the Muslim family. Sharifa’s views of her and her family’s situation are familiar, especially among the Muslim women of the Burmese diaspora: she would prefer to be a housewife, to cook for her family, read the Qu’ran, and remain in the space of the home. At home, it is safe, she says. If her sons were able to send money, maybe their poverty would be less suffocating. Instead, Sharifa’s informal labor provides her sons, especially Iliaz, with support from the South, which de-
scribes Third World women’s provision of material and emotional aid, such as cash or care work, to relatives elsewhere in diaspora. In Sharifa’s case, her son Iliaz is barely able to support his own family in Kuala Lumpur. Thus, instead of sending his aging mother and father cash remittances from work in a chicken factory, Sharifa and Mohammed dedicate substantial amounts of labor and cash to send traditional medicine, spices, amulets, and holy water from Yangon, purchased with a month’s worth of earnings from selling *akyaw*.

Readers will note that, in this case, both Sharifa and Mohammed are working together to generate income that eventually becomes *support from the South*. However, by beginning her working day at 2am, then selling *akyaw* nearby while Mohammed sells *akyaw* downtown, it is Sharifa who dedicates significantly more labor power and labor hours to the production of snacks that they sell. She also cooks for Mohammed, maintains the house, and cares for two orphan girls who have no home. These exclusions are Sharifa’s activities demonstrate the gendered and racialized character of informal hawking labor regimes among the urban poor, where Muslim women are more likely to be subject to the violent inclusions that follow expulsion from the space of the “good life.”

Chit Lay and San Oo are 21 and 30 years old, respectively. Though unrelated, they are both Rohingya women who moved to Yangon from Sittwe with the goal of attending university upon graduation from grade 10. However, neither woman had an identity card, and thus could not sit for exams. For years, Chit Lay and San Oo took free English classes at a nonprofit school in Yangon before being able to attend university. Notably, San Oo and Chit Lay are middle-class Rohingya women, whose families are reasonably comfortable. Chit Lay’s father, mother, and brother support her and her sister through remittances sent from years of work in Saudi Arabia. San Oo’s father worked as a customs agent in Sittwe and is now retired in Yangon. However, both women’s families were unable to fully support them. Chit

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43 Frydenlund, 2020b.
Lay began cooking when she realized that her husband’s income as a car salesman was insufficient to pay rising rent costs, pay school fees for children, and support her parents and in-laws. She decided to find a way to earn extra income to support the family and employed her skills as a cook to create a cake business. She makes most of her money from birthday cakes and other celebratory confections, which are especially popular during festival season and Eid. With the money earned from her business, she was able to buy an ID card and study economics at university. However, she has not been able to find work as a professional, and thus continues her baking business.

Frustrated with her inability to sit for exams and later attend law school, San Oo knew she had to raise enough money to purchase an ID card. However, her lack of diploma precluded opportunities for higher-wage employment. Hence, she came up with the idea to cook and sell traditional Rohingya snacks at her aunt’s home and sell them online. The business required some capital investment in rice, oil, and sugar, but with 40,000 Myanmar Kyat from her father and access to computers and the internet, she was able to quickly build a business that sold upwards of two lakhs worth of snacks per month, and five lakhs per month during Eid. When she saved enough money, she bought an ID card for eight lakhs and enrolled in law school – a favorable outcome.

Neither as poor as Sharifa and Mohammed, nor as privileged as Chit Lay and San Oo, Nur, 58 falls somewhere in between. Myanmar Muslims from Mawlyamine, Nur and her husband live with their middle son and daughter-in-law in the back of their tire shop east of the Yangon river. Nur’s husband, Farouq, used to have a t-shirt shop in the downtown Bogyoke market. They would buy the shirts from Singapore for about 2,000 Myanmar Kyat per shirt and sell them for about 4,000 Myanmar Kyat. However, business was slow in the 1980s and 1990s, and they often only sold two shirts per day, which would barely cover the cost of renting the market stall.

Every day, Nur would walk to the market to bring a lunch box for Farouq: “I passed all the jade shops, and thought, maybe
I can open a jade shop and earn more money.” So, in addition to her work as a housewife and mother, Nur began purchasing jade from Chinese brokers in Mandalay, and selling the jade at a counter down the hall from her husband’s t-shirt shop. Eventually, he abandoned the t-shirt business and joined her in the jade business. Reflecting on her decades working both within and outside the home, Nur says: “I didn’t really think about it – I was just always trying to find a way to help my husband. I love my husband and didn’t want him to struggle alone.”

Although they once owned a small house on 28th street, they sold the house in the mid-1990s when they left their stall in Bogyoke market due to rising rents, old age, and poor health. Nur regrets selling the house, which is worth 20 million Myanmar Kyat now. Nur is also worried for her granddaughter, whose mother was resettled with her younger children in Colorado, USA. The granddaughter was left behind when Mustafa, Nur’s daughter, left for Malaysia a decade ago. Now, the girl is 15 and faces an increasingly precarious fate as Nur and Mohammed grow elderly and sick.

In each story, we can see the cruelty of state violence, structural violence, and abandonment, as well as determination and resilience. The women’s diverse experiences also point to the importance of exploring class striations within Yangon’s Muslim communities. Impoverished and middle-class Muslim women in Yangon have many things in common, but one stands out for the purpose of a worker-led struggle for gender justice: forced inclusion in precarious, informal, and non-waged sales labor that accompanies exclusions from spaces of religious, cultural, and national belonging.

**Producing New Spaces**

The electricity had just gone out in the second story apartment where Hamidah was teaching a two-day makeup class to three Muslim women of varying ethnicities and ages. One was 15, another was 20, and the third was 38. Only the young girl and

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Hamidah wore hijab. We turned on our cell phones for light as Hamidah explained how to properly cleanse and moisturize skin, prevent and treat acne, and use anti-aging products and sunscreen, information she had gleaned from Malaysian and Singaporean YouTube videos and several books that her mother had bought her. The other women took notes on their mobile phones, and the authors found themselves sheepishly checking their own skin in the mirrors. The lights came back on, and the group moved to the front room to begin learning to use foundation, concealer, eyeshadow, and false eyelashes.

The eldest student laughed about wanting to be able to help her teenaged daughter with makeup, and that she wanted to learn to look more beautiful for weddings. The youngest student traveled all the way from Mawlyamyine for the makeup class and explained that she had an interest in beauty wanted to learn to apply makeup professionally to enhance her looks and be more confident. The other student was very quiet, but expressed a similar interest in beauty, wishing to learn to properly use makeup and “be more beautiful.” Hamidah identified a trio of complementary eyeshadow shades and application styles for each of the women’s skin tone and eyes, followed by a demonstration of eyeliner applications for “day” and “night.” After an hour of practice, we completed our “looks” and gathered our belongings to re-enter the crushing heat of Yangon in September. Hamidah and the young girl stood near the window at the front of the apartment as Hamidah demonstrated how to wrap her hijab in the popular Malaysian style, the gauzy fabric swooping into symmetrical folds that draped just right around the girl’s shoulders. We snapped selfies and exchanged phone numbers, and the women dispersed out onto 25th street. Later that day, Hamidah posted the selfies to her Facebook page, where they received 150 ‘likes’ and dozens of enthusiastic comments.

In a city, and a country, where hijabs are signifiers for threatening Other-ness, spaces like Hamidah’s makeup classes and Facebook page provide life-affirming experiences of inclusion, joy, and comfort for Muslim women. For young women, es-
especially, these spaces offer mentorship and the possibility to explore their own identities. As Maria, the administrator for the Hijab Girls Photo page explained, Hamidah and other hijabis’ tutorials and photos inspire her to be confident and proud of her religion and identity, even though “Buddhists misunderstand hijabis and niqabis and Islam”. Notably, she does not wear hijab now because she attends a public school, but she earnestly hopes to wear hijab one day, and lives out her fantasy of being “free” to practice Islam more devoutly by taking selfies where she wears hijab, niqab, and various makeup looks she learned from Hamidah. Her Facebook page has over 20,000 likes, and she is passionate about spreading positive images of women who cover throughout the Myanmar cyberscape: “I love hijabis and niqabis, and I share photos and knowledge about Muslims in Myanmar to help educate people.” For Maria, hijabi cyberspace enables the exploration of self that is too often stifled in other Burmese spaces, especially the school. Hijab Girls Photo affirms not only the existence and belonging of hijabi and niqabi’s in Myanmar through a diverse and extensive collection of visual images but offers an enthusiastic celebration of simply being a young Muslim girl.

Alongside the proliferation of hijabi social spaces online, Muslim women are actively forging and participating in new political spaces of struggle against both social exclusions and capital’s inclusions. For Muslim women, especially Rohingyas, public activism is almost entirely out of reach in Myanmar, especially at a time when journalists are being arrested and imprisoned for reporting on state-sanctioned violence and genocide. However, Muslim women’s identities as workers, women, and mothers are fertile ground for struggles over the right to life and life chances in Myanmar. Specifically, the activism of people like Dr. Aye, a hijabi sexual health educator affiliated with RAINFALL, a gender study organization and radical feminist collective, are challenging standard liberal democratic discourses about women’s rights in Myanmar. Where large organizations like the Gender Equality Network operate within the parameters of the Myanmar nation-state, collaborating with the National
League for Democracy and obeying censorship laws, Dr. Aye and RAINFALL reject liberal gender equality projects that maintain the ontological centrality of patriarchy (for example, prioritizing quotas for women in government) and leave racism and Islamophobia unproblematized.

As RAINFALL co-founder and current MP Zin Mar Aung has said: “laws created under a patriarchal system will certainly be patriarchal.” Hence, institutionalized sexism has allowed patriarchal and capitalist power to survive and thrive in contemporary Myanmar. If we continue to avoid centering the destruction of patriarchy and capitalism together within feminist struggles, feminism will only continue to shore up hegemonic power in Myanmar. In striving to fulfill a mission to theorize a radically just feminist movement in Myanmar’s locally and historically specific contexts, RAINFALL works with farm leaders, labor leaders, and ethnic minority community leaders to build a strong, inclusive feminist platform. Muslim women are key partners in this struggle, and their experiences echo the writings of Marxist and Marxist-feminist scholars who warn that struggle over the wage is incomplete, as unwaged workers remain excluded. Many Muslim women (and women throughout Myanmar) do informal hawking and sales work, as well as unwaged work, so organizing around wage labor has little to offer. Only through collective struggle alongside thousands of farmers, laborers, housewives, and members of marginalized communities can we tackle the immense injustices of gender, race, and class oppression in Myanmar.

**Conclusion**

Our study of hijabi women’s everyday lives in urban Yangon aims to show that Muslim women’s varying experiences of exclusion and precarity involve more than discursive Othering and state violence. Where extant literature highlights practices of discipline and violence against Muslims, our research identifies
how capital articulates with social difference to shape the emergence of new labor subjectivities. Yangon hijabis’ experiences of everyday exclusion and subjugation reflect both historically specific mechanics of religious and cultural exclusion as well as explicit inclusion in flexibilized, precarious hawking and sales work. Notably, these inclusions are uneven and striated by class positionings, in which precarity has varying material results, ranging from extreme poverty to debt or dependence on family members or a relatively comfortable life.

Amid everyday experiences of Bamar Buddhist supremacy and lives characterized by double shifts, Muslim women are actively producing and participating in spaces characterized by joy and belonging, as well as political activism. Muslim women’s self-affirming practices suggest multiple possibilities for making lives both within and in struggle against the specific structures and processes that limit their life chances in Myanmar. As Melissa Wright observes\(^\text{46}\) of women’s organizing against maquiladora femicides, the specific experiences of womanhood can be utilized as a key position from which broader, more radical, political goals can be achieved.

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Myanmar and the Ongoing Rohingya Issue

Tharaphi Than

Abstract

As part of the response to the pogrom of Rohingyas in 2017, this article looks at why Aung San Suu Kyi became the personal face of the Rohingya issue and how the lopsided focus on her by the international media obscured and silenced central players and what should have been the focal point of attention: the Rohingya people themselves. The article discusses how different groups, namely the international media, United Nations, international
and local nongovernmental organizations, and Burmese Facebook users attempted to shape narratives about the Rohingyas and divided communities with their competing interests.

Background to the 2017 Exodus: Perfect Timing to Drive out Rohingyas

Hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas were driven out of Myanmar during the Naga Min (Dragon King) campaign in 1978. Many were repatriated afterward. In June 2012, another exodus took place after racial riots broke out in northern and other parts of
Arakan and the whole country, a series of events which popularized the slogan ‘the West gate has fallen’ among nationalists. The slogan implies that the country now cannot stop the influx of Rohingyas (as well as terrorists as attested by figure 1).

The reality, of course, is the opposite: after the crisis in August 2017, close to one million Rohingyas (and some Hindus) left through western borders to Bangladesh. Considered a coordinated attempt to derail Aung San Suu Kyi’s (ASSK’s) National League for Democracy (NLD) from winning the general election in 2015 and to destabilize her government after the NLD won the elections, the killing of Rohingyas and Muslims in cities such as Meiktila were largely ignored by the government so it could avoid being implicated in the highly-charged, anti-Rohingya (and Muslim) framing of the riots. ASSK and the NLD shunned the media and resorted to using draconian tactics against the institution. Journalists who criticized nationalists, including Wirathu, the monk who incited hatred against Rohingyas and Muslims and whom TIME magazine branded ‘The Face of Buddhist Terror’, were not protected or supported by the NLD and their followers.

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1 Such consideration is not unfounded. Soon after the June 2012, the author had a chance to hold discussions with some politicians and civil society leaders and most argued that the NLD had to be careful about how they react to the Rohingya crisis, which was seen as a deliberate attempt by the army to derail the progress of the NLD. The removal by Facebook of several accounts including that of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing in August and October 2018 respectively supported the NLD and their followers’ fear that the army was behind the coordinated attacks, or in Facebook parlance, “coordinated inauthentic behavior” on Facebook (Meta Newsroom, 2018).

2 Beech, 2013.

3 One such journalist is Swe Win, charged and tried under Article 66(d) of the 2013 Telecommunications Act (Thet Su Aung, 2018), which is seen as a legacy of the Orwellian State deliberately left in the law books by the Aung San Suu Kyi-led government to protect the government from criticism. Swe Win was later shot in an assassination attempt and fled to Australia (ABC Foreign Correspondent, 2021).
It is not a coincidence that the recurrence of the “Rohingya Question” and escalation of the crisis began during the early days of the NLD government that came to power in 2015. National reconciliation—which could be historically interpreted as reconciliation between the army and the NLD—peace, and the rule of law, are three pillars of the NLD party. In 2017 the NLD’s stance on constitutional reform seemed to no longer be the party’s priority. Understanding that the Rohingya crisis escalated post-2011, i.e., during the civilian government period, is important to keep in mind when evaluating the conflicting crisis narratives based on geographical regions, particularly inside and outside the country, as well as the different solutions suggested by regional and international groups.

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4 ATH, 2018.
5 There were different international interventions to initiate and foster national reconciliation between Aung San Suu Kyi and the army (Maung Aung Myoe, 2002).
After the NLD won the 2012 by-elections and 2015 general elections and formed government, it focused a lot on reconciliation, i.e., NLD speeches for winning the support of the military; no other issues were prioritized so highly. In that context, the killing, mass exodus, and long-term internment of Rohingya inside the country were largely ignored by the NLD. Speaking for the Rohingya and protecting their rights, including citizenry rights, would have put the NLD in confrontation with the army. In addition, the NLD would lose followers who view the Rohingya as illegal immigrants. Under the perfect cover of and at the expense of the NLD and ASSK, in the name of promoting national reconciliation, the army could carry out its crimes against Rohingya people. The international media and community came to understand the NLD and particularly ASSK’s positioning only after August 2017.

The Personification of the Problem

The peaceful transition to democracy in Myanmar was hailed as a hallmark of success for Myanmar and the international community that supported Myanmar’s democratic causes during its dictatorship between 1988 and 2011. Little did the world know that the fairy tale everyone wanted to be a part of would end tragically in 2017, barely six years into the transition. The embodiment of Myanmar’s democratic triumph, ASSK, has also been accused of ignoring her lifelong causes of democracy and freedom. Once a poster girl for internationalism, democracy, human rights, and good against evil tropes, after the Rohingya crisis ASSK was disowned by her friends; students and citizens demanded their governments strip her of awards and honorary citizenships, and the United Nations criticized her for not pre-

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7 Cheesman, 2017.
8 One of the reasons ASSK supporters give when warning against criticism of her is that doing so is akin to falling into a trap laid by the military, which is often seen as the ‘big black hands’ behind national unrest.
venting the crisis and even acting willfully in some cases to escalate tensions (and violence against minorities) by spreading fake news.\(^\text{10}\)

While the world outside Myanmar viewed her as part of the problem for the ongoing Rohingya issue and a disgrace to democracy and human rights, her reputation inside Myanmar remained intact as testified by the following cartoon. In the picture, she is depicted as a woman carrying a badly-injured Myanmar (highlighting the Kachin State war in the north and the Rohingya crisis in the west) walking a tightrope with medals falling off her. This cartoon captured a largely sympathetic view the Myanmar public has toward her and is consistent with the popular trend among the general public to show their support with ASSK publicly. The cartoon also reflects the rising sentiment among the general public in Myanmar, i.e., victimization. Most thought ASSK and the whole country were portrayed negatively by the international media. Not only cartoonists, writers, and people who have access to media but also the general public with social media platforms voluntarily took part in defending ASSK and themselves against the international media. To both western media and the public inside Myanmar, ASSK became the center of the whole Rohingya issue, so much so that the real victims—Rohingya people, became less news-worthy than her.

\(^\text{10}\) The United Nations report stated “The State Counsellor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has not used her de facto position as Head of Government, nor her moral authority, to stem or prevent the unfolding events, or seek alternative avenues to meet the Government’s responsibility to protect the civilian population or even to reveal and condemn what was happening. On the contrary, the civilian authorities have spread false and hateful narratives; denied the Tatmadaw’s wrongdoing; blocked independent investigations, including of the Fact-Finding Mission; and overseen the bulldozing of burned Rohingya villages and the destruction of crime sites and evidence. Ignorance on the part of the Myanmar civilian authorities was effectively impossible”, (UNHCR, 2018, p. 389).
After March 2011, when the transfer of power to the Union Solidarity and Development Party civilian government was completed, international attention focused on how free and fair Myanmar’s elections were and how smooth the transition was. The overwhelming narrative was there was a rupture in Burmese politics, a break from the long oppression, human rights abuses, and ongoing civil war with minorities. At long last, Myanmar, a benighted country that lived in the dark corner of the world, had arrived on the world democracy scene. Furthermore, the country needed much cheering on the global stage. Invitations from world leaders were extended to ASSK, locked inside Myanmar for more than two decades. Then-US President Barack Obama and other world leaders Myanmar and met with her, thereby legitimizing the transition and glorifying the long-awaited democratic victory. Voices of the critics who pointed

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12 Her first visit to Europe after the long house arrest was hailed as a “triumphant visit” (Cumming-Bruce, 2018).
out that it was not a rupture but a continuation under disguise\textsuperscript{13} were silenced, and many were branded pessimists putting forward their agenda supporting outside-parliament practices, i.e., street protests, rather than supporting parliamentary democracy.

![Figure 3](image)

It is essential to understand the enthusiastic support of ASSK then to understand how the world suddenly became disappointed with her after the August 2017 events. Even when she should not have been seen as a victim in 2012, the media still framed her as such. Few critics were listened to when they pointed out her silence on the renewed Rohingya crisis in 2012

\textsuperscript{13} This disguise could be understood as the military control was cloaked in the Aung San Suu Kyi-led civilian government. This is at least a narrative many inside Myanmar still circulate.

\textsuperscript{14} Many Facebook users in Myanmar changed their profile pictures to pictures like this in September 2017 amidst the escalating criticisms internally against Aung San Suu Kyi.
and then her collusion with the military and international mining companies when she persuaded disenfranchised farmers to accept compensation and accept jobs at the mining sites.\(^\text{15}\) Both inside and outside Myanmar, ASSK was given the benefit of the doubt, and many were hoping she would slowly speak out against the military on their treatment of Rohingyas and other military-related, old, unresolved issues. However, her spokesperson in 2017 denied she had any sympathy for Rohingyas, dispelling any lingering hope the international community had for her.\(^\text{16}\)

**Different Narratives in Different Circles**

**International Media**

From the early days of her release, the prevailing narrative has been that a weakened ASSK is synonymous with a weakened Myanmar, and many are worried that divide over ASSK will inevitably strengthen the military.\(^\text{17}\) International media and the international community continue to view and understand Myanmar through the lens of ASSK. The same narrative persisted inside the country through the by-elections in 2012, the elections in 2015, and in October 2018, weeks before the by-elections, one of ASSK’s ministers warned his constituents that without ASSK’s leadership, the country would never enjoy peace and development.\(^\text{18}\) The NLD continued to use her pictures in their election

\(^\text{15}\) Criticism of her stance on the Letpadaung mining dispute came often from local and exile Burmese media. See Aung Zaw’s opinion piece for one such critical report (2018).

\(^\text{16}\) McPherson, 2017.

\(^\text{17}\) One UK media outlet picked up such sentiment shortly after the June 2012 riots (Taylor, 2012).

campaigns despite her waning international acclaim. The narratives and headlines in 2018 and 2019, particularly about ASSK and her NLD party, should be understood in that context.

The hype about the success and the transition was so great that one could only expect dismay and frustration to that magnitude, and sure enough, we see such a scale of global awe at the incapacitated leader in the form of withdrawals of human rights awards. Western narratives about the Rohingya seem to be shaped more by the global democratic icon’s silence on the plight than the plight itself. Moreover, we hear more about why ASSK is not speaking up rather than what could be done to help the country to bring back Rohingyas—not to their camps, but to their original communities. Such a narrative alienates local journalists and even human rights campaigners who disagree with the military and its operations but are still overwhelmingly supportive of ASSK. Local journalists, activists, and NLD supporters are frustrated that the media and the international community, including the United Nations (UN), did not separate ASSK from the military but portrayed both parties as colluding with each other to commit crimes. Whether there was collusion was a question probably six or seven years too late. The more attention the media put on ASSK, the more defensive locals became. Unfortunately, the strategy employed locally contained the damage done, and how to respond to international media and campaigns utilizing media and public relations.¹⁹

¹⁹ ရိိုဟင်ဂ ာ Crisis ကရောဂျာ ငြိမ်မအက်ဗ်ုဗ် မိုးသူလေ့လာနိုင်ငံးက ကစားကွက်ရတွက် (ရိုပ်/သ)၊ (၂၀၁၈, ဧပြီ)၊ https://www.facebook.com/theirrawaddy-burmese/videos/1967809533263189. Ex-information minister, Ye Htut also opined that due to the government’s inadequate handling of the media, the world did not have a chance to know that both sides—both Buddhists (and Hindus) and Rohingyas—suffered during the crisis (2018). Aung San Suu Kyi and the country’s blame for the Rohingya crisis has been framed as a public relations failure on the part of the government that distracted from the deliberate killings and tortures committed by the army as reported by Amnesty International (2018).
ASSK, or rather her silence, has been influential in the shaping of international narratives of the Rohingya crisis. However, beyond the international media headlines, discourses and news about Rohingyas are eerily quiet inside Myanmar. Apart from occasional cartoons and news that respond to international news about ASSK and her government’s handling of the Rohingya issue, few public discussions about the Rohingya take place. Domestic and international understanding and framing of one of the worst human-made tragedies of the modern time have been oddly centering around one figure, i.e., ASSK. International media and community attack her, and the domestic (non-Rohingya) population defends her. Otherwise, the central players and what should be the focal point of the crisis, i.e., the Rohingya themselves, are missing from most debates. Rohingyas are left to defend themselves when the world discusses if and how much blame should be appropriated to ASSK. Rohingyas and non-Rohingyas in Myanmar talk past each other; the UN and other international agencies, including the media, inevitably play (often unhelpful) mediators between two parties. Events unfolded and solutions proposed spread far and wide, often via social media;²⁰ local communities no longer enjoy the privacy and right to resolve their problems behind closed doors, nor did they have agency to present their problems from their perspectives and find solutions on their own.

UN, NGO Circle and Academics

Amidst different narratives in the UN and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) circles and the international media, what could be a long-term solution for the crisis went missing. That is how to mobilize the remaining locals, who are not Rohingyas but ethnic Rakhine living in Arakan or Rakhine State, and other Burmans from the rest of the country, to build bridges over how the

²⁰ Immediately after the August 2017 crisis, a local police order for Ayeyarwady Region, i.e., the river delta, which can be accessed by sea from Rakhine State, to be vigilant about escaping Rohingyas (Bengalis in the documents and local language) was leaked to social media.
two warring communities could forge alliances and how they could live together again as they did before. Under the microscopic scrutiny of the media and multiple stakeholders, local attempts to help solve the problems were ignored. As the international community assumes that all Rakhine people and Buddhist Burmese are racists, there is no hope for communities to be able to live together again. Such assumptions are dangerous, and they can further alienate and disempower local communities, particularly brave small organizations and individuals who are desperately trying to find remedies with little resources – and Burmese and Rakhine journalists such as Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, who were jailed for their exposé on the killings of Rohingyas in Inndin.\(^2\)

Concerning academic circles, unlike other conflicts, the Rohingya conflict saw the government welcoming scholars, particularly those that support the government’s narratives that Rohingyas are not indigenous to Arakan. As a scholar and Burmese national, I think the silence of scholars with otherwise good intentions inevitably emboldens nationalists and alienates a few scholars who are outspoken about Rohingyas, and as a collective body, scholars could reflect on our roles and interactions with the country and its people. There is a disconnect between what we teach to our students that if you know more, you will be able to do more things to change your life and those around you and how we as scholars actually engage with our research communities. We keep telling ourselves that we need to know more to do things better - or even start doing things.

**Domestic Populations and Facebook Users**

Domestic narratives in teashops as well as on social media largely fell under three categories following 2017: 1) defense against what many see and call threatening/bullying tactics of western countries and media; 2) ongoing debates about sovereignty versus human rights that include the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Chinese projects in northern Arakan and 3)

\(^2\) Wa Lone & Kyaw Soe Oo, 2018.
prospects for the 2020 elections. International and domestic narratives are, to a certain extent, linked and fueled by each other. Locals see the narratives of the international media and western countries as threatening the country’s sovereignty, and many think international lobbyists are working to push the Rohingya agenda high on the UN security council. Many argue that though they do not like the military, they are together with the military if sovereignty is threatened. Furthermore, the Rohingya issue is the most critical issue many people think is threatening national sovereignty. Post-August 2017 rallying behind ASSK and the military, where the same people are now behind what was previously regarded as two opposition parties, could be understood as grassroots mobilization to protect the country’s sovereignty.

In late 2017 and early 2018, amidst the talk of R2P, many assumed that the West has ulterior motives behind R2P and its campaigns about the Rohingya. Some argue such attempts aim to derail Chinese investments in Arakan state, including the Kyauk-Phyu economic zone. Regarding genocide and ethnic cleansing, a director from a local Myanmar think tank, National Reconciliation and Peace Center, argued that the onus of proof is on the accusers, and not on the government. Such argument dominates the local narrative, and the government seems to have invested heavily in promoting such narratives on social media.

The Ministry of Communication and Information Technology spent about 5 million USD on a Social Media Monitoring Team formed in February 2017, and The New York Times argued that the genocide was incited on Facebook by mostly military personnel near the Myanmar capital. Although Facebook took down the accounts of the military and its supports, including

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22 Spoken in a video report for Kamayut Media, since removed from Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/kamayutmedia/videos/2079480092069176/
24 Mozur, 2018.
that of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, narratives denying genocide and posts promoting hate and violence against Rohingyas continue, and those sympathetic to Rohingyas are also still popular. The Rohingya issue sustains nationalists’ narratives on the need to protect one’s religion and race, especially toward the goal of the main opposition party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, winning the 2020 elections. On March 18, 2018, the president of the USDP party reminded his party that every citizen has to protect one’s race and religion. This kind of narrative encourages the election cycle to closely align with a violence cycle.

Conclusion

History and historians lock Burma in the past; by contrast, liberation and democracy forces the nation and her people to rush to the future already defined by global forces including donors for various projects on democracy. Local Burmese are yet to have the privilege to imagine our future, redeem our past and curve a path from the violent past together. Violence buried will resurface as an even more powerful force to be inflicted on oneself and onto others, especially others that majority Burmans do not deem share their legacy. Building democracy in Burma requires transcending the tragic and brutal past dominated by colonialism and military regimes as well as conflicting donor agendas.

The year 2020 brought renewed hopes for the Rohingya issue. It is no longer about the trial against the government at International Criminal Court but reconciliation between Rohingyas and Rakhine youth in Rakhine State. Rakhine people became the victims of military campaigns themselves and forged alliances with Rohingyas still living in the camps. Local voices, once suppressed, called for the war against Rakhine people to stop and many activists boycotted the NLD-led 2020 elections, a movement unheard of five years ago. Away from the global headline

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25 From the author’s own experience reporting posts inciting violence, Facebook has been slow, sometimes taking up to a week to take down a post.
news, and perhaps in the absence of NGOs and democracy projects in the midst of pandemic, Burmese are slowly beginning to set their agendas. Local political and social movements against the government as well as the military however are seen by the NLD as derailing their plans for reelection in particular and the country’s long-term democratic trajectory in general. Only time will tell whether the youth-led movements, which I see are a real hope for the country, will set both Rohingyas and Rakhine people free.

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**မြန်မာ့စာကြောင်းကို မေးနေဖို့**

ကရိုန်း၏ *သပိတ်* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *ဧဝတီကြား* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *သားကို* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *သားကို* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *သားကို* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *သားကို* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *သားကို* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *သားကို* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *သားကို* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *သားကို* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ၊ *သားကို* (၂၀၁၈, ဇွေး ၁၀)ကြားတွဲ့*ဗိုလ်ဗိုလ်စိုကကည်ကိို ြယိုကကည်ပါကကည်ပါက တိိုင်ေးမပည်ဒိုကခရတွွဲ့ြည်ဟို ြရကွေးဝန်ကကီေးခပ်ရမပာ

https://www.facebook.com/theirrawaddyburmese/videos/1967809533263189
https://www.bbc.com/burmese/burma-43477522
အသီးသီးဖားညီအေး၊ အသီးသီးဖားညီအေးစေမှုများကို အသီးသီးဖားညီအေးများကို အားခင်းအားခင်း စာတမ်းအကျဉ်းအရမျှပ်မှုပိိုင်ခွင့်ဦးကို အားခင်းကြောင့်ဦးသာ မြန်းယဉ်ရက်းမှုနှင့် ဘာသာရေးတွင် အားလုံးအကျဉ်းဝင်းကို ထွန်းနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။ မသီးတာ–စမ်းခြေျာင်းစာတမ်းအကျဉ်းအရမျှပ်မှုပိိုင်ခွင့်ဦးစေမှုကို အားခင်းကြောင့်ဦးသာ မြန်းယဉ်ရက်းမှုနှင့် ဘာသာရေးတွင် အားလုံးအကျဉ်းဝင်းကို ထွန်းနိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။
Abstract

The state and state institutions must guarantee fundamental human rights to secure inclusiveness among the country's multi-religious and multi-ethnic citizens. Freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion must be cultivated as a political culture in nurturing inclusive citizenry in Myanmar.
မသီတ
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မြန်းလူ ိုသည် ကိုလိုနီလက်ရအာက်ြက ြီကာလ သိိုှံ့ြဟိုတ် လွန်ခဲ့် သည့်် ာစိုန စ်တွင်  ိခဲ့်ရသာသက်ဦေးဆ ပိိုင်ပရဒ သ ာ ်စနစ်ကိို ြည်သည့််

အခါကြျှဆန်ှံ့ က င်ပိုန်ကန်ခဲ့်ကကမခင်ေးြ  ိခဲ့်ကကဘဲ၁၉ ာစိုအတွင်ေး နယ်ခ ဲွဲ့

ပဗိတိသျှလက်ရအာက်သိိုှံ့ ကျွန်အမြစ် က ရ ာက်သွာေး သည့််အခါြ သာ

ပရဒသ ာ ်စနစ်သည်အလိိုလိိုအဆ ိုေးသတ်သွာေးခဲ့်မခင်ေးသာ မြစ်ပါသည်။

ိိုှံ့ရကကာင့််မြန်ြာ့်လူ ိုအတွက်လူတစ်ဦေးတစ်ရယာက်၏ရခါင်ေးရဆာင်ြှု

ကိို ပ ိုအပ်ယ ိုြ တ်ကာ မပည်သူလူ ို၏အခန်ေးကဏ္ဍကိိုရနောက်လိိုက်

အမြစ်သာခ ယူြှုသည်အရိိုေးစွဲ အသာေးက သည့််ခ ယူခ က်မြစ်ခဲ့်ပါသည်။

ိိုှံ့ရကကာင့််လည်ေးလူ ိုအတွက်ြ ိ ေးဆက်အလိိုက်ကာလ  ည်ကကာ

အခန်ေးကဏ္ဍရပ ာက်ဆ ြှုအ အိြ်နီေးခ င်ေးနိိုင်င ရလေးြ ာေး မြစ်ကက ရသာ

အမခာေးနိိုင်င ြ ာေးန င့််ပါ အဆက်အဆ    ိခဲ့် ာြ  ဘာသာရ ေးန င့်် ယဉ်ရက ေးြှု

ရဒွေးရ ာယ က်တင်   ိခဲ့်သည်ဟို ဆိိုနိိုင်ြည်မြစ်သည်။ ဥပြာ

မြန်ြာ့်နန်ေးတွင်ေးတွင်ြူဆလ င်ကိိုယ်  ရတာ်ြ ာေးအတွက် ကိိုယ်  ရတာ်

ဗလီအပါအဝင်ြနတရလေးတွင်ဗလီရပါင်ေး၄၀ ခနှံ့် တည်

ရဆာက်ခဲ့်သကဲ့်သိိုှံ့

နန်ေးတွင်ေးအခြ်ေးအနောေးြ ာေးအတွက် ဟိနဒ ဘာသာ

ဝင်ပိုဏ္ာေးြ ာေး၏

အခန်ေးကဏ္ဍသည်အရတာ် အရ ေးပါ ခဲ့်ကကသည်။ ရဒါက်တာသန်ှံ့မြင့််ဦေး

ရ ေးသာေးရသာ ရခတ်သစ်မြန်ြာမပည် အာေး ြန်တီေးပ ိုရြာ်မခင်ေး

စာအို

ပ်စာြ က်န ော ၉၆ တွင် 'မြန်ြာတိိုှံ့သည် ဗိုဒဓ ဘာသာသာြက

ဟိနဒ ယဉ်ရက ေးြှု၏ အနိုပညာန င့်် အရတွေးအရခေါ်ြ ာေး ကိိုလည်ေး

စိြ့််ဝင်ခ စာေးနိိုင်ခဲ့်သည်' ဟို ရြာ်မပ ာေးသည်။

(ဟိနဒ ယိုကကည်ြှုရပေါ် အရမခခ ရသာ သကကဂန်ပွဲရတာ်ြ ာ ကာလကကာ

လာသည်န င့််အြျှရခတ်အဆက်ဆက်ကနိိုင်င ့်အစိိုေး ြ ာေး၏ အကိိုင်
မသီတ 341 အတွယ်ရပေါ်တည်ကာဗိုဒ္ဓဘာသာရတာ်အမြစ်အသွင်ရမပာင်းလာသည်ကိုရတွဲ့သည်။ စင်စစ်သကကဂန်ပွဲရတာ်သည်လွတ်လပ်ရပြီးရခတ်ရန်ပိိုင်းတွင်ရိိုးာယဉ်ရကံြှုပွဲရတာ်အမြစ်ကာလည်ကကာစွာပ်တည်ခဲ့သည်။ ိုှံ့ရကကာင့်သကကဂန်ပွဲရတာ်တွင်လူးရွေးဘာသာအယူဝါဒြရွေးအတူတကွပါဝင်ဆင်နွှဲခဲ့ကကသည်။ သြိိုင်းတစ်ရလျှာက်ရတွဲ့မြင်ခဲ့ကကသည်။ သိိုှံ့တွင် ၂၀၁၂ခုနစ်ရန်ပိိုင်းတွင်ြူဘာသာရေးလှုွဲ့ရဆာေးမှုးမပလိုပ်ကာသကကဂန်ပွဲရတာ်တွင်ပါဝင်ဆင်နွှဲမခင်ျမပန်ဆိုေးမြတ်လာကကသည်ကိုရတွဲ့သည်။)

ိုစဉ်ကခစ်ယာန်ဘာသာမြန်းနိိုင်င်းနိုင်ပိိုင်းစတင်ဝင်ရာကိုလာခဲ့ကကင်၊ကယားကင်၊ခင်စရသာရဒသားတွင်ပိိုးလိုင်ကိိုေးကွယ်လှုပ်ခဲ့သည်ကိုရတွဲ့သည်။မြန်၊ေး၊ခိိုင်၊ွန်စသည့်ပရဒသာနိိုင်င်းနိုင်ပိိုင်းနစ်ကာလည်ကကာစွာအမြစ်တွယ်ခဲ့သည့်ဗိုဒ္ဓယဉ်ရကံြှုရကကာင့်ခစ်ယာန်ဘာသာအပါအဝင်အမခားဘာသာတားာေးကိုလက်ခကိိုေးကွယ်လှုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ ိုှံ့မပင်ကိိုလိိုနီနယ်လွဲ့တိိုှံ့၏ဘာသာတာေးအမြစ်ခစ်ယာန်ဘာသာအာေးရှုလည်းင်းခဲ့သည်။ ရခတ်သစ်မြန်းပည်အာေးြန်တီးပိုရြာ်မခင်းစာအိုပ်စာက်နော၂၄၀တွင်'၁၉ာစိုအလယ်ရလာက်တွင်ဆလင်းသည်အိုပ်ခပ်ရေးပိိုင်း၌မြင့်ေးရသားေးအိုးခဲ့သည်။ ြင်းရနမပည်ရတာ်၏ပြိွဲ့ဝန်ပင်လျှင်ဆလင်မြစ်ခဲ့၏။ ပိုဂျပြိွဲ့ဝန်လည်းရကာင်ပင်။ ပဗိတိသျှသာဟင်နယ်ကမြန်းနန်းတွင်းတွင်ဆလင်းသည်ြိန်းစိိုးနန်းတွင်းအြှုးနင်းကိိုယ်ရတာ်
မသီတွေ့ရစဧက်စွာသောနေရာတွင် သိရုံးချောင်းရခတ်တွင်က ငြိမ်သေးခဲ့ရသော ပညာရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေး ၏အက်ပ်အတည်းနှင့်တကွ ယင်းကို အချင်းအချင်း စိတ်ဓာတ်ကို အမြစ်တွယ်ရအာင် အဓိကပြေးပေးနိုင်ခဲ့့ရသော အရကကာင်းအောင် ကိုလိုနီပညာရေးနှင့်အတူ ရပ်ထားရသေားသည်။ ယင်းသည် ဂွက်ရားနှင့်ရအာင်ဘိုတို့အတွက် သို့မဟုတ်သား ပညာသင်ကားခွင့်မပြေးခဲ့သည်။
မသီတကကများစွာရသာ ြိအာေးမြစ်ခဲ့သည်။ ိုစိတ်ရကာင့်ယင်းကိုရတာင်လန်လိိုစိတ်လည်းမြစ်လာကကသည်။ ိုစိတ်သည်၁၉၂၀ခိုနစ်ရကာင်းသာေးသပိတ်ရနောက်ပိိုင်းအြေးသာေးရကာင်းြာေးရပေါ်ွက်တွင်အရာက်အကူမြစ်ခဲ့သည်။(ိုသိုှံ့မြစ်သည်သာနွတ်လွတ်လပ်ရေးပပီးရန်စစ်အာဏာင်ရပေါ်ွက်လာသည့််အခါယင်းတိိုှံ့ကလည်းအလာေးတူစနစ်ြေးကိိုသိုေးစွဲကာ ဗြာ၊ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာြဟိုတ်ရသာအမခာေးလူြိေး၊ ဘာသာလူစိုြာေးအရပေါ်ဆက်ဆခဲ့သည်ကိိုလည်ေးရတွွဲ့ပါသည်။မြန်ြာ့်လူူ့ရဘာင်အရနမြင့်ပရဒသာ်စနစ်ြဆိို ယ်လစ်စနစ်ကိိုတိိုက်ရိိုကူေးရမပာင်ေးခဲ့်မခင်ေးြဟိုတ်ဘဲကိိုလိိုနီရခတ်တွင်နစ်ာခီရနခဲ့်သမြင့််အမခာေးရသာနိိုင်ငရ ေးစနစ်ြာေးအာေးကင့််သိုေးပိုနည်ေးလြ်ေးကိိုြသိခဲ့ကကဘဲကိိုလိိုနီစနစ်ကင့််သိုေးပိုကိိုသာအတိုခိိုေးနည်ေးယူနိိုင်ခဲ့ကကမခင်ေးလည်ေးမြစ်နိိုင်ပါသည်။)

စီေးပွါေးရေးလိုပ်ငန်ေးမြစ်ာရတာင်သူလယ်သြာေးတိိုှံ့၏အခန်ေးကဏ္ဍြအလွန်အရေးကကီေးခဲ့သည်။သိိုှံ့ရသာ်ကိိုလိိုနီရခတ်တွင်အိနဒိယြလူတန်ေးစာေးနစ်ြိေးကိို နယ်ခ ဲွဲ့အဂဂလိပ်တိိုှံ့ကတင်သွင်ေးလာခဲ့သည်။တစ်ြိေးြာေးခစ်တီေးြာေးမြစ်ကကကာ န်တစ်ြိေးြာေးကူလီြာေးမြစ်ကကသည်။ ိုလူတန်ေးစာေးနစ်ြိေးရကာင့်ဓာေးြဦေးခလယ်လိုပ်လာရသာမြန်ြာအြာေးစိုြာေးအိနဒိယနွယ်ြွာေးြာေးအရပေါ်အမပ်သရဘာြရဆာင်နိိုင်သည့််သရဘာေးြာေးအရမခတည်ခဲ့ကကသည်။ရငွရကကေးအခက်အခဲ ိရသာလယ်သြာေး ြာေးကိိုခစ်တီေးြာေးကအတိိုေးနှုန်ေးမြင့််ြာေးစွာမြင့််ရငွရခေးရပေးခဲ့ကာအရကကွေးဆပ်နိိုင်သည့််အခါလယ်ယာရမြသာြကသြီေးပိုမြို့သြာေးတိိုှံ့ကစိတ်အနောကကကီေးနောခဲ့ကကသည်။ ိုလူတစ်ဆင့််မြန်ြာ့်လူူ့ရဘာင်တွင်ခစ်တီေးြာေးနင့်ရိုပ်သွင်တူသူြာေးအရပေါ်နယ်ခ ဲွဲ့ကတင်သွင်ေးလာသည့််ကိုပ်ရသွေးစိုပ်ကိုလာေး
မသီတ သူရဌေး၊ ဆိိုေးသွြ်ေးရသာသူစိြ်ေးြ ာေးအမြစ်အမြင်သရဘာ ာေးသည် လည်ေးရပေါ်ရပါက်ခဲ့သည်။ တစ်ြန် မြန်ြာ့်လယ်သြာေးတိိုှံ့ က် ဆင်ေး ဲနွြ်ေးပါေးရသာ ကူလီ ြာေးလည်ေး ဝင်ရ ာက်လာကာ အနိြ့််က ဆ ိုေးမြစ်ရသာလယ်ယာန င့််အိြ်တွင်ေးြှုလိုပ်ငန်ေးြ ာေး (ဥပြာြိလလာက   ေးမခင်ေး)
ကိို လိုပ်ကိိုင်ရလ့်  ိကက ာြ  ကူလီြ ာေးန င့်် ရိုပ်သွင်တူသူြ ာေးအရပေါ်ရအာက်တန်ေးစာေးအမြစ် န ိြ်ခ ခွဲမခာေး ဆက်ဆ သည့််အရလ့်အ လည်ေးရပေါ်ရပါက်ခဲ့သည်။

ရခတ်သစ်မြန်ြာမပည်အာေးြန်တီေးပ ိုရြာ်မခင်ေးစာအိုပ်စာြ က်န ော၃၅၀တွင် 'မြန်ြာတိိုှံ့၏လူြ ိ ေးရ ေးဝါဒြ ာအရပေါ်စီေးခ စာေးခ က်အမြင်န င့်် အရကကာက်တ ာေးတိိုှံ့ ရ ာယ က်ရန၏။ အရပေါ်စီေးအမြင်ြ ာမြန်ြာတိိုှံ့ အြ ာေးအာေးမြင့်် ဆက်ဆ ရတွွဲ့ ိရန ရသာ အင်ဒီေးယန်ေးအြ ာေးစိုြ ာကျွြ်ေးက င်ြှုြ  ိရသာအလိုပ်သြာေးြ ာေး၊ ကာယလိုပ်သာေးန င့်် အိြ်တွင်ေးအရစခ ြ ာေး၊ ဆင်ေး ဲြွဲရတ အလိုပ်ြရ ွေး ဝြ်ေးပြ်ေးတသာ လိုပ် ြည့််သူြ ာေးမြစ်ရနရသာရကကာင့််မြစ်သည်။ လူနည်ေးစိုြ ာစီေးပွါေးရ ေး ြ က်စိ န င့်် စီေးပွါေးရ ေးစွြ်ေးအင်  ိသူြ ာေး၊ ရန ာဌာနြ ာေးစွာ၌ ရအာင်မြင်ြှုရနသူြ ာေးရကကာင့််  ိတ်လန်ှံ့ရကကာက် ွ ွဲ့စိတ်ဝင်မခင်ေး မြစ်၏'ဟို ဆိိ ာေးသည်။

တစ်နည်ေးအာေးမြင့််မြန်ြာတိိုှံ့တွင် အိနဒိယနွယ်ြွာေးြ ာေးန င့််ပတ်သက်လျှင် ပိိုြိိုခ ြ်ေးသာသူကိိုမြစ်ရစ၊ ပိိုြိိုဆင်ေး ဲသူကိိုမြစ်ရစအမပ သရဘာြရဆာင်ရသာ အမြင်သရဘာ ာေး တစ်ခို တည်ေးမြင့်် မြတ်သန်ေးခဲ့ကက သည်ြ ာ ကိိုလိိုနီရခတ် န စ်တစ် ာရက ာ်တစ်ရလျှာက်လ ိုေးပင် မြစ်သည်။

သိိုှံ့ ာတွင်ရက ာင်ေးသာေးသြဂ္၏ပ ြဆ ိုေးရသာ အရ ွရ ွအတွင်ေးရ ေးြ  ေးြ ာအစစလာြ်ဘာသာဝင်ဦေး ာ  စ်မြစ်ပပီေး ရနောက်ပိိုင်ေးတွင် ဥကကဌအ ိရ ွေးရကာက်တင်ရမြ ာက်ခ ခဲ့် သည်။  ိိုှံ့အတူ လွတ်လပ်ရ ေးကကိ ေးပြ်ေးြှုကာလအတွင်ေးအသက်စရတေးခဲ့်ကက သည့်် အာ ာနည်ကိိုေးဦေးတွင် အစစလာြ်ဘာသာဝင် ဦေး ာ တ်န င့််  ဲရဘာ် ကိိုရ ွေးတိိုှံ့
ပါဝင်ခဲ့ပီးမြန်ြာ့်လူ ိုက တညီတညွတ်တည်ေးလက်ခ ခဲ့ကကသည်။

၂၀၁၂ ခိုန်စ်ရနောက်ပိိုင်ေးတွင်ြ နိိုင်င ရ ေးသရဘာ ေးသာေးရ ေးအစွန်ေးရ ာက်သရဘာ ေးကိို တင်သွင်ေးလာခဲ့် ာ အြ ိ ေးသာေးဒီြိုကရ စီအြွဲွဲ့ချိိုက်ချိုက် န်တိိုက်ချိိုက် ည်ွယ်ပပီေး ဦေး ာ တ်နင့််ကိိုရ ွေးတိိုှံ့အာေးအာ ာနည်စာ င်ေးတွင် ြ ည့််သွင်ေးဘဲ ရြာက်က်ရြာ်မပြှု အခ ိ ွဲ့ ိလာခဲ့်သည်။

တစ်ြန် မြန်ြာ့်လူ ့ရဘာင်တွင်လူြို့ ိုးနင့်် ဘာသာတ ာေးကိို လည်ေးရကာင်ေး၊ လူြို့ ိုးနင်ေးကိိုလည်ေးရကာင်ေးမိိုင်ေးလင်ေးမပတ်သာေးစွာခွဲမခာေးနောေးလည်နိိုင်စွြ်ေးလွန်စွာအာေးနည်ေးခဲ့်သည်။ လွတ်လပ်ရ ေးပပီေးရနောက် လွတ်လပ်ရသာပိုဂ္လိကြီဒီယာြ ာေးင်သန်ခွင့်် ိခဲ့်သည့််ပါလီြန်ဒီြိုကရ စီရခတ်သက်တြ် ဆယ်နိိုင်င ပိိုင်ြီဒီယာသာလျှင် တစ်ခိုတည်ေးရသာြီဒီယာအမြစ်ပ်တည်ကာမြန် ြာ လူြို့ ိုးနင်ေး ဗိုဒဓ ဘာသာသည်သာနိိုင်င ကိိုကိိုယ် စာေးမပ ရသာအ ာအမြစ်အစဉ်တစိိုက် ပိုရြာ်ခဲ့် အြ ာေးစိုသည် မြန်ြာနင့်် ဗိုဒဓ ဘာသာကိို လူြို့ ိုးနင်ေးဘာသာအမြစ်ခွဲမခာေးြမြင်တတ်ကကရတာ့်ရပ။ ိိုှံ့ရကကာင့်နိိုင်င သာေးကိိုလည်ေးရ ာရ ွေးနောေးလည်တ်သာေးတတ်ကကသည်။

သိိုှံ့မြင့်တရိုတ်၊ ကိုလာေး စသည့်် လူြို့တိိုှံ့ကိို မြန်ြာဟိုတ် သမြင့်၊
မသီတွင် ဗိုဒဓဘာသာကို ကွယ်သူးလည်း ိသမြင့် နိုင်ငံခြင်းမခေ့သေး၊ ဧည့်သည်ဟူသည့်အမြင့်လည်းရပ်းက်လာခဲ့သည်။ ဖျော့မပင် န်လျှင်၊ ချင်းန်လျှင် ဗိုဒဓဘာသာ၊ ခင်းန်လျှင် ဗိုဒဓဘာသာစသမြင့်လူး ိုးနင့်ဘာသာတွဲစပ်နေားလည်းကကသည်။ စ်ယာန်ဘာသာ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာသို့အမှုခင်းတိိုင်းသူ ရိုပ်ငင်းသီးကို အမခားခင်းတိိုင်းသူတစ်ဦးက ဘာသာရမပာင်းသွားသမြင့်ခင်းဟိုတ်ရတာ့်ဟိုရဝြန်သတ်တ်းလှုး ိုး၊ နိုင်ငံခြင်းတွင် လာရလျှာက်သည့်လားဟူတိိုင်းသူက သူသည် ဗိုဒဓဘာသာကို းကွယ်သူဟိုည်းသိိုးပင်ရမပာရစကားးးလားဟူ ွာငယ်ရလေးး ိုးတွင်အ းက သူ၏ းတွင်တွင် လားဟူလူးး ိုးမြစ်သည်။ ပင်ချင်(ချင်)ရသာရနှံ့က်းး ိုးဟူသည့်စာအိုပ်တွင်အစစလားးဘာသာဝင်းကရလေးတစ်ဦးက သူ့းတ်ပိုတင် တွင် မြန်းးအိနဒိယပါကစစတန်ဟူလူဝင်းကကီးကကပ်ရှုကကပ်၊ ြိတထီလာအရှုကကပ်အပပီးတွင်လူးးဟူသည့်ကွက်လပ်ကိုမြည့်းန် ဝန်ရလေးရကကာင်း၊ သူတိိုးးးသားစိုသည်ပါကစစတန်နင့်ည်သည့်အဆက်အစပ်းး းရကကာင်း၊ သူ့ကိုယ်သူမြန်းဟူသာခယူးးကကပ်ရှုကကပ်၊ သိိုးးးတွင်အးက သူ့ကိုလား၊ရသွေးရနောက်ဆက်တွဲ ဝင်ရာက်လာရသာတရိုတ်နိုင်ငံးတရိုတ်းး ားကို ရဒသခတရိုတ်းး ားနင့် ရောရွေးနေားလည်ကကသည် း ားလည်ည်း ဘာသာရောက်အပြီးတွင် ပါကစစတန်ကျိုးည်းနိုင်ငံးတရိုတ်နိုင်ငံးတွင် းတွင်အးစဉ်အဆက်ကအရမခခရနိုင်ခဲ့ကကရသာ
မသီတကီ တရိုတ်လူြ ိ ေးြ ာေးသည်သူတိိုှံ့ကိိုယ်သူတိိုှံ့မြန်ြာနိိုင်င သာေးြ ာေးဟိုသာခ ယူ ာေးကကသည်။ သိိုှံ့ရသာ်စီေးပွါေးရ ေးလက်ဝါေးကကီေးအိုပ်ကာ ရဒသခမြန်ြာတိိုှံ့၏ လယ်ရမြ၊အိြ်ယာြ ာေးကိို ရစ ေးရကာင်ေးရပေးဝယ်ပပီေးပြိ ွဲ့လယ်တွင်တွင်က ယ်လာရသာ တရိုတ်မပည်ြြ  ဝင်ရ ာက်လာသည့်် တရိုတ်ြ ာေးအာေး ြရက ြနပ်မြစ်ကက သမြင့််တရိုတ်ဟို ဆိိုလျှင်ပင် သူစိြ်ေး၊ နိိုင်င မခာေးသာေး၊ ဧည့််သည်ဟူသည့််စလိုတ်တိိုက် ဆနှံ့်က င်တ ိုှံ့မပန်ြ ာေးလည်ေး   ိလာသည်။  ိိုှံ့အတူကိုလာေးြ ာေးကိိုလည်ေးဟိနဒ ክူဆလင်၊ ဗြာမပည်ြွာေး၊ ကြန်၊ ရိိုဟင်ဂ ာဟို အလွယ်တကူ ခွဲမခာေးသိ နိိုင်စွြ်ေးြ သည်န င့််အြျှ သူစိြ်ေး၊ နိိုင်င မခာေးသာေး၊ ဧည့််သည်ဟူ စလိုတ်တိိုက် ဆနှံ့်က င်တ ိုှံ့မပန်တတ်ကကသည်။

သိိုှံ့ရသာ် နိိုင်င ရ ေးန င့််စီေးပွါေးရ ေးအ  တရိုတ်မပည်ြကကီေးကမြန်ြာနိိုင်င အရပေါ် ြည်ြျှအမြတ် ိုတ်ရနသည်ဆိိုဆိို တရိုတ်အြ ာေးစိုသည် ရဒသခ တိိုင်ေး င်ေးသာေး  ြ်ေးြ ာေးန င့်် ဆင်တူကာ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာကိိုကိိုေးကွယ်ကကသမြင့််

ိုေးကွယ်ကကသမြ်် တရိုတ်အလိိုြ  ိဟူသည့်် ခ စာေးခ က်ြ ာ ြမပင်ေးန်ဟိုဆိို ပါြည်။ ိိုှံ့မပင်စစ်အစိိုေး လက် က်တစ်ရလျှာက်လိုေး တွင် သူူ့ဘက်ြ နိိုင်င ရ ေးအ  ပ်တည်ရပေးရသာ တရိုတ်နိိုင်င အရကကာင်ေးကိိုရကာင်ေးရကကာင်ေးသာ ရ ွေးပပီေး နိိုင်င ပိိုင်ြီဒီယာြ ာေးတွင် ရ ေးသာေး ိုတ်လွှင့််မပသခဲ့်မခင်ေးကလည်ေး မြန်ြာ့်လူူ့ရဘာင်တွင်တရိုတ်လူြ ိ ေးြ ာေးနင့်် ပတ်သက်ပပီေး အမပ သရဘာရဆာင်ရသာခ စာေးခ က်မြစ်ရစရအာင်ကကိ ေးပြ်ေးြှုမြစ်သည်။

သိိုှံ့ရကကာင့်် မြန်ြာ့်...
မသီတ

လူရိုနိုင်သည် ကိုလားဟို ြူလအနက် င်ေးကိို ြသိဘဲ သူတိိုှံ့နှုတ်က ိ ေးကာရခေါ်ရဝေါ်ရနသည့််သူြ ာေးန င့််သွင်မပင်ြူ ာ၊ ကိိုေးကွယ် ာ ဘာသာတူသူြ ာေးအရပေါ်တွင် အပ က်သရဘာရဆာင်ရသာ အမြင်ကိိုသာ အရြွ ခဲ့်ရလသည်။ သိိုှံ့မြင့််ရနောင်တွင် ကိုလာေး၊ ြူဆလင်ဟူရသာ အတ်လကခဏာ အရပေါ် ရကကာက် ွ ွဲ့၊  ွ ွဲ့  ာစိတ်ကိို ရြွေးမြ ရပေး န်အခွင့််သာခဲ့်သည်။

၁၉၆၂ ခိုန စ်တွင် ရတာ်လ န်ရ ေးရကာင်စီက နိိုင်င ရတာ်အာဏာကိို သိ ြ်ေးပိိုက်ပပီေးပပီေးခ င်ေး ပ ိုန ိပ်ဥပရဒတစ် ပ် ကိို မပဌာန်ေးကာ ပိုဂ္လိကရနှံ့စဉ်သတင်ေးြီဒီယာအာေးလ ိုေးကိို ပ်ဆိိုင်ေးရစခဲ့်သည်။ စာရပစိစစ်ရ ေးရပါက်ခဲ့်သည်။ စာရပစိစစ်ရ ေးဌာနသည် န်ကိုန်ပြိ ွဲ့တွင်သာ သမြင့််က န်တိိုင်ေးန င့််မပည်နယ်ြ ာေးတွင်ရဒသဆိိုင် ာြီဒီယာြ ာေး၊ စာအိုပ်ိုတ်ရဝရ ေးလိုပ်ငန်ေးြ ာေး တည်ရ ာင်ခွင့််ြမပ ဟို တ ာေးဝင်ြဆိို ရစကာြူ ယင်ေးရဒသြ ာေးတွင် ြီဒီယာလိုပ်ငန်ေး ရပေါ် ွန်ေး န် အရမခ အရနြရပေးရတာ့်ရပ။ စာြူြ ာေးကိို စာရပစိစစ်ရ ေးဌာနသိိုှံ့ တင်မပကာ ခွင့််မပ ခ က် ြ သာ ပ ိုန ိပ် ခွင့််   ိသကဲ့သိိုှံ့ ပ ိုန ိပ်ပပီေးသည့််အခါ တွင်လည်ေးမြနှံ့်ခ ိခွင့််အတွက် စာရပစိစစ်

မသီတ စာရပစိစစ်ရေးကာင့်လည်း စိုလင်ကွဲမပေးသည်လူဘာင်၏ပိုပိုကိုစာက်နေပေးတွင်ရတွေ့ခွင့်သာခဲ့ရခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ တစ်နွယ်ဘာသာစကားအာတွင်လည်း တာဝင်ဘာသာစကားကိုမြန်းဘာသာစကားတစ်ဦးတည်းအာနေးသတ်တ်းပပီးရေးစနစ်တွင်လည်းမြန်းဘာသာစကားမြင့်သာသင်ကကားရပေးသမြင့်အမခားရသော်လူးာပေးနင့်ဘာသာဝင်းအရကကာင့်အားသတ်ဦးရသားစိတ်အာနည်းဟန်တာေးာရာက်ခဲ့သည်။}

မြန်းယ်လစ်လေစဉ်ပါတီရခတ်တွင်တိုင်းင်းသားစည်ညီညွတ်ရှိရခါင်းစဉ်ရအာက်တွင် ဗြာနင့်အမခား (တာဝင်အမြစ်သတ်တ်ခြောင်ရသာ) တိုင်းင်းသားားအကကားခစ်ကကည်င်းနီမှာဆက်ဆရာကိုအရမခခရသာလက်ားာေးကိုသူတိိုှံ့သရဘာနင့်သူတိိုှံ့န်တီးလိုစိတ်အာနည်းဟနှံ့်တာေးာရာက်ခဲ့သည်။

စာရပံဂီတရေးနင့်အာကိုဝါဒမြန်းခိရှိကလည်းလူဘာင်တွင်မြစ်ရန်အပြီးသူအလိုကအရကကာင့်အာသည်အစိိုးကိုမပည်သူအာနည်းလိြ်ညာ်ည့််မြားအသိုးခရသာအရကကာင့်အာအမြစ်ရှုမြင်ခြာလွတ်လပ်လာသည်အခါတွင်အရကကာင့်အာကိုအရမခခရသာအနိုပညာလက်ားာေးန်တီးဟိုယူဆနိိုင်ပါသည်။

စာရပူေးနင့်ဝါဒမြန်းခိရှိကလည်းလူဘာင်တွင်မြစ်ရန်အပြီးသူတိိုှံ့ရကကာင့်ပင်ဖြစ်လိုက်ရအာင်မြစ်ခဲ့သည်။ တစ်နည်းအာနည်းဟိုအရကကာင့်ရကကာင့်ပင်ဖြစ်လိုက်ရအာင်မြစ်ခဲ့သည်။
မသီတ|350

ဘာသာရေးကိုးကွယ်ယိုကကည်ြတူသူြာေးကကားတွင် ိုသိိုှံ့ရသာခ စ်ခင်စည်ေးလိုေးြတူသည်ဟူသည့််အရကကာင်ေးအာကိုယ ိုကကည်န်ခဲယဉ်ေးရကကာင်ေးြွင့််ရမပာခဲ့ကကသည်။ နိိုင်ငပိိုင်သတင်ေးစာြာေးတွင် ဗိုဒဓဘာသာယဉ်ရကျြုနင့််နီေးနွယ်သည့််ပွဲရတာ်သတင်ေးြာေး၊ အလအတန်ေးမပမခင်ေးြာေး၊ လှုပ် ာေးြှုြာေးကိိုသာရာ်မပရလ့် ပပပီေးသိုတတန်ြာေးဲြ ရကာက်နှုတ်ခက်ကိိုလည်ေးအြွင့််စာြက်နောတွင် ရာ်မပရလ့်သည်။ အမခာေးဘာသာရေးအဆိုေးအြြာေးကိိုြူရာ်မပရလ့် ြ ိရပ။ ိိုှံ့မပင်ပညာရေးစနစ်အာေးနည်ေးခက်ရကကာင့််အြာေးမပည်သူကနိိုင်ငတွင်ေး ိတိိုင်ေးင်ေးသာေး၊ နိိုင်ငသာေးနင့််လူးေး၊ ဘာသာတိိုှံ့ကိိုတိကရသခာသဲကွဲစွာနောေးလည်သရဘာရပါက်နိိုင်ြှုြ ိရပ။ ိိုှံ့ရကကာင့််ရိုပ်င်နင့်က ာတ်တိိုှံ့တွင် ဗြာစကားကိိုပီသရအာင်ြရမပာြဆိိုတတ်မခင်ေးသည်ပင်ရလာင်ရမပာင် ယ်ရြာစာအသွင်ရဆာင်ခဲ့်သည်။ ြကကာရသေးြီကာလကတရိုတ်ြရလေးကိိုခစ်တယ်ဟိုအြည်ရသာရိုပ်င်ကာတ်တိိုှံ့တွင် ာတ်ရိုပ်ြာေးမြင့်သာရ ေးသာေးရိိုက်ကူးရလ့် ိကကသည်ဟိုရဝြန်ြှုြိ ေးရပေါ်ွက်ခဲ့သည်။ အလာေးတူပင်ဆိိ ယ်လစ်ရခတ်တစ်ချင်းတွင် ရိုပ်င်ြာေးတွင် လူဆိိေးြာေးက ြ်ေးတိိုင်ေးင်ေးသာေးလူးေးဝတ်ဆင်ရလ့် ိသည့်် ြ်ေးရဘာင်ေးဘီကိိုအဝတ်ြာေးကကသမြင့်် ြ်ေးတိိုှံ့ကသူတိိုှံ့အာေးလူဆိိေးအမြစ်လူးေးမြင်ရအာင်လိုပ်ခသည်ဟိုခစာေးရကကာင်ေးရာက်မပြှုြ ိသကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ကင်ဆိိုလျှင်အိြ်ရာ်ြရလေး ာတ်ရိုပ်ြာေးမြင့်သာရ ေးသာေးရိိုက်ကူးရလ့် ိကကသည်ဟိုရဝြန်ြှုြိ ေးရပေါ်ွက်ခဲ့သည်။
မသီတက်တွင် စာရပစိစစ်ရေးက ိုသိို့ရသာ အရကကာင်းအား ားကိုရသားနိိုင်းစာရေးသူးအား သတင်းစာရဆာင်းပါးးားအမြစ်ရေးသာန် ရတာင်းရစခိိုင်းခဲ့်သည်သာအားနိိုင်င်း ားမခင်းကို သာနစာတ်သူး ားကိုရသားမိပ်း၊ သိ ိနိိုင်ခဲ့ကကားအဆိုပါ ရဆာင်းပါအရကကာင်းအခက်းားသည်ပိုဂ္လိကီဒီယာတွင်ရားမပမခင်းမြစ်သမြင့််အစိိုေးမြဒီယာက်ပိိုြိိုလက်ခနိိုင်းဟိုသာနေားလည်လက်ခခဲ့ကကသည်။ တစ်ပပိင်တည်းတွင်စာရပစိစစ်ရေးကာက်လူးသည်တစ်နိိုင်ငလိုး အတိိုင်းမြစ်ရပေါ်ရနရသာအရကကာင်းအားကိိုလိုရလာက်ရအာင်သိခွင့်ခဲ့ကကရပု့။ တစ်နည်းအားမြင့််နိိုင်ငအတွင်းည်သူးားက အရမခခရနိိုင်ခဲ့ကကသည်၊ ဌာရနတိိုင်းာင်းသားားားည်သူတိိုှံ့မြစ်ကာည်သည့််ရနိိုင်ကကသည်ဟူရသာအရကကာင်းအားကိိုအစိိုေးမြဒီယာကလိုရလာက်စွာြရြာ်မပဲခဲ့ဘဲအစိိုေးရိုေးစိိက်ပြိွဲကကီးားအရကကာင်းငင့််လူးားစိုဗြားားအရကကာင်းကိိုသာရားမပခဲ့်သည်။ ဝါဒမြနှံ့ခိရေးရဆာင်းပါးားတွင်အိြ်င် င - ဧည့်သည်သရဘာတားကိုအားရပေးည့်အရာအရခေါ်၊ အမြစ်အပ်က်းားကိိုရာင်းရပေးရားမပခဲ့်သည်။ သိိုှံ့မြင့််အားရးစိုလူးသည်အမခာေးပိုဂ္လိကီဒီယာနင့်မပည်ပြီဒီယာားား၊ သိိုင်းစာရပျဳးကိိုြတ်ရှုးခဲ့ပါကလူးားရကိုရေး၊ ဘာသာရေးနင့်ပတ်သက်ရသာခယူခက်းားလွန်စွာကဉ်းရမြာင်းသည့််အရနအားအရာရာက်လည်းခဲ့ကကသည်။
သီတာများ သာမန်းတို့၏ ကိုလိုများအောက်မှာ မြောက်ကြက်များများကို ချိန်းငြင်းပြူတိုးစွာ တိုးတက်ရေးကြည့်ရှုတွင်းဖော်ပြသည်။ သူသည် ကိုယ်တိုင် ချင်းစားပြုလုပ်ရေးကြည့်ရှုတွင်အခြေခံပါဝင်သည်။ သူသည် ကိုယ်တိုင် အားလုံးနှင့် တိုးတက်ရေးကြည့်ရှုတွင်ပြုလုပ်ရေးကြည့်ရှုတွင်အခြေခံပါဝင်သည်။ သူသည် ကိုယ်တိုင် ဝါဒများအောက်တွင်ရှိသည်။ သူသည် ကိုယ်တိုင် အားလုံးနှင့် တိုးတက်ရေးကြည့်ရှုတွင်ပြုလုပ်ရေးကြည့်ရှုတွင်အခြေခံပါဝင်သည်။ သူသည် ကိုယ်တိုင် ဝါဒများအောက်တွင်ရှိသည်။ သူသည် ကိုယ်တိုင် အားလုံးနှင့် တိုးတက်ရေးကြည့်ရှုတွင်ပြုလုပ်ရေးကြည့်ရှုတွင်အခြေခံပါဝင်သည်။
မဟာစိုက်သူများကို တိုက်ခိုက်ရမည်။ အဖွဲ့ကြိုးဆဲ သင်ဟု အချက်အလက်များ ပြောပြပါသည်။ သင်သည် ရန်ကုန်တိုင်းဒေသကြီး မြန်မာ့အစိုးရန် များပြောပြပါသည်။ မြန်မာအစိုးရန် များပြောပြပါသည်။ မြန်မာအစိုးရန် များပြောပြပါသည်။

Myanmar ICT for Development Organization (MIDO) က ၂၀၁၈ ခုနှစ် လိုလျင်တွင် ပြုပြင်ခဲ့ရသည်။

1 BenNar News, 2018; Ellis-Petersen, et al., 2018; Ghoneim, 2019; Nyan Lynn Aung, 2018; Uddin, 2018.
မသီ တ|

သနည်းဟူရသာ ရြေးခွန်းအာေး ၂၀၁၆-၁၇ ခိုန စ် န စ်တာကာလအတွင်း ဘာသာရပ်ပေိပကခြားမြစ်ခဲ့ရသာ ပြိွားရဒသငါးရနာ လူရပါင်း၁၈၀ရကားအာေး ရြေးမြန်းကာ မပစိုးမခင်းမြစ်သည်။

ယင်းစာအိုပ်တွင် ရြာ်မပြေးရသာ နှုတ်ရမပြိုင်းြားအမြှုသည် အန်တကယ်အခိိုင်အာတည်ခဲ့်ရကကာင်းလည်းင်းြားသည်။ ယင်းစာအိုပ်တွင် ပါရသာ သူတိိုးမျိုး၏ရမပြေးကကာ က်ားခင်စွာရနိုင်ခဲ့ကကပိုအာေးကိို ြတ်ရှုနိိုင်သည်။

ယင်းစာအိုပ်တွင် ယခင်ကာလြားကဘာသာြတူရသာလူကကာင်းတွင်အခင်းခင်းနေားလည်ခစ်ခင်စွာရနိုင်ခဲ့ကကပိုအာေးကိို ြတ်ရှုနိိုင်သည်။

ယင်းစာအိုပ်တွင် ယခင်ကာလြားကဘာသာြတူရသာလူကကာင်းတွင်အခင်းခင်းနေားလည်ခစ်ခင်စွာရနိုင်ခဲ့ကကပိုအာေးကိို ြတ်ရှုနိိုင်သည်။
မသီ တွင်ရကကာင်း၊ စာက်နော ၈၇၊ ၁၀၂တွင်လည်းယဉ်ရက်းျုဆိိုင်ာပွဲလွ်းသက်ပုူးတွင် ဘာသာလူးခွဲမချဘဲည်သိိုးရပ်င်ခစ်ခင်စွာစိုရပါင်းဆင်နွှဲခဲ့ကကရကကာင်း၊ စာက်နော ၁၁၅တွင်အစစလားဘာသာဝင်အိြ်ရမခအလွန်နည်းရသာပ်ကွက်လွ်းရလေးတွင်ရွေးျွားလာခဲ့သူကသူ့ကိုယ်သူ ဗိုဒြာစ်ဝင်းာေးကရွေးျွားလာခဲ့သူဟိုင်းရလာက်ရအာင် ဗိုဒြာဘာသာပတ်ဝန်းကူညီင်ကသူ့အရပ်းအလွန်ရကာင်းျွန်စွာရစာင့််ရ ာက်ရွေတတာာေးရပါင်းကကရကကာင်း၊ စာက်နော ၁၁၉နင်း ၁၄၈တွင်၂၀ဝ၇ခိုနစ်စက်တင်ဘာရဝါရာင်ရန်ရေးကာလအတွင်းရွေတတာပိိုးဆိုရတာင်းခီတက်လာကကရသာ ဗိုဒြာဘာသာဘိုန်းကကီးာေးအာေးဝိုင်းဝန်းကူညီအာေးရပေးကကာတွင်အစစလားဘာသာဝင်းာေးတွင်ပင် ိယိိုက်းလင်းာေးကဆွန်နီဗလီရပ်မိ ၃သန်းဘူးျာေးကိိုကရည်းရဆာင်ရပေးသည်အလူး ိုးဘာသားခွဲဘဲစည်းလိုးညီညွတ်ခဲ့ကကရကကာင်းတိိုးကိိုရွေးမပျံသည်။

ယင်းစာအိုပ်စာက်နော ၆၁တွင် ၁၉၉၀ရနောက်ပိိုင်းဗိိုလ်ခ်ခင်ညွနှံ့်လက်၁၉၉၆ခိုနစ်တွင်ရကာင်းသားျာေးကဆန်းကင်ဆနဒမပြှုမပိုးချန်တွင်နယ်ပြိွဲ့တစ်ပြိွဲ့ျာေးကိရာအရ ျန်တီးယူရကကာင်းရတာင်ရပါပြိွဲ့တစ်ပြိွဲ့ျာေးကိစစ်ာနိိုင်ငရာလည်းကာ စာက်နော ၂၀၄တွင်ရမြလတွဲ့တစ်ပြိွဲ့ျာေးအစစလားဘာသာဝင်တစ်ဦးနင်း ဗိုဒြာဘာသာဝင်တစ်ဦးတိိုးအသတ်ခသည့်ကိစစ်ာနိိုင်ငရ ေးလည်းကာကွက်ဟိုသိရကကာင်းရမပာမပူက်ကိိုရွေးမပျံသည်။ စာက်နော ၂၀၁၄တွင်အစစလားဘာသာဝင်တစ်ဦးနင်း ၂၀၁၄ခိုနစ်နတရလေးတွင်အစစလားဘာသာဝင်တစ်ဦးနင်း ဗိုဒြာဘာသာဝင်တစ်ဦးအသတ်ခသည့်ကိစစ်ာနိိုင်ငရာလည်းကာ မှတ်ရသည်။
မသီ တအများအားဖြင့် လူဦးရေအများသော အတိုက်အလှုများအပေါ် တောင်းပွဲကို လက်တွေ့သော ရက်ချက်ချင်သည် ကြိုးမပွဲပွဲကို နှင့် မပင်ဆင်ချင်သည်။ (စာကြည့်နောင် ၁၃၄ နှင့် ၁၄၃ တွင်လည်း ၁၉၉၇ ခုနှစ်က ဗိyteြိုနိဘိုက်လုံး၏ ဝိယူတားကို ရွေးချယ်ဦးတွင်မြင့်ပွဲခဲ့ပြီး (ယင်းတွင်ဗိyteြိုက်ရတားကို ရွေးချယ်ဦးခဲ့ရာမှ) ယင်း၏ရန်ဦးဆက်တွဲအများအနည်းဆုံးအနောက်ဦးလျှော့ခဲ့ပြီး မြစ်ပွဲထွက်ခဲ့ပြီး (ယင်းတွင်ဗိyteြိုက်ရတားကို တိုက်ခိုက်) က်ဦးခဲ့ရကကာင်ဦး၊ ဗိyteြိုင်ခဲ့ကကရကကာင်ဦး၊ စာကြည့်နောင် ၁၆၈တွင် ဟိန်းဘာသာဝင်နောင်အစစလာဦးလာဦးအကကာဦး ြည်သိိုးသူငယ်ခင်ဦးအများက် စိတ်တူကိိုယ်တူ (soul mate) အများ လိုက်ရှိလိုသို့ အခါဦးများပေး န်ဦးဆိုသည်။ သင်ဦးမပျက်သည်။ စာကြည့်နောင် ၈၈တွင် ပ်ကွက်ဦးတွင် ဗိyteြိုဒေသာဝင်ဆိိုသူအကကာဦးဦးကိုလာဦးကို ပ်ကွက်တွင်ဦးကိုလာပာဦးကို အစစလာဦးဘာသာဝင်လူငယ်ဦးကိုအန်တိုခိုခက်ကာ အစစလာဦးဘာသာဝင်လူကကာဦးတစ်ဦးက င်ဦးမပြုသည်။ စာကြည့်နောင် ၇၀တွင် ပ်ကွက်ဦးတွင် ဗိyteြိုဒေသာဝင်အာဦး မြစ်ပွဲစတွင်မပျက်ဦးသရလာက်ထားသည်နှင့် ဗိyteြိုဒေသာဝင်အာဦးကကာဦးတစ်ဦးက င်ဦးမပြုသည်။
မသီ တပ်ြရတာ်ြ ာ ူေးကကီေးသူြ ာေးက ဘာသာရ ေး ခွဲမခာေးြှု ကိိုရိိုက်သွင်ေးသမြင့်် ရဒသခ လူငယ်ရလေးြ ာေးကကာေးလူြှုရ ေးသဟ ာတ ိြှုသည် ယခင်ရခတ်ြ ာေးရလာက် အာေးြရကာင်ေးရတာ့်ဘဲ ရလာ ဲလာရကကာင်ေးအစစလာြ် ဘာသာဝင်တစ်ဦေးက ရမပာမပသည်။ စာြ က်န ော ၁၃၃တွင်လည်ေး ၂၀၁၂ ခိုန စ်ရနောက်ပိိုင်ေးမြစ်ခဲ့်သည့်် တင်ေးြာြှုရကကာင့််မြစ်သမြင့်် ၂၀၁၇ ခိုန စ်သိိုှံ့ ရ ာက်ရသာအခါနဂိိုြူလအရမခအရနသိိုှံ့မပန် ရ ာက်ရနပပီမြစ်ရကကာင်ေး၊ စာြ က်နော ၂၀၃တွင် အစစလာြ်ဘာသာဝင်တစ်ဦေးက သူတိိုှံ့အခ င်ေးခ င်ေးကိို ြိတ်ဆိတ်ာေး၊ ရခါင်ေးပြီေးခခ ရနကကသမြင့်် လက်ည ိိုေးအမပစ်ရမပာခ မခင်ေးဟိုယူဆကာ အခ င်ေးခ င်ေးကိို ပငိ မငင်ခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်ေး ြိတထီလာအရ ေးအခင်ေးအပပီေးတွင်ြူ ိိုအရကကာင်ေးအပေါ် က် ွ ွဲ့အာေးငယ်စိတ်ြ ာေး ြမြစ်ရတာ့်ရကကာင့်် ပေိပကခမြစ်ခဲ့်မခင်ေး ြဟိုတ်ရကကာင်ေးရကာင့််မြစ်သမြင့််အစစလာြ် ဘာသာဝင်တစ်ဦေးက သူတိိုှံ့အခ င်ေးခ င်ေးကိို ပငိ မငင်ခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်ေး ြိတထီလာအရ ေးအခင်ေး
မသီ တ 358 ဘဲလူြ ေး ဘာသာ တူ ခင်ေးသာ ပိိုြိိုကူေးလူေး ဆက်ဆ လာကကရကကာင်ေး တိိုှံ့ြ ာ င် ာေးသည်။

ရြေ ိုင ပည နယ အခရ်း နှင လူမျ ်းခရ်း ြေွ ြော်းမှု / လူမျ ်းခရ်း ပဋ ပကခလံှုှုံ့ခ ာ မှုမျာ်း ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်တွင် ရနရသာ လူူ့အြွဲွဲ့အစည်ေး၏ သဟ ာတြမြစ်ြှုသည် ခိိုင်လူြ ိ ေး ဗိုဒဓဘာသာဝင်ြ ာေးန င့်် ရိိုဟင်ဂ ာ လူြ ိ ေး အစစလာြ်ဘာသာဝင်ြ ာေးအကကာေး မြစ်ပွါေးရသာ မပဿနောဟိုဆိို ြည့်် အရနအ ာေး က် ပိိုြိိုရှုပ်ရ ွေးသည်။

စင်စစ် သြိိုင်ေးကိို မပန်ကကည့််လျှင် ခိိုင်သည် ြတူကွဲမပာေးြှု ာေးကိို အရတာ်ကကီေး လက်သင့််ခ နိိုင်ရသာရဒသ မြစ်ခဲ့်ရကကာင့်် ရတွွဲ့ ာလည်ေးမြစ်သည်။

ရဒါက်တာသန်ှံ့မြင့််ဦေး ရ ေးသာေးရသာ ရခတ်သစ် မြန်ြာမပည် အာေး ြန်တီေးပ ိုရြာ်မခင်ေး စာအိုပ် စာြ က်န ော ၁၃၈ တွင် ' ခိိုင်ရဒသ ာစိုန စ်န င့််ခ ီ၍ အမပည်မပည်ဆိိုင် ာ ကိုန်သွယ်ြှုရကကာင့်် စီေးပွါေးြွ ွဲ့ပြိ ေး တိိုေးတက် ခဲ့် ာရန ာလည်ေးမြစ်သည်။ အာ တိိုက်ြကကီေးန င့်် အမခာေး ရန ာြ ာေးြ လူအြ ိ ေးြ ိ ေးန င့်် အရတွေးအရခေါ်၊ အယူအဆ အရ ွရ ွ ကိို အလိိုက်သင့်် လက်ခ နည်ေးယူခဲ့် ာလည်ေး မြစ်သည်။ တိိုေးတက်ြွ ွဲ့ပြိ ေး စည်ပင်ရနရသာ ယဉ်ရက ေးြှုရခတ် သစ် မြန်ြာ့်သြိိုင်ေးတရလျှာက် လူြ ိ ေးစ ို ဘာသာစ ို ပါဝင်ရသာ နန်ေးတွင်ေးအိုပ်ခ ပ်ရ ေးြ ိ ေး   ိသည့််ရန ာမြစ်သည်' ဟို ဆိို ာေးသည်။
စိတ်ဝင်စားယူခဲ့သူဦးလာခဏာအတွင်းရဲ့ပါသည်။

တစ်နှစ်စာက်နောက် ၁၃၉-၁၄၁ အတွင်းရဲ့အင်္ဂလိပ်ဘိုင်က ခိုင်ကို ထောက် ဦးစီးကာ ခိုင်သို့မပန်လည်ရာက်ပျံ့သည်။

ဘက်ဘဂဂါလီမပည်နယ် ပြိွဲ့ရောဂါပြိွဲ့ ိရာက်ရအာင် ွက်ရမပေးပေးရောဂါ ၁၄၃၀ တွင်ြ မပည်နယ်အာဂန်လူစွန့်စားမှု မပေးသည် တပ်ကကီးကို ဦးစီးကာ ခိုင်သို့မပန်လည်ရာက်ပျံ့သည်။

ရမြာက်ဦးပြိွဲ့ သစ်ကိုတည်ခဲ့ပေး နတ်ွာစသွားခဲ့ရကကာင်း၊ ရမြာက်ဦး၌ရန်ြာင်သူဦးသည် ခိုင်၊ ဘဂဂါလီ၊ အာဂန်၊မြန်ာဒတ်ခူပေါ်တူဂီ၊ အဘီဆီးနွယန်း၊ပါင်းနောင်အဒီ ၁၄၀၄ တွင်ြအင်္ဂလိပ်ဘိုင်က ခိုင်ကို ထောက် ဦးစီးကာ ခိုင်သို့မပန်လည်ရာက်ပျံ့သည်။

အစစလာေဘာသာနေ အစစလာေပါဠိဘာသာနေ ပါဠိဘာသာနေပါ ဘွဲ့အာေညီ တပ်ကကီးရကကာင်း၊ ဆိပ်ကြ်ာပြိွဲ့မြစ်ခဲ့ရကကာင်း၊ ရမြာက်ဦး၌ရန်ြာင်သူဦးသည် ခိုင်၊ ဘဂဂါလီနေ ခိုင်အနိုစာရပယဉ်ရကကာင်း၊ဆိပ်ကြ်ာပြိွဲ့မြစ်ခဲ့ရကကာင်း၊ မြန်ာဒတ်ခူရပေါ်တူဂီရပေါ်တူဂီအမြစ် အိုပ်ခြမ်းပိ့်ရေးကို တီးန်တီးခဲ့ရကကာင်း၊

သို့မပေးနိိုင်ခဲ့ ရကကာင်း၊ ို့ြအံ့ရန်ြာင်သူဦးလာခဏာအတွင်းရဲ့ကာယင်းတိို့အာေညီ ကာယင်းတိို့အာေညီ င်ခိုင်သည် ဗြာနုင်ငတွင်လူနည်းစိုမြစ်ခဲ့သကဲ့သိို့ ဧည့်သည်မြစ်ရသာအမခာေးလူိုက်းမပည်နယ်တိို့

သို့မပေးမပေးနိိုင်ခဲ့ ရကကာင်း၊ အစိုလိိုက်အခပ်လိိုက်ဝင်ရာက်လာရကကာင်းတိို့ကိုရြာ်မပေးသည်။

သို့မပေးသို့မပေးနိိုင်ခဲ့ ရကကာင်းအခိုင်တိို့တွင် ဗြာေး၏သိြ်းပိိုက်းအစမပေးကာယင်းတိို့အာေညီ င်ခိုင်သည် ဗြာနိိုင်ငတွင်လူနည်းစိုမြစ်ခဲ့သကဲ့သိို့ ဧည့်သည်မြစ်ရသာအမခာေးလူိုက်မပည်နယ်တိို့
မသီတ 360ယူဆနိိုင်သည်။ တစ်ြန်ခိိုင်လူြ ိ ေးြ ာေးကယင်ေးတိိုှံ့၏ နိိုင်င ရတာ်ကိို တိိုက်ခိိုက်သိြ်ေးယူခဲ့်သည့်် အတိတ်ကိို ြရက နပ်မြစ်ရနကက ဆဲမြစ်သမြင့််ကိိုလိိုနီရခတ်ကတည်ေးကပင် ဗြာလူြ ိ ေးြ ာေးအရပေါ် ြရက နပ်ြှုကိို မပသသည့််အရနမြင့််ပူေးရပါင်ေးရဆာင် ွက်ြှုကိိုလိိုလိိုလာေးလာေးြ ိခဲ့်ကကပါ။ ပင်လိုစာခပ်တွင် လက်တ်ရေးိိုေးသည့််လူြ ိ ေးစိုတွင်လည်ေး ခိိုင်တိိုှံ့ ပါဝင်ခဲ့်ကကပါ။ ပင်လိုစာခပ်တွင် လက်နက်ကိိုင်ရတာခိို ာတွင် ခိိုင်တိိုှံ့ ပါဝင်ခဲ့်ပပီေးအမခာေးလူြ ိ ေးစိုြ ာေးက ြက်ဒယ်မပည်ရာင်စိုဟိုရမပာဆိိုရနခ ိန်တွင် ခိိုင်သည် ဗြာ/မြန်ြာနိိုင်င ြ လွတ်လပ်ရ ေး ယူနိိုင်ရ ေးဟူရသာအသိုေးအနှုန်ေးကိိုသာပိိုသရဘာက သိုေးစွဲခဲ့်ကက၊ သိုေးစွဲရနကကဆဲမြစ်သည်။ ြကကာရသေးြီက ခိိုင့််တပ်ရတာ်က တပ်ြ ခဲ့ကလည်ေး ကွန်ြက်ဒရေး င်ေးသရဘာကိိုသာလိိုခင်ရကကာင်ေး ိုတ်ရြာ်ရမပာဆိိုခဲ့်သည်။

မသီတ 361 ခိိုင်တန်းတူညီးရခါင်းစဉ်ရအာက်တွင် ခိိုင်းာေး၏ ရိုန်းကန်းမပင်း န်သကဲ့်သိိုးအမခားရသာတိိုင်းင်းသားလူး ျာေးစိုအရမခခရသာရဆွေးရနွေးခွင့်ရာြ ာေးရပါက်လာခဲ့် အခ ွဲ့ရသာလူနည်းစိုအတွက် လူးျာေးအြတ်လကခဏာတစ်ခိုခိုသည် ြမြစ်ြရနိိုအပ်ခက်ရာ ရဆာင်လာသည်။ ကိိုလိိုနီရခတ်တွင် စစ်တရကာင်းသာေးြာေးအမြစ်သာြတ်လကခဏာ ိခဲ့် ာြာေးြဟင် ဂာအမြစ်အသိအတ်မပခလိိုမခင်ေးသည် ယင်းအခက်နင့်ပါဆက်စပ်ရနနိိုင်သည်။

စက်တင်ဘာလနင့််ရအာက်တိိုဘာလတိိုှံ့တွင် ဆိိုယ်ြီဒီယာမြစ်ရသာရြ့်စ်ဘွခ်ကမြန်ြာ့်တပ်ြရတာ်ကာ ကွယ်ရေးဦးစီးခ်ဏေးအရကာင့််အပါအဝင် အရကာင့််ရပါင်ေး၂၈ (၁၈+၁၀) ခိုင့််ရပ့်ခ် ၆၅ (၅၂+၁၃) ခိုကိိုပိတ်ပင်တာေးမြစ်က်သိြ်ေးပစ်လိိုက်ရကကာင်ေး၊ အရကကာင်ေးင်းြာ ယင်းတိိုှံ့သည် ရိိုဟင်ဂ ာနင့််ြူဆလင်ြာေးကိို ဦးတည်တိိုက်ခိိုက်ပပီေးလူးျာေးရ ေး ဘာသာရေးအခွဲမခာေးြှုမြစ်ရစန်ဝါဒမြန့်ခိြှု ြာေးမပလိိုက်ရံ့သည့််မြန်ြာ့်တပ်ြရတာ်၏ ဝါဒမြန့်ခိရေးပလက်ရာင်ေးအမြစ်ရြ့်စ်ဘွခ်ကိိုသ ိုေးစွဲရနသည်ဟိုယူဆသမြင့်ယခိုကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ပိတ်လိိုက်ရကကာင်ေးတိိုှံ့ကိိုတိိုင်ေးြ်ြဂ္င်ေးနင့််နယူေးရယာက်တိိုင်ေးသတင်ေးစာတိိုှံ့၌ ရြာ်မပခဲ့်ပါသည်။ ယင်းအရကာင့််ြ ာေးနင့်ရပ့်ခ်ြာေးကိို ခ ိတ်ဆက်သိုေးစွဲသူအရကာင့််ရပါင်ေးက ၁၃.၃၅ (၁၂+၁.၃၅)သန်းသည်ဟိုပါသည်။ ိိုှံ့မပင် ဝါဒမြန့်ခိရေး၏အဓိကညွယ်ခက်ြာ မြန်ြာ့်လူးအတွင်ေးလူးျာေးရ ေး၊ ဘာသာရေးအြတည်ပငိြ်ရလသူတိိုှံ့ဘဝလိိုခခ ြှုအတွက်တပ်ြရတာ်ကိိုအာေးကိိုေးလာရလမြစ်န် ွယ်ကာရနမပည်ရတာ်တပ်ြရတာ်အရမခစိိုက် ာရတာင်ကိုန်ေးတွင် ဝန်ြ်ေးဦးဝ ၇၀ဝြျှမြင့််ရနှံ့ညအဆိိုင်ေးြာေးခွဲကာ
မသီတ 362

ိိုဝါဒမြန်းခိရ ေးရြ့စ်ဘွခ်ပိိုးစ်ဘွခ်ပိိုးစ်ြာေး၊ သတင်ေးရပ့်ခ်ြာေးကိိုြန်တီေးမခင်ေး၊ င်ေးစွဲပင်သတင်ေးြီဒီယာဌာနြာေး၏ရပ့်ခ်ြာေးတွင် အာေးလူရတွရဝ၊ ရဒါသွက်ရစြည့််ရကာြန်ှံ့ြာေးကိိုအစိုလိိုက်အခပ်လိိုက်ရ ေးသာေးမြန်းရဝမခင်ေးြာေးကိိုရဆာင်ွက်မခင်ေးမြစ်ရကကာင်ေးသိသည်။ ိိုရတွဲ့ ိခက်သည် လွန်စွာရေးကကီေးပပီေးတန်ြိိုေးသည််ရတွဲ့ ိခက်မြစ်သကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ ခိိုင်အရေးရနောက်ကွယ်ြအခက်အခွဲ့ကိိုလည်ေးရြာ်တ်နိိုင်ခဲ့သည်ဟိုဆိိုြည်မြစ်သည်။ စင်စစ်အဆိိုပါ ရြာ်တ်ရတွဲ့ ိခက်ကိို နယူေးရယာက်တိိုင်ေးြ်တွင်ရြာ်မပပပီေးက်ပိိုင်ေးအတွင်ေး န်ကိုန်ပြိွဲ့ရတာ်ခန်ေးြရ ွဲ့တွင်လူခနက် ခီကာခီတက်ပပီေးကာကွယ်ရေးဦေးစီေးခ်ပ်ကိို ရာက်ခရကကာင်ေးနင့်မပည်တွင်ေးရ ေးကိိုစွက်ြက်သည့်် ရြ့စ်ဘွခ်ကိိုရ �ုွဲ့ခရကကာင်ေးဆနဒမပပွဲကင်ေးပခဲ့သည်။ ိိုှံ့မပင် အာေးလူရတွဲ့ ိခက်ရ ာက်ဘိုန်ကကီေးတစ်ပါေးကလည်ေးမပည်ပကသည့််က်ြိအာေးရပေးလာလျှင်ရသနတ်ကိိုင်ြည်ဟိုဆိိုလိိုက်သည်။ ိိုသိိုှံ့စီတန်ေးလည့်လည်ရသာဆနဒမပြှုြာေးအတွက်မပည်ဲရေးဝန်ကကီေးဌာနလက်ရအာက် ိအရွရွအိုပ်ခ ပ်ရေးဌာနြာေးတွင်ခွင့််မပခက်ရတာင်ေးခ သည်။ လွန်ခဲ့်ရသာရမခာက်လခန်ှံ့ကအပ်ြက်လူူ့အြွဲွဲ့အစည်ေး ြာေး လူူ့ပိိုင်ခွင့််အရေး တက်ကကွ သူာေးသည် မပည်တွင်ေးပငိြ်ေးခ ြ်ေးရေးအတွက်ပြိွဲ့ရတာ်ခန်ေးြရ ွဲ့တွင်စီတန်ေးလည့်လည်န်ခွင့််မပခက် ယူာတွင်ြူခွင့််ြမပခဲ့သည့််အမပင်ြိအာေးသိုေးလူစိုခွဲကာြြ်ေးဆီေးအရ ေးယူြှုြာေးမပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ မပည် ဲရေးဝန်ကကီေးဌာနသည်ကာကွယ်ရေးဦေးစီေးခ်၏တိိုက်ရိိုက်ကွပ်ကဲြန်ေးခ်ပ်ြှုရအာက်တွင် ိပပီေးအ ပ်သာေးအစိိုေးဟဲခ်ပ်ကိို ဦေးတည်တိိုက်ခိိုက်န်ည် ွယ်သည်ဟိုမပည်တွင်ေးရနလူိုက 

မပည် ဲရေးဝန်ကကီေးဌာနသည်တုတိိုက်ရိိုက်များသိန်ေးထိပ်စီးနစ်ကာကွယ်ရေးဦေးစီေးခ်အကွာင်းတွင် ိိုှံ့ရကကာင့်ယင်ေးကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ရသာဝါဒမြန်းခိရ ေးြာမပည်တွင်ေး ိအာေးလူရတွဲ့ ိခက်ရ စီအြွဲွဲ့ခ်ပ်ကိို ဦေးတည်တိိုက်ခိိုက်န်ည် ွယ်သည်ဟိုမပည်တွင်ေးရနလူစိုခွဲကာြြ်ေးဆီေးအရ ေးယူြှုြာေးမပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။
မသီ တရကာင်းစွာ နောေးလည်သရဘာရပါက်ကကရသား မပည်ပအမြင် တွင်ြူ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာဝင်ြ ာေးက ြူဆလင်ြ ာေးအရပေါ် ြိန ိပ်ခွဲမခာေးသည်၊ အကကြ်ေးကန် က်အနိုင်ယူ န်အာေး ိုတ်၊ အာေးရပေးသည်ဟူရသာ ပ ို ိပ်သာမြစ်ရစခဲ့သည်။

သည်မြစ်စဉ်မြစ်ပ်ြာေးကိိုကကည့်လျှင် ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်တွင်ေးမြစ်ရနသည်ြ ာေး ာရဒသခလူ့အြွဲြဲ့အစည်ေးအတွင်ေးကိိုလိိုနီရခတ် ြတိိုင်၊ ကိိုလိိုနီရခတ်တွင်ေးနင့်ကိိုလိိုနီရခတ်လွနကာလကတည်ေးကမြစ်ရနခဲ့ရသာတင်ေးြာြှု ာေးက်၂၀၀၈ ခိုနစ် ြွဲြစည်ေးပိုအရမခခ ဥပရဒအတည်မပပပမေးရနောက်ပိိုင်ေး၊ အရေးသမြင့်၂၀၁၂ ခိုနစ်ဧပပီလတွင်လစ်လပ်သျှကကာေးမြတ်ရွေးရကာက်ပွဲဆနဒနယ်ြာေးတွင်အ ြ ိ ေးသာေးဒီြိုကရစီအြွဲြခပ်ကအနိုင်ခဲ့ပပပမေးရနောက်ပိိုင်ေးတွင်မြစ်ရပေါ်လာရသာအ ာြ ာေးဟိုင် ပပါသည်။

ိိုှံ့ရကကာင့်၂၀၁၂ခိုနစ်ရနောက်ပိိုင်ေးမြစ်ရပေါ်ခဲ့်သျှခိိုင်မပည်နယ်၏အရ ေးြ ာေးသည် လူြှုရေး ဘာသာရေး ဆိိုင်ာပေိပကခြာေးသက်သက်ဟို ဆိိုန်လွနစွာခဲယဉ်ေးြည်မြစ်ပါသည်။ ၂၀၁၂ခိုနစ် ူလိိုင်လတွင်အစိိုေး ၏ စာရပစိစစ်ရေးပ်ဆိိုင်ေးခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်ေးလွတ်လပ်စွာ ရေးသာေးိုတ်ရြာ်ရမပာဆိိုခွင့််အရမခအရနြာြူ ြ ာေးစွာတိိုေးတက်လာမခင်ေးြ ိရသေးဟို ဆိိုနိိုင်ပါသည်။ သတင်ေးအခက်အလက်ပိိုင်ခွင့််ဆိိုင်ာ�ပရဒဟူ၍လည်ေး ြ ိရသေးသမြင့်လူိợအရနနင့်သိလိိုရသာအခက်အလက်ြ ာေးကိိုလွတ်လပ်စွာ ယူပိိုင်ခွင့်် ြ ိရသေးရပ။

သတင်ေးြီဒီယာလွတ်လပ်ခွင့််သည်လည်ေးအခက်အခဲြ ာေးစွာိရနရသေးပပပမေး သတင်ေးသြာေးြ ာေးကိိုေးဆီေးခပ်ရန်တ ာေးစွဲဆိို ြ �ုြာေးလည်ေး ိရနဆဲမြစ်သည်။ ိိုှံ့မပင် အြ ာေးလူသည် အမပည်မပည်ဆိိုင်ာလူူ့ပိိုင်ခွင့််ြ ာေးအရကကာင်ေးကိိုရသခ ာဂန်သိရသေးသမြင့်လွတ်လပ်စွာကိိုေးကွယ်ယိုကကည်ခွင့််နင့်လွတ်လပ်စွာရ ေးသာေးိုတ်ရြာ်
မသီတ ရမပာဆိိုခွင့်် ာေးက်အစဉ်အဆက်ကာေးနောသိေးခွင့််ရသာဝါဒမြန်ှံ့ခိရေးအရကကာင်ေးအာြ ာေးကိိုသာအန်ဟိုနောေးလည်ရနကကဆဲမြစ်သည်။

ိိုှံ့ရကကာင့်လွတ်လပ်စွာကိိုေးကွယ်ယိုကကည်ခွင့််၊လွတ်လပ်စွာရေးသာေးိုတ်ရြာ်ရမပာဆိိုခွင့််အပါအဝင်အရမခခလူူ့ပိိုင်ခွင့်ြာေးကိိုအာြခရပေးသည့််အခင်ေးအင်းသာလူြိေးရေးဘာသာရေးအအာေးလိုေးအကင်းသည့််အရမခအရနကိုရာက် ိနိိုင်ြည်မြစ်ပါသည်။

References


Facebook ကို အရေးကြီး စီမံခန့်ခွဲခြင်းများအား ချွေတွေးကို အားလုံးချုပ် ကြည့်ခြင်း

Aiden Moe

ယခုနှစ် ၂၀၁၈ ခုနှစ်တွင် မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံတော်တွင် ကကြားရာ စီမံခန့်ခွဲခြင်းများ၏ အကျဉ်းစာတမ်းများ မပိုင်းချဲ့ရသည်။ Facebook ကို အားလုံးချုပ်မှုတွင် အကျဉ်းစာတမ်းများ မပိုင်းချဲ့သည်။

Bad Actor ဗုဒ္ဓဟူး Facebook ကို အားလုံးချုပ်မှု ချွေတွေးကို အလွန်မပိုင်းချဲ့သည်။ မြန်မာ စစ်တပ်နှင့် စစ်ရေးအား အက်ဒါရေး ပိုင်းချဲ့သည်။

Page အသုံးပြုခြင်းများ ဖြစ်သော ဖြစ်ရန်အတွက် အက်ဒါရေးများ ပိုင်းချဲ့သည်။
Abstract

This study reveals how well-connected networks spread false information and hate speech across social media to distort people's perceptions in Myanmar. It focuses on Facebook, the principal platform for internet users in Myanmar, where bad actors effectively spread hate speech and propaganda. The study discusses the background factors that enable these bad actors to spread false information and hate speech and Facebook's lack of competency to solve the problem. This study's critical contribution is detailing how the Myanmar military set up fake Facebook pages, sometimes based in foreign countries that are “friendly” to them, to spread this information and how these fake pages and comment campaigns coordinate and spread their messages.
မြန်မာနိာင်ငံတွင် Media Literacy ဟိုရခေါ်သည့်် ြီဒီယာသိနောေးလည်ြှုနိုက်နိုင်င်ေးတိိုှံ့၊ အာေးနည်ေးမခင်ေး၊ နိုက်နိုင်င်ေးတိိုှံ့ အသိုေးမပခဲ့သည့်် နည်ေးနောြာေးန င့်် မြစ် ပ်ြာေးအာေး ရလ့်လာမခင်ေးမြစ်သည်။ ယခိုရလ့်လာခက်သည် လူြှုကွန်က်ကိုအသိုေးမပခဲ့သည့်် သတင်ေးြာေးြာေးကိို စနစ်တကခိတ်ဆက်ရဆာင်ွက်ခဲ့သည့်် အြွဲွဲ့အစည်ေးြာေး၊ ၄င်ေးတိိုှံ့ အသိုေးမပခဲ့သည့်် နည်ေးနောြာေးန င့်် မြစ် ပ်ြာေးအာေး ရလ့်လာမခင်ေးမြစ်သည်။ ယခိုရလ့်လာခက်တွင် မြန်မာနိာင်င်ေးတိိုှံ့ အသွင်ကူေးရမပာင်ေးရ ေးကာလ၊ Facebook သည် မြန်မာနိာင်င်ေးတိိုှံ့ဆိို ယ်ြီဒီယာအရမခမပ ေးသာေးရေးအစွန်ေးရာက်လှုပ်ာေးြှုနိုင်င်ေးတိိုှံ့ အသိုေးမပခဲ့သည့်် နည်ေးနောြာေး၊ အွန်လိိုင်ေး အရမခမပစစ်ဝါဒမြန်အိမ်ရေးန င့််အင်တာနက်စစ်ဆင်ရေးတွင် အသိုေးမပခဲ့သည့််
သို့ရှိသည် တမ်းပေါ်တွင် Bad Actor နှင့် Bad Actor အကြား သို့မဟုတ် အမတ်တော်မှ သတင်းများပေးသည့် Facebook ကို မိုးပေးသော စာပိုင်း အတွက် အမှန်တကယ်အနံ့ပြေးသည် သို့မဟုတ် အမှန်တကယ်အနံ့ပြေးသည် Facebook မှ အားထောင်သော အချက်အချင်းများ အခြေခံ၍ ဖျင်လာချင်သည်။

“ထို့ဖြစ်သော Giant Internet ဖြင့် Facebook နှင့် Bad Actor အကြား ဝါဒများမှာ ကျန်သောမိုးပေးသည် bad actor အကြားရရှိသော စာသီးရန် Facebook ကို ပထမဆုံး သိထားသော အချက်အချင်းများအတွက် ကျက်စို့သည်” အစိုးရ မှဖြစ်သော အချက်အချင်းများအတွက်

“ကျန်သောမိုးပေးသည် အချက်အချင်းဖြစ်သော Bad Actor အနေဖြင့် အချက်အချင်းများဖြစ်သည်�့ပေးသည် အချက်အချင်းဖြစ်သည်း မိုးပေးသည်း” အစိုးရ မှဖြစ်သော အချက်အချင်းများအတွက်

သတင်းဗား ထားသည် အချိန်မှာ အရာများ ၂၂၇ခါ၊ ကိုရာများ ၁၀၅ခါနှင့် ရပြေးခဲ့သည်။

Secondary Data မှ ဗားအတွက် ဆို ယ်ဗီဒီယာတွင် သတင်းဗားအား မပန်လည်းမပေးရန် အခက်အလက်စစ်ရဆေးရပြေးသည်။

**Think Before You Trust**


**Fact Check Post**


**Real or Not?**

(https://www.facebook.com/realornot.mm/) page ကို ၂၈၊ စက်တင်ဘာ၊ ၂၀၁၉တွင် စတင်ရာင်ခဲ့သည်။

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3 သတင်းဗား-Think Before You Trust (https://www.facebook.com/ThinkBeforeYouTrust/) page ကို ၂၈၊ စက်တင်ဘာ၊ ၂၀၁၉တွင် စတင်ရာင်ခဲ့သည်။

4 သတင်းဗား-Real or Not? (https://www.facebook.com/realornot.mm/) page ကို ၂၈၊ စက်တင်ဘာ၊ ၂၀၁၉တွင် စတင်ရာင်ခဲ့သည်။
Petulla, 2013.
6 Rasmussen, 2019.
7 Mobile phone usage, 2018.
8 http://www.dop.gov.mm/en
Facebook သို့မဟုတ် ဗျူဟာစိတ်တွဲ အဖွဲ့အစည်း

၂၀၁၁ ခုနှစ်တွင်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏အင်တာနက်သို့မဟုတ် Facebook ကစားသူများအားလုံးက ကျန်စွဲပေးခဲ့သည်။ Facebook အသို့သို့ကြားရန်အရမ်းအားဖြင့် Facebook ကျန်စွဲသော်လည်းဆိုတာကို အရေသေးနေရာမှစ၍ မိုးရာတွင် Facebook အသို့ အဆိုပေးပေးခဲ့သည်။

၂၀၁၃ နှင့် ၂၀၁၄ ခုနှစ်တွင် Facebook သို့မဟုတ် လူများကို အရေသေးနေရာတွင်လည်းကောင်း၊ Facebook ကိုအသို့သို့ကြားရန်အရမ်းအားဖြင့် Facebook အသို့ အဆိုပေးပေးခဲ့သည်။

၂၀၁၆ ခုနှစ်တွင်မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင် Facebook သို့မဟုတ် Telenor Myanmar ၁၀ သန်းမြှုပ်နှံခဲ့သည်။

၂၀၁၉ ခုနှစ်တွင် Facebook Ads Manager ၂၁ သန်းမြှုပ်နှံခဲ့သည်။

Facebook သို့မဟုတ် ဗျူဟာစိတ်တွဲ အဖွဲ့အစည်းရပ်တွေ ၁၀ သန်းမြှုပ်နှံခဲ့ပြီး Telenor Myanmar ၂၀၁၆ ခုနှစ် ဒီဇင်ဘာ ၇ ကြားရန် ၁၁ သန်းမြှုပ်နှံခဲ့သည်။

Petulla, 2013.
Trautwein, 2016a.
https://www.facebook.com/adsmanager/creation
သန်းတိိုးပြေးခဲ့်သည်ကိုရတွဲ့သည်။ ၎င်းအရ အတွက် YouTube, Twitter, VK အတွက် Facebook အဖြင့် Giant Internet လာရေးသို့ တင်ပို့ရာတွင် နေရာစုန်ကာ နေရာများကြောင့် အားလုံးသောက်ားသောက်ကွန် က်ားမြန်နိုင်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အားလုံးစွဲသူအရ အတွက်က်မြပတ်အသတ် သာလွန်ရနသည်ကိုရတွဲ့သည်။

Facebook သည် Giant Internet မြစ်လာမခင်ေးသည် မြန်ြာနိုင်င ၏ လူြှုရေး၊ စီးပွာေးရေးနိုင်င်ငရေးမြစ်စဥ်ာေးအရပေါ်တွင်သက်ရာက်ြှုဆေးခဲ့ကာ သတင်ေးအခက်အလက်ြာေးလင်မြန်စွာစီးဆင်းမခင်ေးနင့်လူတိိုင်ေးြိြိဆန်ှံ့အမြင်ကိုလွတ်လပ်စွာိုတ်ရြာ်ခွင့််မခင်ေးကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ရသာအမပသရဘာရဆာင်သည့််သက်ရာက်ြှုြာေးလည်ေးမြန်ြာ့်လူအြွဲွဲ့အစည်ေးတွင်မြစ်ရပေါ်ခဲ့်သည်။

Figure 3: ဗျားသတင်းငွေးစကားမြန်ှံ့မြေးသည့််အြွဲွဲ့အစည်ေးြာေးအတွက်လက်နက်တစ်ခိုသြွယ်မြစ်လာခဲ့်ပပီေးလူအာေးကိိုရမပာင်ေးလဲနဝါဒမြန်ှံ့ခိမခင်ေး၊ အြိုန်ေးတာေးမြန်မြေးမခင်ေး၊ ပေိပကခကိိုလှုွဲ့ရဆာ်မခင်ေးနင့်ဆန်ှံ့ကင်ဘက်အမြင်သူြာေးအာေးတိိုက်ခိိုက်မခင်ေးတိိုှံ့အတွက်အသိုေးမပခဲ့ကကသည်။

13 Htaike Htaike Aung & Wai Myo Htut, 2019.
14 Facebook Ads Manager platform.
Figure 4: ကြားနေသောက်ပျော်ရွှင်မှုများ၌ Facebook ကျယ်ဝန်း ၉၄.၁၁% လိုနှံသည်။

15 Social Media Stats Myanmar, 2021.
Figure 5: Facebook user in Myanmar from 2016 to 2019

For the year 2016, see (Trautwein, 2016b), for 2017 (Kanale, 2017), 2018 (NapoleonCat Stats, 2018b) and 2019 (NapoleonCat Stats, 2019).
Aiden Moe

17 (3 dollars) वर्गीय सबसे अधिक कीमती अपूर्णता के प्रदर्शनकारियों का मूल्य बढ़ाने के लिए जोर दिया जाता है। जो जमीनी सबसे अधिक बढ़ाने के लिए आप 2013 से 2018 तक चालू रहे; कृपया जानें कि उन्होंने Facebook के उपयोगकर्ता अनुसार दिखाई दिए आपके प्रतिकृति प्रमाणित एक अनुमान के अनुसार चालू रहा।

J) User Generated Content

विषयक आधारित मार्गदर्शन में जारी और अंतर्गतिक घोषणायें सीधे blog पोस्टंि विभिन्न प्लेटफार्म पर अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गतिक अंतर्गति
သည် အဓိက သတင်းြတ်သည့် င်းမြစ်ရနာတစ်ခို မြစ်လာခဲ့သည်။

Digital Platform သို့ ပြောင်းလဲစေတာ့် Facebook အရှင်တာတစ်ခါ အချင်းအနှစ်ကို ပြောင်းလဲစေသည်။ သတင်းဌာနာေးသည် Facebook Live သို့ ပြောင်းလဲစေသည်။

Facebook သည်လည်း ၎င်းတို့၏ အဓိက သတင်းမြန်းရဝသည့် င်းမြစ်ရနာတစ်ခို မြစ်လာခဲ့ပါသည်။

ို့အမပင် Facebook Live တို့ကို သြားရိိုေးကိို သြားရိိုေးက ြီဒီယာြာေးက်အင်လူအရမြာက်အြာေး အလင်အမြန် ရပေးပိိုှံ့နိိုင်သည်။

အလားတူပင် နောြည်ရက်းသာေး၏ သတင်းးဌာနာေးကို Facebook အရမခမပတ်သွားသော သတင်းစာက်နောြာေးးအခိန်မပည့််တ်ရှုနိိုင်မခင်ေးကဲ့သိို့ရသာ အခက်အလက်းသည်လည်း Facebook ကို မြန်ြာမပည် ၎င်း၏ သိုေးစွဲသူးာေးအတွက် အဓိက သတင်းးဌာနာေးရှုးပလက်ရြါင်ေးတစ်ခိုအမြစ်အသွင် ရမပာင်ေးလဲရစခဲ့သည်။

4) အမှုးနှစ်ခါ Free Basic

Google Talk နှင်း ကအနိုးးနိုးစီးပါတာက်လည်း Facebook ကိုစီးန်းယုံး Viber ကို ရနောက်ရကာက်ခဲ့ပါသည်။

Facebook Messenger တွေ့ရှိနေသော် Facebook Messenger Video Call အတွက် အဓိက သတင်းဌာနာေးနေပြီး Facebook ကိုစီးန်းယုံးသို့သွားလာခဲ့သည်။

ကြည့်ရန် Facebook နှင်း ကြည့်ရန် ၎င်းတို့ကို လူကြည့်ရန် Facebook ကိုစီးန်းယုံးသို့သွားလာခဲ့သည်။

ကြည့်ရန် Facebook App, 2015.

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18 Castillo, 2017.
19 Kanale, 2018.
20 Facebook App, 2015.
တိုးစီးသော ဗုဒ္ဓသိပ္ပါးများ နောက်ဖြစ်ချက်မှာလည်း Free Basic အမှတ်တံကို ရွေးချယ်ခဲ့သည်။ Facebook မှာ အပြုသဘော၏ အဓိကအရမ်းစားချက်ကို ပေးထားပြီး မှတ်ရွေးချယ်ကြသည်။

21 Trautwein, 2016a.
Figure 6: အဖြင့်သော အချက်သတ္တိ

Figure 7: လူတွေကိုသော ဖါဝါသော အချက်သတ္တိ ပေးထားသော့ page တစ်ခို

Figure 8: လူတွေကိုသော ဖါဝါသော သောကြောင့် ဆိုနေသော့ page တစ်ခို
စ) နာရှင်တွင်းရေးအတွက် ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်ခံချိန် စီမံခန့်ခွဲခြင်း:

ဝန်ကြီးချုပ်မှ ဦးစွဲချက်များအားလုံးကို အထူးသတင်းများအားလုံးကို သတင်းပေးသောစီမံခန့်ခွဲခြင်းအားလုံးကို Facebook မှာ အချင်းအစိတ်ပြီးစီးပွားစွာပေးသည်ကို ၎င်းအားလုံးကို အချင်းအစိတ်အားလုံးကို ပြေးပေးရမည်။ Facebook ကိုလည်း လူအားသို့ မှတ်သားစေသောအစီအစဉ်ကို တစ်ခိုမျိုးကို လူအားလုံးကို ထိုင်သောအခါလည်း အသိပေးရမည်။ Facebook အရာဝတ္ထုမှာ သို့ရာတွင် သို့မဟုတ် Live လွှင့်လာမှုကိုအနေဖြင့် လူအားလုံးကို ထိုင်သောအခါလည်း အသိပေးရမည်။
Figure 9: အဲ့အောက်ဦး အောက်ဦး ဗီယာလိုအောင် ပြသချက်တစ်ခုဖြစ်သည်။
Figure 10: မိဘနော့မ်ားသော ပွဲနဲ့ ပေးဆောင်သောအချက်အလက်များ သဘောတူ

[Figure 10: Image of a group page with Burmese text]

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Figure 11: ရဒသအလိုက် သတင်းနင််း ရာင်ဝယ်ရေးဆိုင်းဂရိုြး

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1. အိမ်ချောင်း အလိုက် စီရင်ခံစာ (၁၅၀၀၀ ဦး)
   15K members · 10+ posts a day
   Magway, Magway, Burma · ရရှိန်းခိုင်င်းများတွင်
   3 members said they live in Myaungmya

2. PTTT (6/2019) အိမ်ချောင်း အလိုက် စီရင်ခံစာ (၂၄၀၀ ဦး)
   2.4K members · 5 posts a week
   15 members said they went to Pathein University

3. မြို့ရေး (အလှထူး)
   23K members · 2 posts a day
   Magway, Magway, Burma · လူပေးများတွင်
   Local Information...

4. မြို့ရေး (အလှထူး)
   441 members · 3 posts a month
   Magway, Magway, Burma

5. မြို့ရေး အလှထူး (အလှထူး)
   2.6K members · 8 posts a day

6. မြို့ရေး အလှထူး (အလှထူး)
   2K members · 6 posts a day
   Magwe, Burma · လူပေးများ အလှထူး စီရင်ခံစာတွင်
   အခြေခံအဖြစ် အလှထူး စီရင်ခံစာတွင်
   တိုက်ခိုက်ခြင်းဖြစ်သည့်အခါ။

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**သင်္ချောင်း**

- အိမ်ချောင်း အလိုက် စီရင်ခံစာ
- PTTT (6/2019) အိမ်ချောင်း အလိုက် စီရင်ခံစာ
- မြို့ရေး (အလှထူး)
- မြို့ရေး (အလှထူး)
- မြို့ရေး အလှထူး (အလှထူး)
- မြို့ရေး အလှထူး (အလှထူး)
Figure 12: နောက်ဆုံး အတူတူ နေထိုင်ရာနေရာများ ကိုးကွယ်ခြင်း။

ကျောင်း၊ Facebook အတွက် အနေအထားအဖျင်ချင်ခြင်း:

အတွက် Facebook အတွက် အနေအထားအဖျင်ချင်ခြင်း အဖျင်ချင်ရ နေထိုင်ခြင်း Facebook ကို အတွက်ဖျင်ရ နေထိုင်ခြင်း ဖျင်
မြင်သာရစသည့်အခက်အလက်တစ်ခိုပင်မြစ်သည်။ အစိုးသည်ရနှံ့စဥ်လူြှုဘဝနင့်သက်ဆိိုင်ရသာအရသေးစာေး ိုတ်မပန်ခက်ာေးြ အစအမခာေးအရေးကကီးသည့်နိိုင်ငရတာအဆင့်ြ ိုတ်မပန် ရကကညာခက်ြ ာေးကို Facebook ကို အသိုေးမပြပေသာ တိိုက်ရိိုက်ြ ိသည်။

Figure 13: အိမ်ခြင်းနှင့် စည်လွှတ်တော်နှင့်စီးပွားရေး ကိုယ်စားပြုပွားမှုဖြစ်သည် အိမ်ခြင်းနှင့်စီးပွားရေး
ယခုမပသောဖျင်ရာ သြမတရိုးရကကညာခက်အား Facebook ကိုယ်တိုင်ကိုသာတိိုက်ရိိုက်အသိုးမပ hảoရားသူ ထိပ်ပါ တစ်ခိုမြစ်သည်။ ဤကဲ့သိ့ှံ့ မီဒီယာကိုကကားခအမြစ်အသိုးမပေးကိုယ်တိိုင်က Facebook ကိုသာတိိုက်ရိိုက်အသိုးမပအားထားစိုးရိုက်ဆက်သွယ်မခင်းသည်လည်း Facebook ကိုလူအားပိိုရစခဲ့သည်အရကကာင်းမခင်းတစ်ပ်မြစ်လာသည်။

အရက်များမှာ အရှေ့တွင်အင်တာနက်မြစ်လာပါသည်။

အဆိုပါအခက်များသည် Facebook မှအရှေ့မြောက်မြင့်မြန်းတွင်ပါသည်။

22 Myanmar President Office, 2018.
23 Bookbinder, 2013.
ဖော်ပေမှုအားဖြင့် အခြားသောသော်လည်း မြန်မာဘာသာစကားအတွက် ပြည့်စုံမှုကို သိရှင်းပြပါသည်။ သူ့ကို အဓိက ဦးရဆာင်ခဲ့ပြီး မြန်မာဗိုဒ္ဓဘာသာ ဆိုင်းကားးတွင် ၉၆၉ ပါရသူ။

၂၀၁၃ တွင် တိုက်လတွင် ပြည့်နှိုင်းသောကြောင့် မပေးခဲ့ပြီး ပောက်လာခဲ့ရသည်။ ပါက်မခင်း၊ စာအိုပ်းမိဝမခင်း၊ သီခင်းမြန်မာခင်းနှင့်တာပွဲမပေးလိုပ်မခင်းတို့ကိုမပေးခဲ့ကကသည်။

၂၀၁၃ ခုနှစ်လတွင် သိမ်းစိုသည့််ဘာသာဖော်ရာအာက်ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည်။

၂၄ အပါအဝင် (၁)၊ (၂၀၁၄)၊
၂၅ NAC & Win Nandar, 2019.
၂၆ May Sitt Paing, 2013.
၎င်းတို့ကို ကြည့်ရှန်းလျှင် ထိုသင်များကို အောက်ပါအတိုင်း တည်ဆောက်ထားသော အချက်များစွာ ပြုလုပ်နိုင်သည်။ Facebook နှင့် YouTube သတ်မှုတွင် အချိန် အောက်ပါအတိုင်း သတ်မှုကို အချိန်နှစ်ကို အထုတ်းကြားခြင်း ရကြောင်းတွေ့ရသည်။

အွန်လိုင်းမီဒီယာသင်တန်း ၂၀၁၄ ခုနှစ်တွင် စတင်ခဲ့သည်။ သာသနာမပစ်ညီမှုမှာ အောက်ပါအတိုင်း မြန်မြင်ခြင်း အမှားကြားကူးစွာ အောက်ပါအတိုင်း ဖော်ပြသည်။

အဆိုပါ သင်တန်းများတွင် အွန်လိုင်းမီဒီယာသင်တန်းကို သတင်းတင်နိုင်သည်။ သတင်းရိုပ်သရိုက်ကူးနိုင်သည်။

အွန်လိုင်းတစ်ဆင့် ဆက်သွယ်ရက်ကို သင်ခန်းစားအောင် သင်ကကားခြင်း ရကြောင်းတွေ့ရသည်။

ရအာက်ပါ Screen Shot ၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ် ရြလအတွင်း အွန်လိုင်းမီဒီယာအွန်လိုင်းနှစ်စိုး သင်တန်းများအား သတင်းပိုမြစ်သည်။
Figure 15: ဗဟိုြသင်တန်ေးရဲ့် အွန်လိိုင်ေးြီဒီယာသင်တန်ေး တစ်ခို၏ သတင်ေး
Facebook ကိုယ်ရပ်တိုင်းရောက်စွာသောစနစ်:

ဆောင်းချင်းနေရာနှင့် Facebook အတွက်အကြောင်းအရာများကို ပြင်းထန်စေရန် Facebook စာက်နောအားလုံးအဖြစ်လေ့လာသည်။

Facebook Advertising စနစ်ကို စီးဆင်းထားသောအနေဖြင့် သေတ္တို့မှာ စာက်နောအားလုံးနှင့်အတွက်အချက်အလက်များကို ရပ်တွေ့ပေးနိုင်သည်။

စာက်နောအားလုံးကို သေတ္တို့နှင့် သိရှိနိုင်သောအခါမှာ Facebook ကို စီးပြည်ထောင်စုများနှင့် Facebook Advertising များကို ကာကွယ်ရေးသားရန် စီးပြားသောအခါမှာ အကြောင်းအရာသောစာက်နောအားနှင့် Like များကို ရပ်တွေ့ပေးနိုင်သောစနစ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်သည့် Facebook ကို ကာကွယ်ရေးသားရန်စီးပြားသောအခါမှာ Facebook မှာ အကြောင်းအရာများနှင့် စာက်နောအားလုံးဖြင့် စီးပြားသောစနစ်တစ်ခုဖြစ်သည်။

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Figure 16: Facebook Advertising

Facebook Advertising သည် အားလုံးတွင် အားလုံးတွင် ပြုလုပ်သူ
နှစ်စဉ် ၂၀၁၇ နှစ်နိုဝင်ဘာလ ၁၇ ရက်နေ့တွင် စီစဉ်ခဲ့သည်။ (အချိန်အနေနှင့် စီစဉ်ခဲ့သူ မှာ Facebook စီစဉ်ရေးရာ အဖွဲ့ဝင်)

Facebook သည် အားလုံးတွင် ပြုလုပ်သည်။

ဝယ်ယူ အားလုံးတွင် ပြုလုပ်သူ Facebook နှင့် အားလုံးတွင် အားလုံးတွင် ပြုလုပ်သူ ဝယ်ယူခဲ့သူများ အားလုံးတွင် ပြုလုပ်သည်။
Aiden Moe

ပြင်သစ် Facebook အတွက် နောက်ထိပ်အထိမ်းအမှတ်အတွက် မြင်ရသော သတင်းများနှင့် သိပ္ပံများ ပြောင်းလဲစေခြင်း စီမံခန့်ခွဲအတွက် ပြင်သစ်ကိုးကွယ်ရင်းပြစ်သဒေးပြောင်းအရာ မိုးမိုးဖေ့စ်ချင်းစွာ ပြုလုပ်သူများ သိသိသာသာ အကြောင်းရှိသော်လည်း ပေးထားခြင်း Misophonia အနေဖြင့် များစွာ အကြားရှိသော စနစ်အတွင်းချင်းစွာ မြင်ရသော Screenshot စိတ်ကူးလိုက်ပါ

Moe Phyu
Nov 4 at 9:02pm

Credit to မြင်ရသောစာကြောင်း

Like   Comment

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Figure 17: အမှားများကို ဝန်ထမ်းဆောင်ရာ Screenshot စကားစီရင်ချင်းစွာ ဖော်ပြသောစာကြောင်း

27 Moe Phyu အထူးသဖြင့် ဘဝအတွက် လုပ်ဆောင်ရာ သိမ်းဆည်းချက်များ အခြေခံသော စီးပွားရေးမှ လျှောက်လှံစေရန် အကြောင်းရှိသော်လည်း ပြင်သစ်ကိုးကွယ်ရင်းပြစ်သဒေးပြောင်းမှုများကို များစွာ ပြောင်းလဲစေခြင်း Misophonia အနေဖြင့် များစွာ အကြားရှိသော စနစ်အတွင်းချင်းစွာ မြင်ရသော Screenshot စိတ်ကူးလိုက်ပါ
သို့သက်ရသ အရ ာက် အာေး တစ်ခိုမြစ်သည်။ ရန်ပိိုင်းတွင် Facebook ဖြင့် ပိိုစ့််သည် ၎င်းတိိုှံ့၏ လူြှုကွန် က်စ နှုန်ေးြ ာေးအာေး ြခ ိ ေး ရြာက်ပါဟို ဆိိုကာ ပိိုစ့််အာေး မပန်လည်ခွင့််မပ ခဲ့်သည်။
Figure 18: ဗိုလ်ချုပ်မှုတို့ကို Facebook ဦးဆောင်ပြီး အောက်ပါ အချက်အလက်များ ပေးထား - မိုးသား Facebook
A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar’s Military

Mozur, 2018.
အိန္ဒိယနိုင်ငံ၏ Facebook အချက်အလက်များသား၄ ခုကြားတွင် သတင်းအတိုးအတွင်း လူမှုနှင်းသော Facebook ကိုဖော်ပြထားသည်။

စစ်တပ်မှားကြောင်းအက်ဒါမြင်းစားပေးသည်။

အက်ဒါမြင်းစား၏ Facebook မှားကြောင်းအက်ဒါကျင်းသားသူအားလုံးသည်
သိပ်င်များအတွက် အဓိကရလ့်လာခဲ့သည်။

က) ဒေတာစတင်အက်ဒါမြင်းစား page မှာ

စစ်တပ်မှားကြောင်းအက်ဒါမြင်းစား page မှားကြောင်းအက်ဒါကျင်းသားသူအားလုံးသည်
သိပ်င်များအတွက် အဓိကရလ့်လာခဲ့သည်။

30 Meta, n.d.
ယောက်ကွယ်မှုမှာ သတ်သုံးနိုင်ပြီး မြန်မာစိုက်ပျိုးရေးမှုများကို အတွက်သို့မဟုတ် စိုက်ပျိုးရေးရွေးချယ်မှုများကို အတွက်သို့မဟုတ် Myanmar Breaking News Page တွင် ပါဝင်သော အက်ဒါများကို အတွက်သည် မြန်မာသို့ အဆင့်မှုများကို အတွက်သည် အဆင့်မှုများကို သတင်းပေးသော Sasha-lin.com- မြန်မာသို့ သတင်းပေးသော သတင်းပေးသော သတင်းပေးသော Sun Thit Lwin - Daily News Page တွင် ပါဝင်သော သတင်းပေးသော သတင်းပေးသော သတင်းပေးသော

Figure 19: မြန်မာသို့ သတင်းပေးသော အဆင့်မှုများကို ပေးသော Myanmar Breaking News Page ပေးသော သတင်းပေးသော သတင်းပေးသော သတင်းပေးသော
Figure 20: မြန်ြာန်ြ င့််ရို  ာေးနိိုင်င တည်ရန ာမပ အက်ဒြင်  ိသည့််

Figure 21: မြန်ြ င့််ရို  ာေးနိိုင်င တည်ရန ာမပ အက်ဒြင်  ိသည့််
Figure 22: မြန်းနိုင်ငတိုက် အတွင်းဖော်ပြခန်း ၏ page ပြင် ၃

၁) စိတ်ကြိုက်သိမ်းဆည်းပြီး အထိအပ်သူ၏ page ပြင်:
စိတ်ကြိုက်သိမ်းဆည်းပြီး အထိအပ်သူ၏ page ပြင်သည် အချက်အလက်များအတွက် အသုံးပြုထားသော (အစီအစဉ်များ AA) နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော အခြေခံအခြေအနေသည် အထိအပ်သူ၏ page ပြင်များကို (အစီအစဉ် KIA) ဆိုသော အချက်အလက်များအတွက် အသုံးပြုထားသည်။ အထိအပ်သူ၏ page ပြင်သည် များသော အနေအထားတွင် AA နှင့် KIA တို့၏ အကြိုက်နှစ်ချက်ဖြစ်သည်။ အထိအပ်သူ၏ page ပြင်ကို AA နှင့် KIA တို့၏ အကြိုက်နှစ်ချက်ဖြစ်သည်။
အဲဒ်င်းပွားရစသည်ပိုစ့်ြား (ဥပြာခိိုင့် ခိိုင်ငရတာကိစစ်သိိုှံ့ရသာ) ကို ရသောသာမြန်ှံ့ရဝရလ့်သည်။ ရိုားအက်ဒြင်ြားသည် တိိုက်ပွဲသတင်ေးြားင့်ပတ်သက်၍သာအစဥ်တစိိုက်ဝါဒမြန်ှံ့ခိြှုြားသည်မပလိုပ်ရလ့်ပပီေး၊ မြန်ြာတည်ရနာမပအက်ဒြင်အရအတွက်ြာတူညီရသာ်လည်ေး ဗီယက်နြ်တည်ရနာမပအက်ဒြင်အရအတွက်ြ ာလည်ေး၂ဦေးစီမြင့်တူညီရသည်ကို ရတွွဲ့သည်။ ဤအခက်ကတူညီရနရသာသူနစ်ဦေးကပင်ရပခွဲ့ငါေးခို၌အက်ဒြင်မြစ်ရန်ဆိိုသည့်ရကာက်ယူခက်ကိုလည်ေးယူဆနိိုင်သည်။

Figure 23: မြန်ြာနင့်ဗီယက်နြ်နိိုင်ငတည်ရနာမပအက်ဒြင် ိသည်။ ပါ ၁
Figure 24: မြန်ြာန င့််ဗီယက်နြ်နိိုင်င တည်ရန ာမပ အက်ဒြင်  ိသည့်် page ၂၄

Figure 25: မြန်ြာန င့််ဗီယက်နြ်နိိုင်င တည်ရန ာမပ အက်ဒြင်  ိသည့်် page ၂၅
Figure 26: ကြွင်းတားပွဲများဖြစ်ပြီးသောင်းရေးအတွက် အသုံးပြုသော်လို့ page စဉ်၂၆

Figure 27: ကြွင်းတားပွဲများဖြစ်ပြီးသောင်းရေးအတွက် အသုံးပြုသော်လို့ page စဉ်၂၇
ရ) စိတ်အားဖြင့်ပြောင်းလည်သော page အသုံးချခြင်း

သို့သော် စိတ်ဖြင့်အချက်အလက်များ အဖြစ်မျိုးစိတ်ဥပဒေအရ page ထုတ်ကျင်ပြီးနောက် နောက်ပိုင်းပြောင်းလိုက်သော page တွင် Kyaw Swar Page ထွက်ပွားပြီးနောက် အချက်အလက်များ ဝင်ရောက်ပြောင်းလိုက်သော page တွင် Kyaw Swar အသုံးပြုသော Facebook ကို အကျိုးပြုသော ဗီယက်နာရီတွင် နောက်ပိုင်းပြောင်းလိုက်သော page ထွက်ပွားနေသည်။ ယခုမှာ page နောက်ဆိုင်ရာ မြစ်ပြောင်းသော Kyaw Swar နှင့် Ko Thet KoThet Reborn page ကို ကျင်ကျင်သော စိတ်ဖြင့်အချက်အလက်များ တွက်ချက်ထားသော Like ကို ကျင်ကျင်ပြောင်းလိုက်သည်။
Figure 28: သူကြာအသောက် ကြာမြင့် စွာကြားစောင်း၍ လောက်စောင်း၍ အက်ဒြင်းတို့၏ ဗိသုကာလောက် page များကို ဖတ်ပါ။

Figure 29: သူကြာအသောက် ကြာမြင့် စွာကြားစောင်း၍ လောက်စောင်း၍ အက်ဒြင်းတို့၏ ဗိသုကာလောက် page များကို ဖတ်ပါ။
Figure 30: ပြင်သစ် အက်ဒြင်းများ စိတ်ပိုင်အနီ သုံးစွဲထားသော page များ က

Figure 31: ပြင်သစ် အက်ဒြင်းများ စိတ်ပိုင်အနီ သုံးစွဲထားသော page များ က
စနစ တကျ စိုြွ ှုံ့ထာ်းသာ ဂရိုမျာ်း တပ်ြရတာ်ရ ာက်ခ သူဂရိုြ ာေးကိို Facebook က မွေးမြောက် နေထိုင်ခွင်း စိန်ဟောင်းအနုများ တစ်ခုခု ပိတ်ပင်ရစ်သေးသည်။ Association of Support & Management Page 31 သည် ၎င်းအား ပြုစုထာ်ခြင်းသာ အဆင့်အတန်း စိုြွ ှုံ့ပိုဆောင်ရွက်ပြီး သူအမ်းများ ချင်းချင်းသည် သီးချင်း ကြိုး ပြပြောင်းသော အခါ အမ်းများ ကျင်းပြုပြီး အခြေကပ်အခြေစိုက်ဖွင့်သည်။ ၎င်းစနစ်များသည် အမှန်ပြု အချိန်အချိန် သောက်ကြားနိုင်သည်။ စိုြွ ှုံ့ပိုဆောင်ရွက်ပြီး သီးချင်းကြိုးပြပြောင်းသော အခါ ၎င်းစနစ်များသည် အမှန်ပြု အချိန်အချိန် သောက်ကြားနိုင်သည်။

31 https://www.facebook.com/AssociationofSupportandManagement/
Figure 32: Association of Support & Management Page ပူးဘုန်ခေါင်ဆောင်မှုခြေ ဘုံ
Figure 33: Association of Support & Management Page
ဗိုလ်တိုင်းဒေသကြီးများ}
Figure 34: Association of Support & Management Page

Figure 35: Association of Support & Management Page
Figure 36: Association of Support & Management Page

duppyo lirw kondawgyu

Figure 37: Association of Support & Management Page
duppyo lirw kondawgyu
မြန်မာပြည်ချင်းစိုက်နှင့် အသိုးမပြောင်းသည့် Facebook ပိ့ိုးများ
စုစွဲသည်။

စိုက်နှင့်အသိုးမပြောင်းသည့် Facebook မှားသောအခါမှာ ပျော်စုစွဲသည်။
အသိုးမပြောင်းသည့် Facebook ကိုအသိုးမပြောင်းသော်လည်း တပ်မတော်ကျင်တွင် ပျော်စုစွဲသည်။

စိုက်နှင့် ပျော်စုစွဲသည်။

Myanmar Breaking News ပိ့ိုး Sun Thit Lwin Page ပိ့ိုးများပျော်စုစွဲသည်။

Figure 38: Myanmar Breaking News Page သော History
Figure 39: Sun Thit Lwin Page သေ History

ပြုရှင်နှင့် ပြုသော အရက်တစ်ခုသည် အယ်ဒမ်အစီအစဉ်သည်
အသွားအပြုသောစုစုံဖြစ်သည်။

အကြိမ်ပြုသော အရက်တစ်ခုသည် အယ်ဒမ်အစီအစဉ်သည်
အသွားအပြုသောစုစုံဖြစ်သည်။

အယ်ဒမ်အစီအစဉ်သည် မပြုသည်။

အယ်ဒမ်အစီအစဉ်သည် မပြုသည်။

အယ်ဒမ်အစီအစဉ်သည် မပြုသည်။
ဗုဒ္ဓသာသระ စိန်ခ်ီဖျင်ရာတွင် အိမ်ရောင်သည် ၎င်းကို လေ့လာသည်။

Figure 40: Myanmar Breaking News Page က တွေ့ရပါတ်တို့ပြုသည် Post ပါသည်။
Figure 41: Sun Thit Lwin Page ဆက်လက်အခြေအနေ Post
Figure 42: Sun Thit Lwin Page သည် သီတဂူဆာရတာနိုင်ငံတော်သန့် ပတ်သက်သည့် Post တစ်ခါ
Figure 43: Myanmar Breaking News Page တွင် ပြသရား Post

အချက်အလက် pageများက အချက်အလက်အား ဖော်ပြထားသော သက်ရောက်မှုကို
ပြသရားနေသော် အောက်ပါမှုကို ဖော်ပြထားသည်။
အချက်အလက် page တွင် အချက်အလက်အား ဖော်ပြထားသော သက်ရောက်မှုကို
ဖော်ပြထားသော် အောက်ပါမှုကို ဖော်ပြထားသည်။

Facebook ၏ အချက်အလက် များကို ပြသရားနေသော် အောက်ပါမှုကို ဖော်ပြထားသည်။
ဤအားဖော်ပြထားသည်။

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Figure 44: အသင့််ြွင့််ပပီေးရသာ Facebook အခွင့် တစ်ခိုလ င် ၂၀ဝ၀ဝက ပ်မြင့််ဝယ်ယူြည်ဟိုတင် ာေးရသာ Post တစ်ခို
Figure 45: အသင့်ပေးထားသော Facebook အခက် တစ်ခု၏ စီစဉ်ပေးထားသော screen shot Post ချက်

အသင့်ပေးထားသော Facebook အခက် တစ်ခု၏ စီစဉ်ပေးထားသော screen shot Post ချက်ကို စိတ်ကူးပြီး မှန်ကန်သော အခက်တစ်ခုကို အသင့်ပေးထားရန် အချက်များ ဝေးကွေိုင်းပြီး AA အခက် ပြီးသားသည်သာ သိမ်းဆည်းပေးပါသည်။
နောင်ဆောင်နေသော နောက်ထိုးရပ်တော်မှာ အခြေ နောက်ဆုံးနောက်ထိုးရပ်တော်မှာ အခြေစီးသည်။ အဆိုပါ နောက်ဆုံးနောက်ထိုးရပ်တော်မှာ သစာရှိအမြစ်ပိုရှိသည်။ ကွန်းနှံးအမြစ်ပိုကြားသည်။

Figure 46: နောက်ဆုံးနောက်ထိုးရပ်တော်မှာ အခြေစီးသည်။

Comment Campaign ဖျင့်ဖျင်သည်:
Comment ကိုစုပေးခြင်းအတွက် အဓိကစာကြောင်းအား ကူညီပေးသည်။ သတင်းဌာနာဌာနများနှင့် အသိုများစွာသော လူများအား ကူညီပေးသည်။

Figure 47: ခိုင်ရကကာင်း AA ကူညီသင့်းရကကာင်း တပ်တား နေရာထဲမှ တင်းသွင်းသွင်း မြစ်သည်။

Figure 48: ခိုင်ရကကာင်း AA ကူညီသင့်းရကကာင်း တပ်တား နေရာထဲမှ တင်းသွင်းသွင်း မြစ်သည်။
Figure 49: AA ကိုအာေးရပေးရနရသာ ခိိုင်ြ ာေးကိို ြလိိုလာေးရကကာင်ေးတင် ာေးသည့်် Post တစ်ခို၁

Figure 50: AA ကိိုအာေးရပေးရနရသာ ခိိုင်ြ ာေးကိို ြလိိုလာေးရကကာင်ေးတင် ာေးသည့်် Post တစ်ခို၂

တူညီခသာကွနများအာ်းမတူညီခသာခနရာများတွင ခပ်း၍ သတင်းများအာ်းပံိုခပာင်း ြေင်းအရကာင့်တစ်ခိုတည်ေး သိိုှံ့ြဟိုတ် လူတစ်ဦေးတည်ေး တူညီရသာ သတင်ေးဌာနြာေးရအာက် တူညီရနရသာ သတင်ေးမြစ် ပ်ြ ာေးရအာက်တွင် သတင်ေးစကာေးတစ်ခိုတည်ေးကိို ကွန်ြန်ှံ့ရပေးမခင်ေး သည်လည်ေး ဝါဒမြန်ှံ့အရကာင့််ြ ာေး၏ နည်ေးနောတစ်ခိုပင် မြစ်သည်။ ယခိုရအာက်တွင်မပာေးရသာ Screen Shot ကိို Eleven နင ဧ ာဝတီသတင်ေးဌာနြာေးြ တင် ာေးရသာ န်နဝါ ီရလေး က်ရနှံ့တွင် AA ကင်ေးစခန်ေးရလေးခို အာေး ဝင်ရ ာက်တိိုက်ခိိုက်ခဲ့ရသာ သတင်ေးြ ာေးရအာက်တွင် Myat Min Maung ဆိုရသာ နောြည်နင ့်် အရကာင့််တူညီရသာ သတင်ေးြ ာေးရအာက်တွင် အသိပြုးသာ သိပ္ပံ့သာ အသင်္ခတ်သာ အသိပြုးသာ သိပ္ပံ့သာ အသင်္ခတ်သာ
AA ဝါခ အသက်တွင်းအွန်ပုံမှန်ကန်တွင်း ပစ္စည်းကြည့် သတ်မှတ်ချက်အား အရက်စ်ဆောင်စေခ်ပြီး။

Figure 51: AA ဝါခ အသက်တွင်းအွန်ပုံမှန်ကန်တွင်း ပစ္စည်းကြည့် သတ်မှတ်ချက်အား အရက်စ်ဆောင်စေခ်ပြီး။

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Figure 52: AA သည် အကကြ်ေးြက်အြွဲွဲ့မြစ်ရကကာင်ေးကိို ည်ညွှန်ေးသည့်် စာတစ်ခို ဲအာေး အရကာင့််န စ်ခိုသ ိုေး၍ ကွန်ြန်ှံ့ရပေး ာေးမခင်ေး 

သမာ်းရ ို်းကျ ြစ ခနခသာ ြေွ  ြော်း က  ံမှုနှင အမိုန ်းတရာ်း (Bad Actor မျာ်းအာ်း ခထာက ပံ ခပ်းသည အဓ က အခ ကာင ်းအရာ) 

အိုန်ေးစကာေးဟို အဓိပပာယ်ြွင့်် န် ကကိ ေးစာေးသည့်် သာဓကြ ာေး  ိခဲ့်သည်။
ယူလူကျောင်း ပြောဆိုပါကာကွယ်ရစာင့်ရစားမှုများနှင့် ဆိုလိုသည်။

32 မြန်မာ့စာတန္ဖို့ ပါတ်။

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ခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆုံး ဆိုပါတော့လို့ မြစ်လှုံးအာ့ အားလုံးတွင် ဆိုက်သောကြည့်မှု ကဲ့သို့ ရတာကသည်။ သို့သော် ချပ်ထား မြစ်ရိိုင်းစဥ်တစ်ခုသွယ် ရန်ကို ရတာက ချပ်ချင်သည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့ ခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆုံး ဆက်စပ်ပါးမြစ်ရိိုင်းစဥ်တစ်ခုသွယ် မြစ်ရန်မခင်းအာ့ သတတ ချပ်ချင်သည်။ ခကျာင်းသင်နေစာများအတွင်းမှ အမိုန်းတရားနှင့် ထားက ံမှု ဗို情商အာ့ မြန်းေးက်တွင် ဆာ၊ဆာြေးကိုပါ ဆာအမြစ် ယူဆပါသည်။ အနရနတောအနနတဂိုဏ်းဝင်မြစ်ပပီး ြတူယူကသည်။ သက်ဆိိုင်ရသာအမျိုးရိုင်းတွင် ဆာ၊ဆာြေးအင်းပိုရေးသာမြင်မခင်း၊ ြိိုင်မခင်း မပြုကို အရလေးအမြတ်မပြုသည်အိုးကျားသားပါ ဆိိုနိိုင်သည်။

ကျေးဇူးတင်ညွှန်ဖူးစေချင်သော အချက်အလက်များအာ့ ကယ်စရိတ်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဗို情商အာ့ မြန်းေးက်တွင် ဗိုဒီယိုပါ လေးစားကကသည်။ သက်ဆိိုင်ရသာ အယူအဆသည် ရခြားစွဲဆန်ပါသည်။ ဗိုဒီယိုပါ လေးစားကကစားသည်။

ငယ်ွယ်နိုနယ်ရသာ ဆက်သစ်ြာေးအရပေါ် လွှျြိိုေးြှုကကီေးြာေးပါသည်။ ဤကဲ့သိို့ စာသင်ရက်ကာင်းန်းရက်ကာင်းသင်ခန်းစာြာေးသည်။

စတိုတထတန်း (Grade-5) သည် စာပေတစ်ပါးပါး သို့သော် စာပေတစ်ပါးပါး ရှုမြင်သည့်် သင်ခန်းစာြာေးကိုပါ ဆိိုနိိုင်သည်။ အဆိိုပါ ကဗာသည် ရသွေးရန်မခင်းကိို ြိုန်းတီးစာအာဟိုက် သင်ကကာေးသည်။ ကဗာတစ်ခိုမြစ်သည်။ အဆိိုပါ ကဗာအာ့ ၂၀၁၈ရုကျင်ဘာ ၂၆တွင်
အစောက်အပါအတိုင်း အစိုးရစားလျင်မှတ်တမ်း အရေးအနေဖြင့် သင်ခန်းစားသည် မိသားစုများသည် အရေးအနေဖြင့် ပြုလုပ်သင်ပေးမှု မြောက်လုပ်ခွင့် ရှိသည်။ သင်ခန်းစားသည် သင်ကို အရေးအနေဖြင့် ပြုလုပ်သင်ပေးမှု မြောက်ခွင့် ရှိသည်။ သင်ခန်းစားသည် အရေးအနေဖြင့် ပြုလုပ်သင်ပေးမှု မြောက်ခွင့် ရှိသည်။

34 လွတ်လပ် (၂၀၁၈) မှ
35 စတိုတထတန်း စာ့တ်ဖျင်၊ ၂၀၁၉။
36 ရောင်ကီး (လယ်တီပဏ္ိတ) မှ (၂၀၁၉) မှ
Figure 53: လယ်တီပဏ္ိတိုင်ကကီးရေး "အားနင််ရစာင့်တား"စကားရမပ၀

Figure 54: လယ်တီပဏ္ိတိုင်ကကီးရေး "အားနင််ရစာင့်တား"စကားရမပ၁
Figure 55: လယ်တီပဏ္ိတဦေးရြာင်ကကီေးရ ေး "အြိုင်် အြိုင််ရစာင့််တာေး"စကာေးရမပ

Figure 56: လယ်တီပဏ္ိတဦေးရြာင်ကကီေးရ ေး "အြိုင်် အြိုင််ရစာင့််တာေး"စကာေးရမပ

အိုပခရ်းနှင့် အစိုးရယနတရားအတွင်းမှ လော့ဂုံမှုလူအာေးရနှံ့တဓူဝင်ဆိိုင်ကကရတွွဲ့ရန်သည် အိုပ်ခရ်းယနတာေးအတွင်းတွင်ခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆံုးသည် တာေးဝင်သြွယ်
တည် ိရနပပီေးအစိိုး ဌာနြ ာေး ဲတွင် လူဝင်ြှုကကီေးကကပ်ရ ေးဌာန၏ လူြ ိ ေးရ ေး၊ ဘာသာရ ေးအ လူနည်ေးစိုမြစ်သူြ ာေးအရပေါ် ခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆြှုသည် ပိိုြိို၍ င်သာမြင်သာ သည်ကိိုရတွွဲ့ ပပီေး၊ တ်ပ ိုတင်၊ ပတ်စ်ပိိုှံ့တိိုှံ့အာေး လိုပ်ရဆာင် ာတွင် ခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆ မခင်ေးကိိုရပေါ်ရပေါ် င် င် ပိိုြိိုကက ရတွွဲ့ ရလ့် သည် ရပေါ် င် င် ပိိုြိိုကက ရတွွဲ့ ရလ့် သည် ကဲ့သိိုှံ့ ရသွေးရန ောဟို စိစစ်သည့််အပိိုင်ေးန င့်် ပတ်သက်၍ ညွှန်ကကာေးခ က်အရနမြင့်် တ ာေးဝင် စာ ွက်စာတစ်စ ိုတစ် ာ ွက် ခဲ့်မခင်ေး ြ ိဘဲ၊ နှုတ်ြိန်ှံ့မြင့်ရဆာင် ွက်သည့်် သရဘာ သက်ရ ာက်သည်။ သိိုှံ့ရသာ် ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်ရမြာက်ပိိုင်ေးတွင်ြူ ရိိုဟင်ဂ ာြ ာေးအရပေါ် ပစ်ြ တ် ာေး သည့်် ရဒသနတ အြိန်ှံ့ြ ာေး ိုတ်မပန်ခဲ့်ပပီေး၊ ရိိုဟင်ဂ ာြ ာေး၏ လွတ်လပ်စွာခ ီေးသွာေးလာခွင့််၊ လပ် ပ် ိြ်ေးမြာေးခွင့််န င့်် ကရလေး ရြွေးြွာေးခွင့််တိိုှံ့ကိို အဓိက ပစ်ြ တ် ာေး ကန်ှံ့သတ်ခဲ့်သည် ။

37 Duwun, 2019.
38 Fortify Rights, 2014.
39 http://www.mip.gov.mm/
စစ်အစိုးရအစိုးရသားချုပ်တိုးတက်လာရေး
စစ်အစိုးရအစိုးရသားချုပ်တိုးတက်လာရေးအတွက် နိုင်ငံရေး အကိုကိုမပြေးကား ဟိုန်တပ်ကာင်သူရိုပ် င်သရိုပ်ရဆာင် အရမြာက်အားပါဝင်သည်ဦ် စစ်ကားားကိုရိိုက်ကူးရလိုပါပီးလူးိ စိုလက်နက်ကိိုင်

Figure 57: ကြည့်မြင်မြင်ကျင်းသောဝင်ကြီးစိုးစိမ်းဝင် Website
ကြျိုးမြင်ကူးရှု့မှုတာရေးကို တွေ့ရှိစေရာတွင် အခြားသော ဝါဒမြန်းခွဲမြောက်ကြားမှုနှင့် သောက်လျှင်အသိုးအဝေးများကို အမောက်ရှု့းစွာ ပြန်လာစေသည်။ အဆိုပါ ဝါဒမြန်းခွဲမြောက်ကြားမှုအားလုံးကို မပည့်လျှင် ယူနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ တပ်ဦးရာက်ခွဲမြောက်ကြားတွင် လူမှု့စိုက်စီးအားကို ရလားသည်။ အဆိုပါ ဝါဒမြန်းခွဲမြောက်ကြားမှု သားကပြောပြီး ရိုပ်င်ကိိုင်းအားကို ရလားသည်။ အမောက်ရှု့းစွာမိုးရှု့းသည်။ ဤကဲ့သိုးခွဲမြောက်ကြားမှုတို့မြင့်မားသော ပည့်လျှင်မြန်းမြောက်မှုတို့ဖြင့် အဆိုပါ တစ်စိုတစ် ပညာရပ်မခွဲမြားကြောင်း မပည့်လျှင် ယူနိုင်ခဲ့သည်။

40 မြန်းမြောက်နှင့် ခွဲမြောက်ကြားမှု
41 Myanmar Muslim Media, 2017.
Figure 58: ၂၀၁၆ ခုနှစ်အတွက် အကယ်ဒွေးဆိုခဲ့သည့် အိုတ်ကကာေးမြက်ရပါက်ာတ်ကာေးြအစစလာြဘာသာဝင်ြ ာေးအာေးအိြ်င်ရနာဝင်ယူသည့် ဧည့်သည်အမြစ်ပိုရြာသည့် တ်ဝင်ခန်း အင်တာနက်စစ်ဆင်ရေးအာေးပိိုြိိုအာေးရကာင်ေးရစခဲ့သည်။

Facebook သို့မဟုတ်ခွေခင်းြန်းဖျင်သာြစားချစ်သည့် စနစ်တကာခိတ်ဆက်ရဆာင်ပပီး Facebook အာေး ဗောင်းနောင်သြွယ်အသိုေးမပခဲ့သူြာေး အင်တာနက်စစ်ဆင်ရေးြအာေး ပိိုြိိုအာေးရကာင်ေးရစခဲ့သည်။

Content Moderation သို့မဟုတ်ခွေခင်းြန်းဖျင်သာြစားချစ်သည့် Facebook အာေး ဒေလာချီလွယ်ကူသွားြရန် အဲဒီအာေးကိိုေးအာေးမပ ခဲ့်မခင်ေးသည်လည်း စနစ်တကာခိတ်ဆက်ရဆာင်ပပီး Facebook အာေး ဗောင်းနောင်သြွယ်အသိုေးမပခဲ့သူြာေး အင်တာနက်စစ်ဆင်ရေးြအာေး ပိိုြိိုအာေးရကာင်ေးရစခဲ့သည်။

42 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HRsvhV73VNk&t=7436s
နိိုင်ငံရေး လူဦးရေ ၏ ငါးပိုတစ်ပိုမြစ်သည့် Facebook သိုးစွဲသူ ၁၀သန်းခန်းအိခဲ့ရသာ ၂၀၁၅ ခုနစ်၂၀၁၆ ခုနစ်အခွန်အိွဲန်းစကားာေးအာေးစစ်ရဆေးအရ ေးယူန်အတွက် Facebook ခန်းာေးခဲ့ရသာ ၄ဦးခန်းသာ မြစ်ပ်ာေးအာေးကကိတင်ကွယ်န်အတွက် လိုရလာက်ရသာမြစ်ပ်ာေးတစ်ပ်ဟိုတ်ခဲ့ပါ။

မြင့်တ်ခဲ့သည်ကို ၂၀၁၇ ခုနစ်ရြလတွင်မြစ်ပွာေးခဲ့ရသာ “ကိုလား”ဆိုသည့်စကားစိုပါဝင်သည့်စာတိိုင်းအာေး Facebook အလိုအရလာက်မြတ်ခဲ့သည့်မြစ်စဥ်ကသက်ရသမပခဲ့သည်။ သူ့စကားစိုသည်ခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆုံးသည့်အဓိပါယ်သက်ရာက်နိိုင်ပါ။ ၎င်းစကားစိုသည်ခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆုံးရပ်သည့်အရကကာင်းမခင်းာေးအာေးပါဝင်သည်ကိုလား ကိုလားစသည့်စကားစိုးသည်မြန်းစာတွင်ရနှံ့စဥ်သိုးစကားစိုးသည်မြစ်ပွာေးကိုလား ဆိုသည်မြစ်သည်။

43 Stecklow, 2018.
44 Facebook Ban, 2017.
မြန်မာ့စိတ်ဝင်စားချက်များ၏ Content Moderatorအဖြစ်ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သော Aiden Moe သည် Facebookကို လက်ခံခဲ့ရသည်။

WPAC (World Press Freedom Index) ရှင်းကြားမှုများကို စစ်ဆေးပြီး ၂၀၁၈ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလတွင်မပြောင်းခဲ့ရသည်။ Content Moderator အဖြစ်ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သည်။

BSR (Business, Social and Reputation) ကို စစ်ဆေးပြီး ၂၀၁၈ ခုနှစ်မှစ၍ တို့များကို မပြောင်းခဲ့ရသည်။

အဆိုပါ Content Moderator အဖြစ်ပြုလုပ်ခဲ့သော Aiden Moe သည် Facebookကို လက်ခံခဲ့ရသည်။

45 Warofka, 2018.
သိမ်းလည်းရခြက်သည် အင်တန်အရ မကကူပြုသည်။ Facebook က ပိုင်ဆိုင်ကြောင်းဖော်ပြသည် ။ Content Moderator ယောက်ပြောင်းလဲမှုရေးသားပါသည်။

Over Moderation ဦးစားသားတွေက သွေးသမီးသွားသောက်ကို ကြည့်ရှုပါ။ Facebook ကြားပါးသောက်ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ပါသည်။

Over Moderation ဦးစားသားတွေက သွေးသမီးသွားသောက်ကို ကြည့်ရှုပါ။ Facebook ကြားပါးသောက်ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ပါသည်။

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Figure 59: Facebook ဗိုင်းရင်း ၂ရှိသော့တ်ပါးတွင်ရှိပါး
Your post is now back on Facebook. We’re sorry we got it wrong. Learn more.

5 hours ago

Figure 60: ကျင်နားမိုက်ခဲ့သည့် ပိိုစ့််အာေး မပန်လည်၍ complain
ဆိုသော Facebook ကို ရေးသားနေသောအချက်များကို ပြောင်းပြီး နောက်ပိုင်းထဲတွင် ပိုစ့််အာေး မပန်လည်၍
စိတ်ပြောက်ခြင်း။
Figure 61: ဗုဒ္ဓကုန်း ဗုဒ္ဓကုန်းဗုဒ္ဓကုန်းဗုဒ္ဓကုန်း Facebook ဗုဒ္ဓကုန်း ဗုဒ္ဓကုန်းဗုဒ္ဓကုန်းဗုဒ္ဓကုန်းဗုဒ္ဓကုန်းဗုဒ္ဓကုန်း ဗုဒ္ဓကုန်း
အဆိုပါ မြစ်စဥ်တွင် သိုရတသီ တစ်ဦးြ  တင် ာေးရသာ  Burmanization ရဆာင်ေးပါေးအာေး Facebook ကို ပိုစ့််ကိိုက်ညီဟိုဆိိုကာ မြ တ်ခ ခဲ့သည်။  ိိုှံ့ရနောက် သိုရတသီြ  ၎င်ေး၏ ရဆာင်ေးပါေးန င့််ပတ်သက်၍ Facebook ကို နိုဆိိုကာ မြတ်ခ ခဲ့သည်။ ိိုှံ့ရနောက်တက်ပပီေးရနောက် Facebook ကို နိုဆိိုကာ မြတ်ခ ခဲ့သည်။ ိိုှံ့ရန်ပိိုစ့််ကိိုပင်  ပိိုစ့််ပိိုင်  င်ကိိုလည်ေး သ ိုေးက ကကာ ပိိုစ့််တင်ခွင့်် ban ခဲ့သည်။ Burmanization နင့် ပတ်သက်ပပီေး ပညာ  င်ြ ာေးအကကာေး တွင်ပင် မငင်ေးခ ိုြှုြ ာေးရနရသေးကာ ၎င်ေးရဆာင်ေးပါေးပါအခ က်အလက်ြ ာေးကိို စိစစ် န်အတွက် Facebook Content Moderator ပိိုစ့််အာေး အမခာေးသူြ ာေးက မပန်လည်ကူေးယူရြာ်မပ ရန ရသေးသည်။
Figure 62: သတိကျငွေးသည် ပြောပြပောင်ခြင်းမှု ယှဉ်ပြိုင် အဖြစ် အဖြစ် Myo Han ပြောပြပောင်ခြင်း ကြောင်းပြောပြပောင်ခြင်းကြောင်း အဖြစ် 46

သတိကျင်းသည် အဖြစ် Facebook တွင် Content Moderator ဖောက် ပြောပြပောင်ကြောင်း အဖြစ် အဖြစ် Facebook တွင် Content Moderator ဖောက် ပြောပြပောင်ကြောင်း အဖြစ် အဖြစ် 46 Myo Han, 2019.
ဗိိုလ်ချုပ်ကကီးရဟာင်းရနဝင်း၏ ရမြေးမြစ်သူ ရအေးရနဝင်းအရကာင့်တင်ခဲ့သော Facebook သည် မိုးမပိုစ့်တစ်ခို ဆိုးရူးနှင့်အစိုအွဲွဲ့တစ်ခိုကို ယ်ဪေးန် သို့ဟိုတ်ခွဲမချိန်တွင် Facebook မြတ်နိုင်ပါသည်။

47 Facebook post by Aye Ne Win, subsequently removed: https://www.facebook.com/ayenewin1976/posts/67484456196408
48 https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/hate_speech
Figure 63: ဓာတ်လိုက်မခင်ေးရကကာင့်် ကရလေးငယ်တစ်ဦေး ရသဆ ိုေး သည့်် 
သတင်ေးကိို အရမခခ ၍ ကရလေးငယ်သည် ြိုတ်ဆိတ်ြပါသည့်် အတွက်
ရငွြ ဟိိုကာ ရအေးရနဝင်ေးက 
ရ ေးသာေးခဲ့်မခင်ေးမြစ်ပပီေး၊ ဤပိိုစ့််
င် တွင် ရေးသား ပြုရသော ကြောင်းသို့ ပြည်သူများ ခေါ်ဆိုါသည်။ ကြောင်းသို့ ယုံကြည်သည်။ င်၏ အချိန်သို့ မျိုးစိတ် ဖျင်သွင်းအောင် ပြည်သူများ မိုဘိုး ခေါ်ဆိုသည်။

49 ချီးခဲ့သောအချိန်က ရွေးချယ်။
You anonymously reported Aye NeWin's post for displaying hate speech.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

- Block Aye
  You won't be able to see or contact each other

- Request review
  Our review team will take another look at this post.

ACTIVITY

Read 1 Previous Message

Our reply
Sunday, 7 October 2018 at 08:20
Thanks for your report – you did the right thing by letting us know about this. The post was reviewed, and although it doesn't go against one of our specific Community Standards, we understand that it may still be offensive to you and others. No one should have to see posts they consider hateful on Facebook, so we want to help you avoid things like this in the future.
From the list above, you can block Aye NeWin directly, or you may be able to unfriend or unfollow them. If you unfollow them, you'll remain friends on Facebook, but you won't see their posts in your News Feed.
We know these options may not apply to every situation, so please let us know if you see something else you think we should review. You may also consider using Facebook to speak out and educate the community around you. Counter-speech in the form of accurate information and alternative viewpoints can help create a safer and more

Figure 64: အားကြီးစိတ်၏ တစ်ကြိမ်တွင် ရှိပေးသော Facebook အခြေ report တွေသည် သိရှိသော သူများ၏ ဓာတ်ပေးမှုဖြစ်နှံ့စွာပြုသည် အားလုံးအတိုက် Facebook နှင့်အသေးစိတ်တစ်စ်ဖြစ်သည်
အဆိုပါ ပိုစ့််၏ ရအာက်တွင် ရ ေးသာေး ာေးရသာ ရအေးရနဝင်ေး၏ comment အတွက် အဆိုပါ ပိုစ့််၏ မြန်ကြက်သံကြက်တွင် ပါဝင်သော ပညာသင်ကြားမှုအတွက် ပြောက်လာသည်။ အကြောင်း မြန်ကြက်သံကြက်တွင် သစ်လယ်သံကြက်တွင် ပြောက်လာသည်။

Facebook ဆိုင်ရာကျောင်းသားများအား အကြောင်း ပြောက်လာသည်။ ၂၀၁၅ ခုနှစ်မှစ၍ မြန်ကြက်သံကြက်တွင်လည်း ပြောက်လာသည်။

50 Facebook Safety, 2015.
Figure 65: ပြောင်းလဲ Community Standards အရှိန်အား Community Standards မြန်မာမြတ်စုစုပေါင်း အသိရပေးရသာ ပိုစ့်တွင် အိုးရပ်ခဲ့သည်ကို ရတွဲ့သည်။ Facebook သို့စွဲသူရပ်ခဲ့သည်ကို ရတွဲ့သည်။ 51

Ibid. 52 Trautwein, 2016.
Figure 66: Community Standards မြန်ြာမပန်အန စ်ခ  ပ်အာေး ဒိုတိယအကကိြ် မြန်ှံ့ရဝ ာတွင် အြိုန်ေးစကာေးန င့်် ပတ်သက်၍ အသိရပေးရသာ ပိိုစ့််တွင် react လိုပ်သူရပါင်ေး 49K, Comment 415 န င့်် 1.3K shares မပာေးခဲ့သည်ကို ရတွွဲ့ သည်။ ဤအခ ိန်တွင် မြန်ြာနိိုင်င ၌ Facebook သ ိုေးစွဲသူရပါင်ေး ၂၀ သန်ေး ပပပီ မြစ်သည်။ အ က်ပါ ပ ို၂ပ ိုတွင် Facebook သ ိုေးစွဲသူြ ာေးြ  တ ိုှံ့မပန် ာေးရသာ နင့် အရ အတွက်ြ ာ ၁သန်ေးပင် ြမပည့််ခဲ့သည်ကိို ရတွွဲ့ သည်။ ဆိိုေးဝါေးသည့််အခ က်ြ ာ အြိုန်ေးစကာေး ြရမပာ ဟူရသာပညာရပေးပိိုစ့််ရအာက်တွင် ြွတ်ဆလင်ြ ာေးအာေး ဦေးတည်ရသာ အြိုန်ေးစကာေးြ ာေးကိိုလည်ေး ရတွွဲ့ သည်။ (ပ ို၂ Figure 67 တွင် မပာေးရသာ ကွန်ြန်ှံ့အာေး ကကည့််ပါ) ဤသည်ြ ာ ကိုြပဏီ၏ Facebook Safety post no longer accessible: https://www.face-book.com/fbsafety/pho-tos/a.197686146935898/1572321749472324/?type=3&theater 53 Facebook Safety post no longer accessible: https://www.face-book.com/fbsafety/pho-tos/a.197686146935898/1572321749472324/?type=3&theater 54 NapoleonCat Stats, 2018a.
ဗားသုံးပါ၀င်သင့်သည် အသိုးခန်းသို့ လိုအပ်သည်။ Facebook Safety Page မှာ အခက်အခဲ သို့မဟုတ် ဗီဒီယာတွင် Reporting စနစ်ဖြင့် လိုအပ်သည်။

Figure 68: အခက်အခဲကွင်းကွယ်ဝန်းမှစစ်ဆေးကြည့်စှုန်။
Figure 69: အြိုန်ေးစကာေးြရမပာ ဟူရသာပညာရပေးပိိုစ့်် အရကာင့််လ ိုခခ ရေးဗီဒီယိိုသည် Like 24K, 495 Comments, 5779 shares နင့်် 242K views ိပပီေး၊ Reporting ဗီဒီယိိုြ ာ Like 13K, 396 Comments, 5,354 Shares နင့်် 1.6 Million Views ိာေးသည်။

Facebook သိုေးစွဲသူ သန်ေး၂၀၁၈ ခိုန စ် ူလိုင် ၁ က်ရနှံ့က 

55 https://www.facebook.com/pg/fbsafety/videos/?ref=page_internal
စိတ်ဝင်စားမှုနှင့် Facebook အတွက် Facebook အထူးကျင်းပြီး အားပေးသူများ၏ စိတ်ဝင်စားမှုမှာ အင်တန်းကျင်းပြီး အားပေးသူများ၏ Bad Actor မှာ စိတ်ဝင်စားမှု အကူအညီကျင်းပြီး ထိုစစ်ဆေးေးရွက်ရောက်သည့်် Facebook ကို Advertis-ing Policies မှ ထွက်ရှိသည့် ကြောင့် Facebook ကို အသိုးမပါသည်။ အစိုးရများနှင့် အမေရိကန် နိုင်ငံတော် ဖျင်ဆီးသူများ၏ Social Media မှာ Facebook များသိုးစွဲကြောင်း ပြောက်လာရောက်သော Screenshot ကြောင်း အားလုံးအားဖော်ပြထားသည့် သိုးစွဲသူများအတွက် အချင်းချင်းကြည့်ရှုလျှင် ဝင်ရောက်နိုင်သည်။

56 https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/
Figure 70: အြိုန်ေးတ ာေးဆိိုင် ာ လ ှုွဲ့ရဆာြှုြ ာေးပါဝင်ရနသည့့်် ၎ေအျင်မငာတစ်ခို
Figure 71: အသက်အရှေ့သူတစ်ဦး ပြောင်းလဲလိုပါသော သီချင်းကြည့်ရှိသူ Facebook တွင် τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τοπ τီချင်းကြည့်ရှိသူ (သို့မဟုတ် Screenshot ပြင်ယူချင်သော လူငယ်သူတစ်ဦး ပြောင်းလဲလိုပါသော သီချင်းကြည့်ရှိသူ Facebook တွင် τοπ τοπ τီချင်းကြည့်ရှိသူ)

သူငယ်သူတစ်ဦး အခြေခံသော အသက်အရှေ့သူတစ်ဦး ၏ page ပြင်ပြင် နေ့စွဲတစ်ဦး များ ၏ Like ၏ Follower များအကြား Facebook လူငယ်သူတစ်ဦး အခြေခံသော သီချင်းကြည့်ရှိသူ
Figure 72: မိနစ်များဖြစ်သော Myanmar Now ၏အခမ်းအနားအဖြစ် page အတွက် နေ့စဉ်များတွင် Like ရသော Follower များသည် Facebook Advertising ဝါကျ အဖြစ် များဖြစ်သော Myanmar Now ထဲမှ အခမ်းအနားအဖြစ် ၏ page အတွက် Ads များတွင် နေ့စဉ်များတွင် စိစစ်နိုင်ချင်သော်လည်း စိစစ်နိုင်မခင်း Ads ခွင့်မပြ သည်ဟိုဆိုရသာ်လည်း အခမ်းအနား Ads ခွင့်မပြသည်ကို ရတွွဲ့သည်။ Facebook Ads ရပေါ်လစီတွင် တာေးမြစ် ာေးရသာ နှင့် Facebook အားဖြင့် နေ့စဉ်များတွင် နေ့စဉ်များတွင် စိစစ်နိုင်ချင်သော်လည်း စိစစ်နိုင်မခင်း Ads ခွင့်မပြသည်ကို ရတွွဲ့သည်။

Facebook အတွက် Ads အခမ်းအနားအဖြစ် များဖြစ်သော နေ့စဉ်များတွင် စိစစ်နိုင်ချင်သော်လည်း စိစစ်နိုင်မခင်း Ads ခွင့်မပြသည် အကြောင်းအရာများတွင် စိစစ်နိုင်ချင်သော်လည်း စိစစ်နိုင်မခင်း Ads ခွင့်မပြသည်လည်း Facebook Ads အဖြစ် နေ့စဉ်များတွင် စိစစ်နိုင်ချင်သော်လည်း စိစစ်နိုင်မခင်း Ads ခွင့်မပြသည်

57 Facebook page no longer accessible: https://www.facebook.com/446011896252506
အရကကာင်းအား အားကိုအရကကာင်းအားကို ရကကာ်မငာခွင့်မပရနသည်ကိုလည်းရတွဲ့မြင်ရန်သည်။

သမြင့်မြစ်ဆိုစီးကိုနင်းပတ်သက်ပပီးနောက်လည်းဟိုတ်၊

အွဲွဲ့အစည်လည်းဟိုတ်သည့့်နည်းစနစ်က က အသိပညာဆိုသည့််ရပခ့်သည် မြစ်ဆိုစီးကို ဆန်းကင်သည််ပိိုစ့်ြာေးနိုင်ငရေးနိုင်ငရေးကို

dိိုက်ခိိုက်ဆန်းကင်သည််ပိိုစ့်ြာေးကိို Ads သိုး၍တင်ရလ့်ပပီး ၎င်း

ြာေးကိို မပိိုှံ့မပရိုှံ့အခါတွင်လည်း Ads Facebook နှင့်တွေ့ရို့သည်

သို့အပြုမဲ့ဌာနချင်းစီးစီးး
Figure 73: ကြိယ်ထူထရွက် ပြောင်းရာအတွက် သိပ္ပံရေးသားခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်

ထိုအချက်အလက်အဖြင့် အလုပ်သော အရာရှိတို့ အားလုံးကို ထိုများသည် အောက်ပါ အချက်အလက်များ အားလုံးကို သိပ္ပံရေးသားခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်(၁) ပြည်ထောင်းစု(၂) ဖြစ်စေချင်သည်။ အားလုံးကို အကြောင်းအရာတွင် မှန်ကန်သော သိပ္ပံရေးသားခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။

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58 ကြိယ်ထူထရွက်အားဖြင့် ရက်စွဲခြင်း
မြစ်ဆိုစီးကိန်းဆန်းကို ငွဆန်ဒမပပွဲကိုမပို့ခဲ့သည်နှင့် Open Society Foundation မှညံ့သောက်သွားနိုင်ကြသည်။
ပြည်သူ့အားချက်ခစ်သည် Open Society Foundation မှ အားပညာပြည်သူများ စီမံခန့်ခွဲခြင်းများ စည်မှုစွာရင်းနှီးပြီးသော အက်တိဗ်အမျိုးအစား အခြေစိုးလေးစီး ၏ အားပညာထောက်များ၌ ပြီးမှုများတွေ့ရသည်အားဖြင့် Ads များ အခြေစိုး ၏ ယာဉ်များများစွာ ပြီးမှုများဖြစ်သည်။

Bad Actor များက အိုးစားပါတော့သည် Facebook Algorithm
Facebook သည် Algorithm ကို အိုးစားပါသောနေရာများ၌ ရွေးချယ်ထားသော အားပညာအဖျက် ပြည်သူ့အားချက်ခစ်ခြင်းနှင့် အိုးစားပါသောနေရာများတွင် စီမံခန့်ခွဲခြင်းများ၏ အားပညာအဖျက် ခိုးများကို ထောက်များစွာ ပြီးမှုများဖြစ်သည်။

Bad Actor များက ဗျနှာပြည်များကို အိုးစားပါသည်နေရာများတွင် နောက်ဆုံးမှုများတွင် အားပညာအဖျက် ကွာင်းကွယ်ပြီးသောနေရာများ၌ အိုးစားပါသည်။

နည်းစနစ်မှာ ၁၆ ရက်နှစ် ၁၉၃၇ ရက်နှစ် နောက်ဆုံးနေရာတွင် သိရှိသည်။

59 ကျွန်တော်အချက်အလက်များ ရှိသည်။
Figure 75: News Feed တွင် ရပေါ်ရန် တပ်ြရတာ်ကိိုရ ာက်ခသည့် Suggested Group များ က

Suggested Groups

[Image of suggested groups]

ဗျားရာဦးကြည်းရံနေသော 8 friends - 130,852 members

[Join button]

နေရာပံုစံရောင်းချရာဦးကြည်းရံနေသော 2 friends - 69,762 members

[Join button]
Figure 76: News Feed တွင် ရပေါ်ရန် တပ်ြရတာ်ကိုရာက်ခြင်း နှင့် Suggested Group ထည့်သွင်း
ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အားလုံး:

ဗိုလ်ချုပ်အားလုံး:

အိုပ်ခေါ်သို့မဟုတ်အိုပ်ခေါ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်သည့်အကျိုးအတွေးအတည်းစာများနှင့်လူအားလုံးကိုအားပေးသည်။

ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းထဲမှာ လူနိုင်ငံတော်အကျိုးအတွေးအတည်းစာများနှင့်လူအားလုံးကိုအားပေးသည်။

သို့ဖြစ်စွာ ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းကို အားပေးသည်။

page များအားလုံးခေါ် comment campaign

Group ပြုလုပ်ခြင်းကို အားပေးသည်။
အောက်ပါအကျိုးပြုချက်များကို အသေးစိတ်ဖော်ပြချက်သော Page ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို အသေးစိတ်ဖော်ပြချက်သည်ကြောင်း ကျင်းပသည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အောက်ပါအကျိုးပြုချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသော Page ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို အသေးစိတ်ဖော်ပြချက်သည်ကြောင်း ကျင်းပသည်ဖြစ်သည်။

Aiden Moe

Page ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို အသေးစိတ်ဖော်ပြချက်သည်ကြောင်း ကျင်းပသည်ဖြစ်သည်။ အောက်ပါအကျိုးပြုချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသော Page ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို အသေးစိတ်ဖော်ပြချက်သည်ကြောင်း ကျင်းပသည်ဖြစ်သည်။

facebook advertising

ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသော Page Admin ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို အသေးစိတ်ဖော်ပြချက်သည်ကြောင်း ကျင်းပသည်ဖြစ်သည်။

KIA, AA အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသော Page Admin ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသည်ဖြစ်သည်။

page ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသည်ဖြစ်သည်။

pagan ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသည်ဖြစ်သည်။

Kachin Daily News ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသည်ဖြစ်သည်။

clickbait

Website ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသည်ကား အခြားသော ပြုလုပ်ချက်များကို ဖော်ပြသည်ဖြစ်သည်။

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စီးပွားရေးဆိုင်ရာအရမ်းအရန်းကိုလှုပ်ခါနိိုင်စွာရေးရန်မင်းနိုင်သည်ဦးန်တစ်ခိုပင်မြစ်ရန်စွာရေးသားရေးအစွန်းရာက်ဦးန်တင်ရှုပ်ခါဦးန်မြင့်ဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို အသိုးမပြုလူဦးရေးတို့မြတ်ဦးန်စစ်ဝါဒတ်ရက်ဦးန်သည်

Facebookကိုအသိုးမပြုလူဦးရေးတို့မြတ်ဦးန်စစ်ဝါဒတ်ရက်ဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကိုမြင့်တင်ရှုပ်ခါဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို မြင့်တင်ရှုပ်ခါဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို ပို့က်သည်ကို ပို့က်သည်ကို ပို့က်သည်

အကကီးဦးဆိုအင်တာနက်ပလက်ရြာဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို ယရနှံ့ကကာထရွဲဦးရေးနှင်စနစ်တက်ခိတ်ဆက်ရဆာင်ွက်ပို့သည်ာသည်ကိုလူဦးရေးနှင်စနစ်တက်ခိတ်ဆက်ရဆာင်ရန်သည်မြဲဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို ခွဲမခာဦးဆက်ဆှုဦးဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို ပို့က်သည်ကို ပို့က်သည်ကို ပို့က်သည်

Facebook အရန်းစနစ်တက်ခိတ်ဆက်ရဆာင်ွက်ပို့သည်ာသည်ကိုလူဦးရေးနှင်စနစ်တက်ခိတ်ဆက်ရဆာင်ရန်သည် ကွန်က်ခိတ်ဆက်ဦးန်သည်မြန်ဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို ရြာဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို စဥ်ဆက်မပတ်မပလိုပ်သင်းသည်

Facebook content moderator ဦးန်သည်ကိုလူဦးရေးနှင်စနစ်တက်ခိတ်ဆက်ရဆာင်ရန်သည် ကွန်က်ခိတ်ဆက်ဦးန်သည်မြန်ဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို ရြာဦးန်သည်ာသည်ကို စဥ်ဆက်မပတ်မပလိုပ်သင်းသည်

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ပရန်းကြားစီမံခန့် အကြောင်းရင်းသားသည် Transparency Policy အာ့ အထောက်အမှတ်ရှင်းလင်းပါသည်။ ကျော်ကြားမှု၊ အခြေခံမှုအာ့ Facebook အလက်ရှိတွေ့ရှိသော သတင်းများအာ့ လိုအပ်သည်။ အိုပ်ခိုလ်သူ့များကို အကြောင်းရင်းသားသည်တွေ့ရှိမှုအာ့ Facebook ကိုအသိရှိသောအခါ အိုပ်ခိုလ်သောအခါ Ad Library အာ့က အတိုက်အပြန်တွေ့ရှိသောအခါ Facebookဥပရဒပေါ်များကို ပြောင်းလဲသောအခါ အိုပ်ခိုလ်သောအခါ AI အချက်အလက်ပြားမှုအာ့ သတင်းများရှိသောအခါ Digital အိုပ်ခိုလ်သောအခါ ကျောင်းသား ကြုံတွေ့ရှိသောအခါ Facebook တွင် ဖွဲ့စည်းပါဝင်သောအခါ သတင်းများသောအခါ Facebook အလိုအပ်သည်။
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ပြောင်းလဲရှိဦးလိုင်းနှင့်သွင်းကောင်းသွားသော ဆေးသားကို တင်ဆက်ကြည့်ရှုနိုင်သည်။
ဆေးသား Facebook
မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရေးယာဉ်အရ ပြုပြီးနောက် သုံးစွဲသည်ကို မြစ်ရပ်လာသည်မြစ်စဉ်တခိုမြစ်သည်ကိုမြန်မာဘိုင်အိုပ်ချပ်ရပ်ဦး၊ ကိုလိုနီရခတ်အိုပ်ချပ်နင််ကိုလိုနီရခတ်လွတ်ရမြာက်ရပ်လှုပ်ရားာေးြာေး၊ ဂုပန်ရခတ်စစ်ပုပီးပါလီနိုကရစီရခတ် (၁၉၄၈-၁၉၆၂)၊ အိြ်ရစာင့်အစိိုးလက်က် (၁၉၅၈-၁၉၆၀)၊ မြန်မာစိိုးစိိုးပါတီရခတ် (၁၉၆၂-)
Abstract

This paper discusses the shifts in Burmese political culture that were predominantly caused by political spirits of nationalism. The study covers the political developments from the Myanmar dynastic era up to the growth of fundamental religious nationalism after the 2012 by-election. The paper concludes that the political elites in Myanmar should not regard ethnic and religious conflicts as a result of clashing economic interests among the different communities, but that they are caused by struggles against structural injustice deeply rooted in Myanmar society.
မိ ားထက်တန (အစေး - အမေ) ကြည့် ကြောင်းရေး သို့မဟုတ် ကြော များစွာ အခြေခံကြောင်းရေး စိုးရိမ်သော မိုးသွားခဲ့သည် လက်နက် သီးသောပိုန် (1899 - 1901) ရကကာင့်ရပ်ရပ်ခဲ့သည် တရိုတ်ရိုေး ာ ရဆေးပညာ၊ သိိုင်ေးပညာ၊ စစ်ပညာစသည်တိိုှံ့ အာေးကိိုယ်စာေးမပ သည့််  ာတ်လြ်ေး ာတ်ကွက်ြ ာေးပါဝင်သည့်် ဝတထ ၊ မပ ာတ်၊ ကဗာတိိုှံ့သည် ယရနှံ့တိိုင် ပင်ဆက်လက်လွြ်ေးြိိုေးလ က် ိရသေးသည်ကိို ရတွွဲ့ သည်။ ကိိုလိိုနီရခတ်လက်ရအာက်ခနိိုင်င်ြာေးနင််အိုပ်စိိုေးသူ နိိုင်ငတိိုှံ့အကကာေးလက်နက်၊ နည်ေးပညာ၊ ဘဏ္ဍာရ ေးဆိိုင်ာ ကွာမခာေးြှုြာေးကိို အြ ိ ေးသာေးရေးစိတ်အာေးအသ ိုေးမပ တန်ေးညခဲ့ကကသည်။

ဒိုတိယကြ္ာစစ်သည် အြ ိ ေးသာေးရေးလိှုင်ေးအာေးအရကာင်ေးဆိိုေးအခိန်၌ ရပေါ်ရပါက်ခဲ့်မခင်ေးမြစ်ပပီေးနိိုင်ရေး၊ စီေးပွာေးရေးလူြအွေရေးကိစစပ်ဆိိုင်ာ အရကာက်အယူြန်သြျှကိို လူြိေးရေး၊ ဘာသာရေး၊ ယဥ်ရက်ြှုမြှုြာေးအရပေါ်ကိို အရပေါ် ြ  သာခဥ်ကပ် ရဆာင်ွက်ခဲ့သည့်် အခိိုက်အတနှံ့်အမြစ်ရတွွဲ့မြင်နိိုင်သည်။ အရမခခအာေးမြင့်တည်််ပပီေးမြစ်သည့််သာြာန်လူို၏ အြ ိ ေးသာေးရေး တန်ြိိုေးာေးြှုကိို နိိုင်ငရေး ည်ြန်ေးခက်အတွက်လွှဲရမပာင်ေးသ ိုေးစွဲြှု၏ ရအာင်မြင်ြှု သက်ရသပင်မြစ်သည်။ တပပိ င်နက်ပင်အြ ိ ေးသာေးရေးအစွန်ရ ာက်အရတွေးအရခေါ်၏ ကကီေးြာေးသည့််အနတ ာယ်ြှုကိို လည်ေးညွှန်ေးဆိိုသည်။ ကြ္ာ့်နိိုင်ငြာေးအရနမြင့််အြ ိ ေးသာေးရေးအစွန်ေးရ ာက်ြှုနင့်ခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆြှုအရတွေးအရခေါ်၏ ကကီေးြာေးသည့််သက်ရ ာက်ြှုအရပေါ်သတာခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆြှုကိို တာမြစ်တိိုှံ့မပန်န်ကကိေးစာေးခဲ့ကကမခင်ေးသက်ရသပင်မြစ်သည်။

စစ်ရအေးရခတ်၌ ဘာသာရေး၊ အသာေးအရ ာင်၊ လူြိေးအရပေါ်အရမခခသည့််မပဿနောြ ာေးကြ္ာ့် နိိုင်င အြ ာေးစိုတွင် မြစ်ပွာေးခဲ့်ရသာ်
မိးထက်တန် လည်း စစ်ရအေးကာလ လက်ဝဲလက်ယာ ပပိ င်ဆိိုင်ြှု လိှုင်ေးရအာက်တွင် အြ ိ ေးသာေးရေး တက်ကကွြှုလှုပ်  ာေးြှုြ ာေးသည် ကြဟာရန ာအြ ာေးစို၌ ယာယီသရဘာရဆာင်ပပီေး နိိုင်င ရ ေး ွက်ရပါက် အလိိုှံ့င ာ ြန်တီေး အသ ိုေးခ သည့်် လှုပ်  ာေးြှုြ ာေးအမြစ်သာ ရတွွဲ့ ပါသည်။ စစ်ရအေးရခတ် အပပီေးတွင် ကွဲမပာေးစ ိုလင်ြှုအရပေါ် လက်ခ နိိုင်ြှု ပိိုြိိုအာေးရကာင်ေးရစ န် လှုပ်  ာေးြှုြ ာေး မပ လိုပ်မခင်ေး အရတွေးအရခေါ်ြ ာေး မြနှံ့်ရဝမခင်ေးကိို ပိိုြိိုမပ လိုပ်လာ ကကသည်။ အြ ိ ေးသာေးရ ေးအရတွေးအရခေါ်အာေး အသ ိုေးမပ ၍ စီေးပွာေးရ ေး၊ နိိုင်င ရ ေး အာေးသာခ က်ြ ာေး  ယူနိိုင် န် အာေး  ိုတ်သည့်် အင်အာေးစိုန င့်် ကွဲမပာေးစ ိုလင်ြှုအရတွေးအရခေါ်အာေး  ပ်ခ ၍ ခွဲမခာေးဆက်ဆ ြှုြ ာေးကိို ဆနှံ့်က င်သည့်် အင် အာေးစိုြ ာေး အကကာေးအာေး ပပိ င်ြှုသည် ယရနှံ့ရခတ်၌ လက်ဝဲလက်ယာ နိိုင်င ရ ေးအရတွေးအရခေါ် အာေးပပိ င်ြှုက် ပိိုြိိုရ  ွဲ့တန်ေးရ ာက်  ိရနသည်ကိို ရတွွဲ့မြင် သည်။}

ယခိုရဆာင်ေးပါးသည်  အြ ိ ေးသာေး ရ ေးအရမခခ စိတ်အရပေါ် နိိုင်င ရ ေး အကိ ေးအမြတ်အလိိုှံ့င ာ အသ ိုေးခ  န် ကကိ ေးစာေးလာမခင်ေးရကကာင့်် မြစ်ရပေါ် လာသည့်် မြန်ြာ့်နိိုင်င ရ ေးယဥ်ရက ေးြှုအရ ွွဲ့ န င့်် ပါတ်သက်သည့်် ကနဦေးရလ့်လာ ခ က်ရဆာင်ေးပါးမြစ်သည်။

မန မာဘိုရင အိုပ ြေျ ပ ခရ်းကာလ လူြ ိ ေးရပါင်ေးစ ိုန င့်် ဘာသာရပါင်ေးစ ိုစိုရပါင်ေးရန ိိုင်လ က်  ိပပီေး အဂဂလိပ်၊ ဂ ပန်တိိုှံ့၏ သိြ်ေးပိိုက်မခင်ေးခ ခဲ့်  သည့်် မြန်ြာနိိုင်င သည် အြ ိ ေးသာေးရ ေး ဝါဒ အရပေါ်အရမခခ သည့်် နိိုင်င ရ ေးမြစ်စဥ်ြ ာေးန င့်် အသာေးက ပပီေးမြစ်သည်။ ကိိုလိိုနီနိိုင်င တခိုအမြစ် ပဗိတိသျှတိိုှံ့၏ အနဒိယအင်ပါယာ အတွင်ေးသိိုှံ့သွပ်သွင်ေးမခင်ေးြခ  ြီ လက်  ိ မြန်ြာနိိုင်င ဟို သက်ြ တ် ခ က်ခ  ာေး သည့်် နယ်နြိတ်ြ ာေးသည် မြန်ြာြင်ေးအိုပ်ခ  ပ်ြှု
ယာယီပြားခြင်းအတွက်ကိုယ်မှာ ပိုင်ယွင်ရက်စ်အပါအဝင် အပူခိုးစနစ်ဖြင့် လူးတွင် သာရာက်သည် မြန်မာဘာသာ ဆာင်ဆက်သွယ်ရပ်ဆိိုင်ကနှံ့သက်ခက်းအပါအဝင် ပိုးန်းပြီး နိုင်ငံရေးစနစ်တက်ရပ်သက်ခဲ့ရပါက်ခဲ့ပြီး ကုန်ရိုးတွင် လက်မြန်မာနယ်နိုင်ငံရေးးအတွက် လက်ရအာက်ခြေ ရန်ခဲ့ရပါက်ခဲ့သည်။ ကုန်ရိုးတွင် ခြေကြာမှုအဂဂလိပ်အပ်ခြေသစ်စတင်းကြီးကာပါ ရိိုးာကိုကွယ်အသစ်ပြီး မြင့်အစားာမြစ်ပွားခဲ့သည်ကိုရတွွဲ့သည်။

စိုက်ပျင်းသောစိုးစွဲမှုအားလုံးကို ဗုဒ္ဓဘာသာ ပြောင်းလဲသည်အထိ ကာလတခွဲတွင်ပါက်ခဲ့သည်။ အိမ်မခံဆောင်မခင်း၊ အိုပ်ခိုပ်ရေး စနစ်သက်ရာင်နိုင်မခင်းပြီး ကာလနှင့်အတူ အမြစ်သာခဲ့ရပါက်ခဲ့သည်။ ပြောင်းလဲသည်အထိနိုင်ငံရေးလူများ ရဒသတခွဲအကကားကူးလူးဆက်ဆံ့ညွှန်မှုကို ပေးမြို့သည် နိုင်ငံရေးသားပါယ်မခင်းစသည့်မပဿန်းမြစ်ပွားခဲ့သည်ကိုရတွွဲ့သည်။
မိုးထက်တနာ ကိုလိုနီခြေတ အိုပ်ခရ်းကိုလိုနီရခတ်အိုပ်ခရ်းသည် မြန်မားအားလုံးသေးသည် မြန်မားအားလုံး ဦးပိုက်သည်နေားစွာ ဦပီးားရတာင်းရဒသအိုပ်ခရ်း၊မပည်ြရဒသအိုပ်ခရ်းအမြစ်ခွဲမှုများကွဲမပားမခိုးနေားစွာ ဦပီးားရတာင်းရဒသအိုပ်ခရ်းယုန်တားမြင့်ခိန်ညာဦးရဆာင်ခဲ့သည်။ လူးဦးးး၊ ဘာသာရးဆိိုင်ာကိစစ်ဦးတွင် ယဥ်ရက်းြှုးဦးမခင်းနေခွဲမှုဆက်ဆံကိုတပပိင်နက်ကင့်သိုးခဲ့သည်။ ဘာသာရးပေိပကခြားြန်တီခဲ့်ပိိုင်ရေးအရွဲွဲ့အာေးြန်တီးခဲ့သည်။ ကိုလိုနီခြေတလွတ်ခမာကခရ်းလှုပ်ရှားမှုများကိုလိုနီရခတ်အိုပ်ခရ်းလှုပ် ဦးသည်လည်း အိုပ်ခရ်းစိတ်အာေးအရမခချစတင်ခဲ့သည်ကိုရတွေ့သည်။ လွတ်လပ်ရေးလှုပ်ဦးတွင်ကီးဦးသည့််အခန်းကဏ္ဍ်ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည့််တိိ့ရှံ့ဗြာအစည်းအရိုး၏ဗြာမပည်သည်တိိ့ရှံ့မပည်၊ ဗြာစာသည်တိိ့ရှံ့စာ၊ ဗြာစကားသည်တိိ့ရှံ့စကား၊ သခင်ဦးရဟံ့်တိိ့ရှံ့ဗြာစသည့််ရကကွေးရကကာ်သိုးခဲ့ရတာင်းရဒသအိုပ်ခရ်းနယ်ရာတွင်သာဦးမြစ်၍ ရတာင်းရဒသအိုပ်ခရ်းအပိိုင်းတွင်ြရတွေ့ ိရပ။ အွဲွဲ့ဝင်းဦး၏အွဲွဲ့တွင် သခင်ဟူသည့််စကားလိုးဦးဇွဲဦးမှုဆွဲခဲ့ပိိုးအဂဂလိပ်းဦးာေးက်ပိိုးမြင့်မြတ်သူဦးာေးဟူသည့််အရတွေးအရခေါ်ကိုဗြာလူဦးာေး ၏မြင့်မြတ်ပိိုးာေး၊ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာအာေးခီးရမြာက်ြထွဲွဲ့မခင်းာေး၊ ရေးစစ်ပွဲဦးတွင်ဗြာတိိ့ရှံ့
မိားထက်တန 482 အနိုင်ယူခဲ့သည် စစ်ပွဲ့ ာေးအရကကာင်း ည့်သွင်းရ ေးသားခဲ့သည်။ ယိိုးဒယား၊ ကိုလား စသည် လူ့ ိ့းကိိုပါ ည့် သွင်းစွဲခဲ့သည်။ တိိ့ဗြာ့အစည်းအရ ိ့းြ တ်တြ်းြာေးအ  ၎င်းရခတ်တွင် သခင်နေားခ သူ ြ ာေးတွင် ယရနှံ့ရခတ် တိိ့ဗြာ့အစည်းအရ ိ့းြ တ်တြ်းြ ာေးအ ၎င်းရခတ်တွင် သည်ကိို ရတွွဲ့ မခင်း၊ (လွတ်လပ်ရ ေးန င့််ပတ်သက်သည့်် လှုပ် ာေးြှု ာေးတွင် ယရနှံ့ရခတ် တိိ့ဗြာ့အစည်းအရ ိ့းြ တ်တြ်းြ ာေးအ ၎င်းရခတ်တွင် သည်ကိို ရတွွဲ့ မခင်းြ ိရပဋ။ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာဝင် ြဟိုတ်သည့်် အြွဲွဲ့ဝင်ြ ာေးပါဝင်ခဲ့ရသာ်လည်း အရ အတွက် နည်းပါးစွာ ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည်ကိို ရတွွဲ့ သည်။

ဂျပန်ခြေတာ တိိက်သာတူညီျှရ ေးရခါင်းစဥ်ရအာက်တွင် ပူးရပါင်းရဆာင်ခဲ့ကကပပီေး ဥရ ာပနိိုင်ငာေးဆနှံ့် ကင်ရေးြ ာ ဘ ိုသရဘာတူညီခက်အမြစ်စွဲကိိုင်ခဲ့ကကသည်။ ဂ ပန်ရခတ်အတွင်းမြစ်ဝကျွန်းရပါဒသ ကင် - ဗြာ့အိကရိုဏ်မြစ်ပွာေးခဲ့ပပီေးကင်လူ့ ိ့းြ ာေးသည် အဂဂလပ်တပ်တွင် ဝင်ရာက်အြှုြ်ေးရဆာင်သူြ ာေးမြစ်ကကသည်ဟူသည့်် ရကာက်ခက်အရပေါ်အရမခခ ၍ မြစ်ပွာေးခဲ့မခင်းြ ိပဲ ဂပန်တိိ့ဗြာ့၏ အစွန်းရာက်အြ ိ ေးသာေးရ ေးအရတွေး အရခေါ်၏ ြိစီးနိပ်စက်ြှုရအာက် လွတ်လပ်ရာက်ပွဲအတွက် လှုပ် ာေးခဲ့်
မိားထက်တန - ကကသည်။ ြက်ဆစ်တိိုက်ြက်ရေးမပည်သူလွတ်ရမြာက်ရေးတပ်ဦေး - ဆပလဟူသည့်အမြင်အာေးရမပာင်ေးလဲရခြင်ေးခဲ့သည်။ မြန်ာ့်သိိုင်ေးတွင်အာေးသာေးရေးဝါဒအစွန်ေးရာက်ြှုအာေးဆနှံ့်ကင်ေးမပည်သူလွတ်ရမြာက်ရေးတပ်ဦေး - လွတ်လပ်ရေးယူာတွင်ရတာင်တန်င့်မပည်ြရဒသအတူတကွယူနင့််က်ဒယ်စနစ်အာေးအရမခခသည့်မပည်ရာင်စိုစနစ်အာေးတည်ရဆာက်န်သရဘာတူစာခပ်အာေးရတာင်တန်ေးရဒသအိုပ်ခပ်ရေးရအာက်ိနယ်ရမြြာေးတွင်ရနိိုင်သည့်တိိုင်ေးင်ေးသာေးကိိုယ်စာေးလယ်ာေးမြင့််ြွဲွဲ့စည်ေးာေးသည်မြန်ာနိိုင်ငအစိိုေးနင့်ကခင်ရကာြတီ၊ခင်ရကာြတီ၊ြ်ေးရကာြတီတိိုှံ့အကကာေးရေးြမိိုင်ခဲ့်သည်။ ိိုစဥ်ကတိိုင်ေးမပည်မပလွန်တိိုှံ့ပါဝင်ခဲ့်မခင်ေးြ ိရပ။ ိိုနယ်ရမြြာေးသည်အဂဂလိပ်သိိုှံ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးြဆိုေးရှုေးြီကဗြာ့်ဘိုင့်ကသာသက်ရာက်မခင်ေးအမပည့််အဝနီေးပါေးြသည်။ သိိုှံ့ာတွင်…

စစ်ပပ်ခြေတအဂဂလိပ်တိိုှံ့ ြလွတ်လပ်ရေးယူာတွင်ရတာင်တန်င့်မပည်ြရဒသကိိုယ်စာေးလယ်ာေးမြင့််ြွဲွဲ့စည်ေးာေးသည်မြန်ာနိိုင်ငအစိိုေးနင့်ကခင်ရကာြတီ၊ခင်ရကာြတီ၊ြ်ေးရကာြတီတိိုှံ့အကကာေး၌ရေးြမိိုင်ခဲ့်မခင်ေးြ ိသည်။ ရနိိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ိိုစဥ်ကတိိုင်ေးမပည်မပလွန်တိိုှံ့ပါဝင်ခဲ့်မခင်ေးြ ိရပ။ ိိုနယ်ရမြြာေးသည်အဂဂလိပ်သိိုှံ့လွတ်လပ်ရေးြဆိုေးရှုေးြီကဗြာ့်ဘိုင့်ကသာသက်ရာက်မခင်ေးအမပည့််အဝနီေးပါေးြသည်။
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ငှက်ပျောင်းရာင်စိုးအတွက်လိုအပ်သည်းစနစ်ြေးကို ြူမပည်ရာင်စိုးအတွင်ေးပါဝင်ရနိုင်ြည့််ရဒသြာေးြ ရခါင်ေးရဆာင်ြာေး၊ လူြိ ေးတခိုခင်ေးရခါင်ေးရဆာင်ြာေးအကကာေးရကလည်စွာရဆွေးရနွေးွက်ရပေါ် ာေးသည့််သရဘာတူညီခါြိေး ြ ိရပ။

ပါလီမနိုကခရစီခြေတ (၁၉၄၈-၁၉၆၂)

မြန်ြာနိုင်ငံ၏ လွတ်လပ်ရေး ိြှုနင့်အတူမပည်တွင်ေးစစ်ပါတပပိိင်ြဲစတင်ခဲ့သည်။ ဒိုတိယကြ္ာစစ်ကာလတွင်လက်နက်မြင့်တ်လပ်ရေးကကိေးပြ်ေးြ�ုြ တွင်ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည့််ြိေးဆက်ြာေးရခတ်မြစ်သည်။ အာဏာြဆပလိုအစိိုေးအြွဲြာေးပါဝင်သကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ လက်တွဲတိိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့သူြာေးမြစ်ကကသည်။ ဗြာမပည်ကွန်မြနစ်ပါတီ၊ ကွန်မြနစ်ပါတီ (ဗြာမပည်) ကဲ့သိိုှံ့အယူဝါဒတခိုလေးအာေးဆွဲကိိုင်ာေးရသာ်လည်ေးြတူညီသည့််လက်နက်ကိိုင်ရတာ်လန်ရေးအြွဲြာေးပါဝင်သကဲ့်သိိုှံ့၊ ကင်အြိေးသာေးကာကွယ်ရေးအြွဲြာေးပါဝင်သူြာေးမြစ်ကကသည်။ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာတာေးြာေးရဟာရမပာမြနှံ့်ရဝမခင်ေးြလိုပ်ခဲ့ပပီေးလူြာေးစိုဗိုဒဓဘာသာဝင်ြာေးြ ာေးမခင်ေးမပဆိိုင်ာေးမပ လိုပ်ခဲ့ပပီေးလူြာေးစိိုဗိုဒဓဘာသာဝင်ြာေးြ ာေးမခင်ေးမပခေးခဲ့သည်ကိို ရတွွဲ့သည်။ ိိုှံ့အမပင်ကွန်မြနစ်အယူဝါဒ ိသူြာေးအာေး ဘာသာြဲ့်ြာေး၊ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာ အာေး ရစာ်ကာေး
မိုးထက်တနာ

က်ဆီးသူး အမြစ်ပိုရား ဗိုဒဓဘာသာသည် အမိုးဘာသာတိို့ မြင့်မြတ်သည့်ဘာသာမြစ်ရကက်တားရာကို သိခဲ့သည်။ ၎င်းဝါဒမြနှံ့်ခီးကွန်မြန်စ်အယူဝါဒ သူးအရပ်သာကဗိုဒဓဘာသာဝင်အနည်းစိုမြစ်သည့်တိိုင်းင်းသားလက်နက်ကိိုင်း းဳာေးအရပ်သာကမပည်တွင်းရန်အွဲွဲ့အစည်းအသီးသီးသက်ရာက်ခဲ့သည်။ အစိုးကကီး၍ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာအခြွေးအနေားး းဳာေး၊ ဘိုးတည်ရက်ာင်းရဆာက်လိုပ်ငန်းဳာေးသည်လည်း ဗိုဒဓဘာသာဝင်အဝိုင်းအဝိုင်း၌နိိုင်ငူ အ ူးအခွင့််အရးာေးအစိုးလွဲြာေးသည့် ခစားကိိုပိိုးခိိုင်းကိရစခဲ့သည်။

အမိုးစိုးရလက (အုံး) စိုးရိုက်ချင်သူများ၏ ယုံကြည်မှုသည် မူဝါဒအသံများရှိသော စိုးရိုက်ချင်သူများ၏ စိုးရိုက်ချင်သူများကြီးမှုကြီးလိုက်သော စိုးရိုက်ချင်သူများဖြစ်သည်။ ဗိုဒဓသာသာဝင်တိို့၏ဘာသာရေးအရပ်သာက အစိုးရးခက်တခိုအမြစ်ရတွေးရခေါ်ရဆာင်းက်းဳာေးတစ်စရနကားလာခဲ့းပီးအိးင်င်း

အုံးအခြူးငြင်ဖြစ်သော (အုံး) နောက်ဆိုသော်မိုးကြည်ချင်သူများ၏ ယုံကြည်မှုသည် မူဝါဒအသံများရှိသော စိုးရိုက်ချင်သူများ၏ စိုးရိုက်ချင်သူများကြီးမှုကြီးလိုက်သော စိုးရိုက်ချင်သူများဖြစ်သည်။ ဗိုဒဓသာသာဝင်တိို့၏ဘာသာရေးအရပ်သာက အစိုးရးခက်တခိုအမြစ်ရတွေးရခေါ်ရဆာင်းက်းဳာေးတစ်စရနကားလာခဲ့းပီးအိးင်င်း
မိးထက်တန

ဧည့်သည်၊ လူးစိုလူနည်းစိုစသည်ခယူချားအားရကာင်းလာခဲ့သည်။ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာအားအမခွံဘာသာဝင်တိို့တွင်လည်းဘာသာရေးအရပ်အရမြချက်သို့ချိုင်းတွင်ကယ်မပနှံ့စွာတည်ဆောင်ခဲ့သည်။ လူနည်းစိုအမခွံဘာသာဝင်တိို့တွင်လည်းဘာသာရေးအရပ်အရမြချက်ထိကာဒိုတိယနိုင်ငံသားြားသူရတွေးရခေါ်ရနိုင်လာသည့်အစိုင့်ဘာသာရေးတန်းတူညီအရပ်ပ်ခတိိုက်ပွဲဝင်သည်အစိုးအမြစ်ကွဲမပားြှုးတစစရပ်လာခဲ့သည်။

မနမာိုရှယလစလမ်းစဥပါတီခြင်း(၁၉၆၂-၁၉８၈)မြန်းနိုင်ငံရေးတွင်စစ်ရဘာင်အယွင်းြားကာလမြစ်ပပီးလူးြားရေးပိုကာခဏမြစ်ပွားသည်ကာလမြစ်သည်။

နိုင်ငံရေးလိမ်းစဥ်အားအယွင်းြားကိုအိန်းအရအမြစ်ဗိုဒဓဘာသာအရတွေးအရချိုင်းြားအာေးပိုးသွပ်သွင်းလာခဲ့သည်ကိုရတွေးသည်။ နိုင်ငံရေးသားဟာနောယကအာေးဗိုဒဓဘာသာပါတ်သက်သည်ကိစစ်ပိုးမပြုးန်အတွက်အစိုးအမြစ်ချွဲးစည်းခဲ့သည်ကိုရတွေးသည်။ နိုင်ငံရေးညွှယ်ခက်ားအတွက်ဘာသာရေးခြှုကိုပိုးမပြုးလာခဲ့သည်။

ဥပြာအားမြင့်နယ်နြိတ်ခင်းြာသည်တရိုတ်နိုင်ငံနိုင်ငံရေးအရကလည်းားအတွက်တရိုတ်-မြန်းအိကရိုဏ်ကိုလည်းရကာင်း၊ြဆလပါတီအာေးမပည်သူလူဏားနပ်းမြင့်တက်ရန်တွင်မပည်၊ရတာင်ကကီးတိို့အစစ်လာြ်ဘာသာဝင်ားအာေးဦးတည်တိိုက်ြာက်သည်ပေိပကခြားကိုြန်တီးခဲ့သည်။ ၁၉၇၆ခွန်စ်တွင်လည်းနဂါးငင်းစစ်ဆင်ရေးအည်မြင့်
မိားထက်တန်ခိုင်မပည်နယ် ရိုဟင်ဂာေးအာေး ည်ွယ်သည့် နယ်ရမြင်းလင်းြှုစစ်ဆင်ရေးတပ်ဆင်နွှဲခဲ့သည်။ ိုှံ့အမပင်လူတတိိုင်းကာ န်အစီအာေးမပစ်ဒဏ်ကအကဥ်ေးသာေးရာခာေးန်ကကိေးစာေးခဲ့သည်။

နိုင်ငံခတာပင်ဝပ်ပီးမှုတည်ခေးအေးနှင့်ရွှေးချယ်ခရ်းခကာင်စီခကာင်အစီအာေးနှင့်ြှုလက်ခရ်းခကာင်စီအတွင်းမပိုြိိုမပာေးစွာရပေါ်ွက်လာခဲ့သည်။

တပ်ြရတာ်အစိိုေးလည်းလူိုက်ရေးတွင်မပည်တွင်ေးစစ်စတင်စဥ်ကစတင်ရတာင်ေးဆိိုခဲ့သည့််တန်းတူညီြျှရေး၊ ဒီြိုကရစီရေး၊စစ်အာဏာင်စနစ်ဆနှံ့်ကင်ရေးရတာင်ေးဆိိုခက်ြာေးသာြကလူူ့အခွင့််အရေး၊ ကွဲမပာေးစိုလင်ြှုလက်ရေး၊ ြက်ဒယ်မပည်ရာင်စိုအရေးစသည့််ရတာင်ေးဆိိုခက်ြာေးပိိုြိိုမပာေးစွာရပေါ်ွက်လာခဲ့သည်။

ွေး/၁၉၈၈ နိုင်ငံခတာပီးမှုတည်ခေးအေးနှင့်ရွှေးချယ်ခရ်းခကာင်စီခကာင်အစီအာေးနှင့်ြှုလက်ခရ်းခကာင်စီအတွင်းမပိုြိိုမပာေးစွာရပေါ်ွက်လာခဲ့သည်။

နဝတ/နှလွန်က်တွင်ဒီြိုကရစီအရေး၊လူူ့အခွင့််အရေးလှုပ် ာေးြှုြာေးကိိုဦေးတည်မိပ်လာသည်။ ိုစဥ်ကအတိိုက်အခရခါင်ေးရဆာင်မြစ်သူရဒေါ်ရအာင်ဆန်ေးစိုကကည်အာေးိုနက်တိိုက်ခိိုက်ြှုတွင်ပင် ၎င်ေး၏အိြ်ရာင်ြက်ြာေးနိုင်ငမခာေးသာေးမြစ်ရနသည်ကိုည်ညွှန်ေး၍တိိုက်ခိိုက်ြှုြာေးမပလိုခဲ့သလိို၊မပည်ပနိိုင်ငသာေးနင့်လက်ပ်မခင်ေးအာေးနိိုင်ငရတာသစစာရြာက်၊အြိုးသစစာရြာက်အမြစ်အဓိပပါယ်ခဲ့သည်။
မိုးထက်တန် အကကားပူးတွဲရဆာင်းက်ြှုြ ာေးအာေးရကာင်ေးခဲ့သည်။ နအြ/နဝတ/နအြ အစိိုး အရန်မြင့်မပည်တွင်ေးမပည်ပ ဒီြိုကရစီရေး၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရ ေးလှုပ် ာေးြှုြ ာေးကို နပ်ကွပ်တာေးမြစ်န်အတွက်မပည်တွင်ေး အတိိုက်အချိန်မြင့်ကို ြြ်ေးဆီေး ိန်ေးသိြ်ေးသည်ြျှြက၊ အတိိုက်အချိန်တိိုှံ့၏ လှုပ် ာေးြှုြ ာေးသည်မပည်ပနိိုင်င်ေးကို လည်မြန်ြာ့်မပည်တွင်ေးရေးကို ဝင်ရာက်စွက်ကာ နယ်ခဲွဲ့နည်းယိုတတိကိုရာင်ခဲ့သည်။ မပည်တွင်ေး ဒီြိုကရစီအရ ေးလူ့အခွင့်အရ ေးလှုပ် ာေးြှုြ ာေးအာေး အာေးအြိုေးသာေးသစစာရြာက်လိုပ်ငန်ေးြာေးအမြစ်ပိုရြာ်ဝါဒမြနှံ့်ခဲ့သည်။ မပည်တွင်ေးဒီြိိုကရစီအရ ေးလူ့အခွင့်အရ ေးလှုပ် ာေးြှုြ ာေးအာေး အာေးအြိုေးသာေးရသစစာရြာက်လိုပ်ငန်ေးြာေးအမြစ်နိိုင်င ပိိုင်ြီဒီယာြ ာေးကိို အသိုေးခပိုရြာ်ခဲ့သည်။ 

နဝတ/နအြ ရခတ်တွင်ကင်မပည်နယ်ိိုေးစစ်ရကကာင့််ရန်စွနှံ့်ခွါြှုမြိိုေးနိိုင်င က်သိိုှံ့ ရနပ်စွနှံ့်ခွါြှု ြာေးမြစ်ပွာေးခဲ့သည်။ ဘာသာရေးကိစစြ ာေးအာေးနိိုင်င ရေးည်ွယ်ခက်မြင့်အသိုေးမပိုြ ာေးသာေးရေးစိတ်ဓါတ်ကိိုပိုက်နိှုေးဆွကာတိိုင်ေးမပည်၏အရမခခလိိုအပ်ခက်မြစ်သည့်် ဒီြိိုကရစီအရေး၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရ ေးလှုပ် ာေးြှုြ ာေးအာေးလွှြ်ေးြိိုေးနိိုင်င ကကိေးခဲ့သည်။

မိုး/မိုး အေးခြေ ကြေး/မြစ်သိိုှံ့ ြာေးပိုင်းတင်မပည်ပူးြာေးအတွက် ြ တ်ပိုတင်မပည် ာေးရမပာင်ေးလဲအပ်သည့် လူ့အခွင့်အရ ဗိုဒဓဟိုတ်သူြာေးအတွက် ြ တ်ပိုတင်   ိနိိုင်ြှုကိိုပိိုြိိုတင်ေးကကပ်ခဲ့သည်။ တာေးဝင်စာမြင့်် ိုတ်မပန်ာေးမခင်ေးြ ိရသာ်လည်ေး နိိုင်င သာေးစိစစ်ရေး ကဒ်တွင် ရြာ်မပန်လိိုအပ်သည့်် လူြိုေး၊ ဘာသာရနာတိိုှံ့တွင် ဗြာ/ဗိုဒဓဟိုမြည့််စွက် န်အတွက် တွန်ေးအာေးရပေးြှုြ ာေးမပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။

အင်ဂင်နီယာပညာ၊ ရဆေးပညာသင်ကကာေးန်စစ်တကကသိိုလ်ြာေး၊
မိ ားထက်တန ရကာလိပ်သိပပ ြ ာေး တိိုေးခ ဲွဲ့ြွင့််လ စ်ခဲ့်ပပီေး တကကသိိုလ်အဆင့််စစ်ရကကာင်ေးအာေး လ ိုေးတွင် အစစလာြ်၊ ခ စ်  န် နင့််ဟိနဒ ဘာသာ ဝင်ြ ာေးအာေး ဝင်ရ ာက်ခွင့််ကိိုကနှံ့်သတ်ခဲ့်သည်။ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာသာဝင်ြ ာေးကကီေးစိိုေးသည့််တပ်ြရတာ်အမြစ် ပ ိုရြာ်လာခဲ့်သည်။ ဘာသာရ ေး၊ လူြ ိ ေးရ ေးမပဿနောြာေးအကကိြ်ရပါင်ေးြ ာေးစွာမြစ်ပွာေး သကဲ့်သိိုှံ့၊ အစိိုေး ြ ကကီေးြှုေးက င်ေးပသည့််အရနောက်နိိုင်င ဆန်က င်ရ ေးလူ ိုရ ာက်ခပွဲြ ာေးအကကိြ်ြ ာေးစွာက င်ေးပမပ လိုပ်ခဲ့်သည်။ နိိုင်င တကာအဝန်ေးအဝိိုင်ေး ၏ မြန်ြာ့်ဒီြိိုကရ ေးစီအရ ေးအရပေါ� တပ်ြရတာ်အစိိုေး ၏ လိုပ်ရဆာင်ခ က်ြ ာေးအတွက် ြိအာေးြ ာေး၊ အရ ေးယူြှု ြ ာေးမြင့်တက်လာခိန်၊ ကိုလသြဂ္ကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ နိိုင်င တကာအြွဲွဲ့အစည်ေးြ ာေး၏ အရ ေးယူ န်ဆိုေးမြတ်ခ က်ြ ာေးခ ြ တ်ခိန်၊ အစီ င်ခ စာြ ာေး ွက်ရပေါ်ခ ိန်တွင် အစိိုေး ဦေးရဆာင်သည့််မပည်ပနိိုင်င ဆနှံ့်က င်ရ ေးလူ ိုအစည်ေးအရဝေးပွဲြ ာေးကိိုပြိ ွဲ့တိိုင်နီေးပါေးက င်ေးပခဲ့်သည်။ မပည်တွင်ေးနိိုင်င ရ ေး ရ ခိန်မြ င့််တက်ခ ိန်ြ ိ ေးတွင် နိိုင်င ရ ေး ွက်ရပါက်အမြစ် ဘာသာ ရ ေး၊ လူြ ိ ေးရ ေးအဓိကရိုဏ်ေး ြ ာေးကိို ရကာလဟာလြ ာေး ိုတ်လွှင့််မြနှံ့်ခ ိကာ ရြာ် ိုတ်ခဲ့်သည်။ ိိုသိိုှံ့က င်ေးပသည့်် လူ ိုရ ာက်ခ ပွဲြ ာေးသိိုှံ့ တက်ရ ာက် နိိုင်င ဝန် ြ်ေးြ ာေးအာေး သက်ဆိိုင် ာ ဝန် ြ်ေးအကကီေးအကဲြ ာေးြ တဆင့််ရသာ် လည်ေးရကာင်ေး၊ အ ပ်သူအ ပ်သာေးြ ာေးအာေး သက်ဆိိုက် ာ ပ်ကွက် အိုပ်ခ ပ်ရ ေးအြွဲွဲ့ြ ာေးြ လည်ေး ရကာင်ေး အတင်ေးအကကပ်တက်ရ ာက် နိိုင်င ရ ေး ွက်ရပေးရခေါ်ယူခဲ့်ပပီေး ိိုပွဲက င်ေးပသည့်် သတင်ေးအာေး နိိုင်င ပိိုင် ြီဒီယာြ ာေး တွင် ရခါင်ေးကကီေးသတင်ေးြ ာေးအမြစ် တခန်ေးတနောေးအက ယ်တဝင့််ရြာ်မပခဲ့်ကကသည်။  ိိုကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ အစိိုေး ကိိုယ်တိိုင် ြန်တီေးမပ လိုပ်သည့်် လူ ိုအစည်ေးအရဝေးပွဲြ ာေးြ ကကိ တင်စီစဥ်ပပီေးမြစ်သည့််
မိးထက်တန
490
ဆိုမြတ်ခက်းမြား၊ ရကကွေးရကကာ်သရဆာင်ပိုဒ်းမြားခြတ်ရလ့်သည်။

နအောက်တွင်သည့်း “မပည်သူးသရဘား” အခက်းမြား၊မပည်ပြီဒီယားးမြားနိုင်သည့်းရကကွေးရကကာ်သမြားသည့်းကျောင်းမှားအတော်၊အရယ်းမြင့်းနိုင်စိမ်းမြောင်ခဲ့သည်။

နဝတ/နအောက်တွင်ပေိကခြားကိုးတည်သည့်းရကာလဟာလမြနှံ့်ခိြှုးမြားသည့်းကွပ်ကဲ့်သတင်းရပြားအစည်းမှား၊ အစိိုးးးလွဲ့စည်းမြားသည့်းအွဲှုးမှားသည်။

ြီးသတ်၊ တက်ကက်လှုပ်မြားသူမြန်စိုးမြန့်လက်ရာတပ်သောတင်ကိုတင်းစည်းမြားသည်မပည်သူးအားင်းးမြားသည်။မပည်သူးစွြးအားင်းးအားလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ ိိုသိိုးအမပင်ပေိပကခစတင်သူမြစ်လိုပ်ရဆာင်ခဲ့ကကသည်။

ရကာလဟလမြနှံ့်ခိြှုရနောက်ပိုစတားားအားလိုပ်ရဆာင်မြစ်သည်။၂၀၀၁ခုနစ်စက်တင်ဘာ၁၁က်အားလိကန်နိိုင်ငတိိုက်ခိိုက်းအပပမှားတွင်အစစလားနိုင်ငတိိုက်ခိိုက်းအပြုးမြားသည်ကိုရတွေ့သည်။ အစစလားမြားပြု၊ ဂီဟတ်စသည်တိိုးပြည်သူးမပည်တွင်းရန်အစစလားဝင်းအားလိုမြစ်သည်။ အစစလားးမြားသည် ဘာသာမခားးမှားနိုင်သည်။

ယူနိုင်ငတိိုက်ခိိုက်းအပြုးမြားသည် အစစလားသိိုးသွပ်သွင်းမြစ်သည်လိုပ်ရဆာင်ရနရကကာင်းမြားသည်။
မိုးထက်တနေ သရဘာတာ ြားမြနှံ့ခိခဲ့ကကသည်။ အစစလာြ်ဘာသာဝင်တိိုှံ့အရနမြင့်် ဘာသာမခာေးအြိေးသြီေးြာေးအာေးအိြ်ရာင်ဘက်အမြစ်ယူနိိုင်ပါက အစစလာြ်နိိုင်ငြားြာေးြ ဘွဲြိသူအလိိုက် ဆိုရငွ (သိိုှံ့) ရာက်ပ့်ရကကေးြာေးရပေးရကကာင်ေးဝါဒမြနှံ့်ခိြေးမပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။

သတိြွယ်အခက်တပ်ရတာ်အရနမြင့်် အိြ်ရာင် ြက်ြာေးအရပေါ်အရမခခတွက်ခက်ြှုြာေးမပလိုပ်လာခဲ့သည်။ သတင်ေးရပေးြာေးတွင် စနစ်တကကင်သိိုလ်ဝင်တန်ေးြရအာင်မြင်သူ) ြာေးနင့်က်ပ်ခွင့််တင်မခင်ေးအာေးခွင့််မပ မခင်ေးြာေး၊ ဘာသာမခာေး (သိိုှံ့) ဘွဲြိသူနင့်အိြ်ရာင်မပခဲ့သည့်တပ်ရတာ်အာေးအာေးအပ်ြက်ဌာနြာေးသိိုေးလွှဲရမပာင်င်ေးမခင်ေး၊ တပ်ရတာ်အတွင်ေးကာလကကာ ာူေးဆိိုင်ေးင့်မခင်ေးြာေးကိုလည်မပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။

နအြရခတ်တွင် လူိေး/ဘာသာရေးခွဲမခာေးြှုြာေးတွင် စနစ်တကကင်သိိုလ်ဝင်တန်ေးြရအာင်မြင်သူ) ြာေးနင့်က်ပ်ခွင့််တင်မခင်ေးအာေးခွင့််မပ မခင်ေးြာေးကိုရတွွဲ့သည်။ နိိုင်ငပိိုင်ြီဒီယာြာေးတွင် နိိုင်ငမခာေးဆနှံ့်ကင်ရေး၊ အြိေးသာေးရေးနင့် ဘာသာရေးအဆိိုအြိနှံ့်ာေးကိုပ ိုြန်ရြာ်မပခဲ့ပပီေး၊ ကန်ဝါဒမြနှံ့်ခိရေးပိုစြာေးကိုပေိပကခြာေးမြစ်ရပေါ်ရစလိိုသည့်အခိန်တွင်လည်ကာင်ေး၊ လူိုအာေးအရကကာက်တာေးမြင့်
စိုက်ပျိုးရေး ဖျင်ဖျင် နောက်ဆုံး အစိုးရာအနေဖြင့် ကျန်ရှိလျှင် အဝါရှင်ချောင်း

ပြည်သူရေးစုံစမ်းပွဲအပေါ် ပြည်သူရေးစုံစမ်းပွဲ ပထမဆုံးတွင် စိုက်ပျိုးရေးစုံစမ်းပွဲကို ကျန်ရှိနိုင်ရန်အတွက် အသိုးမပြုခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၀၇အခါက ရော်ဝါဆာရာစွန်းတွင် သင်္ချိန်တွင်လည်းရကာင်းစနစ်တက်ရာင်းနင်အသိုးမပြုကို ၂၀၀၁ခိုနစ်စတင်၍ ပြုကို ၂၀၀၀ခရိုနစ်ခကာကပွကာလမြန်းနိုင်ငတွင် အင်တာနက်အသိုးမပြုကို ၂၀၀၁ခိုနစ်စတင်၍ တွေ့ရသား တပ်ရတာစစ်ရကကာင်းာေး၊ စစ်ဌာနခပ်ာေးနင့်နနကိုနေ၊ နနတရလေးကဲ့သိို့ပြိွဲကကီးာေးတွင်သာအကနှံ့အသတ်မြင်စတင်ခွင့်မပြုကို မခင်းမြစ်သည်။ ရဝါရာင်ရတာ်လန်ရေးကာလတွင်မြန်းနိုင်ငတွင်အနိွဲ့အာေးစိုတွင်အင်တာနက်တဆင့်ဆက်သွယ်ရဆာင်ွက်ာေးကိိုအသိုးမပြုလိုပ်ရဆာင်ခဲ့သည်ကိိရတွေသည်။ မပည်ပြီဒီယာာေး၊ မပည်ပရာက်တွေလှုပ် ာေးသူာေးအရနမြင့်အင်တာနက်သတင်းစာက်နေား၊ ဘရလာ့်ာတဆင့်ရဝါရာင်လှုပ်ာေး၊ တပ်ရတာ၏က်စက်စွာတို့မပန်ရမြင်ငင်းာေးကိိုအခါနင့်တရမပညီကြ္ာသိိုးတင်မပနိိုင်ခဲ့သည်။ ယခင်အခါကာလက်နိိုင်ငတွင်အင်တာနက်က်နိိုင်ငတွင်လည်းအင်တာနက်ဘရလာ့်ရေးသားမခင်းမြစ်သည်။ အပ်ပျော်ရွှေးနိုင်သည်။ Opposite Eye အာေးာပညာရနသည့်တပ်ရတာအ ာေးယ်ာေးတွင်လည်းအင်တာနက်ဘရလာ့်ရေးသားမခင်းမြစ်သည်။ ိသည်။ ၎င်းတိို့အနက် Chat Box ရာဝန်ရာအပူဖြစ်ပြီး g-talki skype နောက်အင်တာနက်စွာယ်စွာပြောင်းလဲသည့်
မိးထက်တန 493 ဒီြိိုကရ စီအရ တက်ကကွလှုပ်  ာေးသူြ ာေးန င့်် စကာေးစစ် ိိုေးြှုြ ာေးမပ လိုပ်လာခဲ့သည်။ အရစာပိိုင်ေးတွင် တပ်ြရတာ်ြ  ၎င်ေးတိိုှံ့ ဘရလာ့်ရ ေးသာေးမခင်ေးအာေးတာေးမြစ်ကနှံ့်သတ်ြှုြ ာေး မပ လိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ ရနောက်ပိိုင်ေးတွင် အင်တာနက်၏ လူြှုကွန်ယက်ြ ာေး၏ ဝါဒမြနှံ့်ခ ိရ ေး၏  ိရ ာက်ြှုကိို သရဘာရပါက်နောေးလည်လာပပီေး ၂၀၀၈ခိုန စ် အရစာပိိုင်ေးတွင် အစိိုေး အရ ာက်အပ ့်မြင့်် ဘရလာ့်စာြ က်န ောြ ာေး၊ ဆိို  ယ်ြီဒီယာစာြ က်န ောြ ာေး၊ FM ရ ဒီယိို လိှုင်ေး ြ ာေး ရာင်၍ ဝါဒမြနှံ့် ာတွင်အသ ိုေးမပ ခဲ့သည်။ (ဥပြာ။ ပိရတာက်ရမြ)

အင်တာနက်န င့်် လူြှုကွန်ယက်ြ ာေး၏ အသ ိုေးဝင်မပနှံ့်န �ုပ ိုကိို စနစ်တက အသ ိုေးခ ခဲ့သည်။ မပင်ဦေးလွင်ပြိ ွဲ့အနီေး  တနောပ ိိုဒ်ဘာစီတီေးတွင် တပ်ြရတာ်ကွန်မပ တာရကာလိပ်ဆင်ေး တပ်ကကပ်ကကီေးြ ာေး၊ ဆက်သွယ် ရ ေးတပ်ြ  အင်ဂ င်နီယာြ ာေး၊ ရို  ာေးမပန်ပါ ဂူြ ာေးန င့်် အင်တာနက်အသ ိုေးမပ ြှု ရစာင့််ကကည့််မခင်ေး၊ အင်တာနက် စာြ က်န ောြ ာေးအာေး တာေးဆီေးမခင်ေးတိိုှံ့ကိို စတင်မပ လိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ ၎င်ေးြ ာတပ်ြရတာ်၏ အင်တာနက်အသ ိုေးခ  ဝါဒမြနှံ့်ခ ိရ ေးန င့်် ရစာင့််ကကည့်် ပ် ရ ေး အစီအြ ၏ အစမြစ်၍ ယခိုအ ခါ လူဦေးရ   ာဂဏန်ေးမြင့်် ရနမပည်ရတာ်တွင် အရမခစိိုက်၍ လိုပ်ရဆာင်လ က်   ိပါသည်။

အက်ပမြစ်စဥ်မြန်ြာနိိုင်င အိုပ်စိိုေးသူအဆက်ဆက်၏ ဘာသာရ ေးအသ ိုေးခ  နိိုင်င ရ ေးရဆာင် ွက်ခ က် ြ ာေး၊ အသ ိုေးမပ ပ ိုြ ာေးကိို တင်မပ ာေးမခင်ေးမြစ်ပါသည်။ ြဆပလရခတ်၊ ြဆလရခတ်တိိုှံ့တွင် လူြ ိ ေးရ ေး၊ ဘာသာ ရ ေး အသ ိုေးခ ြှု ာေးအရပေါ်  တိိုက်ရိိုက်ဆနှံ့်က င်သည့်် လှုပ်  ာေးြှုြ ိ ေး အာေးရကာင်ေးစွာြရတွွဲ့ခဲ့် ရပ။ လက်ဝဲ ပ်ခ သူ တိိုှံ့၏ ဘာသာရ ေးအသ ိုေးခ ြှု၊ လူြ ိ ေးရ ေးခွဲမခာေးြှုြ ာေး အရပေါ်ရဝြန်ရမပာဆိိြှုြ ာေး
မိုထက်တန်းထားျဖစ်ရသေးလည်း သီးမခားစီတည် သည့်် အြတ်လကခဏား ာေးက်လူတန်းစားအမြင်မြင့််ခဥ်ေးကပ်လာခဲ့်ပါသည်။

နှ/နဝတရခတ်တွင်ြှု စစ်အာဏာ င်စနစ်ဆနှံ့်က င်ရေးပင်ြည် ယ်ခက်ကိိုလူူ့အခွင့််အရ ေး၊ ကွဲမပာေးစိုလင်ြာ့်နိိုင်ငရ ေး၊ ဒီြိိုကရစီရေး၊ တန်းတူညီျရေး စသည့််သီးမခာေးတနိုေးတိိုှံ့မြင့်ခဥ်ေးကပ်လာခဲ့်သည်။ ဘာသာရေးပေိပကခ၊ လူိုေးရရေးကား ကင်ေးစင် န်ကကို လူးေးလှုပ်ေးကမ်းဝါဒနင့် ဘာသာရေး၊ လူိုေးရရေးကား မြန်ြာ့်နိိုင်ငရ ေးအခင်ေးအကင်ေးတွင်ပါဝင်လာခဲ့်သည်။

စစ်အာဏာတိိုှံ့ဘက်ြ  အာဏာတည်ပြဲရေးအတွက် ဗြာလူိုေးကကီးဝါဒနင့် ဘာသာရေး၊ လူိုေးရရေးကား မြန်ြာ့်နိိုင်ငရ ေးအနိိုင် ခဲ့်ပပီေး ဒီြိိုကရစီအရ ေးတက်ကကွလှုပ် သူြာေးဘက်ြ လူိုေးကကီးဝါဒနင့်အာဏာ င်စနစ်အမြစ်မပတ်ရေး၊ ဘာသာရေး၊ လူိုေးရရေးလွတ်လပ်ခွင့််နင့် ကွဲမပာေးစိုလင်ပငိြ်ေးခြ်ေးစွာ ရနိိုင်နိိုင်ရ ေးတိိုှံ့အတွက်ပ်ခတိိုက်ပွဲဝင်ခဲ့ကကသည်။

၂၀၁၀ ခရွ်းခကာက ပွကာလ၂၀၀၀ ရွေးရကာက်ပွဲအနိိုင် ပါတီ အြိုေးသာေးဒီြိိုကရစီအြွဲွဲ့ခပ်ပါဝင်သည့်် ၂၀၁၀ ရွေးရကာက်ပွဲတွင် အနိိုင် ခဲ့်သည့််မပည်ရပာင်စိုကကခိိုင်ရေးနင့် ြွဲ့ပြိ ေးရေးပါတီသည် ဒီြိိုကရစီအရ ေး၊ ပငိြ်ေးခြ်ေးရ ေး၊ လူူ့အခွင့််အရ ေး စသည့််စကာေးလိုေးြာေးကိို လိှုင်လိှုင်သိုေးစွဲခဲ့်သည်။ ၂၀၁၀ ရွေးရကာက်ပွဲ၌ မြန်ြာ့်နိိုင်ငရ ေးတွင်ပေိပကခခလိုပ်အမြစ်ကာလာ ည်ကကာစွာ တည်ခဲ့သည့်် ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်တွင်ရနိိုင်သည့််ရိိုဟင်ဂာေးအာေး White Card ြာေး ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်တွင်ရနိိုင်သည့်် ရိိုဟင်ဂာေးအာေးကြည်နေသည်။
မိီထ်တနာ အစစလာဳဘာသာဝင် ကိိုယ်စာေးလယ် ရလာင်းးားရွေးခယ် ရွေးရကာက်ပွဲဝင်ရာက်ရစမခင်းားကိုလည်း မပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။

ရွေးရကာက်ပွဲဆွယ်ကာလတွင်လည်း ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်ိရိိုဟင်ဂျားးာေးးနိိုင်ငံသားမြစ်ြှုခွင့််အတွက် ဆက်လက်လိုပ်ရဆာင်သွားည်းမြစ်ရကကာင့်ရမပာဆိိုစည်းးးာေးမခင်းာေးမပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်ကို ရတွွဲ့သည်။

တဘက်တွင်လည်း ၂၀၁၁ ခုနှစ်စတင်၍မပည်တွင်းစစ်ပ်စဲရေးနင််ပင်းခြ်းရေးအတွက် ရဆာင်ွက်းာေးရတွွဲ့ခဲ့သည်။

တပ်ြရတားအာရဟာင်းာေးမြင့်ြွဲ့စည်းးးာေးသည့််မပည်ရာင်စိုကကံြားရာ ေးနင့်် ြွ ွဲ့ပြိ ေးရေးပါတီသည် တပ်ြရတားအိုပ်ခပ်သည့််ကာလအတွင်ေး ၎င်းတိိုှံ့ကိိုတိိုင်ခိုင်ရေးနင့််ကွဲမပာေးစိုလင်ြှုလက်ခန်းရေးအရပေါ်အရလေးာေးသည့််ပါတီတပ်အမြစ်ပိုရြာ်ရဆာင်ွက်းာေးမပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။

၂၀၀၃ ခုနစ်ရကာက်ဆည်လူးိြ်ိိုင်းာေးရေး၊ ဘာသာရေးပေိပကန်တီသူတဦးအမြစ်ရာင်ဒဏ်ကခခဲ့သည့််နေညရကာက်သဃာတပါးမြစ်သည့််င်ဝီသူကိိုယ်တိိုင်ပင်လျှင် ၂၀၁၂ အရစာပိိုင်းမပန်လည်လွတ်ရမြာက်ပပီးရန်တွင် ရကာက်ဆည်ပေိပကန်ရကကာင့်ရာင်ဒဏ်ကခရနဆဲမြစ်သည့််အစစလာဳဘာသာဝင်ာေးလွှတ်ရမြာက်ရေးအတွက် ိုတ်ရြာ်ရမပာဆိိုြှုးာေးမပလိုပ်မခင်း၊ဆနဒမပပွဲာေးမပလိုပ်မခင်းစသည့််ကွဲမပာေးစိုလင်ြှုဆိိုင်ာလှုပ်ာေးမပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။

ိိုအချင်းကာလအတွင်းရပါင်းာေးစွာပိုသွင်းခခဲ့သည့််နိိုင်ငံမခာေးသာေးရကကာက်ရာဂါ၏ သက်ရာက်ြှုကိိုလည်း
မိ ားထက်တန

၂၀၁၂ ခုနှစ် ဧပြီလတွင် ကင်ပျစ်ခဲ့သည့် ကကားများကို ပျစ်ပါဝင်ခဲ့သည်။ အရကကာင်းမပျစ်သည်။ မော်ရတာင်းစီး ကိန်းရက်း အသိုပ်တွင် အာဏာမပျစ်ကြသည်။ အာဏာမပျစ်ကြသည်။

ယခု သားဒီးကရစားလွဲ့ပါဝင်သည်။ ပိုက်လိုင်းရက်းလှုပ်ရာသဲမှုများအရ ပျစ်နှုပ်သည်။ အာဏာမပျစ်ကြသည်။ အာဏာမပျစ်ကြသည်။

ယခုလူ့အခွင့်ကိုရှုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ မြစ်ခဲ့ပါဝင်သည်။ အကကားအကကားအကကားခဲ့သည်။
မိးထက်တန် 497 လွတ်ရတားသိို့ ပြေးသည်။ ပြေးကာလသည် တရိုတ်နိုင်ငံမြန်မြားစေတွင် ကိန်းမပေးစေ ဥပေဒ် အရပ်များ မပည်သူလူ့ဆိုင်ကာ ငြှုန်းဆုံးအခိုးလည်းမြစ်သည်။ ၂၀၁၂ ခုနှစ် ဂျွန်လတွင် ၎င်းမပည်နယ်၌ စစ်ဖွယ် ကင်ရေးလှုပ်ရာတွင် ရပ်ခဲ့ပါက်ခဲ့သည်။ အချိန်အရမ်းအရ ွဲ့အရမပြင်အရုံးများ ကိုည်တွေ့သည် ဘာသာရောပါကခြားသို့မပန်လည်မြစ်ရပ်ခဲ့သည်။ အေးမြင့်တရိုတ်ကိုန်ပစစည်ဆန်ကင်ရေးလှုပ်ရာတွင် ဘာသာတူဆိုင်းတွင်သာရစ်ဝယ်ယူလှုပ်ရှုံးမြှုံးမပြီးပျော်သည်။ ၉၆၉ စာရက်အရေအရ ညွယ်တိုက်ခိုက်သည် သတင်းစကားမြစ်ခဲ့သည်။ ၂၀၁၂ နှစ်လက်ပါဝင်မြစ်သည် တရိုတ်ဆန်ကင်ရေးလှုပ်ရာတွင်အရမပြုတွင် အေးကိုည်တွေ့ခဲ့သည်။ ဥပေဒ်တရားတရားကိုန်ပစစည်ဆန်ကင်ရေးလှုပ်ရာတွင်အရမ်းအရမပြင်အရုံးများ ၏ရှုသို့မပြီးပျော်သည်။ ၉၆၉ ဖော်စာရက်နှင့်ပတ်သက်သည် အလုံရဆာင်ပိုဒ်၊ အေးတဆိပ်၊ သီခင်း၊ ဂေါနယ်၊ စာရဆာင်စသည် သကဂတမပြုရေးယိုက်စနစ်တက်ရှိင်လာခဲ့သည်။ မြန်မြားနိုင်ငံသားများအကီးအကီးဥပေဒ်လှုပ်ရာတွင် လူမြစ်ရပ်က်ခဲ့သည်။
ယနေ့မှာလည်း မိုးထက်တန် ၂၀၁၃ ခုနှစ် မိုးထက်တန် အိမ်လေးကဏ္ဍအား အမြင့်ဆေးတွန်းပို့ရပြီး အခန်းကဏ္ဍအရကွဲ့မြစ်ပြီး အခြေအနေ့သူတွင် အစစလား့ကင်ရေးလှုပ် ာေးြှုြာေးနိုင်ငှံ့အနှံ့အမပိုးအယ်မပနှံ့်ဆေးရပါက်ခဲ့သည်။ ြဘသာအွဲ့ာေးနိုင်ငှံ့ြွဲ့စည်းမခင်း၊ ၉၆၉ အိြ်ာေးအြတ်တဆိပ်ြာေးအာေး အိြ်ြာေး၊ ရစေးဆိိုင်ြာေး၊ စက်သိုေးယာဥ်ြာေးတွင်တပ်ဆင်မခင်းစသည့်လှုပ် ာေးကယ်မပနှံ့်စွာမပလိုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး ဘာသာဝင်ြာေးအာေး ဦေးတည်သည့်တိိုက်ခိိုက်ြှုြာေး၊ ပေိပကခြန်တီေးမခင်းြာေးကိိုနိုင်ငှံ့မပလိုပ်ခဲ့သည်။ ရာ့ဟင်ဂျာဟူသည့်အရခေါ်အရဝါးအစနိိုင်ငှံ့ဆိိုနိိုင်ြှုြ ိမခင်းအဝါဒမြနှံ့်ခိြှုြာေးမပလိုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး ဘာသာစကား၊ ယဥ်ရက်းြှုြာေးလူြှုစီးပွာေးအရမခအရန်တိိုှံ့အမလိုက်ထွက်လာသည့်တူညီြာေးကယ်မပနှံ့်ခဲ့ပြီး နိုင်ငှံ့ဝါဒမြနှံ့်ခိြှုြာေးအာေး အင်တာနက်လူြှုကွန်ယက်ြာေးတဆင့်စနစ်တကမြနှံ့်ရဝခဲ့ကကမခင်းမြစ်၍ လှုပ် ာေးြှုြာေးအတွက် ခိန်းဆိိုမခင်း၊ ရကာလဟာလမြနှံ့်ခိမခင်းြာေးကို ြတူညီသည့်အရကာင့််အတိုရပါင်ေးြာေးစွာြမပလိုပ်ခဲ့ပြီး ယရနှံ့ Facebook ကိိုယ်တိိုင်ြအြိုန်ေးစကားမြနှံ့်ခိသူြ ာေးအမြစ်သိုေးစွဲသူအခြွဲ့အာေးအရေးယူြယ် ာေးပပီေးရန်တွင်ပင်၎င်ေးအြိုန်ေးစကားမြနှံ့်ခိ သူြ ာေးအမြစ် သိုေးစွဲသူအခြွဲ့အာေးအရေးယူြယ် ာေးပပီေးရန်တွင် အရေးယူြယ် ာေးကို မြစ်ပွာေးခဲ့သည့်လူြိုန်ေးစကားမြနှံ့်ခိသူြာေးအတွင်း မြစ်သူြာေး၊ ညီညာမြင့်ရသာ်အတွင်း မြစ်မက်လုန်းမြန်တီေးခဲ့ကကသည်။
မိုးထက်တနိုင်ညွှန်းရကာင်း ဘာသာရေးပေးပကခြားကိိုဆနှံ့်ကင်ခဲ့ကကပပီးလူနည်းစိုအစစလာြ်ဘာသာဝင်တိိုှံ့အရပေါ်ကာကွယ်ရစာင့််ရ ာက်ခဲ့ကကသည်။ ၂၀၁၄ သန်ရခါင်စာင်းရကာက်ယူြှုြမပပဲခန်လပ် ာေးခဲ့သည်။ White Card ြာေးကိိုလည်းမပန်လည်သိြ်ေးယူခဲ့ပပီးအကိုဆက်အာေးမြင့်၂၀၁၅ရွေးရကာက်ပွဲတွင် ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်ဘူေးသီေးရတာင်၊ရြာင်ရတာနင့်စစ်ရတွပြိွဲ့နယ်ာေးတွင်ြပဲခွင့််ိသူအရအတွက်ြာင်းစွာရလာ့ကခဲ့သည်။ ိိုှံ့အမပင်မပည်ရာင်စိုကကိုရရ ေးနင့်ြွဲ့ပြိေးရေးပါတီသည်လည်းအစစလာြ်အြတ်ရလာင်းာေးတင်သွင်းမခင်ေးြိရတာ့်သကဲ့သိိုှံ့ပါတီကကီေးအြာေးစိုတွင်လည်းအစစလာြ်ဘာသာဝင်လွှတ်ရတာ်ကိိုယ်စာေးလယ်ရလာင်းာေးပါဝင်ခဲ့်မခင်ေးြ ိရတာ့်ပါ။ ဗိုဒဓဘာသာဝင်လူာေးစိုရာက်ခြုအတွက်ည်ွယ်၍လိုပ်ရဆာင်ခဲ့်မခင်ေးမြစ်သည်။ အြိေးသာေးဒီြိိုကရစီအြွဲွဲ့ခပ်အစိိုေးအြွဲွဲ့အာဏာပပီးခိန်တွင်ရပေါ်ရပါက်ခဲ့သည့််၂၀၁၆၊၂၀၁၇ခိုနစ်ြာေးတွင်မြစ်ပွာေးခဲ့သည့််ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်လူာေးရေးဘာသာရေးမပဿနောြာေးအပပီးတွင်ြူရိိုဟင်ဂ ာဟူရသာလူာေးအြည်အစာေး ဘဂဂါလီအြည်ကိိုတွင်ယ်စွာသ ိုေးစွဲလာကကယ်စွဲကကိုယ်စာေးလျှြကက”ရိိုဟင်ဂ ာ”ဟူရသာစကာေးလိုေးသည်ပင်လျှင် အြိေးသာေးသစစာရြာက်၊OICအရာက်ပ စသည့််အဓိပပါယ်ကိိုကိိုယ်စာေးမပသည့််သြွယ်မြစ်ရပေါ်လာခဲ့သည်။ မပည်တွင်ေးြီဒီယာြာေး
မိ ားထက်တန

| 500 |

အခြေခံ၍: အကြမ်းများစွာ ဤသပ်ပြုခြင်းနှင့် အခြေခံ၍ လော အစား ပြုစုထားသော မိုးစုံကို သို့မဟုတ် ခိုင်မိုင်းသော့်အရာများ အသိုးမပြုသော များကို အသိုးမပြုထားသော ၂၀၁၇ တွင် လွဲမှားခြင်းသည်။ သို့သော် အစား သို့မဟုတ် စွာ ဘဂဂါလီအသိုးမပြုခြင်းကို အသိုးမပြုထားသည်။ မိုးစုံကို တက်ကွဲလွဲ့သူကြား လှုပ်ရာသွားပေးနိုင်သည်။ မိုးစုံကို တက်ကွဲလွဲ့သူအခွင့်အရ ေးတွင် အစစလာ့သူ အမြင့်ဆိုးရှိပေးညွှန်းသည်။

ယခင်က လွဲမှားရေးအရ ေး၊ ဒီ့ိုကရစီအရ ေးပ်ခြင်းကို အသိုးမပြုထားသည်။ မိုးစုံအမြင့်ဆိုးအရ ေးနင့်က င့်ဝတ်ဆိုင်ရာကို ရှုရာင်းချင်းကို စွက်းလှု့ ေးသည်။ လက်ရတွက် မြန်းနိုင်ငံတွင်က င့်သိုးလက်သည့်တော်ေးနင့် ကိုလိိုနီအစိုးေးလက်ကိုစတင်ခဲ့သည်။ အဆက်ဆက်အိုပ်စိုးသူတိို့ အလိုက်မပင်ဆင်မြည့်စွက်းလှု့ခဲ့သည်။

အားလုံးကိုရှုရှုပေးဖွေပါကြောင်း အားလုံးကိုရှုရှုပေးသော ပြုစုထားခြင်းကို မှန်ကန်သော့်အရာတွင် ဆိုသည်ဟု အစိုအေးငြှု့ပေးသည်။ အစိုအေးငြှု့ပေးသည်။ လူ့အခွင့်အရ ေးစနှုန်း၊ ကင်ဝတ်စနှုန်းသာေးနင့်ကို ရသွားလက်သည်။ ြျှတ၍ လွဲမှားရေးအရ ေးစနှုန်း၊ လွဲမှားရေးကင်ဝတ်စနှုန်းသာေးနင့်ကိုက်ညီသည်။ ဥပရဒြာေးမြင့်သာတာဥပရဒြာေးမြစ်၍ လွဲမှားရေးအရာမြင့်သာတို့ အရကာင်အည်ရာ်နိိုင်ညီသည်။

အများသားခရ်းဝါဒ (၂၀၁၈)

လက် ကာလ မြန်းနိုင်ငံရေးတွင် အသိုးမပြုခြင်းကို ေးသာေးရေးအစွန်းရာကိုလှုပ်ရာသွားရန် သကဲ့သို့မဟုတ်အစိုအေးငြှု့၊ လူပိုဂ့္ေးသူတိို့ အလိုက်ရပေးရန် အစွန်းရာကိုလှုပ်ရာသွားထားသည်။
မိားထက်တန | 501

ြသိက ိ ေးကျွမပ ရနသည့်် သူြ ာေးြာ အြ ာေးစိုမြစ်၍ အြ ိ ေးသာေးရ ေးအစွန်ေး
ရ ာက်ြှုအာေး ခိုခဆနှံ့်က င် န်ကကိ ေးစာေးရနသူြာြူ လူနည်ေးစိုအမြစ်သာ
ရတွွဲ့မြင် သည်။

အမျ ်းသာ်းခရ်းအစွန်းခရာကမျာ်း
အြ ိ ေးသာေးရ ေးအစွန်ေးရ ာက်အြွဲွဲ့ြ ာေးသည်

ဘာသာရ ေးလူြ ိ ေးရ ေး

အစွန်ေးရ ာက်လှုပ် ာေးြှုြ ာေး ပိိုြိိုမပ လိုပ်လာခဲ့်သည်ကိို ရတွွဲ့ ိ သည်။
ရိိုဟင်ဂ ာတိအ
ိုှံ့ ရပေါ်ဆနှံ့်က င်ရ ေးလှုပ် ာေးြှုြ ာေးသာြက

တိိုင်ေး င်ေးသာေး

လက် နက်ကိိုင်ြ ာေးအာေး အမပ တ်တိိုက် န် ရတာင်ေးဆိိုြှုြ ာေး မပ လိုပ်မခင်ေး၊
တပ်ြရတာ်၏

ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်နင့််

ပါဝင်ရဆာင် ွက်ြှုြ ာေးကိို ရ

မပည်တွင်ေးစစ်

ပွဲြ ာေးတွင်

ာက်ခမခင်ေး၊ “ဝက်သာေးစာေးပွဲရတာ်” ကဲ့် သိိုှံ့

ဘာသာအယူဝါဒတ ပ်အာေး ရလာင်ရမပာင်နြ
ိ ့််ခ သည့်် အခြ်ေးအနောေးြ ာေး
က င်ေးပမခင်ေး

အစစလာြ်ဘာသာဝင်တိိုှံ့

ဝတ်မပ ဆိုရတာင်ေးမခင်ေး၊

ဘာသာရ ေး

ဆိိုင် ာအခြ်ေးအနောေးက င်ေးပမခင်ေး

တိအ
ိုှံ့ ာေးတာေးမြစ်

ရနောက်ယက်မခင်ေးကဲ့် တိိုှံ့ မပ လိုပ်ခဲ့်သည်။ ဤကဲ့်သိိုှံ့ အစွန်ေးရ ာက်
အြ ိ ေးသာေးရ ေး လှုပ် ာေးြှုြ ာေးကိို

ိရ ာက်စွာတာေး န် တာဝန် ိသူ

တိဘ
ိုှံ့ က်ြ ပ က်ကွက်ခဲ့် သည်ကိို လည်ေးရတွွဲ့
တာေးမြစ်ြြ
ှု ာေးကိို
သာသနောအာေး

လူြ ာေးစိုဗိုဒဓဘာသာြ ာေး၏
ရစာ်ကာေးသည့််

တမိုှံ့ ပန်ခဲ့်သည်ကိိုရတွွဲ့
က င်အြ ိ ေးသာေးအစည်ေးအရိုေး

သည်။ အစိိုေး ၏
အမြင်တွင်

အြိနှံ့်အမြစ်

သည်။
(KNU)

ဘာသာ

ပိုရြာ်ဝါဒမြနှံ့်ခ က
ိ ာ

တပ်ြရတာ်အစိိုေး လက်
အာေး

က်

ပြိ ခ န်အတွက်

ဘာသာရ ေးအ ရသွေးခွဲ အသိုေးမပ ခဲ့်သည့်် ဗိုဒဓဘာသာ က င်အစည်ေးအရိုေး
(DKBA)

နင့််

၂၀၁၀

တွင်

ြနယ်မခာေးရစာင့််တပ်အမြစ်ရမပာင်ေးလဲြွဲွဲ့စည်ေးခဲ့်သည့််

DKBA
တပ်ြ


နိုင်ငံရေး၏ ပျော်ရွှင်တို့အကြောင်း အချက်အလက်များ နေထိုင်ကြသည်၏ လက်ထက် သို့ကောက်ခြင်း၏ အရောင်းအဝေး အုပ်စုအားလုံးကို စီမံမှုရေး တည်ဆောက်ရာ အထူးသဖြင့် သင့်ကြက် ရေးသားခြင်းထဲမှာ လည်ပညာရေးတို့တွင် ကျင်းပစ်သည်။ သင့်ကြက်တွင် အခြေခံသောအရောင်းအဝေးများကို စီမံမှုရေး တည်ဆောက်ရာ အထူးသဖြင့် သင့်ကြက်ရေးသားခြင်းထဲမှာ လည်ပညာရေးတို့တွင် ကျင်းပစ်သည်။ ဒီကြက်တွင် အခြေခံသောအရောင်းအဝေးများကို စီမံမှုရေး တည်ဆောက်ရာ အထူးသဖြင့် သင့်ကြက်ရေးသားခြင်းထဲမှာ လည်ပညာရေးတို့တွင် ကျင်းပစ်သည်။ ဒီကြက်တွင် အခြေခံသောအရောင်းအဝေးများကို စီမံမှုရေး တည်ဆောက်ရာ အထူးသဖြင့် သင့်ကြက်ရေးသားခြင်းထဲမှာ လည်ပညာရေးတို့တွင် ကျင်းပစ်သည်။

လိုအပ်ချက်
လိုအပ်ချက်များကို ရှာဖွေပေးမည်။ ရှာဖွေရာမှာ အလားတို့ကို များစွာစီမံမှုရေး တည်ဆောက်ရာ အထူးသဖြင့် သင့်ကြက်ရေးသားခြင်းထဲမှာ လည်ပညာရေးတို့တွင် ကျင်းပစ်သည်။ ဒီကြက်တွင် အခြေခံသောအရောင်းအဝေးများကို စီမံမှုရေး တည်ဆောက်ရာ အထူးသဖြင့် သင့်ကြက်ရေးသားခြင်းထဲမှာ လည်ပညာရေးတို့တွင် ကျင်းပစ်သည်။ ဒီကြက်တွင် အခြေခံသောအရောင်းအဝေးများကို စီမံမှုရေး တည်ဆောက်ရာ အထူးသဖြင့် သင့်ကြက်ရေးသားခြင်းထဲမှာ လည်ပညာရေးတို့တွင် ကျင်းပစ်သည်။ ဒီကြက်တွင် အခြေခံသောအရောင်းအဝေးများကို စီမံမှုရေး တည်ဆောက်ရာ အထူးသဖြင့် သင့်ကြက်ရေးသားခြင်းထဲမှာ လည်ပညာရေးတို့တွင် ကျင်းပစ်သည်။
မပည်ပြီးနောက်တိုင်းရင်းမှာ ဆိုသည်းသောစားနေသောစားသောကြည့်စားပါသည်။

ဆိုသည်းသောစားနေသောစားသောကြည့်စားပါသည်။

အရဒပျံသမားအားဖြင့် ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်ပါသည်။

အရဒပျံသမားအားဖြင့် ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်ပါသည်။

ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်သည်။

ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်သည်။

ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်သည်။

ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်သည်။

ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်သည်။

ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်သည်။

ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်သည်။

ဆိုသည်းပြုလုပ်သည်။
မိုးထက်တနရေးအရပ်ရကာင်စွာနေားလည်မခင်းသပဲန်သတင်းေးအသိုးမပြေးလျက်ကော့ဝင်ရာက်စွက်န်ကကိုးစားရန်ပီးတပ်ရတာသည်အစိုးခွန်းခေးရာများများတပ်းချုပ်ကာင်းစွာနေားလည်မခင်းသပဲသို့မဟုတ်အာေးဆန်းကင်သည့်လှုပ်ရာေးအေးကိုစစ်ေးရဟာင်းအွဲွဲ့အစည်းတဆင့်လိုပ်ရဆာင်ရန်သည်။

နိုင်ငံခရ်းပါတီများမပည်ရတာင်စိုကကိုခိိုင်ရေးင့်ြွဲွဲ့ပြိေးရေးပါတီအပါအဝင်ပါတီအွဲွဲ့သည်အိုးသားရေးလိှုင်းအာေးအသိုးခွင့်အရမခြင်းသည်။မပည်ရာင်စိုက်ခိိုင်ရေးင့်ြွဲွဲ့ပြိေးရေးပါတီဖြင့်ပါတီအွဲွဲ့လွဲ၍ပါတီအိုးစိုတွင်ရခါင်းရဆင်ကကသူေးတခြိန်ကစစ်အာဏာင်စနစ်အာေးဆန်ကင်ခဲ့ပေးနိုင်ငံတကာအာေးဆန်စီေးနိပ်စက်ခဲ့သူေးမြစ်သည်။

ဗိုဒာဓဘာသာဝင်းာေး၏ရာက်ခြှုရစန်ည်ခက်အသီးသီးအာေးအရမခြင်းသည်။နိုင်ငတကာအရေးယူေးေးအရပ်တိုမပန်သည်ြာေးပူးရပါင်းိုတ်မပန်ခဲ့ကကသကဲ့်သိိုးအြိုးသားရေးအစွန်းရာက်အွဲွဲ့ြာေးင့်ြွယ်ခက်အသီးသီးမြစ်သည်။

မိုးထက်တန်းာေးတရားနည်းပညာပေးသူများာေးတရားများပေးသူများအထူးာေးအိုးအာေးအစွန်းရာက်အွဲွဲ့ြာေးင့်ြွယ်ခက်အသီးသီးသည်။
အချိန်လိုက်ရှုးသူအာဦးလိုက်စာမျက်နှာပြင်တွင် - အမှားအပြုအခြေခံသူဦးထောင်ရှုးပြန်သူများ၏ ရွေးချယ်ရေးစီအဖွဲ့ ပေးလျက်ရှိသည်။ အမှားအပြုအနေဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲရေးစီအဖွဲ့ရှုးပြန်သူများ ဖော်ပြသည်။ အမှားအပြုအနေဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲရေးစီအဖွဲ့ရှုးပြန်သူများ ဖော်ပြသည်။ အမှားအပြုအနေဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲရေးစီအဖွဲ့ရှုးပြန်သူများ ဖော်ပြသည်။ အမှားအပြုအနေဖြင့် ပြောင်းလဲရေးစီအဖွဲ့ရှုးပြန်သူများ ဖော်ပြသည်။
မိ ားထက်တနောအာေး အစိုးရအြွဲ့အရနာနောင်အတွက် ပိို့အရာကို ညွှန်ကြားသည်။ ိုသို့ြှု့ခွင့်ကို လိုပ်ရဆာင်လက်ရတွဲ့ပူးရပါင်းရဆာင်ွက်သည်။ ိုသိုှံ့ညွယ်ရဆာင်ွက်တွင်ရဆွေးရနွေးညိနိှုင်ေးြှု၊ အြို့သာေးမပန်လည်သင့််မြတ်ရုန်းင်ေးတာအရမခခလိုအပ်ခက်မြစ်သည်။ တပ်ြရတာ်ဘက်သယမြစ်ြွယ်လက်ရတွဲ့ပူးရပါင်ေးရဆာင်ွက်လိုြှုအရမခအရန်အာေးပို့ခွင့်အရ ြာေးမပာေးစိုလင်သည့််အရမခအရန်အာေးလက်ခနိိုင်ြှုြာအတာေးအဆီေးအကနှံ့်အသတ်ြာေးစွာမြင့််ပိတ်ဆိိုှံ့လက်သည်။ တပ်ြရတာ်ပိိုင်မြန်ြာ့်စီေးရုန်းပွာေးရုန်းပိိုင်ကိုြပဏီအပါအဝင်ရခတ်အဆက်ဆက်အိုပ်စိိုေးသူြာေး၏အကြောင်းအရပ်စိိုေးသည့််အတွက်မပလိုပ်နိိုင်မခင်ေးြပဲတပ်ြရတာ်၏နိိုင်ငရုန်းတာယူသည့််အသာယူြာေးစွာမြင်ခိုန်တွင်အြို့သာေးမပန်လည်သင့််မြတ်ရုန်းခါင်းစဥ်သည် ဒီြိိုကရစီအခွင့််အရာလူအခွင့််အရာန င့််ြ၀ေးသည့််တည်ဆဲဥပရဒြာေးကိိုသာဆက်လက်ကြားရိုေးရန ပပီေးလူနည်ေးစိုတိိုင်ေးင်ေးသာေးြာေး၊ လူနည်ေးစိုဘာသာဝင်ြာေး၊ ြီဒီယာြာေးန င့််လူူ့အခွင့််အရာတက်ကကွလှုပ် ာေးသူြာေးအရပေါ်လွှဲြ ာေးသည့််တပ်ြရတာ်စီင်ရုန်းမြင့််သာကင်ေးသိုေးလက် ပဲြိိုက်ြှုြာလာနိိုင်သည့််အတွက်မပ လိုပ်နိိုင်မခင်ေးြပဲ နိိုင်ငရုန်းရာင်းကိုြာင်းတွင်ပို့ဦေးပိိုင်ကိုြပဏီ
မိးထက်တနာ တာစီ င်ရေးအလွဲအာေးကိုလည်း တာစီဥပရဒစိိုေးြာေးအမြစ်ပ်ခေကာင်အည်ရြာ်ရနည့် အရမခအရနမြစ်သည်။ အိုသားမပန်လည်သင့်မြတ်ရေး ဦးစားရပ်ဆာင်ရွက်းရပေးလိုပ်ရဆာင်ရွှုအာက်တွင်အစိိုးအြွဲွဲ့အရနမြင့်တိိုင်းင်းသားလက်နက်ကိိုင်အြွဲွဲ့ြာေးအပါအဝင်ရိိုဟင်ဂာြာေး၊ လူ့အခွင့်အရေးကာကွယ်ရစာင့်ရာက်သူြာေးအရပေါ်အရတွေးအရခေါ်အပင်ကာကွယ်ပ်ခေရပေးနိိုင်မခင်ေးအာေးနည်းခဲ့်မခင်ေးြာလက် ိမြန်ြာနိိုင်ငရေးအာေးဆိိုေးဝါေးသည့််အရမခအရနသိိုှံ့တွန်ေးပိိုှံ့ရပေးသည့််အရကကာင်တစ်ပ်မြစ်သည်။

အစိိုးအြွဲွဲ့အရနမြင့်ိုသားရေးအစွန်းရာက်အာက်တွင်ရိိုဟင်ဂာြာေးကိိုသာြကမြန်ြာစလင်ြာေးအရပေါ်ည်ရွယ်သည့််ပခိြ်ေးရမခာက်စကာေးြာေးသည်အစိိုးအြွဲွဲ့၏လူိုင်းရေး၊ ဘာသာရေးသရဘာာေးကိိုရစာင့်ကကည့််သရိုပ်ခွဲြှုလိုပ်ရဆာင်န်လိိုအပ်ရနပပီေးမြစ်ရကကာင်ေးအခက်ရပေးရခါင်ေးရလာင်ေးသပင်မြစ်သည်။ နိိုင်ငတကာပညာင်းမြားပါဝင်သည့််အကကရပေးအြွဲွဲ့ြာေး၊စိုစြ်ေးရေးအြွဲွဲ့ြာေးကိိုအစိိုးဦးရဆာင်ြွဲွဲ့စည်ေးခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်းတပ်ြရတာ်၏သရဘာတူညီြှုြသည့််အတွက် ဗောင်းအြွဲွဲ့ြာေး၏အကကမြပ်ဵးက်ာေး၊ ရတွွဲ့ိသည့််အတွက် ၎င်ေးအြွဲွဲ့ြာေးကိိုမြန်ြာမခင်ေးြာေးက်သိြ်ေးန်ကကိေးစာေးခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်းတပ်ြရတာ်၏သရဘာတူညီြှုြသည့််အတွက် ၎င်ေးအြွဲွဲ့ြာေးကိိုမြန်ြာမခင်ေးြာေးက်သိြ်ေးန်ကကိေးစာေးခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်းတပ်ြရတာ်၏သရဘာတူညီြှုြသည့််အတွက် ၎င်ေးအြွဲွဲ့ြာေးကိိုမြန်ြာမခင်ေးြာေးက်သိြ်ေးန်ကကိေးစာေးခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်းတပ်ြရတာ်၏သရဘာတူညီြှုြသည့််အတွက် ဗောင်းအြွဲွဲ့ြာေးကိိုမြန်ြာမခင်ေးြာေးက်သိြ်ေးန်ကကိေးစာေးခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်းတပ်ြရတာ်၏သရဘာတူညီြှုြသည့််အတွက် ဗောင်းအြွဲွဲ့ြာေးကိိုမြန်ြာမခင်ေးြာေးက်သိြ်ေးန်ကကိေးစာေးခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်းတပ်ြရတာ်၏သရဘာတူညီြှုြသည့််အတွက် ဗောင်းအြွဲွဲ့ြာေးကိိုမြန်ြာမခင်ေးြာေးက်သိြ်ေးန်ကကိေးစာေးခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်းတပ်ြရတာ်၏သရဘာတူညီြှုြသည့််အတွက် ဗောင်းအြွဲွဲ့ြာေးကိိုမြန်ြာမခင်ေးြာေးက်သိြ်ေးန်ကကိေးစာေးခဲ့်ရသာ်လည်းတပ်ြရတာ်၏သရဘာတူညီြှုြသည့််
ဗုဒ္ဓဝိဟာရတွင် ပြုလုပ်ထားသည်မှာ နိုင်ငံတကာရာသံကြိုက်နာမှုများကို အထောက်အကူဆောင်ရွက်နေကြပါစေသည်။

စာပိုဒ်:

နိုင်ငံတကာအပေါ်တွင် ပြုလုပ်ထားသော နိုင်ငံတကာရာသံကြိုက်နာများသည် သက်ရှိသော အဆင့်အတန်းကို အထောက်အကူဆောင်ရွက်နေကြပါစေသည်။ သို့သော် အဆင့်အတန်းကို အထောက်အကူဆောင်ရွက်နေကြပါစေသည်။

ထို့အပြင် ဗုဒ္ဓဝိဟာရကို ပြုလုပ်ပြီး ရာသံကြိုက်နာများကို အထောက်အကူဆောင်ရွက်နေကြပါစေသည်။

ဗုဒ္ဓဝိဟာရတွင်ပြုလုပ်ထားသော နိုင်ငံတကာရာသံကြိုက်နာများသည် သက်ရှိသော အဆင့်အတန်းကို အထောက်အကူဆောင်ရွက်နေကြပါစေသည်။

ယင်းအပေါ်တွင် ပြုလုပ်ထားသော နိုင်ငံတကာရာသံကြိုက်နာများသည် သက်ရှိသော အဆင့်အတန်းကို အထောက်အကူဆောင်ရွက်နေကြပါစေသည်။

ယင်းအပေါ်တွင် ပြုလုပ်ထားသော နိုင်ငံတကာရာသံကြိုက်နာများသည် သက်ရှိသော အဆင့်အတန်းကို အထောက်အကူဆောင်ရွက်နေကြပါစေသည်။

ယင်းအပေါ်တွင် ပြုလုပ်ထားသော နိုင်ငံတကာရာသံကြိုက်နာများသည် သက်ရှိသော အဆင့်အတန်းကို အထောက်အကူဆောင်ရွက်နေကြပါစေသည်။
မျိုးထက်တန်းထိုင်းစိုတိုင်းရင်းသားများအြေးသားရေးဝါဒအာေးရကာင်းလားင့်အတူမြန်းလူးကကီးဝါဒသာကသက်ဆိိုင်းတိိုင်းင်းသားအသီးသီးတိို့တွင်လည်းအြေးသားရေးဝါဒကကီးစိိုးလားင့်အေးကိိုရတွွဲ့သည်။ကိိုယ်ပိိုင်အတ်လကခဏားမြလားင့်အေးကိိုမပလိုပ်လာကကသည်။ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်တွင်ခိိုင်လွတ်လပ်ရရှုးြှုအခြ်းအနေားကိိုကင်ခဲ့ပပီး ၎င်းမြန်းဘိုင်၏ကင်ရက်တိိုက်ခိိုက်ြှုရကကာင့်ရပေါ်ရပါက်ခဲ့သည်။၂၀၁၈ခိုတွင်ိုအခန်းအနေားအာေးကင်ပခွင့်အာေးတာမြစ်ခဲ့ပပီးအစိိုးအဆက်ဆက်၏နိိုင်ငရာအာဏာအတွက်လူးကကီးဘာသာရာအရပေါ်အသိုးခြှုာမြန်းနိိုင်ငရာတွင်ယရနှံ့တိိုင်အသက်ဝင်ဆဲမြစ်သည်။ယခိုအခါတွင်ရိိုဟင်ဂာဆနှံ့်ကင်ရအာေးမြန်းြိုသားရေးဝါဒပင်အရတွေးအရခေါ်အမြင့်ကယ်မပနှံ့်စွာခွင့်မပါသည်။အမပင်လည်းကခင်မပည်နယ်၌ကခင်လူးစိုတစိုနင့်တစိုအကကား၊ကခင်နင့်ြေးနီတိိုင်င်းသားြာေးနင့်ပအိိုဝ့််၊ပရလာင်စသည့်ြိုင်င်းသာေးြာေးအကကားလူဦေးရပါင်းနှံ့ရနိုင်းသပြင်းအစိိုးအဆက်ဆက်၏နိိုင်ငရာအာဏာအတွက်လူးကကီးဘာသာရာအရပေါ်အသိုးခြှုာမြန်းနိိုင်ငရာတွင်ယရနှံ့တိိုင်အသက်ဝင်ဆဲမြစ်သည်။
အချိန်ကြီးလာရေးသူများကို ကြည့်ရှုပေးကာ ပြုလုပ်သော နာမည်ကို ဖော်ပြသော်လည်း အခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးပါသည်။ အချိန်ကြီးလာရေးသူများကို ကြည့်ရှုပေးကာ ပြုလုပ်သော်လည်း အခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးပါသည်။

Facebook ပေါ်တွင် Closed Group/Secret Group ဖော်ပြသောအခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးကာ ပြုလုပ်သော်လည်း အခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးပါသည်။ မိဘိုင်းများနှင့် လေးတစ်ဦးအနေဖြင့် လေးတစ်ဦးအနေဖြင့်

စီစဉ်ဖော်ပြသောအခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးကာ ပြုလုပ်သော်လည်း အခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးပါသည်။

အကက္ကလေးမှ အခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးကာ ပြုလုပ်သော်လည်း အခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးပါသည်။

အမှန်တကယ် အခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးကာ ပြုလုပ်သော်လည်း အခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးပါသည်။

မြန်မာနိုင်ငံရှိအခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးကာ ပြုလုပ်သော်လည်း အခြေခံကြည့်ရှုပေးပါသည်။
မိ ားထက်တနှံ့က်ယူဖြစ်သည်။ လက်  ိက င့််သ ိုေးလ က်သည့်် အစိိုေးမပန်လည်လက်ခ ရ ေးဆိိုင် ာေး၊ တိိုင်ေး င်ေးသာေးလက်နက်ကိိုင်တပ်ြ ာေး အရပေါ်သရဘာ ာေးြ ာေးအ  မပန်လည် လက်ခ ရ ေးန င့််ပငိြ်ေးခ ြ်ေးရ ေး ည်ြ န်ေး ခ က်ြ ာေး မပည့််ဝနိိုင်ြွယ်ြ  ိရပ။ ၂၀၁၂ ခိုန စ်အတွင်ေး ရန ပ်စွနှံ့်ခွာြှုြ ာေး စတင်ခဲ့်ပပီေး ယခိုတိိုင်ြိြိတိိုှံ့ ရဒသသိိုှံ့မပန်လည် အ ရမခခ နိိုင်မခင်ေးြ  ိရသေးသည့်် ဒိုကခသည်ြ ာေးြ ာ ဘဂဂလာေးရဒ့်  ်နိိုင်င န င့််  ခိိုင်မပည်နယ်အတွင်ေး သိန်ေးရပါင်ေး ြ ာေးစွာ   ိရနဆဲမြစ်သည်။ ဒိုကခသည်စခန်ေးြ ာေးတွင် ရန ိိုင် သူြ ာေးအရနမြင့်် ပညာရ ေး၊ စီေးပွာေးရ ေး၊ လူြှုရ ေးန င့်် ယဥ်ရက ေးြှုစသည့်် အရမခခ အခွင့််အရ ေးန င့်် ကာလာကကာမြင့်သည်န င့််အြျှ စိတ်  ည်သည်ေးခ ြှုြ ာေး ရလ ာ့်က မခင်ေး၊ ရြျှာ်လင့််ခ က်ကင်ေးြလဲ့မခင်ေး စသည့်် အရမခအရန ာေး အရပေါ်အရမခခ သည့်် တ ိုှံ့မပန်လှုပ်  ာေးြှုြ ာေး အခ ိန်ြရ ွေးရပေါ်ရပါက်နိိုင် သည့်် အရမခအရနမြစ်သည်။ ပညာသင်ကကာေး န်အခွင့််အရ ေးန င့်် ရဝေးကွာရနသည့်် ဘဂဂလာေးရဒ့်  ်နိိုင်င   ိ ဒိုကခသည် လူငယ်ရ ာင်ရပါင်ေးြ ာေးစွာသည် အကကကြ်ေးြက်ဝါဒ၏ စည်ေးရ ိုေးရ ေးပစ်ြ တ်မြစ်ရနနိိုင် သကဲ့သိိုှံ့ ၎င်ေးတိိုှံ့လူူ့အသိိုင်ေးအဝိိုင်ေးတ ခိုလ ိုေး တန်ေးတူညီြျှြှု   ိရ ေးန င့််လွတ်ရမြာက်ရ ေး လှုပ်  ာေးြှုအတွက် လည်ေး ကကီေး ြာေးသည့်် အရမခခ အင်အာေးစိုအမြစ်   ိရနပါသည်။ လူူ့အခွင့််အရ ေး အရမခခ အခ က် ြ ာေး အ ပင်လူသာေးြ ိ ေးနွယ်တခို အရနမြင့်် သင့််  ိိုက်သည်ြ ာေးကိို ရက ာ်လွန်၍ အရ ေးတကကီေး လက်ရတွွဲ့လိုပ်ရဆာင်သင့််သည်ြ ာေးကိို ြမပ လိုပ်ပဲ သြိိုင်ေးရ ေးမငင်ေးခိုန်ြှုြ ာေး၊ အယူဝါဒကွဲမပာေးြှုြ ာေး၊ လူြ ိ ေးရ ေး အရမခခ ြိုန်ေးတီေးြှု စသည့်် သတ်ြ တ်ခ က်ဆိိုင် ာ သ ရဘာြတူညီြှု
မိုးထက်တနှီး အချိန်ရွေးရပ်ကွဲနိုင်သည် မပြန်းထောပ်အမြစ်ဦးည်သည်။

အရေးကြီးမှု ရောင်းပွေါ်စရာများ လေးစာစီစာရင်း ရွေးချယ်ပါသည်။
ခက်သီ

၅၁၃ လူ့တန်းသိြ်း င်းသွားရလာက်တဲ့်အ ိရအာင် ယဉ်ရက ေးတဲ့် ကြ္ာြ ာ သင့််ရတာ့်လိိုှံ့လာေး ။

တိ ိစဆာန်လိို ခခ ခတ်ပိတ်ဆိိုှံ့ ာေးခ  တဲ့် လူသာေးြ ိ ေးနွယ်စို တခိုဟာ လူသာေးရတွ ဲွဲ့ အရမခခ  ပိိုင်ခွင့််ရတွ တာေးမြစ် ိန်ေးခ  ပ်ခ  ာေး တဲ့် လူသာေးြ ိ ေးနွယ်စိုဟာ လူနဲှံ့လူခ င်ေးကိို ဘို ာေးသခင် ဲွဲ့ အခွင့်် ူေးခ လူသာေးရတွအမြစ် အာေးက ရငေးရြာ င်ေးသာ ရြျှာ်ကကည့််ရန တဲ့် လူသာေးြ ိ ေးနွယ်စိုဟာ ိရနရသေးတယ်ဆိိုရ ိုနဲှံ့ လူသာေးဆန်တဲ့် အမခာေးကြ္ာသာေးရတွြ ာ တာဝန်  ိသွာေးပပီ။

ဂူတာမပင်ြ ာ အင်းဒင်ြ ာ အမခာေး ကြ္ာ့် တရန ာ ာြ ာ ြ ိ ေးနွယ်စိုတခိုခိုကိို ည် ွယ်ပပီေးသတ်မြတ်ရနတဲ့် ဂ ီနိိုဆိိုက်ရတွ   ိရန ဲွဲ့။

အတ ိုေးအရ ိုေး ရသဆ ိုေးသွာေး တဲ့် ကရလေးသူငယ် နဲှံ့ သက်ကကီေး ွယ်အိိုရတွ

ဘယ်လိိုမပစ်ြှု ြ ိ ေးနဲှံ့ ရသဆ ိုေးသွာေး တယ် သိလိြ့််ြယ်ြဟိုတ်ဘူေး

ဘို ာေးသခင်နဲှံ့ရတွွဲ့ င် ရြေးကကလိြ့််ြယ် ကျွန်ိုပ်တိိုှံ့
ဗိုလ်ချီကျောင်းသား ပူဟူကျောင်းသား နောက်ပိုင်းခွင်အဖွဲ့မှ ပြည်သူ့ အများဆုံး လူများအတွက် အပြောင်းအလှုများ ရှိခဲ့သော အခြေခံမှ အကယ်၍ ကြားစွာ ပြောဆိုချက်များ တင်ခံအောင် ရှိနိုင်မည်။
Gu Dar Pyin

Khet Thi

Like them, we are also the mixed-blood descendants of Pyu, Sak, and Kanyam. The myth of a pure Kshatriya bloodline will make a mockery of your idiosyncrasies.

Does our civilized world still permit the deprivation of the dignity of a community? The community is rounded up and fenced off like animals. The community has been denied their inherent rights. The community has no choice but to envy the privileges that others enjoy as the gift of God. For those in the world with a conscience, their very existence is enough reason to protect them.

There are genocides in Gu Dar Pyin, in Inn Din, and elsewhere, That took the innocent lives of even children and the elderly. None of the victims know what sin they have committed. But when they meet God hereafter, they could ask, “Are we free from hell now?”

5/9/2019
About the Authors

Wai Moe is a former prisoner of conscience turned journalist, who has written for The New York Times, Foreign Policy, Washington Post, The Thomson Reuters Foundation, The Irrawaddy and other outlets.

Michael W. Charney is Professor of Asian and Military History at both the Center for International Studies and Diplomacy and the Department of History at SOAS, University of London. He has worked on the history of Myanmar, and particularly Rakhine State (Arakan), for thirty years and is the author of four monographs on the history of the country. He is also on the Board of Directors of the INGO, Forces for Renewal for Southeast Asia.

Htet Min Lwin is a doctoral student in Religious Studies at York University, Toronto. He received an MA degree in political science from the Central European University, Budapest, with a thesis on the trajectory of Ma Ba Tha. He was previously founding country director (2016-2020) of the Forum of Federations Myanmar Office, working with many major stakeholders on federalism/decentralization and local governance. His interests are in the intersections of religion and politics, religious ideology, Buddhism, social movements, participatory democracy, decentralization/federalism, culture, Burmese political philosophy, and Southeast Asia.

Nikita Gehlot has an M.Phil. Degree and is currently doing a PhD in Political Geography at the Jawaharlal Nehru University of New Delhi. Her research studies narratives of border crossings by Rohingya refugee women living in India and reflects on how the categories of citizenship and statelessness are understood from the perspective of women migrants in the context of forced migration and gender-based violence. Nikita is particularly interested in citizenship, statelessness, women, border crossings, forced migration, and gender-based violence.
Elliott Prasse-Freeman is an Assistant Professor at the National University of Singapore. He received his PhD from Yale University's Department of Anthropology based on long-term fieldwork in Myanmar on Burmese subaltern political thought and activism. He is the co-editor of Unraveling Myanmar's Transition: Progress, Retrenchment, and Ambiguity Amidst Liberalization (NUS Press, 2020) and is working on book projects on Burmese activism and mass violence against the Rohingya, respectively.

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Shae Frydenlund is a feminist economic geographer whose research on labor and forced displacement is informed by questions of racialization and gendered inequality. Her work has been published in the Journal of Cultural Geography, Geoforum, and Himalaya: Journal of the Association of Nepal and Himalaya Studies. She earned her PhD in Geography from the University of Colorado Boulder and is a Global Shifts postdoctoral fellow at UPenn Perry World House and the Center for Research in Feminist, Queer and Transgender Studies.
Shunn Lei is a feminist activist and researcher from Yangon.

Tharaphi Than is currently an Associate Professor at the Department of World Languages and Cultures and Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Northern Illinois University. Her research interests include women, gender, feminism, dissent, print media, and cartoons. Along with feminists from Myanmar and India, she is working on Field Feminisms, an edited volume to be published by Amsterdam University Press. She is also one of the editors for Humanities across Borders: A Methodologies Book Series to be published by the same press. She spends three-quarters of the year in the US and another quarter in Myanmar or traveling.

Dr Ma Thida is a surgeon and writer who still practices both of her careers in Burma. In addition to working at a nonprofit hospital and clinic, she is also an editor and publisher of a youth magazine in Yangon and has written mostly short stories since her late teenage years. Her first novel, The Sunflower, is in Burmese, and she also writes in English sometimes. She writes commentary for fifty short stories monthly at one reputable Burmese literature magazine. Though she is mainly recognized as a short story writer, she now writes many non-fiction articles. She was in prison from 1993 to 1999 for her political activities in Burma. Thida has been awarded a Babara Goldsmith Freedom to Write award, Reebok Human Rights Award, and American Association of Arts and Science's honored award in 1996 and 1997 while she was in prison. Her works have been translated into the English, Japanese, Catalonia, and Macedonian languages. She was a Radcliffe fellowship fellow in 2009-10 and now is a visiting scholar at the Southeast Asia study council at Yale University.

Aiden Moe was one of the Myaung Mya Youth Network's founders in 2012, together with three youth activists. In 2016, Aiden co-founded Burma Monitor and worked as the Program Director until 2018. Burma Monitor extensively monitors hate speech
and disinformation in Myanmar and publishes the peace process daily journal and runs counter-disinformation campaigns. Since 2018 October, Aiden has been working for the Myanmar Tech Accountability Network (MTAN) as the Technical Advisor. MTAN is a network of Myanmar civil society organizations coordinating efforts to mitigate the risk of social media-induced violence and political instability in Myanmar.

**Moe Htet Nay** is a former student activist.

**Khet Thi** is the pseudonym of Zaw Tun, a native of Pale Township, Monywa. He was a political activist who actively took part in historical political movements such as the 1996 student uprising and the 2007 saffron revolution. He was a protest leader in the spring revolution of 2021 until he was arrested by soldiers on 8 May in Shwebo Township. He was tortured to death by 9am the next day, 9 May 2021.