Naw Htee Ku & Kasper Hoffmann | ယခုဆောင်းပါးကို မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ဖတ်ရှုရန် ဤနေရာတွင် နှိပ်ပါ

Cite as: 
Naw Htee Ku, & Hoffmann, K. (2026). Shifting Tides: Political Ruptures and Environmental Activism in Tanintharyi Region. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 7. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5649

Abstract

This article examines the transformation of environmental activism in Tanintharyi Region since the 1990s, emphasizing the impact of significant political ruptures on activists. Using qualitative methods including interviews and autoethnography, and by incorporating social movements theory, we argue that these ruptures create new challenges and opportunities that shape activists’ ability to challenge public authorities. We demonstrate how sudden and dramatic political shifts have spurred changes in the environmental movement, which has evolved from an initial emphasis on human rights to a focus on Indigenous rights and now centers on revolutionary action and humanitarian aid.

Introduction

When political space gradually opened in Myanmar in the 2010s, environmental activism emerged as an important form of political contestation and advocacy, including in Tanintharyi Region (henceforth just Tanintharyi). The military junta’s brutal crackdown on dissent following the 2021 military coup profoundly impacted the vibrant environmental activism in Tanintharyi. Activists could no longer advocate for environmental rights and protection openly. Many were forced to flee, go into hiding, and/or join the growing movement resisting military rule. However, the 2021 coup was not the first political rupture experienced by all environmental activists in Tanintharyi. For decades, Tanintharyi activists have had to adapt to political change affecting the environment and their ability to challenge state and business interests.¹

In this article, we explore the transformation of environmental activism in Tanintharyi since 1992, including how sudden and dramatic ruptures² in Myanmar’s political arena in the mid-2010s, and the 2021 military coup, affected environmental activism. Our main argument is that ruptures produce new constraints, but also new opportunities that condition activists’ capacities to make collective claims and challenge public authorities. For instance, while the 2021 coup forced environmental activists underground, they responded with innovative, mainly online forms of protest, using communication technologies that were unavailable during previous periods of military rule.³

We explore the transformation of environmental activism through case studies in three demarcated periods. These are the period from 1992-2012 prior to the bilateral ceasefire between the military and the Karen National Union (KNU), the period from 2012-2021 following the ceasefire and up to the coup, and the post-coup period (2021-present). For the first period, our case study is a lawsuit against the Unocal corporation, a company based in the United States (U.S.), which struck a deal with the Myanmar military to build a pipeline crossing through Tanintharyi. For the second period, we focus on a campaign against the Ban Chuang coal mine, a complex joint venture between Thailand and Myanmar investors. For the third period, we examine the mostly online Blood Money Campaign led by Myanmar youth targeting foreign companies whose investments finance the military regime.

To analyze these cases, we draw on a combination of social movement theory⁴ and the literature on public authority in conflict-affected areas and during times of rupture.⁵ Several scholars studied plural authorities and the emergence of hybrid governance in conflict areas with limited statehood prior to the coup, focusing predominantly on service delivery, including justice and education.⁶ Park⁷ studied agrarian and environmental movements through a gendered perspective while Sekine⁸ worked on the struggles of agrarian climate justice before the coup. Adam Simpson’s Energy, Governance, and Security in Thailand and Myanmar⁹ examines how large transnational energy projects—pipelines and dams—often erode environmental security and justice for marginalized communities under authoritarian or hybrid regimes. At the same time, Simpson shows that environmental activism can act as a vital counterbalance to state and corporate power. However, we do not yet know how such activities evolved over time and were affected by different political ruptures. By exploring these issues, this article contributes to Myanmar scholarship on the linkages between politics, ruptures, and activism.¹⁰

We used qualitative methods to undertake our research, including the first-hand experiences of the first author, who is a veteran environmental activist from Tanintharyi. As such, the article is partly an autoethnographic account of environmental activism, which we combine with analysis of the broader context of political transformation.¹¹ The authors also undertook twenty semi-structured interviews with leaders of Myanmar and border-based civil society organizations (CSOs) and members of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). We used semi-structured interviews to understand why our interlocutors are involved with environmental activism, what meaning they ascribe to being an environmental activist, and their overall experiences as part of the movement, in particular their experiences of the struggles with public authorities.¹² We analyzed these interviews as subjective narratives that provided insights into the identities and claims of the activists. The interviewees were selected through snowball sampling and were interviewed in the Karen, Burmese, or English languages (depending on the interviewee’s choice). Some interviewees were interviewed more than once. We acknowledge that key informant interviews often reflect official narratives and conceal marginal perspectives and power relations. However, we have sought to nuance our analysis and make it more representative through contextualization and by using other materials¹³ such as environmental organizations’ public-facing publications and communications (research papers, reports, statements, websites, and Facebook pages). The first author also conducted participant observation by attending online press conferences, meetings and workshops with other environmental activists to observe in detail how activists organize and mobilize. This provided a window into how online environmental activism is practiced today.

The article is structured as follows. First, we discuss our key concepts and the theories that we draw on. Subsequently, we expand on the historical context of Tanintharyi. We then present our analyses of environmental activism between the 1990s and today, moving chronologically from period to period. In the conclusion we reflect on what can be learned about the relationship between environmental activism and public authority in conflict-affected regions during times of rupture.

Rupture, the Political Opportunity Structure, and Social Movements

In this article we contextualize the transformation of environmental activism in relation to the concept of rupture, defined as “open moments” that create new constraints, incentives, and opportunities.¹⁴ In the context of post-coup Myanmar, marked by extreme repression and economic hardship, Thawnghmung et al. have shown that resistance shifted towards what they call “accommodation”; that is, actions that combine compliance and passive resistance, allowing individuals to prioritize survival while subtly undermining the regime.¹⁵ To use the terminology of Tilly & Tarrow, ruptures radically change the “political opportunity structure” in a given regime.¹⁶ In this article, political opportunity structure refers to the properties of what Olivier de Sardan calls a “local political arena”,¹⁷ understood as the space—both in conceptual and geographical senses—where political activities and interactions occur.¹⁸ The political arena concept is appropriate for studying political struggle in Myanmar, as it helps to understand politics in postcolonial contexts in which a multiplicity of actors, such as militias, insurgents, NGOs, customary leaders, businesses, state institutions, etc. compete for public authorityover territory, resources and populations, particularly at the local level. By public authority, we mean the capacity to institute and enforce norms and rules in a given political arena in relation to particular issues, such as taxation, land rights, the environment, health and security and justice provision.¹⁹ In the context of legal pluralism, such as that observed in Tanintharyi, public authority changes as various actors gain or lose the ability to assert it, depending on the fluctuations of power struggles. This phenomenon is especially evident during moments of upheaval.

We focus on how ruptures transform the relationship between environmental social movements and public authorities. Social movements are groups of people which challenge the interests and rules of public authorities. Some of the distinguishing features of social movements are that they make “sustained claims” which draw on specific “repertoires of contention” that are based on common goals and “political identities”.²⁰ These common goals and political identities often grow out of feelings of injustice, of solidarity, and of common interests among activists. Yet unless they can maintain their momentum as a collective, movements can also disperse into isolated malcontent groups or individuals.²¹ The concept “repertoire of contention” is a key term within social movement theory. It refers to the arrays of contentious performances that are known by and available to a set of political actors at a given point in time.²² Repertoires are both strategic and purposeful, as social movements frequently use cultural rituals and performances to intentionally challenge authorities. They involve contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are framed and deployed to challenge public authorities. Lastly, they mobilize supporters through the construction of a shared political identity; that is, the collective labels the movement members use to define themselves—we women, we citizens, we peasants, we Karen, we environmentalists, we human rights defenders, we revolutionaries.²³ Environmental activists in Tanintharyi have over time challenged public authorities with different claims, performances, and political identities, but these have been shaped by ruptures in the opportunity structure of the Tanintharyi political arena.

Overview of Tanintharyi

Located in southeast Myanmar, Tanintharyi borders the Andaman Sea to the west and the Tenasserim Hills and Thailand to the east. To the north is Mon State. It is home to a culturally, religiously, and ethnically heterogenous population. The majority religion is Buddhism, with substantial Christian, Muslim, and Hindu minorities. The region is home to ethnic Dawei people, also called Tavoyans, as well as ethnic Mon, Bamar, and Mokens. It has vast tracks of primary tropical forests with high degrees of biodiversity. However, over time these delicate ecosystems have been threatened and increasingly destroyed by state and business expansion, as well as by conflict and ceasefire dynamics. Due to its rich forests and biodiversity, a large number of top-down national and international conservation projects were initiated in Tanintharyi following the bilateral ceasefire between the KNU and the military in 2012. Communities in Tanintharyi were quickly pressured by land grabs and natural resource extraction through mining, logging, and palm oil concessions. Tanintharyi is also a region characterized by plural authorities and hybrid governance, due to decades of ethno-nationalist armed conflict.

Soon after independence from the British, Tanintharyi became a site of armed struggle between the nation’s military and ethnic Karen armies. The political organization the KNU was established on 5 February 1947 with the aim of achieving independence for Karen people. The KNU laid claim to parts of what are now recognized by the military administration as Tanintharyi and Bago regions, as well as Karen and Mon states. This is a contiguous land area the KNU calls Kawthoolei—in English, “the land without darkness.”

Armed struggle affiliated with the KNU started in late 1947 with the founding of the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) but rapidly escalated in 1948. Since then, Burma’s national administration controlled the Tanintharyi capital city, Dawei, but the KNU and its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), which formed after the KNDO and later incorporated it, fought for control of the Karen-populated rural areas.²⁴ This armed struggle lasted until 2012, when a bilateral ceasefire was signed between the Myanmar government and the KNU.

The governance structure of the KNU comprises seven districts, each with a KNLA brigade and a set of administrative structures and departments, including ministries of health, education, justice, agriculture, and forestry.²⁵ As a de facto federation, these seven districts enjoy significant autonomy in local governance and financial management.²⁶ Within the KNU administration, Tanintharyi is referred to as Mergui-Tavoy District. It is under the KNLA’s Brigade 4, which is more autonomous than other brigades, in part because of the geographical distance from central KNU authorities.²⁷ Until recently, the KNU was the only armed actor challenging the public authority of the Myanmar state in Tanintharyi.²⁸ However, after the coup, more armed actors claiming public authority emerged in the region, in particular People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). In the following sections we go deeper into the shifting political history of Tanintharyi, and how environmental activism was shaped by this history, through our case studies.

Period 1: Military Rule Prior to 2012

In the mid-1990s, Myanmar’s military carried out several offensives against KNLA Brigade 4 in Tanintharyi. Many Karen civilians fled to refugee camps along the Burma-Thailand border, while others were forcibly resettled by the military into relocation sites along military-controlled roads.²⁹ These offensives enabled the military to expand control in areas in which the KNU had already built roads, were providing services, and were protecting the forests.³⁰ The loss of KNU territory paved the way for the military to grant large-scale palm oil concessions to investors.³¹

Due to the military regime’s restrictions on politics at that time, it was impossible for civilians to engage in on-the-ground activism, let alone directly confront military authorities and investors to defend local populations. However, environmental activism of different kinds began to blossom among refugee populations living in the Myanmar-Thailand border region.³² Among these were the Karen Nature Conservation Group (KNCG) founded in 1997 by Karen refugee students and teachers in Mae Ra Moe/Mae Ra Ma Luang Camp in Thailand. Another was the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN) founded in 2000 by Saw Paul Sein Twa and members of the KNCG. Since its establishment, the latter has engaged in complex environmental campaigns, including training, awareness raising, the promotion of conservation, documentation of environmental issues and public-facing advocacy.³³ The first case study below represents this early phase of activism in Tanintharyi, when it was mostly organized outside of the country.

Case 1: The Unocal Lawsuit

In 1992 the transnational petroleum companies Unocal and Total formed a joint venture with the Myanmar junta to build the Yadana and Yetagun pipelines in Tanintharyi, constituting the first major foreign investment in oil and gas signed by the military.³⁴ In 1994, the military carried out operations against the KNU, ostensibly to provide security for the pipeline project.³⁵ These operations included widespread violence against civilians and forced relocations by the military. Many were murdered, detained and tortured.

One Karen refugee living in the Myanmar-Thailand border area, Ka Hsaw Wa, documented these atrocities. He could not challenge the pipeline project within Myanmar, due to the authoritarian nature of the military government.³⁶ However, in the early 1990s, he met Katie Redford, an American law student who was teaching along the Myanmar-Thailand border. Together they worked on the case. After completing her law degree in the U.S., she returned to the Myanmar-Thailand border area, accompanied by another lawyer. In 1995, Ka Hsaw Wa and the two American lawyers co-founded EarthRights International (ERI) – a nonprofit organization focusing on the protection and promotion of environmental and human rights through legal actions, training, and advocacy campaigns. ERI debuted by campaigning against the regime and companies involved in the pipeline project, pointing to the atrocities committed.³⁷ ERI filed a lawsuit against Unocal in a U.S. federal court in Los Angeles on behalf of fifteen local Karen and Tavoyan plaintiffs aiming to obtain compensation for human rights abuses, including torture, murder and forced relocation.³⁸ In 1997, the court agreed to hear the case against the companies registered in the U.S.

ERI utilized the Alien Tort Statute, which is a law that allows foreign nationals to seek remedies in U.S. courts for human rights violations committed outside the U.S. However, the case was severely delayed. To maintain pressure on Unocal and its partners and create awareness of the case, a transnational network sprang into action. It consisted of environmental organizations based on the Myanmar-Thailand border, such as the Southeast Asian Information Network, the Karen Human Rights Group, and KESAN. The network continued to document and monitor the abuses committed in connection with the pipeline project. ERI conducted media interviews and made documentaries that highlighted the atrocities and environmental destruction wrought by the construction of the pipelines. They also worked with groups like OILWATCH, Environmental Rights Action, and the Sierra Club. Due to the prohibitive political opportunity structure within Myanmar, the campaign mainly targeted an international audience and company shareholders. The lawsuit finally concluded in 2005, with the company agreeing to compensate the fifteen plaintiffs with an undisclosed amount.³⁹

This case study shows that even in non-democratic regimes, political opportunity structures simultaneously produce constraints and opportunities for political activists. Indeed, during the period of military dictatorship, any kind of open opposition was met with violence and repression. So, political opponents mounted challenges from border areas, despite the military’s sustained efforts to control its populations through violence and isolate the country internationally. An encounter between a Karen refugee and an American lawyer became a catalyst for the formation of a transnational network of activists campaigning against the pipelines. It is noteworthy that the network chose what students of courts and movements have called “legal mobilization” to contest the pipeline project —a strategy that initiated the civil rights movement in the U.S. in the 1950s.⁴⁰ Hence, the network’s key contentious performance drew on a deeply rooted repertoire of contention, which, it can be assumed, was familiar to its American members. It is probably not coincidental that the main allies of the Karen activists were American lawyers. Alongside legal mobilization, the network used mass media and produced its own documentaries to raise awareness of the case in international audiences, tried and tested contentious performances used by social movements across the world. Moreover, protests were organized at the company’s headquarters. For instance, Burmese and American activists organized a demonstration carrying effigies of Unocal’s chief executive and a Burmese military officer during a Unocal company shareholders’ meeting on 24 May 2004 in Los Angeles.⁴¹

Though they obviously implied concern for the environment, the contentious performances and the shared purpose and political identity of this early social movement were centered less on the environment than on human rights. This was because the premise of the legal claim was that the human rights of local residents had been violated. The campaign put a spotlight on how the construction of the pipeline led to atrocities. To the degree that Unocal agreed to pay compensation to fifteen plaintiffs, the challenge can be considered a success. The collective action and sustained claims of this network can be seen as an environmental social movement in the making.

Period 2: The Rupture of the 2012 Bilateral Ceasefire

After five decades of military rule, political reforms in Myanmar began during President Thein Sein’s tenure, with by-elections held in April 2012. The National League for Democracy emerged from these as a dominant political party.⁴² This partial democratization significantly reshaped Myanmar’s political opportunity structure. Civil society could better participate in politics and effect change.⁴³ An increasing number of environmental organizations emerged in this period, and, from 2012 onwards, activists abroad started to move back to Myanmar. In turn, this led to more open protests and challenges to the junta. For instance, activists protested large dam construction projects like the Myitsone Dam.⁴⁴

The years following 2012 were marked by an acceleration of economic growth and the development of infrastructure increased in Tanintharyi after the signing of ceasefires. The KNU signed a bilateral ceasefire on 12 January 2012 and on 15 October 2015 it joined the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.⁴⁵ In Tanintharyi, the 2012 ceasefire led to a radical rupture in the political opportunity structure in the local political arena. Before the ceasefire, the expansion of extractive industries had been hampered by the ongoing conflict between the KNU and the military. The ceasefire removed this hindrance leading to a different power dynamic. In place of an armed struggle between the KNU and the junta, a new form of mixed rule emerged. The semi-civilian government granted land concessions for logging, rubber plantations and mines to cronies, army commanders, and foreign investors, which Kevin Woods calls “ceasefire capitalism.”⁴⁶ A significant development was that local KNU leaders started participating in these processes. Even as the KNU developed policies to recognize customary land rights, it collaborated with the government to grant concessions to investors, even when they lacked provisions for environmental protection.⁴⁷ For instance, certain leaders of the KNU’s Brigade 4 registered private companies like Noble Prince, which signed a memorandum of understanding with Burmese and Chinese companies for a hydropower dam on the Tanintharyi river, and for the Mae Tha Mee Khee industrial project.⁴⁸ While the KNU had crucial public authority among local communities for its engagement and delivery of public services, certain leaders jeopardized it by participating in ceasefire capitalist activities.⁴⁹

Moreover, the ceasefire agreement allowed the central government to extend its administrative reach in the region, including through internationally funded conservation projects.⁵⁰ The World Wildlife Fund, Fauna and Flora International, and the Wildlife Conservation Society all set up offices in Dawei, partnering with the central government to implement conservation projects. The most notable conservation project was the Ridge to Reef Project covering 3.58 million acres of land (35 percent of Tanintharyi Region).⁵¹In addition, the government granted licenses for several large-scale infrastructure projects, including the Dawei Deep Sea Port, which was a central component of the Dawei Special Economic Zone (SEZ) project,⁵² the Launglon coal power plant, and the Tanintharyi Dam. None of these initiatives were implemented with meaningful consultation with local communities, fueling widespread activism.

Yet, just as the transformation of the political opportunity structure in Tanintharyi created opportunities for public authorities and businesses to control territory and exploit natural resources, it also allowed the emergence of a dynamic social movement. This movement sought to protect local communities and the environment from encroaching businesses and public authorities. As one Karen activist and environmental NGO executive director recalls:

I received frequent phone calls from local community members seeking advice when investors started clearing their orchards and they were sued by the companies.⁵³

The movement involved some actors of the network that contested the pipelines project; however, it was much larger in scale. The members were a diverse group, both ethnically and religiously, and they hailed from across Tanintharyi as well as the camps on the Myanmar-Thailand border. A significant shift was an increase in funding and support from the refugees living in the border region to organizations inside Myanmar.⁵⁴ In this sense, it was a transnational movement. Yet in contrast to the movement that contested the pipelines, the leaders of the new movement were based inside Tanintharyi. For example, after 2010, several local organizations in Tanintharyi established an online presence for the first time, creating Facebook pages to disseminate information, mobilize new members, and raise public awareness of regional issues.

These local organizations documented the negative impacts of the encroachment of extractive industries, infrastructure development, and conservation projects on local communities. For example, they documented cases of involuntary resettlement, unfair and unequal compensation, lack of transparency and consent, and intimidation by both local KNU/KNLA and state authorities. A young executive director of a local NGO who was involved in the movement described her reasons for joining:

I involve myself and participate in the movement as I want to see social and environmental justice. For any (major business) investment, there should be accountability.⁵⁵

The activists claimed that the projects threatened the livelihoods and culture of local Karen and Tavoyan communities since the areas covered their farmlands, orchards, herbal forests, and community fishponds. The movement gained a victory when its activism resulted in the cancellation of the 4,000 megawatt (MW) coal power plant in the Dawei SEZ in 2012 and the 500 MW coal plant in Launglon Township in 2016. A middle-aged Tavoyan activist shared details of the movement and their different strategies:

We organized activities such as plastic waste collection, peaceful protests, and cycling events. Our approach is grounded in three principles: 1) activities should be easily accessible for everyone; 2) activities should ensure safety for all participants; and 3) activities should leave participants feeling they’ve made a positive contribution.⁵⁶

The movement was initially supported by the Eastern People Network based in Thailand, which shared their own experiences from campaigns in Thailand. Later, activities were adapted to local traditions and culture. For example, when a company representative arrives at a village, the community members would beat their pots in protest. Traditionally, this was done to scare off the evil spirits. The following case study explores how the rupture of the 2012 ceasefire created new opportunities, incentives and constraints in the local political arena of Tanintharyi for public authorities and activists.

Case 2: Contesting the Ban Chaung (Paw Klo) Coal Mine

The Ban Chaung coal mine project was situated in a mixed-control zone where the KNU and the Myanmar central government shared and competed for public authority. The project was a complex joint venture involving a Myanmar investor, the Mayflower Mining Company, and a Thailand investor, the East Star Company. Given the prevailing legal and institutional pluralism in Tanintharyi, the mine needed permission from both the KNU and central authorities. While the Myanmar company sought permission from the latter, the Thai company negotiated permission from Brigade 4 of the KNLA, which had more de facto authority on the ground.

Once operations started, local Karen communities witnessed their environment degrade. The pollution of water sources was experienced as the most serious problem. The pollution of vital natural resources prompted a local Karen civil society organization called the Tarkapaw Youth Group and local community leaders to mobilize affected Karen communities to protest against the mine.⁵⁷ They formed committees that reached out to regional and international organizations such as the Spirit in Education Movement (SEM), ERI, and Inclusive Development International, alongside academics, lawyers, researchers, media, and civil society groups. The SEM is based in Thailand, and they played an important role as they had extensive experience protesting industries polluting in Karen areas inside Thailand.⁵⁸ The movement organized trips to both sides of the border. In this way, a transboundary network of mutual learning between Karen groups based in Tanintharyi and Thailand developed.

As a result of these extensive mobilization efforts, people from the affected areas started to protest against the mine, claiming that it threatened their culture, livelihoods, and environment. A young Karen woman from a village impacted by the coal mining commented: “I grew up in this area and I don’t want my village to be destroyed by coal mining. So, I started to get involved in the movement.”⁵⁹

The movement employed a large spectrum of contentious performances. They included the documentation of how various species, in particular fish, herbal medicines, and other plants, in particular trees, were threatened by the coal mine. The knowledge produced was publicized through the launching of reports (see figure 1 for an excerpt).

Figure 1
Seventy fish and aquatic species threatened by the coal mine as documented by local activists and villagers in 2017.⁶⁰

Also utilized were community activities such as interfaith prayers, singing contests, fish conservation ceremonies, sports competitions, and celebrations of cultural and traditional events like the wrist-tying ceremony and the Karen New Year. International events were also utilized, with celebrations of events like the International Day of the World’s Indigenous People, World Food Day, International Forest Day, and International Mountain Day. While the former drew on local traditions, the latter performances drew on international discourses on Indigenous rights. Figure 2 below shows youths participating in a song contest.

Figure 2
Photograph of environment song contest on World Environment Day in Kataungni’s village hall in 2019, taken by Tarkapaw Youth Group’s staff.

The movement sent petition letters to stakeholders including the companies involved, the Myanmar government, and KNU institutions, as well as the Thai Human Rights Commission. These were complemented by disruptive on-site protests such as roadblocks (see figure 3) and gentler methods such as putting up posters.

Figure 3
Photo of company roadblock by villagers in Paw Klo in 2012 taken by Saw Wah, a local volunteer.

Other methods included counter-mapping, referring to the mapping of Indigenous land to claim territory and land rights, a practice which has been used as a contentious performance by Indigenous people in many parts of the world.⁶¹ Rocks were also painted with anti-mining messages along roads and the Paw Klo river (see figure 4). The roadblock was strategically positioned near the coal mining site, where villagers felled a large tree and raised the Karen flag to obstruct access. Community members assembled at the site, displaying posters and banners bearing the slogan “Stop Coal Mining.” Company representatives did not attempt to remove the flag or the felled tree and the KNU was called upon to intervene. The protests and a series of advocacy campaigns prevented the company from exploiting the full 2,100 acres originally granted by the Myanmar government; extraction was limited to approximately 64 acres. Eventually, mining operations were suspended by the government and formally terminated by the KNU.

Figure 4⁶²
A rock painting along the Paw Klo river calling for respect for the Indigenous people of Ban Chaung in 2013.

The arrangement of stakeholder meetings was also a key strategy of the movement. This had two objectives. First, it was intended to make complaints to public authorities and companies; second, it was intended to shape communication between affected communities and public authorities and companies. Activists urged villagers not to sign any documents to avoid being manipulated. As part of the same contentious performances, they urged companies and public authorities to arrange the meetings in Dawei, where they could be present to support the villagers. During these meetings, activists often claimed that public authorities and companies had not secured “Free, Prior and Informed Consent” (FPIC) from locals before they began the mining operations.⁶³ The concept of FPIC is invoked by virtually all international institutions dealing with Indigenous peoples’ rights, such as various United Nations (UN) bodies, like the Human Rights Committee, the International Labor Organization, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the World Bank. They were affirmed in 2007 in the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples⁶⁴—which was adopted by the Myanmar government.⁶⁵

The mobilization of the activists emboldened villagers. The first author participated in one of the stakeholder meetings in which local community members, company executives, Myanmar and KNU authorities, and civil society representatives participated. There, a local Karen woman said to the managing director of the Myanmar Mayflower company that they were unaware of the coal mining project until a bulldozer arrived and cleared the plantation in her orchard. They demanded that authorities and companies consult with and seek permission from Karen Indigenous communities before commencing operations.

Since the coal mine was in an area of mixed control, activists organized meetings with both the Myanmar government and the KNU. Meetings between the central KNU and key community leaders were facilitated by KESAN. For instance, KESAN organized a meeting with central KNU leaders during which local activists presented the negative impacts of coal mining. Activists also lobbied new political leaders elected to the Tanintharyi Region parliament, particularly the Karen Ethnic Affairs Minister, and the Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation.

The movement organized documentation trips to counter criticisms raised by public authorities and companies that framed activists as emotional rather than fact-based. Media, CSOs, and academic experts were invited to visit polluted sites in order to document and see the damage themselves. They interviewed villagers and tested the level of pollution of the air and water to verify the community’s claims. They also took blood samples from locals. Since Myanmar experts were afraid to be involved in the movement, they approached Thai experts, who had assisted in Thailand with similar issues. This provided the movement with scientific evidence of their claims and countered accusations they were being overly emotional.

The social movement campaigning against the mine was at least partially successful insofar as mining activities were suspended several times between 2014 and 2018. In January 2014, district leaders from KNU Brigade 4 suspended the East Star Company’s license, but it resumed mining operations after negotiating with the brigade. Then, after continuous lobbying by activists, the central KNU Mining Department cancelled the company’s mining permit in May 2018. Similarly, the regional government of Tanintharyi suspended the activities of the Myanmar Mayflower Company in May 2017 after a sustained campaign by activists.⁶⁶ However, local public authorities, including from the KNU and the Myanmar military, and the companies, did not respect these decisions and rulings. For instance, the former chairperson of KNU Brigade 4 facilitated meetings between company representatives and local communities, in which community members were urged to sign forms permitting the company to resume operations.

This case shows that the rupture created by the bilateral ceasefire changed the political opportunity structure in Tanintharyi. A key change was the forging of an alliance between the Myanmar government and KNU Brigade 4 leading to the opening of the Ban Chaung mine. However, at the same time, commencement of mining operations triggered a vigorous locally-led transnational social movement, which, through its contentious performances, was able to convince public authorities to suspend mining operations on several occasions based on national laws and international FPIC norms.

The movement was united for the purpose of closing the mine. The members had a shared political identity as defenders of Indigenous peoples’ rights and the environment. Indeed, the creative variety of contentious performances all invoked these two themes. An integral premise behind the challenge to the mine was that traditional Indigenous methods of managing the environment were more sustainable than modern forms. Some of the contentious performances invoked traditional Indigenous cultural practices. At the same time, the community celebrated international commemorative days, which further consolidated their political identity as Indigenous peoples. Similarly, the movement’s strategy of legal mobilization focused on claiming land rights through the international language and discourse of Indigenous rights.⁶⁷ In this sense, their strategy appears to differ from activists in other parts of Myanmar, for as Dunford argues, strategies based on international rights may not be successfully applied in Myanmar as the government does not recognize them. Similarly, Prasse-Freeman points out that many Burmese grassroots activists reject formal rights frameworks due to a lack of local relevance.⁶⁸

The activists’ documentation of environmental degradation focused on how pollution from investment projects threatened both the environment and Indigenous Karen livelihoods and culture. Similarly, counter-mapping was used to lay claim to land in the name of customary land rights and indigeneity.

There are significant differences between the social movement that emerged after the ceasefire in 2012, and the network protesting against the pipelines in the 1990s and the 2000s. The most important change was that, for the first time, contentious collective actions could be carried out in public within Myanmar due to a more permissive opportunity structure. For the same reason, the social movement challenging the mine could use a much wider array of contentious performances, including roadblocks, demonstrations and press conferences. Alongside the changing contentious performance, a new political identity emerged. Rather than framing themselves as human rights activists, the post-ceasefire activists framed themselves as defenders of the rights of Indigenous people and the environment.

The movement drew on several repertoires of contention. First, it further developed the contentious performances that the activists challenging the pipelines had used, including the extensive documentation of damages, the use of media to raise awareness, networking, and legal mobilization. Nevertheless, the shift towards a movement that identified as defenders of Indigenous peoples’ rights implied that it invoked a different, although overlapping, repertoire of contention. A growing number of international human rights bodies have elaborated legal principles and standards designed particularly to protect Indigenous peoples.⁶⁹ At the same time, various international instruments have recognized a wide range of rights belonging to Indigenous groups. As a result, a regime of Indigenous peoples’ rights has gradually emerged at the international level. The activists strategically adopted the discourse of this regime as a repertoire of contention in order to claim land rights and challenge public authorities, companies and international conservation agencies.⁷⁰ There were several reasons for this.

First, the KNU, as the most powerful and credible public authority on the ground, formally recognizes international Indigenous rights in its land and forest policies lending legitimacy and protection to community claims. Second, international investors such as the Thai East Star Company could be influenced by the prevailing international standards on the rights of Indigenous people. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s domestic legal framework could not protect against land grabs and rights violations. Third, it allowed them to build alliances with international rights-based networks like the ICCA consortium.⁷¹. However, as we showed in the case of the protest against the Paw Klo mine, this strategy was only partially successful, due to the autonomy of the leaders of Brigade 4. However, there were more successful examples. For instance, on behalf of the Karen community in Tanintharyi Region, the Conservation Alliance Tanawthari (CAT), submitted a formal complaint against the “Ridge to Reef project” financed by the Global Environmental Facility and the UNDP.⁷² This project proposed a conservation landscape of approximately 3.5 million acres covering 225 villages. It was suspended on 26 December 2018, due to FPIC violations, and the case was formally cancelled in April 2024 due to the military coup and the deteriorating security environment.⁷³

Period 3: The Rupture of the Coup

On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s military leaders staged a coup d’état leading to widespread protests. The military reacted to the protests with violent repression.⁷⁴ This in turn led to the emergence of a revolutionary movement composed of a heterogenous cast of politicians and other civilians, CSOs, and new and old armed groups. This meant a radical restructuring of Myanmar’s political opportunity structure and reconfiguration of the terrain of public authority.⁷⁵ While the military still controls substantial parts of the country, its means of trying to establish control is growing evermore extreme, and the territory controlled by resistance groups has increased significantly.⁷⁶

The coup has had significant repercussions in Tanintharyi and has deeply impacted how environmental activists can operate. The resumption of military rule in Tanintharyi and the entry of new actors has dramatically changed the terrain of public authority. Public authority has fragmented as various actors govern relatively small areas. The situation is dynamic as public authority and territorial control move according to the ebbs and flows of the fighting. The main actors are the KNU, the Kawthoolei Army (KTLA), a splinter group of the KNU,⁷⁷ PDFs,⁷⁸ local defense forces, the National Unity Government (NUG), and the military. In some areas the NUG attempts to provide humanitarian assistance and establish local administration systems to compete with the KNU and the Myanmar military. However, the NUG has limited capacity.

Even though the rupture caused by the coup enabled several new armed groups to carve out small spaces of control, the subsequent decline in the Myanmar military’s power and capacity led to the KNU taking over many mixed-control areas.⁷⁹ The KNU has started to administer these areas, for instance, by recognizing land rights, and by governing security. As part of the latter KNU/KNLA has created more security checkpoints to register who enters and leaves its territory and restrict access to outsiders. A leader from a healthcare service community-based organization was frustrated with movement restrictions in his area, stating that:

I had to pass nineteen checkpoints to reach the city from my village, including KNLA, junta, and PDF checkpoints.⁸⁰

Organizations also need approval from the KNU to conduct activities, even humanitarian ones. As a Karen program manager in a humanitarian organization based in Dawei outlined:

When we arrive at a village in KNU territory, our staff must meet the local authorities in their office to register our names, disclose our activities in detail, and declare how many days we’ll spend in the community. We must also inform them when we leave the community, even though we have a common Karen identity and we’re there only to assist internally displaced people affected by the conflict.⁸¹

While such restrictions may seem harsh to civilians, for the KNU, they are key to security and territorial control. Natural resource extraction in Tanintharyi has escalated in both military and resistance-controlled areas since the coup. Across Tanintharyi, small and medium-scale mining operated by companies collaborating with either the junta or KNU has increased.⁸² Dawei Watch, which was formed in 2013 to raise the voice of people in Tanintharyi, reports that gold mining has multiplied tenfold in one mining area in the Tanintharyi Nature Reserve area.⁸³ As a result, forests have been destroyed and water sources polluted. Yet local villagers do not dare protest. A Karen woman who was part of the previous anti-dam movement said: “Gold mining is permitted by the local armed authorities, leading to river pollution. However, there’s no place where the local villagers can protest.”⁸⁴

In the same vein, a former activist and community leader said:

In our region, natural resource extraction like mining and logging has surged since the coup. We haven’t dared to report it, and there’s nowhere to raise complaints. Before the coup, we were able to prevent these activities, but now we have no power to stop them.⁸⁵

Mining concessions have also surged in military-ruled areas where residents must pay monthly taxes.⁸⁶ Moreover, the newly formed KTLA contests KNLA Brigade 4 on the grounds that it has prioritized business interests rather than defeating the junta.⁸⁷ The conflict between KNLA Brigade 4 and the KTLA for territorial control in the region is escalating and the KNLA captured a KTLA base in 2023. The struggle among Karen-based armed groups has had disastrous consequences for civilians, who are threatened, detained, and even killed by both sides who accuse them of collaborating with their enemy.⁸⁸

The resumption of violent conflict makes protesting in public incredibly dangerous. Due to their past involvement in public contestation of public and business interests, many activists have fled the country. Others fled to forested areas controlled by the KNU. A Karen leader from a local environmental organization said: “After the coup, we announced that our organization would cease to exist. We’re worried that the military will investigate. I moved from the city and went place to place until I ended up staying in the jungle.”⁸⁹

Importantly, while many activists became involved with humanitarian assistance, others became more explicitly political and radical, joining the growing armed resistance. Members of environmental organizations created a network of activists monitoring natural resource extraction and training on federalism. Due to the danger of public contestation, they organize, campaign and meet almost exclusively online. A young Tavoyan woman director from a local organization noted how the coup changed its activities:

Currently, we’re working on monitoring and researching resource governance, awareness raising, and trainings on federalism and humanitarian emergency responses. We mainly organize online based on a digital system since we can’t work in the field anymore.⁹⁰

There has also been a noticeable generational change, with young people now leading the environmental movement, partly because many first-generation leaders have been forced into exile. The organizations work through locals and volunteers based in the community. As precautionary measures, the activists have adopted new strategies, such as changing the names of their organizations and using pseudonyms. Moreover, the environmental organizations inside the country have closed their offices. Instead, staff work from either Thailand or from areas which are not controlled by the junta.

These organizations’ funding allocation for environmental activities has reduced as humanitarian and political activities⁹¹ increased, and international organizations are no longer able to carry out activities in the field due to limitations on travelling and security concerns. Below we show a case linked to a gas pipeline project to illustrate how social movements have adapted to the new context following the coup.

Case 3: The Blood Money Campaign

The Blood Money Campaign is a primarily online social movement led by Myanmar youth activists operating at the national level. The members include social and political activists, pro-democracy supporters, labor and student union members. Members come from various regions of Myanmar and the global Myanmar diaspora. People from Tanintharyi have joined the movement on an individual basis. The movement collaborates with different internal actors, consisting of strike committees and community groups, which are especially hard-hit by air strikes. External actors involved include the ERI, the Thai Extraterritorial Obligation-Watch Working Group, Inclusive Development International, and the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma. An important difference from the pre-coup environmental movement is that young women are among the leaders of the Blood Money Campaign. The overall goal of the movement is to cut revenue to the Myanmar military. Their campaigns target the foreign investors in the pipelines including TotalEnergies (France), Chevron (U.S.) and PTTEP (a subsidiary of Thailand’s state-owned Petroleum Authority of Thailand) demanding to scale down their activities in Myanmar. Their main argument is that the revenues derived from the pipelines fund the military and thereby contribute to human rights violations.⁹² The campaign urges respect for international human rights law and guidelines on responsible business. However, due to the ongoing armed conflict and the junta’s violent repression of its opponents, the movement exists mainly as an online phenomenon, as remarked by an organizer: “Under the military regime, there’s no political space to criticize, challenge, or exercise rights. The online campaign is the safest way.”⁹³

The movement uses several kinds of contentious performances to raise awareness of the link between foreign capital and regime atrocities. These include petitions, online and offline protests, panel discussions, press conferences and photo campaigns. In the words of an advisor of the Blood Money Campaign: “As a team, we post updates on Twitter [now X], share updated information on Facebook and we have launched an online petition.”⁹⁴

Some contentious performances were carried out on the ground. For instance, the Democracy Movement Strike Committee from Dawei organized a mock march by youth, which carried pro-revolution and pro-environment messages. However, it was carried out in a location beyond the control of the military.⁹⁵ Subsequently, the movement lodged formal complaints with the governments of the U.S., the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, alleging non-compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises regarding investor responsibilities,⁹⁶ and petitioned shareholders directly. On 4 May 2022, a coalition of 637 Myanmar and international CSOs, supported by 220,000 individuals signatories, issued an open letter urging the U.S. government to impose sanctions on Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise to prevent oil and gas revenues from reaching the military. ⁹⁷ In response to this sustained advocacy, the U.S. imposed partial sanctions of the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) in October 2023, closely aligning with the campaign’s demands. Media coverage emphasized the connection between these advocacy efforts and the subsequent sanctions.⁹⁸

Companies Total and Chevron also withdrew from Myanmar.⁹⁹ However, following the withdrawal of these companies, PTTEP assumed the stakes and signed an expanded gas production agreement on 10 April 2025. Additionally, Gulf Petroleum Myanmar, a Thai private firm, concluded a Memorandum of Agreement with the MOGE for a new production-sharing contract on 20 May 2025. In response, the Blood Money Campaign continue to exert pressure on Thai investors to halt payments of gas revenues to the military junta and to refrain from entering new contractual arrangements.¹⁰⁰ These online performances are inspired by international actors, notably the Palestine Solidarity Campaign,but also the wider revolutionary movement in Myanmar. As one of the organizers explained:

Regarding the campaigns, we try to take three steps: Collect, Adapt, Act. First, we collect information by searching which other organizations are doing it and in what ways. For instance, awareness raising and campaigning through cartoons, videos, online posts, online petitions, etc. Second, we try to adapt their activity design to our local context and theme. Third, through information and adaptation, we create and design our own activities.¹⁰¹

Another part of the campaign focuses on banning the export of jet fuel to Myanmar, as junta warplanes target civilian populations.

One of the most important changes from previous periods of environmental activism is that activists see themselves as revolutionaries. They see revolution as the ultimate objective of the movement. Activists face a dual burden, balancing their work in activism while also involving in revolutionary efforts through supporting the Civil Disobedience Movement and delivering humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons. Activists continue to make efforts to meet their earlier objectives, such as promoting responsible business, environmental conservation and opposition to large-scale harmful development projects, as well as simultaneously pursuing the broader revolutionary goal of ending military rule. As Ma Pan Ei further noted:

We’re delivering emergency assistance to those who need to relocate due to the ongoing armed conflict. At the same time, we continue monitoring the recent memoranda of understanding signed between cooperations and the military, in line with our previous engagement in the resource sector. ¹⁰²

The above case shows how the rupture caused by the military coup radically reshaped the capacity of environmental activists to make collective claims and challenge public authorities in the local arena in Tanintharyi. In fact, due to the junta’s violent repression of all forms of activism, campaigning against it in the open has become too dangerous. Even protesting against other armed actors such as the KNU/KNLA and PDFs has become risky. As a result, since the 2021 coup and political rupture, activist organizations have transitioned nearly all their activities online, including the Blood Money Campaign. It has effectively raised awareness about Western companies funding the junta, prompting some to withdraw from Myanmar. The rupture created by the coup led to a notable change in the purpose and political identity of environmental activists. For the people involved in the Blood Money Campaign, the objective was to cut funding for the military and, through that, contribute to the revolution. Hence, claiming land rights for Indigenous people was no longer the core framing. By the same token, they did not see or frame themselves primarily as defenders of the rights of Indigenous people, but rather as revolutionaries fighting to overturn the regime and for the creation of federal state. Significantly, the movement drew on both internal and external repertoires of contention. Like in previous periods of environmental activism, it successfully utilized petitions and media to raise awareness about foreign companies financing the junta, highlighting complicity in its atrocities.

Conclusion

The trajectory of environmental activism in Tanintharyi illustrates how changing properties in the political opportunity structure reshape activism and social movements over time. As we have illustrated, such changes in Tanintharyi occurred over three distinctive periods, separated by two major ruptures in 2012 and 2021. These ruptures created new constraints and opportunities within the local political arena. The ruptures changed the landscape of public authority in Tanintharyi. Activists adapted their strategies to the transformation of the landscape of public authority by changing repertoires of contention, claims and political identities. Simultaneously, we have shown how local and global repertoires of contention and claim-making have intermingled over time.

The first period, beginning in the 1990s, was a context of intense pressure from a highly repressive military regime. Activists faced severe limitations nationally and in the local political arena. In response, they shifted their focus to the international arena, launching a legal case in the U.S. against Unocal for its role in the Yadana and Yetagun pipelines project. Even though the court case was conducted on foreign soil, it led to the birth of a transnational network of activists who were united in the cause of curbing atrocities committed in the name of development. This transnational network framed its claims around corporate accountability and human rights, demonstrating the strategic importance of using external repertoires of contention and leveraging extra-territorial institutions and legislations to challenge local injustices.

The second period began with the political opening of Myanmar in 2011. However, in the local political arena in Tanintharyi, it was the 2012 KNU-military bilateral ceasefire which caused a rupture in the political opportunity structure. It led to the opening of political space which created a host of new opportunities and incentives. This opening produced a more intense phase of capitalist resource extraction, in which the Myanmar government, investors and some local KNU leaders participated. Yet, at the same time, the opening of political space allowed environmental activists to mobilize and protest openly in ways that had not previously been possible.¹⁰³ Local environmental activists launched a vigorous campaign supported by international donors and border-based activists, adopting a diverse repertoire of contention, including public protests, advocacy campaigns, and cultural rituals. In this period, environmental activism was grounded in claims of Indigenous people’s rights and environmental protection, blending customary and global repertoires and performances of contention.

The third period began with the military coup in 2021, a second rupture that radically altered the political opportunity structure by reintroducing violent repression and eliminating the possibility of public dissent. Many environmental activists in Tanintharyi were forced to either go underground or flee, but a substantial number remained active through armed resistance, political advocacy, or humanitarian aid. Online campaigns became a critical component of environmental activists’ repertoire of contention, leveraging digital platforms to mobilize international solidarity and pressure foreign stakeholders to divest from the military regime. While earlier claims had focused on human rights, Indigenous peoples’ rights, and environmental justice, this period saw a shift toward broader revolutionary goals, with activists framing their struggle as part of a nationwide movement for regime change and the creation of a federal state.

These three periods demonstrate the significant capacity of environmental activists in Tanintharyi to adapt to shifting political opportunity structures. Our analysis shows the importance of paying attention to how ruptures that redefine the contested terrain of public authority pose constraints, but also open new opportunities for reshaping the strategies, repertoires, claims, and identities of activists. Over time, the environmentalist movement in Tanintharyi evolved from transnational advocacy and Indigenous environmental claims to becoming part of Myanmar’s broader revolutionary struggle, illustrating the endurance and creativity of contentious politics in an ever-changing political landscape.

Endnotes

¹ Doi Ra & Khu Khu Ju, 2021; Sekine, 2021; Woods, 2019.
² Kyed & Chambers, 2026 [this issue].
³ Megan & Tran, 2024; Prasse-Freeman, 2023a.
⁴ Tarrow, 2011; Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015.
⁵ Hoffmann & Kirk, 2013; Hoffmann & Vlassenroot, 2014; Kirk & Allen, 2021; Lund, 2016; Titeca, 2009; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2008.
⁶ Kyed, 2020; Sekine, 2021; South & Joll, 2016.
⁷ Park, 2021.
⁸ Sekine, 2021.
⁹ Simpson, 2016.
¹⁰ Rhoads & Wittekind, 2018.
¹¹ Reed-Danahay, 1997.
¹² For a comprehensive ethnographic study of grassroots activism based on more than a decade of fieldwork in Myanmar, see Elliott Prasse-Freeman (2023b).
¹³ Lokot, 2021.
¹⁴ Lund, 2016.
¹⁵ Thawnghmung et al., 2023.
¹⁶ Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 59.
¹⁷ De Sardan, 2015.
¹⁸ De Sardan, 2005, pp. 189-190.
¹⁹ Harrisson & Kyed, 2019; Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; Hoffmann et al., 2016; Kirk & Allen, 2021; Lund, 2016.
²⁰ Goodwin & Jasper, 2015, p. 3; Tarrow, 2011, p. 9; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 11.
²¹ Tarrow, 2011, pp. 9-12.
²² Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 49.
²³ Tilly & Tarrow, 2015, p. 12.
²⁴ Brenner, 2019; Mark, 2023.
²⁵ Jolliffe, 2015; 2016.
²⁶ Jolliffe, 2016, p. 14.
²⁷ South et al., 2018.
²⁸ Woods, 2021.
²⁹ South, 2011.
³⁰ South et al., 2018.
³¹ Woods, 2015; 2021. According to Woods (2015, pp. 30-35), 18 percent of total land area (1.9 million acres) in Tanintharyi was allocated as palm oil concessions, but less than 20 percent was actually planted with palm seed.
³² Brenner & Schulman, 2019; Hedström, 2016.
³³ Karen Environmental and Social Action Network, 2022.
³⁴ Barbesgaard, 2019.
³⁵ EarthRights International & Southeast Asian Information Network, 1996.
³⁶ Cheesman, 2015.
³⁷ EarthRights International, 2025.
³⁸ EarthRights International, 2005a.
³⁹ EarthRights International, 2005b; Reuters, 2002.
⁴⁰ McCann, 1994; 2006.
⁴¹ “Protesters Call On”, 2004.
⁴² Clapp, 2020.
⁴³ Brenner & Schulman, 2019.
⁴⁴ Hkawn Ja Aung, 2014; Howa Wa Zau Gam et al., 2007; Middleton, 2012; Simpson, 2016.
⁴⁵ Jolliffe, 2018.
⁴⁶ Woods, 2013.
⁴⁷ Naw Cherry Oo et al., 2023.
⁴⁸ Candle Light, 2019; Saw Yan Naing, 2016.
⁴⁹ Jolliffe, 2016.
⁵⁰ South et al., 2018.
⁵¹ Conservation Alliance of Tanawthari, 2020. This conservation project was proposed by the United Nations Development Program, Flora and Fauna International, the Smithsonian Institute, and the Myanmar government’s Forestry and Fisheries departments. It was funded with $21 million from the Global Environment Facility.
⁵² The Dawei Special Economic Zone was a large-scale transborder infrastructure project—including a deep-sea port, petrochemical estate, industrial zone, pipelines, and road/rail links to Thailand that was suspended in 2013 following limited investment and strong criticism. For an in-depth analysis, see Aung (2022).
⁵³ Naw Eh Doh, personal communication, August 14, 2023.
⁵⁴ Brenner & Schulman, 2019.
⁵⁵ Ma Pan Ei, personal communication, August 5, 2023.
⁵⁶ Ko Aung, personal communication, October 13, 2024.
⁵⁷ Tarkapaw Youth Group was formed in 2010 to focus on community mobilization and advocacy campaigns related to land and mining issues in Indigenous communities in Ban Chaung (Paw Klo).
⁵⁸ Sitthikriengkrai & Porath, 2017.
⁵⁹ Naw Paw, personal communication, January 19, 2024.
⁶⁰ Tarkapaw Youth Group, & Ban Chaung Community Sustainable Environmental Conservation Committee, 2018.
⁶¹ Anthias, 2018; Wainwright & Bryan, 2009.
⁶² Tee Kabu, a Paw Klo community leader, took this photo.
⁶³ FPIC involves three principles: “free” implies no coercion, intimidation or manipulation; “prior” implies that consent must be sought sufficiently in advance of any authorization or commencement of activities and that there is enough time for consultation; and “informed” means that Indigenous communities should receive satisfactory information in a way that is accessible to them (Barelli, 2012).
⁶⁴ Barelli, 2012, pp. 9-10.
⁶⁵ See the website of IWGIA (2025).
⁶⁶ Tarkapaw Youth Group et al., 2015; Tarkapaw Youth Group & Ban Chaung Community Sustainable Environmental Conservation Committee, 2018.
⁶⁷ For a critical analysis of the evolution of the Indigenous rights discourse in Myanmar see Dunford (2019).
⁶⁸ Prasse-Freeman, 2023b.
⁶⁹ Xanthaki, 2007.
⁷⁰ Conservation Alliance of Tanawthari, 2020; Tarkapaw Youth Group, & Ban Chaung Community Sustainable Environmental Conservation Committee, 2018.
⁷¹ ICCA is an abbreviation for “territories and areas conserved by Indigenous peoples and local communities” or “territories of life.”
⁷² Conservation Alliance of Tanawthari, 2018.
⁷³ Global Environment Facility, 2024; United Nations Development Programme, 2024.
⁷⁴ Bynum, 2022; Kipgen, 2021.
⁷⁵ Thawnghmung & Naw Moo Moo Paw, 2024.
⁷⁶ International Crisis Group, 2024.
⁷⁷ The KTLA was established on 19 July 2022 by leader Nerdah Bo Mya who split from the KNU after being dismissed as the Commander-in-Chief of the KNDO.
⁷⁸ There are around 66 PDF groups in Tanintharyi (The Tanintharyi Times, 2024).
⁷⁹ Also see Saw Ner Dhu Da, 2006, [this issue].
⁸⁰ Saw Eh Soe, personal communication, June 25, 2023.
⁸¹ Naw Say Say, personal communication, October 4, 2023.
⁸² Independent Research Network, 2022.
⁸³ “Gold mining devastating forest”, 2023.
⁸⁴ Naw Eh Eh, personal communication, August 4, 2023.
⁸⁵ Saw Eh Soe, personal communication, June 25, 2023.
⁸⁶ Mg Htin, 2024.
⁸⁷ Hein Thar, 2023.
⁸⁸ “Rival Ethnic Karen”, 2023.
⁸⁹ Saw Shwe, personal communication, July 29, 2023.
⁹⁰ Ma Pan Ei, personal communication, August 5, 2023.
⁹¹ Also see Kyed & Chambers (2023).
⁹² Herbertson & Blood Money Campaign, 2023.
⁹³ Campaign organizer, personal communication, January 17, 2024.
⁹⁴ Ko Myo, personal communication, October 13, 2024.
⁹⁵ Hein Htoo Zan, 2023.
⁹⁶ Inclusive Development International et al., 2024.
⁹⁷ Progressive Voice, 2022.
⁹⁸ Associated Press, 2023.
⁹⁹ Mathiason, 2022; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2023.
¹⁰⁰ Blood Money, 2025.
¹⁰¹ Ko Myo, personal communication, October 13, 2024.
¹⁰² Ma Pan Ei, personal communication, August 5, 2023.
¹⁰³ Also see Park (2021) and Sekine (2021).

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