Helene Maria Kyed, Ah Lynn & Nyan Pyi Thit | ယခုဆောင်းပါးကို မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ဖတ်ရှုရန် ဤနေရာတွင် နှိပ်ပါ

Cite as: 
Kyed, H. M., Ah Lynn, & Nyan Pyi Thit. (2026). Local Experiences and Perceptions of Climate Change During Myanmar’s Violent Rupture. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 7. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5645

Abstract

This article examines how communities in conflict-affected areas of Myanmar perceive and experience climate change in the wake of the 2021 military coup. Drawing on two years of community ethnography across eight localities, we explore how local people articulate environmental and weather changes amidst violent rupture, authoritarian rule, and chronic crisis. We foreground local voices to show that climate change is not perceived in isolation but intertwined with conflict, insecurity, spiritual beliefs, and sociopolitical disruptions. Under conditions of high risk and repression, community ethnography is a vital methodology for accessing knowledge otherwise excluded from dominant climate-conflict narratives. We argue that local perceptions challenge the assumption that climate change is solely a global, biophysical phenomenon, instead revealing deeply contextual understandings rooted in political violence, economic hardship, and moral or religious interpretations. These insights reframe the climate-conflict nexus by highlighting how conflict and governance breakdowns shape both vulnerability and meaning-making.

Introduction

The violent rupture caused by the 2021 military coup in Myanmar has dramatically impacted everyday lives and local governance dynamics, reflecting an intertwinement of political, security, and economic crises.¹ In this article we explore how this multiple crisis is affecting local people’s experiences and perceptions of climate change. We foreground local perspectives, capturing how people in their everyday lives speak about weather and environmental changes against the background of what we refer to as the triple burden of climate change, conflict, and authoritarian rule.

Our analysis is based on two years of community ethnographer studies from June 2022 to July 2024 across eight localities in Kachin, Karen, Mon, and Rakhine states, as well as Tanintharyi, Sagaing, and Bago regions, and the Naga Self-Administered Zone (SAZ). These are areas deeply affected by the repressive practices of the military regime, then known as the State Administrative Council (SAC), and by active contestations between the SAC and resistance forces, including People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and ethnic resistance organizations (EROs). During the study, four of the localities were under full SAC control, three were contested by the SAC and resistance forces, and in one locality the SAC collaborated with EROs. We therefore do not cover any ‘liberated areas’ held by resistance forces.

The negative livelihood impacts of climate change, which people mainly speak about as weather changes or abnormalities, are not new, but people experience them as worsening since the military coup. The same applies to environmental degradation, which people in our study seldom separate from climatic and weather changes, but narrate as part of the same crisis. We suggest that this experience of escalation is due to people’s growing inability to cope with and respond to the intersecting economic, political and security crises since the military coup. Simultaneously, concerns for environmental protection and climate change adaptation are overshadowed by the immediate priorities of survival and security. This is particularly evident in areas where SAC oppression and conflict between military and resistance forces permeate daily life, and where governance is either absent, contested or indifferent to environmental concerns. In these localities, environmental activists and community-based organizations that played critical roles prior to the coup have ceased operations, partly due to military repression and partly because most of the young people who used to be key actors in environmental activities have fled to other areas.²

In this article, we examine people’s perceptions of the root causes of climate change, grounded as they are in their situated knowledge. We show how individuals integrate both material and immaterial explanations for climate change, but that in general, they associate it with wider experiences of crisis within their locality and Myanmar, not with global carbon emissions. For example, people view deforestation and pollution as material causes of climate change, which they relate to the extractive activities and greed of the military. They place limited responsibility on internally displaced persons (IDPs) and local communities, though this is justified as the result of the need to survive during times of profound crisis rather than greed. Some people also view climate change as the result of environmental deterioration caused by the long-term effects of the commodification of nature and the decline of traditional practices and norms. Others interpret climate change in religious and spiritual terms, with explanations varying between Christian, Buddhist, and animist beliefs. These religiously informed explanations are often intertwined with moral and material interpretations, including notions of immoral behavior.

Based on these insights, we argue that it is impossible to try and isolate people’s climate change experiences from the political, socioeconomic, environmental, and security dynamics that affect their lives.³ For many people climate change is not simply equal to rising global greenhouse emissions. Climate changes are the concrete experiences that people in Myanmar have of weather abnormalities, natural hazards and environmental damage— which they, for instance, relate to activities like tree felling and mining in their immediate context. We further argue that people’s perceptions of the causes of climate change are embedded in wider understandings of “chronic crisis,”⁴ based on their experiences of the current violent rupture and of the longer histories of environmental and state violence. People’s perceptions of climate change are also influenced by religious and culturally informed understandings of crisis and human-nature relations.

Theoretically, we deepen understandings of the climate change-conflict nexus by foregrounding the local experiences and perceptions of conflict-affected populations—a topic that is generally neglected in favor of scientific and quantitative studies that focus on identifying the conditions under which climate change leads to conflict.⁵ We draw on recent anthropological and human geography studies that include local knowledge systems in understanding climate and environmental changes,⁶ but add to these a focus on how violent rupture⁷ and chronic crisis⁸ shape local knowledge on climate change.⁹ We conceptualize the military coup as a violent rupture that has triggered sudden disruptive changes to people’s lives, their security, and the governance structures in their areas. This rupture is layered upon decades of chronic crisis, encompassing the longer history of military rule, armed conflict, and environmental degradation, all of which intersect with changing weather patterns being experienced globally.

This article proceeds with four sections and a conclusion. We begin by introducing our community ethnography methodology. We then outline the studies and theories upon which our analysis draws, and what we add to existing studies of the climate change-conflict nexus. This is followed by a presentation of our empirical findings, centered first on people’s observations of climate and environmental changes after the coup, and secondly on what they perceive to be the root causes of these changes. Due to space limitations, the article does not address how people try to adapt to or cope with climate change during conflict, although the studies did cover these questions.

Reflections on Community Ethnography Methodology

This articles’ findings are based on community researcher ethnography, a research methodology developed by senior researchers at Nyan Corridor, a Myanmar-based organization which was forced to radically change its approach to research in response to the volatile and insecure situation following the 2021 military coup. The methodology is ethnographic and relies on the coproduction of knowledge¹⁰ between community-based researchers and researchers from Nyan Corridor and the Danish Institute for International Studies. In the current situation, it is both unsafe and unethical for researchers to conduct ethnographic research in military-controlled areas of Myanmar through in situ fieldwork. Formal interviews and surveys also jeopardize the security of research participants, as these can arouse suspicion by local authorities, especially in areas with a significant military presence. Moreover, the conflict situation and military oppression have made formal interviews risky and unreliable. Many people fear expressing honest views and experiences during interviews, due to high levels of mistrust and fear of military informants.

To adapt to these circumstances, Nyan Corridor recruited individuals still residing in local communities to be trained as community ethnographers. Many of those recruited already had some experience working with or connections to researchers at Nyan Corridor prior to the coup, while others were brought on board with the assistance of civil society organizations that had already collaborated with Nyan Corridor for several years. This approach was critical in fostering relationships based on trust and confidentiality. While some of the community ethnographers had prior training in qualitative research methodologies, they received additional, targeted training to navigate the new conditions of the disrupted research environment. As community ethnographers, they were trained to gather information from within their own communities and surrounding areas as they went about their daily lives, following strict security and ethical protocols. They collected data from their own lived experiences and interactions with fellow community members, through participant observation and informal conversations. In rarer cases, some community ethnographers conducted interviews, but only with individuals they knew well and had deep levels of trust with.

Community ethnographers were recruited from eight communities with three different types of conflict and governance dynamics.¹¹ These included Myitkyina (urban Kachin State), Taungoo (urban Bago Region), Mudon (rural Mon State), Hpa-an (urban Karen State), all of which are under SAC control; Layshi (rural and urban Naga SAZ), under mixed SAC and ERO control; Kale (urban Sagaing Region), Launglone (rural Tanintharyi Region), influenced by armed contestation between the SAC and resistance forces; and Sittwe (urban Rakhine State), characterized by contestations between SAC and the Arakan Army (AA), an ERO.¹² Prior to data collection community ethnographers were given nine days of online training by Nyan Corridor, covering research philosophy, ethnographic data collection methodologies and techniques, and research security protocols and ethics.

The community ethnographer project commenced in June 2022, and by July 2024 it had completed five rounds of studies (May-June 2022; December-January 2023; July-August 2023; February-March 2024; June-July 2024). This adheres to the longitudinal ethnographic approach, necessary for understanding the nuances in changes over time and for deepening the knowledge of local experiences and perceptions of climate change within a conflict context. To ensure the protection of community ethnographers, they refrained from taking notes. Instead, every six months, the community ethnographers met online for rigorous debriefing, sharing of research, and reflections among themselves and with the Nyan Corridor senior researchers.

The studies have produced unique insights, but their data are products of constraints and limitations, mostly due to security issues. One key limitation is the lack of systematic representativity and diversity of perspectives. This is because community ethnographers are only able to safely speak with individuals they trust and know. The volatile situation also constrained follow-up interviews with some participants, possibly affecting the depth and comprehensiveness of the data collected. Practical constraints included frequent electricity outages and recurring internet disruptions, hindering consistent communication via the Zoom and Signal apps, accessed through virtual private networks.

A final challenge was that some community researchers felt that discussing climate issues with people during such a critical time might appear insensitive. Community researchers themselves posited “What’s the point?” and “Why ask about this now?” at different periods over the course of the study. As we address further in this article, these views are a general reflection of wider society, and the fact that many people do not feel they can prioritize climate and environmental issues while they are struggling to survive and remain safe from the cascading effects of violent rupture.

Studies of the Climate Change-Conflict Nexus and Local Perceptions of Climate Change

Scholarship on the climate change-conflict nexus increasingly recognizes how armed conflict exacerbates climate vulnerability and reduces affected populations’ ability to cope with climate change.¹³ However, few studies explore how local people experience and attribute meaning to climate risks during times of and as part of living with conflict.¹⁴ Most research instead focuses on determining the causal relationship between climate risks and conflict using quantitative datasets or predictive models.¹⁵ When human dimensions are considered, they often rely on scientific abstractions that exclude local knowledge.¹⁶ In addition, as Branch argues,¹⁷ there is a strong tendency to focus on how climate change, deriving from global carbon emissions, causes conflict, rather than the reverse: i.e., how wars and political violence are bound up with transformations in the climate and the environment, seen from the perspective of local people.

This article, following Augsten et al.,¹⁸ approaches climate-conflict interlinkages through a qualitative lens that foregrounds “context-specific ways of knowing”.¹⁹ This approach allows for the inclusion of diverse ontologies and epistemologies, challenging the dominance of Western scientific knowledge.²⁰ Studies of local perceptions fill significant gaps in scientific models by providing a more contextualized picture of climate change impacts and informing culturally adapted policies.²¹

Although Western scientific knowledge still dominates research on climate change perceptions, an increasing number of anthropology and human geography studies engage with local and Indigenous knowledge.²² These studies, though not focused on conflict-affected populations, are helpful for approaching research on climate change in Myanmar. We further draw on Branch’s work on Northern Uganda, which shows how histories of political violence are directly entangled with people’s experiences of climate-related disasters.²³

These studies show that climate change is “not purely a physical or even solely an environmental phenomenon, but also has social, cultural, economic (and) spiritual and moral aspects” when seen from the perspective of local people.²⁴ This means that attention should not only be paid to the factors in the weather or the environment that local people attribute to climate change, which has tended to dominate research on climate change perceptions,²⁵ but also to local beliefs, morality, values, and worldviews, including spiritual or religiously informed knowledge.²⁶ This focus becomes particularly important when we also want to explore local people’s interpretations of what causes climate change, i.e., what they understand as the reasons for changes in, for instance, temperatures, rainfall and natural hazards.²⁷

Studies by Porcuna-Ferrer et al.²⁸ and Reyes-García et al.²⁹ highlight that local people’s perceptions express multi-causal views of change, which combine observations of weather and environmental change with socioeconomic, cultural, and political realities. Changes caused by climate change are also articulated as mediated by inequality, violence, marginalization, and environmental injustices, reflecting the deeper histories and power relations that local communities are embedded in.³⁰ Consequently, climate change is rarely isolated as a “discernible and abstract (biophysical) problem stemming from greenhouse gas emissions”.³¹ In fact, most studies on local understandings of the causes of climate change among rural communities in Asia, Africa and Latin American reveal that global greenhouse gas emissions are seldom articulated as the cause of climate change.³² Rather, people tend to focus on local change processes and human conduct within the local or nearby context.³³

Local people often combine material with non-material or spiritual explanations, although this varies with different positionings, including religious and ethnic affiliations, education, socioeconomic status etc.³⁴ Material issues such as over-extraction of natural resources, development programs, adverse state policies, new infrastructure, rapid urbanization, and/or war are some explanations for climate changes highlighted by local people.³⁵ Non-material reasons can include cosmological explanations linked to the degradation of human relations with the environment, for instance, the loss of cultural and spiritual traditions. Many among the Bolivian Tsimane, for example, perceive that disrespectful behavior towards guardian spirits of nature causes environmental and weather changes, which are seen as spiritual punishments.³⁶ Similarly, the Bassiri people of Senegal attribute climate change to both socioeconomic shifts and spiritual forces: while some highlight forest degradation, resource extraction, and increased materialism linked to market integration and new forms of governance, others mention changes in traditional values and the abandonment of ancestral practices.³⁷ Porcuna-Ferrer et al. note that although educated young men were familiar with the scientific concept of climate change, they also often incorporated local beliefs and traditional worldviews in their understandings of climate change.³⁸ Scoville-Simonds’ study in Peru shows how different religious worldviews—Catholic and evangelical Protestant—shape varied local interpretations of the causes of climate change, ultimately reflecting different understandings of human-nature relations.³⁹

Studies among Tibetan villagers in Yunnan province of China⁴⁰ show how Tibetan cosmology—constituting a syncretism of Buddhism and Shamanism—shape the ways that ordinary people understand weather, climate, and environment.⁴¹ Although villagers’ accounts of observable changes generally agreed with scientific climate records for the area, such as erratic rainfall and rising temperatures, they did not see climate change as a global phenomenon, but attributed it instead to local change processes, associated with human immoral misconduct.⁴² Tibetan villagers combined material causes (e.g., erratic rainfall due to tree felling) with spiritual causes (e.g., poor harvests due to violation of taboos in sacred places). Tibetans were mainly blamed for religious misconduct such as failing to make offerings or violating taboos, while outsiders, particularly Chinese tourists, government agencies, and companies, were blamed for both material and spiritual offenses, such as littering on sacred mountains.⁴³ Some also associated climate change with Chinese government policies that undermine Tibetan culture and religion, linked to Chinese domination and increased migration and tourism. This perspective reflects how perceptions of climate change are intertwined with broader notions of crises, where loss of autonomy, state interventions, and cultural erosion are seen both as causes and indicators of growing social and moral disorder. In that sense, Salick et al. note the physical climate is directly linked to a ‘moral climate’ created by human activities: e.g., weather hazards and environmental degradation are seen as caused by the disruption of a way of life, including the proliferation of harmful practices, affecting both natural and social worlds.⁴⁴

These insights demonstrate how it is impossible to isolate local climate change experiences and perceptions from other social, economic, and political change processes or from people’s historical experiences and worldviews. This resonates with our findings from Myanmar, as we address below. Our study adds a focus on the ways that violent conflict dynamics and authoritarian rule also affect climate change perceptions and priorities, a largely unexplored area due to the challenges of field research in conflict zones.⁴⁵

Experiences of Climate Change and its Impacts Across Communities

This section explores how our community researchers and those they spoke with experienced and described climatic changes, and how these impacted their everyday lives. Notably, few people in local communities directly referred to “climate change,” in the sense of the English term or as a scientific concept, even though the changes they described, such as rising temperatures, fit with such scientific descriptions. There were exceptions to this among some youth, civil society members, and local leaders, who did refer to “climate change.” Most people, however spoke more concretely about the weather and environmental changes they had experienced since their childhood, or used local words for weather-related changes that carry additional meaning that do not directly translate to “climate change” in English. For instance: yathi-udu paukpyanchin in the Burmese language, yathi-udu and pyaunglaeyar in Rakhine, yathi-udu pyatseechin in Dawei, and ou tu praong hlai in Mon. These terms indicate an abnormality or deviation from the norm (in the weather) associated with negative or destructive change. Conversely, the terms used by speakers of the Chin language in Kale (khua hun ki khel) and in Jinghpaw (makau grupyin galai shai ai lam) can indicate both negative and positive change. In Hpa-an, Taungoo and Layshi, where Pwo Karen, S’kaw Karen, and the Goga-Naga dialect are spoken respectively, people did not use a specific word for climate change, but instead used terms like hot and cool to describe variations in weather conditions (in Pwo and S’kaw) or descriptive phrases like “devil weather” (dzodru dzoli she ae) to express frustration with changes to the weather (in the Goga-Naga language). This variety reflects the linguistic and cultural differences across the country.

A core commonality, however, was that people in the studied localities rarely separated weather from environmental changes; they discussed them as part of the same change processes. In addition, the dominant tendency was to highlight local changes, with very few mentioning global changes, similar to people in Tibetan and Ugandan villages.⁴⁶ This may reflect back upon the rare use of the word “climate change.”

Locally observable weather and environmental changes were mostly associated with the preceding five to fifteen years, but there was a clear sense that people felt these changes had escalated after the coup. This sense of escalation was evident over time, especially during the study’s rounds four and five in 2024, which, we suggest, reflects the intensification of armed conflict, military oppression, and deteriorating social and economic conditions—all factors which exacerbate the challenges of dealing with increased heat and erratic rainfall. At the same time, our community ethnographers highlighted that environmental and weather issues are less frequently part of everyday conversations than before the coup, because people are too concerned with everyday insecurities and the struggle to maintain livelihoods. However, people do discuss the heat when it becomes too hot, and the rain when it fails to arrive as expected or is too heavy when it does. Below we unpack how people associate climate and environmental changes with rainfall patterns and heat and then we address the impacts these have on people’s lives.

Changing Rainfall

Erratic and changing rainfall patterns were reported across all our studied communities. In Kale, people spoke of abnormal rain that no longer arrives at the expected time, and when they do, they tend to be brief but intense, leading to flooding. A 75-year-old woman explained that in the past, she had never experienced flooding, but that over the past decade it had become an annual occurrence. According to local perceptions, landslides damaging roads and compromising water resources for drinking water and irrigation have also increased significantly. In the dry season, water sources are also drying up more frequently.

In Myitkyina, people similarly reported that rainfall patterns have become irregular, with heavy downpours occurring during typically dry periods and a delayed onset of the monsoon season. For example, in 2022, rain during the harvest season flooded paddy fields, putting farmers further into debt. Furthermore, in March 2024, an unprecedented hailstorm occurred. People often point to these kinds of events when they describe how the weather is changing. Similarly, in Hpa-an, flooding of low-lying areas close to the Salween River is not new, but some think it is worsening year by year. Locals in Hpa-an also report that support to manage the negative impacts of these floods has decreased significantly since the coup. Residents also experience more frequent droughts and greater water scarcity compared to previous years.

In Mudon, people also spoke about abnormal rainfall patterns, which no longer adhere to the usual seasonal cycles. Floods have become more frequent—one to four times a year—and more severe, lasting longer. In the past, floodwaters would recede within hours; now residents are often forced to evacuate their homes, with the floodwaters taking more than a week to subside. Concurrently, delayed rains are exacerbating drought and water scarcity, severely affecting crop growth.

In the coastal town of Sittwe, erratic rainfall and the drying up of water reservoirs coincide with rising sea levels. This, combined with the depletion of mangroves, has led to the salinization of farmland, including vegetable and paddy fields. As a result of weather changes, people can now only harvest crops once per year, whereas they previously planted twice for two harvests. The area is also highly susceptible to cyclones and storms, most devastatingly in 2023 with Cyclone Mocha.⁴⁷ In the coastal village of Launglone, where fishing is the primary livelihood, residents report stronger oceanic flooding, which is worsened by the depletion of mangroves, causing soil erosion. However, many people were less focused on changing weather patterns and disaster-related events, primarily due to the ongoing armed conflict and concerns about their everyday survival.

In Taungoo, people similarly spoke of erratic rainfall, which has contributed to the drying up of plants and soils, leaving many unable to cultivate crops. The Sittaung River also dried up in 2023, with locals recalling that, for the first time in living memory, they were able to cross the river on foot. Flooding in the areas has also become more frequent than in the past, partly due to dam breaches along the river, leading to prolonged flooding in both rural and urban areas. Skin infections resulting from the floods have also increased. In mid-2024, hundreds of people were displaced by flooding in Bago Region, including in villages already dealing with intense conflict.

In contrast to other areas of the study, the hilly, high altitude Layshi in the Naga SAZ is not impacted by flooding in the same way, but heavy rains do lead to landslides. Residents in Layshi also report unpredictable rainfall that no longer follows the traditional seasonal patterns of summer, winter, and the rainy season. Rather, rainfall comes at the wrong times and has even occurred during typically dry winter months. For example, residents described how in 2019 and 2020 the rains came so late that people were unable to harvest their crops: residents observed that paddy plants dried out or broke by the time the rains finally came, coinciding with the harvest period. Among people in Layshi, there is a growing perception that the erratic rainfall has made it more difficult to predict the best time to plant and harvest, ultimately resulting in declining yields. While paddy yields were satisfactory in 2023, other crops, like vegetables, either failed to produce good yields or could not be planted in time due to the delayed rainfall. Additionally, heavy rains have caused significant damage to irrigation infrastructure, with landslides and soil erosion destroying water channels. A severe hailstorm in 2024 further hindered agricultural activities by preventing farmers from burning their shifting cultivation fields in time. In 2024, Layshi experienced an unprecedented landslide. Residents reported that they had never before witnessed a landslide of such magnitude. The landslide occurred in a neighboring ward of the study area, engulfing three households and causing significant damage.

Increased Heat

All studied communities also highlighted experiences of changing temperatures, with increasing temperatures and heat waves being a common theme in discussions during the March to May summer period in 2023 and 2024, when high temperatures surpassed records in many places of Myanmar, leading to almost two thousand deaths.⁴⁸ The heat was experienced as extreme in Kale in April 2024, surpassing any temperature they had experienced before, with weather stations across Southeast Asia reporting record high temperatures of 43°C to 50°C.⁴⁹ In Kale, very few people have access to air conditioning, and uneven access to electricity means that cooling devices including much more affordable fans cannot be reliably used. To cope with the extreme heat, people stayed indoors as much as possible and reduced physically demanding activities. However, the heat caused skin irritation, and many found it difficult to eat. Similarly, in 2024, in Myitkyina, the temperature reached 45°C during summer, and people struggled to stay cool. Respondents reported illnesses among the elderly and children, with some heat-related deaths. Like in Kale, people in Myitkyina said the heat made it difficult for them to consume food. After the heatwave, intense rainfall over a short period of time then led to flooding, which displaced several residents.

In Hpa-an, the heatwave made it impossible for many to work. Five people in the studied ward passed away after being forced to continue working in their construction jobs. In Mudon the extreme heat disrupted sleep, many also lost their appetite and fell ill with fevers and sore throats. People lamented that large trees which used to provide shade had been cut down. The summer heat is also a cause for concern in Sittwe, exacerbating the drying up of water resources. Locals believe that the hot weather has affected plant germination. Many people were forced to stay inside their homes during the summer months. Taungoo experienced its highest temperatures in 2023 and 2024, reaching 46°C and 50°C. These extreme heat conditions led to widespread illness, particularly among the elderly, some of whom passed away. As in other townships, people in Taungoo could not eat properly, and electricity shortages prevented the regular use of fans for cooling. Those displaced from cooler, higher-altitude areas were said to be the most affected by the heat. Among those who died during the heatwave in 2024, the majority were elderly IDPs.

In contrast to low-lying areas, Layshi, situated at a high altitude, does not experience the same heatwaves. However, people talk about how the heat from the sun feels increasingly intense and that winter temperatures no longer drop below zero, meaning they no longer see frozen water. Despite being in a cooler region, the summer of 2024 brought unusually high temperatures that were severe enough to prevent people from working and, for the first time, the clean drinking water resources dried up. As a result, people were forced to use water from the terrace field irrigation systems. Following the extreme heat, heavy rains fell onto the parched ground, leading to significant soil erosion in many places, which caused damage to some people’s terraced farmlands.

Impacts of Weather Changes: Intersection with Conflict and Environmental Degradation

Across these communities, shifts in temperatures and rainfall are generating a variety of immediate and secondary impacts, depending on the local context. Immediate impacts include landslides, flooding, drought, water scarcity, and the drying up of rivers and streams. These in turn have led to declining agricultural yields, sometimes to the extent that farmers are unable to grow paddy or vegetables some years. Fruit trees and vegetable crops suffer from the intense heat and lack of timely rainfall, plants fail to germinate, and new insects and pests damage crops. Furthermore, many health hazards are emerging due to heat.

Importantly, these climate change impacts are viewed as inextricably linked to the consequences of armed conflict and political-economic disruptions that followed the 2021 coup. Conversations with local people about changing weather patterns often converge with discussions about environmental exploitation, livelihood insecurities, land-use issues, armed battles, and the rising costs of agricultural inputs, such as seeds and fertilizers.

In Myitkyina, for example, conversations about the heat often merged with talks about pollution and landslides due to the growth in mining activities which have left a lot of people’s farmland barren. In Kale, the armed clashes between SAC forces and the resistance have meant that coping with erratic rainfall, rising heat and landslides has become so difficult for farmers that many have stopped farming altogether. They live under fear that new armed clashes will happen in their farmland areas⁵⁰ or that their farmland will be burned down by military forces, forcing them to flee, as has happened in several places in Sagaing Region.⁵¹ The proximity of security checkpoints also deters farmers from working in their fields. Economic hardship since the coup is also inhibiting the use of adaptive farming methods needed to cope with climate change. This is particularly linked to the rising prices since the coup of fertilizers and petrol. For example, paddy farmers in Kale are responding to decreasing water resources by using fuel to pump up water for irrigation, but the petrol price has now increased so much that even this is no longer feasible. In addition, farmers can no longer access Agri Bank loans since the coup, impacting their ability to purchase drought resistant paddy seeds.

Rising agricultural input prices also affect farmers in Mudon, who explained that they can no longer afford to grow paddy. Instead, they rely mainly on remittances from the many young and middle-aged relatives who have migrated to Thailand. At the same time, they fear that if they abandon paddy farming altogether then their land will be confiscated by the SAC, which requires that land be in use for people to retain rights to the land.⁵² In the Sittwe area, rising fuel prices, along with weather changes, similarly contribute to the inability of farmers to continue to grow vegetables twice a year: they need fuel to pump water for watering the plants when the rain fails.

In Launglone and Sittwe rising sea levels were coupled with talks about mangrove forest depletion, contributing to salination of farmland and reduction in snails, shrimp and other sea animals collected on the ocean shore. In Launglone people describe how preoccupation with livelihoods and everyday security also affects the environment in various ways. The presence of SAC military forces along the coast and on land makes it too risky to fish offshore. Fishermen are therefore forced to rely on the collection of snails and other coastal products along the beach for their survival. However, these resources are also diminishing, due to over-collection and the depletion of mangroves, which are being cut down at an accelerated rate for firewood and income. This situation has led to tensions between local communities and private businesses, such as the Dawei Development Public Company, which has restricted the cutting of mangroves in areas it claims to be a protected forest area.

In Mudon, when asked about climate change, people also spoke about the social impacts of the double burden of heat and insecurity. In the past, during hot weather, children and adults would gather under the shade of large trees, but now that the trees are gone, such gatherings no longer occur. Additionally, fear of SAC soldiers has further discouraged people from gathering in the village. Activities such as playing football in the village have also ceased, both due to the heat and fear of the SAC. In Naga, growing tensions have arisen over water scarcity, which is disrupting traditional water sharing practices. This has led to further conflict and an increase in nocturnal water theft.

In Kale and Taungoo, residents also expressed concerns regarding the materially destructive impact that warfare inflicts on both the environment and local wildlife. Despite these areas being under SAC control, armed conflict remains perilously close, with some residents’ farmland directly damaged by bombs and gunfire. Residents believe that the conflict has exacerbated air pollution, diminishing the atmosphere’s ability to retain moisture, which in turn has adversely affected fruit trees and crops. Additionally, they attribute the health deterioration of livestock – particularly pigs and poultry – to the presence of nitric oxide from gunfire and airstrikes. A noticeable decline in bird species has also been observed, with many presumed to have migrated elsewhere due to the ongoing conflict. Seasonal bird songs, once a familiar and pleasant sound during the summer, have been absent since 2023, further illustrating the environmental toll of conflict. In Taungoo, locals also reported that the migration of birds from forests to agricultural areas has increased due to fighting and the widespread burning of forests, leading to further crop destruction.

Across urban areas—Myitkyina, Hpa-an, Sittwe and Taungoo—our community researchers also observed growing concerns regarding the environmental and social impacts resulting from the increase in IDPs fleeing from conflict. Restrictions on aid imposed by the SAC, coupled with diminishing resources within local communities and churches, have left IDPs struggling to survive. In some areas, this has led to an increase in deforestation as individuals cut down trees for basic survival needs. Additionally, the high concentration of displaced people has contributed to garbage overflows and air pollution from waste burning. These conditions have generated social tensions as host communities increasingly blame IDPs for environmental degradation, waste management issues, and, at times, theft and noise disturbances. This situation can also be linked to the gradual break down in the social contract, with outsiders sometimes viewed with suspicion.

As these accounts demonstrate, people’s understanding of climate change is not limited to isolated scientific definitions, such as temperature rise. Rather, it is deeply intertwined with lived experiences of armed conflict and violence, affecting a wide range of issues such as pollution, bird migration, agricultural practices, and rising agricultural input prices. The connections that individuals make between changes in weather patterns and wider experiences of crisis become especially evident when examining how people perceive the underlying causes of climate change. The next section explores this directly, based on the question of why people think climate change or changes to the weather are occurring.

Perceptions of the Causes of Climate Change

As in studies among Tibetan and Ugandan villages,⁵³ very few people in the studied communities speak about weather changes as the result of global carbon emissions, but rather see them as caused by destructive and immoral human activities within their local and national contexts. Some people combine these material explanations with more immaterial and religious understandings of crisis. Yet our community researchers also said that many people are reluctant to give their views of the causes of climate change, either saying that they do not know, or that they cannot even think about, climate and environmental issues because of the devasting livelihood and security situation they face. According to some community researchers the inability to prioritize such issues could contribute to a further deepening of environmental devastation. Below we discuss the different local explanations for climate change provided to our community researchers.

Disappearance of Trees

Large-scale deforestation and the disappearance of trees is a common explanation for increased heat across all communities. “Less trees year by year means more heat year by year,” noted one resident in Kale. Many also believe that tree loss depletes soil water, severely affecting both farmlands and households.

While deforestation in Myanmar has been steadily rising for decades⁵⁴ there is a widespread perception that tree felling has accelerated post-coup, even in areas where forests remained relatively intact prior to 2021.⁵⁵ Deforestation is occurring in two primary ways, both linked to the current crisis. First, timber logging by companies—often with SAC licenses, but also sometimes with links to militias or EROs—has increased. Second, villagers, facing electricity shortages, rising gas prices, and livelihood uncertainties, are felling more trees, including mangroves, for firewood and sale.

In Taungoo people reported that due to the intensified conflict dynamics since 2023, surrounding teak forests have been completely depleted, because people can no longer oversee their plantations, and because the SAC military allows businesspeople to harvest and sell the timber. Some believe the SAC permits or even engages in deforestation to hinder resistance forces believed to be hiding in forests.⁵⁶ In Sittwe, residents attribute climate change primarily to forest depletion by the SAC military and crony business elites, especially prior to the rise of the AA. For example, people report that military-affiliated businesses have confiscated homelands from IDPs for logging operations. Political instability has further disrupted forest conservation efforts, with 75 percent of mangroves reportedly destroyed around the Sittwe area. While military-linked businesses are largely blamed, locals are also cutting mangroves for survival, driven in part by the SAC’s four cuts or pya lay pya strategy—a clearance operation aimed at depriving resistance forces of food, funds, information, and recruits.

In contrast, in Kale, commercial timber extraction has decreased due to armed clashes, but local tree cutting has surged as people turn to firewood in response to a 300 percent increase in gas prices and a sharp decline in electricity access. In Launglone, the SAC and local PDFs are believed to allow logging businesses to operate in mountainside forests, which villagers can no longer access due to fear of armed actors. Along the coast, mangrove depletion has accelerated as villagers increasingly rely on firewood due to electricity cuts, rising costs, job losses, and restrictions on fishing due to the SAC military’s presence. Although some recognize that mangrove depletion exacerbates climate change risks—such as rising sea levels—most prioritize immediate survival over environmental concerns. A community researcher in Launglone noted that fear of both the SAC and PDFs prevents villagers from raising concerns about mangrove cutting. The mistrust and suspicion between villagers, fueled by the conflict between the SAC and PDFs, have undermined collective action on environmental and social issues.

Deforestation has increased since the coup across SAC-controlled and contested areas, driven by war economies, survival concerns, and a lack of regulatory enforcement. This trend is compounded by a decline in environmental activism and local conservation initiatives.⁵⁷ Although the Taungoo community researcher reported that PDFs and the Karen National Union are enforcing tree-cutting restrictions in the ‘liberated areas’ of Bago Region, the situation is the opposite in the SAC-controlled and conflict-ridden areas around Taungoo.

Commodification of Nature: Agrobusinesses, Mining and Development

In Hpa-an, Layshi, Mudon, and Myitkyina, communities associate environmental degradation, heat, and erratic rainfall with the exploitation of natural resources, which aligns with the commodification of nature driven by capitalist development.⁵⁸ While this commodification dates back to colonial times, the communities note its intensification from the late 1990s and early 2010s, coinciding with economic liberalization and ceasefires with ethnic armed groups.

In Hpa-an, locals highlight the destruction of forested mountains for limestone extraction to produce cement for infrastructure projects. In Layshi, deforestation began around 2010 with improved road infrastructure and new government buildings. Local authorities and influential figures who secured construction contracts accumulated wealth, allowing them to establish sawmills, purchase chainsaws and trucks, and transport timber via new roads. Although these activities predate the coup, unregulated timber trade with India, facilitated by armed actors, has escalated since 2021, furthering deforestation. Village leaders now struggle to enforce customary restrictions on wood cutting as the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-K has collaborated with the SAC to expand its influence over Nagaland since 2024, undermining local regulations.

In Mudon, the shift to cash crops, particularly rubber plantations, following the 1995 ceasefire between the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the military, is seen as contributing to regional heat increases. Rubber depletes soil nutrients and reduces water resources, negatively impacting vegetation.⁵⁹ A household leader explained that natural forests had largely disappeared by 2010 due to both rubber cultivation and timber extraction by the NMSP and village leaders. One respondent noted that the last remaining forest was cleared for road construction under the National League for Democracy government, leaving no large, shady trees in the village. Our community ethnographer emphasized that post-coup insecurity has halted efforts to replant trees or pursue alternatives to growing rubber, even though villagers frequently attribute heat and drought to its cultivation.

In Myitkyina, higher temperatures and fluctuating seasons are commonly attributed to increased gold mining, particularly since the military coup. This mining activity, linked to deforestation and pollution, has damaged rivers, streams, pastures, wildlife, and farmland. Locals accuse the armed actors—the SAC, military-linked militias, and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO)—for benefitting from gold mining, either through direct extraction, taxation, or fines imposed on so-called ‘illegal miners.’ Chinese company involvement in extractive industries, including timber and rare-earth acquisition, is also blamed.⁶⁰ Despite recognizing the environmental harm caused by gold mining, many local residents have sold their homes and land to invest in artisanal mining due to economic hardship. Kachin environmental activists and local communities face increasing challenges in complaining about environmental destruction due to the wartime situation.⁶¹ Efforts to halt mining through social media campaigns, protests, and engagement with the KIO have largely failed.⁶²

Religious Explanations: Immorality and ‘End of the World’

Narratives of the causes of climate change across our studied communities frequently drew on religion. They varied depending on individual beliefs and faith traditions but often overlapped with the material explanations discussed above. Some interpretations were predominantly eschatological, while others attributed abnormal weather and environmental devastation more directly to immoral human behavior or a neglect of faith and spiritual practices.⁶³ What was common, however, was the perception that climatic changes were not viewed in isolation but were perceived as part of a much deeper crisis.

Among Buddhists in Hpa-an, Launglone, Mudon, and Sittwe, eschatological views that climatic changes are a sign of the world’s imminent destruction are prevalent. Some Buddhists explained that changes to the weather are reflective of the Buddha’s warnings that crisis would occur prior to the end of the world. In Sittwe, a community ethnographer’s mother explained:⁶⁴

We’re now living in the kut karla (destruction period). Everywhere, people are fighting each other, and the prices of goods are rising almost every day. People are facing famine, the political situation is very terrifying, and natural disasters are increasing. It’s surely the time to end the world, just as the Buddha said.

Similarly, in Launglone, some Buddhists also spoke about the crisis following the coup as a sign of the period before the arrival of Arimetteyya, the fifth and final Buddha that is said to appear after a period of human and ecological destruction. It is widely believed that prior to the coming of the next Buddha, the world will face three great calamities, or kut (destruction). These are 1) dubbaṇikakappa (famine); 2) rogakappa (disease) and; 3) satthakappa (new weapons).⁶⁵ Many ordinary Buddhists connect changes to the weather to these teachings, alongside other contemporary crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the increase in advanced weaponry in conflict, a rise in natural disasters, and war. People believe that these intersecting crises are evidence of the fulfilling of the 16 dreams of King Kawthala from the Gotama Buddha’s time, which predicted the end of the world. It is said that the period proceeding Arimetteyya’s arrival is characterized as one where the powerful oppress ordinary people, the wealthy operate above the law, individuals turn against one another, and greed and anger prevail. Furthermore, Buddhist teachings on moral conduct are perceived to have lost their value, with an increasing number of people abandoning the Buddhist dhamma in favor of immoral paths.⁶⁶ In line with these beliefs, changes in the weather and the environment are also seen as interconnected. The community ethnographer in Launglone explained:

In my village, people say that in the old days, people were loyal to one another. They had good morals. Nowadays, people’s morals are poor, and they’re very greedy. Famine and disease outbreaks are often associated with bad weather. The current bad weather is fundamentally caused by human greed and conflict. People now talk about how the old sayings from elders are proving to be true.

Other Buddhists in Launglone placed more concrete emphasis on immoral behavior by humans, rather than eschatological predictions of the end of the world, viewing loss of incomes, insecurities and bad weather as related to people’s past life misdeeds (linked to the Buddhist concept of karma).⁶⁷ Our community researcher in Mudon, referring to the Buddhist dhamma, drew a link between greed and depletion of natural resources, highlighting: “All of this (abnormal weather) is due to human greed. In the past, people didn’t need to cultivate much … However, because of human greed, people started storing food … Eventually, natural resources became depleted.”

Among Christians in Taungoo, Kale, Myitkyina, and Layshi, including Evangelists, Roman Catholics, and Baptists, there are also strong eschatological perceptions of crisis, where climate change is one among many signs of the end of the world and the coming of Christ. Christians, like Buddhists, also closely link the current crisis to immoral human behavior. In Taungoo, for instance, older evangelical Baptists explained how the crisis signaled the time before the end of the world and the second coming of Christ, where people will fight and kill one another, and where there will be increased disease, natural disasters, famine, and wars. Similar views were found among Baptists in Layshi, who spoke about abnormal weather as a sign of the end of times.

In contrast, younger Baptists in Taungoo more directly connected environmental and wartime disasters to human greed. They perceive God to be systematic and fair, having created humans, nature, and animals in balance. They described how God provided sufficient trees and animals for human needs, but due to human greed and man-made environmental disruptions, like deforestation, construction of dams and excessive mining, nature’s balance has been disrupted. A Chin Baptist pastor in Kale explained in similar terms that climate change was due to the greed and anger of humans, which has distorted the balance between humans and nature that God created. “People have become merciless and don’t look at nature as a living thing, instead they cut down the plants to make money,” he said. A Roman Catholic from Kale also mentioned that human greed has led people to exploit religion for personal gain, resulting in the overuse of the earth, leading to an increase in diseases and pollution. Baptists in Myitkyina also link climate change to greed, which they view as an act of disobedience to God’s commandments. Specifically, they refer to Biblical stories of the Sena people as a metaphor for contemporary Chinese exploitation of resources to fulfil endless greed. While destructive human activities—especially by Chinese others who are perceived as having no God—are seen as the immediate causes of environmental and climate change within their local context, these activities are also interpreted as part of the broader signs that the world is coming to an end during the current crisis.

In some localities, community ethnographers also found examples of animist spiritual beliefs influencing perceptions of climate change and crisis, including among some Buddhist and Christian communities. Reflecting the integration of Buddhism with pre-Buddhist spiritual beliefs,⁶⁸ some people in Mudon described abnormal weather as a sign that the spirits are angry, because of people’s failure to adhere to established norms, such as marrying close kin. Elders among Naga in Layshi and Chin in Kale also lamented how the conversion to Christianity had led to a decline in animist rituals, such as seeking permission from forest spirits before cutting trees, hunting and cultivating land. They related this ritual decline to poor agricultural yields, which they also connected to an increase in sinful actions and overexploitation of nature. In this way, they implicitly reference cosmological changes in human-nature relations.⁶⁹ Although the elders in Kale did not directly attribute the weather changes to spiritual decline, they explained that former beliefs in tree spirits had previously prevented people from cutting down large trees or using timber for commercial purposes, practices now seen as contributing to rising temperatures. A similar view was expressed by some Plong Karen elders in and around Hpa-an, most of whom mix Buddhist and animist beliefs. As one grandmother explained:

In the past, our forefathers respected the big trees and the thick forests. They would not dare to speak rudely in front of the trees, believing that the forest spirits would become angry and immediately punish them, even taking lives. Now, there’s no respect for these spirits, and people indiscriminately cut the trees and clear the mountains for business. That is why the heat is increasing.

Pwo Karen communities have long associated adverse weather, erratic rainfall, and poor agricultural yields with spiritual punishments resulting from improper human engagements with spirits.⁷⁰ For example, if the weather negatively impacts paddy production, it is interpreted as a sign that the ritual offerings have not been performed correctly, or that the person who performed the ritual was engaged in immoral activities. The abandonment of these traditions is considered inauspicious, leading to misfortunes, including ill health or poor agricultural yields. Today, many elderly farmers continue to perform these rituals, but when it comes to explaining weather-related issues, they tend to blend animist and Buddhist beliefs. For instance, during the 2023 monsoonal flood in Hpa-an, many locals remarked that the flood was caused by the moral failings of the country’s leaders following the coup. This view is based on the belief that if a Buddhist kingdom has a strong and virtuous leader that follows the Buddha’s teachings, the weather will also be good.⁷¹ Thus, moral and spiritual explanations do not only target the immoral behavior of local people but can also extend to national leaders. In other localities, some people similarly interpreted abnormal weather and water scarcity as signs that the spirits showed sadness and anger due to the immoral leadership of the country and the killing of its people. A Karen elder near Taungoo, when asked why he thought new pests were harming the crops, remarked: “When there are bad leaders, many bad things happen.”

Conclusion

This article’s analysis of local experiences and perceptions of climate change in military-controlled and conflict-affected areas of Myanmar post-coup confirms that climate change cannot be understood solely as a physical or ecological phenomenon, separate from political, security, socioeconomic, moral and religious issues.⁷² As we have shown with our community ethnographies, local people’s perspectives on climate change across different areas of Myanmar demonstrate a deep intertwining of material, religious, and moral views, all compounded by military oppression and interconnected crises. Abnormal weather and environmental degradation are attributed not only to local acts of deforestation, overexploitation of natural resources, and climate disruptions but also to a deeper spiritual and moral crisis in society. These views overlap, blending explanations of human greed, political instability, and ecological imbalance with eschatological beliefs and karmic consequences. The ongoing coup and conflict-driven devastation are seen as part of this broader crisis, where the war economy accelerates deforestation, resource extraction, and environmental destruction.

People draw from religious teachings, such as Buddhist prophecies and Christian eschatology, to frame climatic changes as part of a wider existential and moral collapse. Animist beliefs also persist, where disruptions in the natural world are seen as punishments from spirits for human misbehavior. The devastation wrought by the conflict, including land confiscation, logging, and resource extraction by military-linked businesses, is perceived as further deepening the moral and environmental crises. Thus, climate change is not isolated from broader crises but understood as reflecting deeper shifts in the relationship between humans, nature, and political power. The convergence of material and spiritual explanations underscores how communities navigate the complexities of both immediate survival and existential challenges amid the backdrop of increasing armed conflict and military oppression.

Another key insight from this study is that analyses of the climate change-conflict nexus must be aware of longer histories of crises and political violence in the contexts in question.⁷³ While the coup has deepened climate change vulnerabilities in Myanmar, this builds off decades of elite and military-driven exploitation of natural resources at the expense of local communities. Although there was a brief period of rising environmental activism and climate change awareness before the coup, deforestation and commodification of nature, which affect human-nature relations, have long been ongoing in Myanmar.⁷⁴ Vigh’s concept of “chronic crisis”⁷⁵ helps us to understand crisis not as a short-term issue but as a prolonged state of instability. Rather than seeing crisis as a transient temporal disruption, it should be recognized as embedded within deeper systems of cyclical violence which persist and endure over time. Crisis situations are interconnected rather than isolated, as evidenced by Myanmar’s prolonged conflicts involving various ethnic groups. Historical patterns show that during periods of political change, there has been significant depletion of forests and other natural resources—during both ceasefires and armed conflict.⁷⁶ This reflects how natural resource management is intricately linked to the broader political and conflict dynamics in the country.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, we suggest that an emphasis on chronic crisis does not render the concept of rupture obsolete.⁷⁸ In the localities covered by the studies on which this article is based, the coup and its aftermath of violence, repression, economic hardship, displacement, etc., have been experienced as a significant disruption to preexisting life worlds. In places like Mudon, Kale, and Launglone, open fighting and contestations over administrative control between the military and resistance forces have been experienced as dramatic ruptures with the past, as these communities did not live under open conflict before the coup (unlike in Karen, Rakhine, and Kachin states). Here, even engaging in ordinary farming or fishing activities, let alone adapting to climate change, is nearly impossible, forcing many young people to leave and those who remain to exploit the natural environment in new ways, like cutting mangroves or forests for firewood and income. Social relations and trust among community members have also declined significantly, along with fear of collective activities due to military repression. In urban areas like Myitkyina, Hpa-an, Taungoo, and Sittwe, military repression of collective environmental activities coexists with what is seen as a drastic increase in natural resource exploitation by armed actors and their business affiliates, leading to pollution and deforestation. Understanding these changes through the lens of rupture adds to the concept of crisis the notion of dramatic eruption and escalation.⁷⁹ In the areas studied, the disruptions following the coup are mainly viewed as negative. This can be contrasted with emerging insights from some ERO and PDF liberated areas, where efforts are being made to create new or strengthen existing environmental protection activities and develop climate change actions and initiatives.⁸⁰

This article has demonstrated how not only war but also violent and contested local governance dynamics within a repressive military regime are strongly shaping climate change vulnerabilities, challenging the predominant focus in academic and policy studies on how climate change leads to conflict. The case of Myanmar shows the reverse. This becomes clear when we view the climate change-conflict nexus from the perspective of local conflict-affected populations and take seriously local experiences and perceptions, rather than prioritizing scientific knowledge and models. As argued in this article, one way to pursue this under conditions of high insecurity is through the coproduction of knowledge with community ethnographers living with climate change within conflict-affected communities.

Endnotes

¹ Kyed & Chambers, 2026 [this issue].
² Naw Htee Ku & Hoffman, 2026 [this issue].
³ Branch, 2018.
⁴ Vigh, 2008.
⁵ See Kyed & Chambers (2026) [this issue].
⁶ Goldman et al., 2018; Porcuna-Ferrer et al., 2023; Reyes-Garcías et al., 2024, p. 10; Rosengren, 2018; Salick et al., 2012.
⁷ Holbraad et al., 2019, p. 248; Lund, 2016.
⁸ Vigh, 2008.
⁹ Branch, 2018.
¹⁰ Goldman et al., 2018.
¹¹ Nyan Corridor also used the community ethnographer approach to collect data on everyday governance following the coup in 22 communities across 14 states and regions.
¹² In some of these areas the conflict situation evolved over the course of the five rounds of studies. For instance, EROs increasingly collaborated with the SAC in the Naga areas. In Kale Township resistance forces were weakened after round two, although the SAC still lacked the support of the local population. Launglone was initially a contested area, but by the fourth round, armed conflict had decreased, leading to a stable form of dual governance by both military and resistance groups. Rakhine State also experienced a notable shift between the first and second rounds, with intense clashes between the AA and the military junta leading to a clearer demarcation of control between the two forces. By the fourth round, we had lost communication with researchers in Rakhine State.
¹³ Abrahams & Carr, 2017; Kyed & Chambers, 2026 [this issue].
¹⁴ Exceptions include Augsten et al. (2022), Branch (2018) and Sturridge (2023).
¹⁵ Adams et al., 2018; Hsiang & Burke, 2013; Witmer et al., 2017.
¹⁶ Goldman et al., 2018, p. 3.
¹⁷ Branch, 2018, p. 311.
¹⁸ Augsten et al., 2022.
¹⁹ Goldman et al., 2018, p. 5.
²⁰ Chakraborty & Sherpa, 2021; Conway et al., 2019; Goldman et al., 2018, pp. 5-6; Reyes-García et al., 2024.
²¹ Byg & Salick, 2009, pp. 156-164; Reyes-García et al., 2024, p. 10; Sraku-Lartey et al., 2020, p. 17.
²² Byg & Salick, 2009; Porcuna-Ferrer et al., 2023; Reyes-Garcías et al., 2024, p. 10; Rosengren, 2018; Scoville-Simonds, 2018.
²³ Branch, 2018.
²⁴ Byg & Salick, 2009, p. 165.
²⁵ Uprety et al., 2017.
²⁶ Salick et al., 2012; Scoville-Simonds, 2018.
²⁷ Branch, 2018.
²⁸ Porcuna-Ferrer et al., 2023.
²⁹ Reyes-García et al., 2024, p. 4.
³⁰ Branch, 2018; Reyes-García et al., 2024, p. 5.
³¹ Porcuna-Ferrer et al., 2023, p. 11.
³² Branch, 2018.
³³ Salick et al., 2012.
³⁴ Scoville-Simonds, 2018, p. 346. Also see Rosenberg (2018) and Salick et al. (2012).
³⁵ Branch, 2018; Reyes-García et al., 2024.
³⁶ Reyes-García et al., 2024, pp. 4-7.
³⁷ Porcuna-Ferrer et al., 2023, p. 6.
³⁸ Porcuna-Ferrer et al. 2023, p. 10.
³⁹ Scoville-Simonds, 2018. On Ghana, see Golo & Yaro (2013).
⁴⁰ Byg & Salick, 2009; Salick et al., 2012.
⁴¹ Salick et al., 2012, p. 450.
⁴² Byg & Salick, 2009, pp. 158-164.
⁴³ Byg & Salick, 2009, pp. 161-164.
⁴⁴ Salick et al., 2012, pp. 465-470.
⁴⁵ Augsten et al., 2022, p. 14.
⁴⁶ Branch, 2018; Salick et al., 2012.
⁴⁷ See Chambers et al. (2026) [this issue].
⁴⁸ Ant Pweh Aung, 2024.
⁴⁹ Al Jazeera, 2024.
⁵⁰ Saw Ner Dhu Da, 2026, [this issue].
⁵¹ “War zone farmers”, 2022.
⁵² This fear of losing land can be linked to the 2012 land law, which requires farmers to use their land, or it can be taken over by the state, and it also relates to historical practices of military land grabs (Lue Htar, 2020; Mark, 2016).
⁵³ Branch, 2018; Salick et al., 2012.
⁵⁴ Woods et al., 2021.
⁵⁵ South, 2024. Further, according to Woods et al. (2021, p. 2), Myanmar ranks among the top 10 countries in the world for forest loss, and in the top three for the highest rate of deforestation. The country lost nearly 550,000 ha (5500 km²) of forest per year between 2010 and 2015, amounting to a 1.7 percent annual rate of forest loss.
⁵⁶ Cutting and burning forests has long been a tactic of the military as part of the ‘four cuts’ strategy used against EROs in the borderlands. For more details see Saw Ner Dhu Da (2006) [this issue].
⁵⁷ Naw Htee Ku & Hoffman, 2026 [this issue].
⁵⁸ Castree, 2003; Sullivan, 2009.
⁵⁹ Woods et al., 2020.
⁶⁰ Global Witness, 2024.
⁶¹ Fishbein et al., 2022.
⁶² In 2023 there was an exception, when public protests against a new rare earth mine in KIO territory were successful (Fishbein et al., 2023).
⁶³ Also see Scoville-Simonds (2018) on Peru.
⁶⁴ We do not cover Muslim perspectives on climate change in Rakhine State but see Chambers et al. (2006) [this issue].
⁶⁵ ကပ်၊ ၁—ဒုဗ္ဘိက္ခန္တရကပ်၊ ၂—ရောဂန္တရကပ်၊ ၃— သတ္ထန္တရကပ်။
⁶⁶ For more details on these beliefs see Foxeus (2016) and Spiro (1967).
⁶⁷ For a detailed analysis of how Buddhist teachings intersect with everyday understandings of morality, see Chambers (2024).
⁶⁸ Spiro, 1967.
⁶⁹ Scoville-Simonds, 2018.
⁷⁰ Chambers, 2024, pp. 66-69.
⁷¹ Also see Strong (1983).
⁷² Percuna-Ferrer et al., 2023; Reyes-García et al., 2024.
⁷³ Branch, 2018.
⁷⁴ Borras Jr et al., 2020.
⁷⁵ Vigh, 2008.
⁷⁶ Woods, 2011.
⁷⁷ Kramer, 2021.
⁷⁸ Holbraad et al., 2019, p. 248; Lund, 2016.
⁷⁹ Lund, 2016, p. 1203.
⁸⁰ Kyed & Chambers, 2026 [this issue]; South, 2023.

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