Nway Kant Kaw | ယခုဆောင်းပါးကို မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ဖတ်ရှုရန် ဤနေရာတွင် နှိပ်ပါ

Cite as: 
Nway Kant Kaw. (2026). Greening Dictatorship: The Military’s Appropriation of Climate Change. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 7. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5653

Abstract

Since the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military has used the media organizations it took control of to project an image of environmental stewardship and climate change awareness. Through analyzing print and online articles published in the junta outlets The Global New Light of Myanmar and The Mirror between February 2021 and July 2024, I develop three case studies to argue that the military’s State Administration Council appropriates a ‘greening’ language of climate change and environmental protection to legitimize its rule and present itself as a functioning state to domestic and international audiences. The military is ‘greening dictatorship’ by purporting to be committed to mitigating climate change while masking ongoing exploitation of natural resources and atrocities against the people. Its actions mirror those of authoritarian regimes elsewhere, which often exploit environmental initiatives to project an image of responsibility and stability as a cover up for its repression. However, the Myanmar military is trying to use environmental rhetoric not only to divert attention from their violent rule, but also to try to secure international recognition, funding and investments.

Introduction

Since the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military has renewed its war against the pro-democracy resistance movement. It has expanded to the public majority its legacy of brutal killings, detentions, and breaches of the human rights of minorities. It now targets all civilians who do not sufficiently support its regime. The military controls its own media products and tries to censor independent media in order to maintain its preferred public image of a well-functioning state. Across this military-owned or influenced media environment, the military blames the country’s instability and political-economic crisis on what it calls “terrorist groups,” i.e., any group opposing military rule.

In this article, I examine how Myanmar’s military junta, which named itself the State Administration Council (SAC) after the 2021 coup, utilizes SAC-controlled media to project an image of environmental stewardship and climate change awareness. Through a digital ethnography-based analysis of newspaper stories published in The Global New Light of Myanmar and The Mirror between February 2021 and July 2024,¹ I argue that the SAC appropriates a ‘greening’ language of climate change and environmental protection to present itself as a functioning state. I introduce the concept of ‘greening dictatorship’ to describe how the SAC showcases a purported commitment to mitigating climate change as part of its effort to normalize its regime, while masking its exploitation of natural resources and ongoing atrocities against civilians.

This greening of dictatorship is executed through media portrayals of initiatives such as tree-planting ceremonies by high-ranking SAC officials, biodiversity and forest conservation initiatives by SAC ministries, natural disaster responses, and renewable energy projects, while omitting reference to the political crisis or the widespread conflict with resistance groups. By presenting these activities as part of a cohesive national agenda, the SAC displays an image of stability, environmental responsibility and adherence to global climate commitments. This portrayal starkly contrasts with realities on the ground, where the SAC has lost control over large swaths of territory and where ordinary people are affected by environmental mismanagement and large-scale resource exploitation exacerbated by military rule. However, this destruction remains absent from SAC-controlled media narratives, where environmental crises are disconnected from the political and military actions worsening them. In short, the military seeks to obscure its role in the very crises it claims to be addressing, presenting itself as a protector of Myanmar’s environment while actively contributing to its devastation.

I develop my concept of ‘greening dictatorship’ by drawing from existing literature on greenwashing,² and authoritarian environmentalism.³ I approach greenwashing as part of the politics of climate change, whereby the appropriation of greening has political intentions. Greening refers to the process of increasing protection of the environment and/or making something or somewhere greener—by for example, planting grass, trees, and plants.⁴ I further draw on the concept of ‘rupture’⁵ to situate greening dictatorship within the context of the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, which has caused alarming disruptions to people’s everyday lives, and transformed politics into an intensely competitive environment where the SAC is challenged by multiple armed and unarmed actors; this new context is where the politics of climate change now occurs. The contrast between the SAC’s fanciful media narratives and the everyday struggles of Myanmar people is fertile ground for introducing and understanding the process of greening dictatorship.

My analysis questions the extent to which the SAC’s greening efforts have been successful in convincing the wider international community of its benign intent. While the SAC has been invited by China and other neighboring countries to participate in climate-related events, and is officially recognized by Russia and others, it has lost most of the pre-coup bilateral and multilateral international funding for climate change initiatives previously channeled through the state, such as funding from the European Union and the United Nations (UN). The SAC has also been banned from the international climate change Conference of the Parties (COPs), led by the UN, since 2021.

In terms of domestic legitimacy, it is beyond the scope of this article to assess if the SAC’s greening initiatives have affected ordinary people’s view of the SAC and made them believe that the military cares for the environment. My impression is that the SAC-controlled media is mostly consumed by SAC supporters and foreign audiences, including member governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and much less by ordinary people in Myanmar (whether in Burmese or English). A study by International Media Support and Nyan Corridor confirmed this, claiming only 1 in every 100 Myanmar citizens are reading printed newspapers in Myanmar after the coup, and that few people even have access to newspapers.⁶ Given this, media representations likely have little influence on domestic legitimacy.

Ordinary Burmese experienced nearly nine years of relative media freedom after military regime censorship reduced from 2012-2021, and there are many private, exile, and independent media organizations to choose from, including new options after the 2021 coup. This is notwithstanding the SAC’s ongoing efforts to constrain the information environment, including using social media and virtual private network bans, and to prevent accurate, verified news from reaching the public.

This article begins by elaborating on its methodological and theoretical approaches. That is followed by an overall analysis of media representations of the SAC’s environment and climate commitments, leading into three case studies of greening dictatorship: tree-planting ceremonies and forest conservation projects, plastic reduction campaigns, and renewable energy projects. This is followed by a section focusing on how the SAC tries to showcase itself to regional and international actors. I then contrast the greening done by the military with people’s everyday experiences, and with critiques of the military in presented in independent media and by civil society organizations (CSOs). I conclude by analyzing my findings and discussing how they contribute to wider debates about dictatorships and climate change.

Methodology

This article builds on a longitudinal digital ethnographic study I have conducted since 2021 in which I analyze military (and SAC) discourses and media representations of their engagement with environmental and climate change issues. Due to the prevailing security situation in Myanmar, it is too dangerous to conduct interviews with SAC officials and perform in situ fieldwork of SAC climate and environmental policies and performances. Instead, I used a methodological approach aimed at facilitating analysis of the wealth of social insights available on digital media platforms during crisis periods such as conflicts and pandemics.⁷ I have followed military policy announcements and reports in SAC-controlled newspapers, as well as general social media content, and incorporated my own everyday life experiences living under SAC control as a resident of Yangon. I have also consumed contrasting information in independent media. In total I reviewed and analyzed 107 news articles from March 2021 to July 2024, coding them into topics and sub-topics on climate change and environmental issues.

In this study I particularly focus on analyzing media representations within SAC-controlled newspapers. I chose to focus on content in The Global New Light of Myanmar and The Mirror because these are the two daily newspapers that the SAC prioritizes most. While The Mirror is published in Burmese, The Global New Light of Myanmar is published in English. Myanmar Alin is another daily military-controlled media title in the Burmese language, but it is simply a Burmese language version of The Global New Light of Myanmar.⁸ The Mirror (kyemon in Burmese) has been published since 1964 and targets a Burmese audience. It is mostly read by SAC supporters in Myanmar and abroad, and since the coup has been subject to strict military media censorship. On the other hand, The Global New Light of Myanmar targets international English-proficient readers, and is used by the SAC to portray its legitimacy to an international audience. This was evident at a SAC Ministry of Information meeting in 2022, where the minister was quoted saying the newspaper should be distributed internationally as “the real situation of the country and the development need to reach the international community” (sic); he also “urged the meeting attendees to discuss the practical requirements of becoming a newspaper of international interest.”⁹

Besides focusing on these two SAC-controlled newspapers, I also followed other more critical media outlets online, as well as regularly read reports by CSOs. By doing so, I have been able to understand over time how the SAC’s celebration of its greening activities diverges from reality.

Greenwashing and Environmental Authoritarianism

This article draws on the following definition of greenwashing:

Marketing strategies which aim to present a company’s products or an actor’s political goals as ‘green’ and eco-friendly, hoping to cater to the increasing number of people who opt for conscious consumption and green politics. The mechanism central to ‘greenwashing’, however, is the legitimization of harmful practices by means of a ‘green image.’¹⁰

It does so to consider how these greenwashing strategies can be used for political purposes by regimes such as the SAC. When searching for literature on this topic, I did not find specific articles addressing how military regimes in the wake of coups and immense violent rupture engage in greenwashing, but scholarship on greenwashing by authoritarian regimes and on environmental authoritarianism can help shed light on the case of Myanmar.

Drawing on political ecology, Fröhlich & Hirt address how authoritarian regimes align with global environmental initiatives, appearing to embrace green development while continuing to exploit natural resources or engage in repressive actions.¹¹ Some also collaborate with foreign actors to paint an image of environmental responsibility, while concealing human rights violations. An important concept in this context is the “ecologization”¹² of disasters. This is the process of framing disasters as ‘natural’ by deemphasizing or ignoring entirely the anthropogenic and political dimensions of disasters and their consequences. This can be seen as a method of greenwashing forms of political repression like forced resettlement and movement restrictions, diverting attention away from the needs of disaster survivors and the failures of the disaster response. For instance, Fröhlich & Hirt argue that a drought in Northern Ethiopia was blamed by the ruling regime for causing famine and mass displacement of the Tigrayans, although war and repression were the real causes:

The drought was used as a rhetoric shield to ‘greenwash’ repressive practices towards the different liberation movements and the civilian population, including a massive forced resettlement campaign of Tigrayans.¹³

Another example of greenwashing by states is found in the work of Hughes et al.,¹⁴ who examine how the Israeli state uses environmental infrastructures, such as waste management and renewable energy, to mask land appropriation and dispossession in Palestine territories. This form of greenwashing is a rhetorical strategy of the Israeli state and corporate actors to highlight “progressive” innovations in climate change mitigation, sustainability, and green agriculture, diverting attention away from human rights abuses and settler violence.¹⁵ This example parallels how authoritarian regimes exploit green initiatives to gain legitimacy while continuing exploitative practices. Andersson¹⁶ further explores how environmental conservation is weaponized for political and military purposes. In Guatemala, the army used conservation efforts in the Petén region as part of counterinsurgency operations. While selectively enforcing environmental protections, the military advanced its war strategies under the guise of conservation.

The growing climate change crisis is also being securitized by authoritarian regimes, justifying emergency measures and consolidation of centralized power. ¹⁷ This topic can be linked to the ongoing debate on environmental authoritarianism, which has its proponents and critics. The argument in favor of environmental authoritarianism includes the premise that democratic processes are too slow, complex, and constrained by competing interests, to effectively address the pressing challenges of climate change with the urgency and scale required. Authoritarian regimes, by contrast, are better equipped to push through ambitious and effective environmental and climate policies, act swiftly on emergencies and prioritize long-term ecological sustainability over short-term political interests.¹⁸ Critics argue that authoritarian environmentalism is inherently unjust because it excludes the voices of those most affected by environmental policies and often involves the suppression of dissent.¹⁹ For Gverdtsiteli:

Authoritarian environmentalism proposes a non-participatory approach to public policymaking which manifests itself in a limited, state-dominated policy process and strict command-and-control measures that leads to the restriction of freedoms of individuals and businesses. ²⁰

Opponents also contend that, in practice, authoritarian regimes do not necessarily deliver effective environmental governance. Instead, the increasing prominence of climate change and environmental protection in the agendas of authoritarian regimes has led to performative acts or showcasing of ‘greening’ that serve to consolidate power rather than address genuine ecological concerns—i.e., not just greening, but greenwashing. For example, Li & Shapiro highlight how Chinese authorities have strategically utilized environmental interventions, such as large-scale forest regeneration programs, to deepen their control and stifle opposition.²¹ While these programs have significantly increased vegetation cover in China, they have also displaced farmers and workers, revealing the human costs of such initiatives. Similarly, in Laos and Vietnam, environmental initiatives such as hydropower projects are used by central authorities to strengthen state power and gain access to transnational resources. These projects often involve forcibly relocating impoverished communities to less hospitable areas, exacerbating their marginalization under the guise of carbon reduction efforts.²² In short, authoritarian regimes may succeed in solving some environmental problems, but they often do so at the expense of public participation and justice.

As I will show, Myanmar’s SAC has adopted similar greening tactics since the 2021 coup. The SAC also engages in ‘ecologizing’ natural disasters, using extreme events to justify repressive measures while presenting itself as an environmental steward.

Furthermore, the SAC has announced new forest conservation areas in resistance-held and contested areas, possibly as a tool to try and suppress the resistance and obtain territorial control through an image of environmental responsibility.²³ However, the SAC displays more characteristics of a dictatorship rather than an authoritarian state, given that it rules predominantly through military violence and seeks to oppress all political opposition.²⁴ Hence, I argue it is a ‘greening dictatorship’ rather than an example of environmental authoritarianism.

Media Representations of the SAC’s Climate and Environmental Commitments

This section provides an overview of how the SAC-controlled media represents the SAC and high-ranking military officials as knowledgeable about and caring for climate change and the environment. Many articles published in The Global New Light of Myanmar and The Mirror are written by journalists, editors, and experts, like meteorologists and hydrologists,²⁵ who are supportive of the SAC or at least content to work for it. Articles written by public servants working under the SAC are written by persons who chose to remain inside the administration and not join the widespread civil disobedience movement after the 2021 coup. Noticeably, these articles often provide a neutral or non-political portrayal of environmental and climate change issues domestically and globally, completely omitting the ongoing political crisis and armed conflict. Others overtly celebrate the SAC as a national savior and caretaker of the environment.

During my survey of newspapers, I identified four categories of articles dealing with climate change and environmental issues. The first are general informative pieces on what climate change is and what its impacts are, which draw on international information, sometimes referring to UN reports and sometimes to climate-related disasters and environmental issues in other countries, like haze pollution in Thailand.²⁶ Many of these are in the international section and some are just reprints of international media articles, for example from Newsweek or Reader’s Digest.²⁷ A few do mention Myanmar, such as one that warns of the devasting impacts of El Nino, encouraging Myanmar people to take proactive protection measures.²⁸ In the international section, I also noticed several articles on the COP summits.²⁹ Noticeably, none of these mention the SAC’s exclusion from them since 2021, concealing the SAC’s lack of international recognition.³⁰

The second category of articles features the SAC being celebrated as committed to international climate change and environmental frameworks and action. This is particularly showcased through the SAC’s and military officers’ ceremonial celebrations of international days, such as the World Environment Day, International Day of the Forest, and the World Water Day.³¹ On several such occasions the leader of the SAC and commander-in-chief of the military, Min Aung Hlaing, is depicted in photos and quotes as an environmentally friendly leader.³² On International Biodiversity Day, an officer from the SAC’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation’s (MoNREC’s)³³ Forestry Department authored a long article on biodiversity, which described how since 1993 Myanmar has supported the UN Convention on Biological Diversity.³⁴ In 2023 the MoNREC also celebrated International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer, which began with the screening of a video of the UN Secretary General’s speech. This indicated a clear effort to display the SAC’s international connections.³⁵ Some articles also mention Myanmar as leading in nature conservation parks in the ASEAN.³⁶ In line with this, several articles describe the SAC’s engagement in discussions of environmental issues with actors in the region, such as Thailand, China and ASEAN on topics like air pollution, forest fires, and disaster risk reduction.³⁷ Some articles feature the SAC’s investment in renewable energy, emphasizing collaborations with companies in China, Thailand, and Singapore. ³⁸ These articles highlight the SAC’s efforts to attract foreign investment for green energy projects, while also stating that the SAC is committed to environmental and social impact assessments.

Articles in the third category that I identified cover more governmental aspects of the SAC’s domestic greening efforts by its ministerial departments, especially the fishery, forestry, agriculture and water departments, as well as the MoNREC. Examples include forest conservation, the establishment of geoparks, and coastal protection. Other articles mention conservation of biodiversity and protection of wildlife, often accompanied by colorful photos of beautiful landscapes and animals.³⁹ Some articles link nature conservation to tourism, inviting tourists to visit Myanmar’s pristine beaches and nature.⁴⁰ One article even claims that European tourists are flocking to the southern marine reserve in Lampi Marine National Park, as if there is no war or conflict going on.⁴¹ Other articles describe how SAC ministries and township-level departments aid agricultural adaptation, address water scarcity, and deal with wastewater management.⁴² These articles consistently portray an image of a well-functioning state, capable of environmental governance and conservation, within a context of stability, while completely omitting any mention of the ongoing conflict and political crisis.

Articles in the fourth category cover weather information, warnings and disaster statistics issued by departments and ministries such as the SAC’s Meteorology and Hydrology Department, and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Rescue and Rehabilitation, in the event of floods, heatwaves, storms, etc. SAC departments are often praised for their efforts to provide public awareness, advice and disaster management.⁴³ The ways in which weather hazards are portrayed by SAC officials in the media are reminiscent of the ‘ecologization’ of disasters,⁴⁴ presented as completely isolated from the vulnerabilities of disaster victims caused by the political crisis and state violence. In the extensive media coverage of Cyclone Mocha in 2023, flooding in Bago in 2023, and flooding in Myitkyina in 2024, the focus is on conveying an image of the effectiveness of the SAC in providing disaster aid. Articles also cover ceremonial aspects such as SAC officials and military officers, including Min Aung Hlaing, visiting disaster sites and handing donations to victims.⁴⁵

Overall, the media articles emphasize the positive actions of the SAC, portraying its leaders and officials as committed to global climate and environmental agendas, while leaving out other voices. The media, for instance, rarely mentions the significant role of other actors in environmental activities and disaster efforts, such as religious leaders, environmentalists, civil society and parahita (social welfare) groups.⁴⁶ The Red Cross, which collaborates with the SAC, is referenced slightly more often. The portrayal of the SAC as a caring and ‘green’ state also relies, I suggest, on the near-complete silencing of conflict and political instability. This is even the case when articles are about hotly contested regions such as Chin State; one article was limited to discussing the chief minister’s implementation of agricultural cooperatives there.⁴⁷ Rare and only implicit references to conflict appear in SAC officials’ speeches linked to disaster relief and environmental conservation, where they make calls for unity between the people and the government, using well-known military slogans like “the strength of the nation lies within.” Indirectly, this call for unity can be read as an effort to encourage support for the SAC over resistance movements. On a few occasions, Min Aung Hlaing mentions peace, stability and climate change in the same speeches, but without specifically addressing the actual fighting on the ground.⁴⁸ In addition, the resistance groups are never mentioned in articles on climate and environment, with the exception of one article where Min Aung Hlaing is quoted for criticizing the Arakan Army in relation to the SAC’s efforts to respond to Cyclone Mocha.⁴⁹ I also did not find any article where the resistance groups are blamed for environmental destruction, which can be contrasted with how the National Unity Government’s (NUG’s) MoNREC consistently blames the military for such destruction. This silence, I suggest, reinforces the SAC’s ‘greening’ narrative, using climate and environmental issues as ways to promote itself, while erasing political instability and violent conflict.

The SAC-controlled media thus promotes an image of ‘business as usual,’ with government ministries and departments continuing their environmental work as if there had been no military coup. This serves as a form of greenwashing, whereby environmental and climate issues are depoliticized, while masking the SAC’s repressive practices and contestations with resistance groups, and as I will address later, the engagement of the SAC in natural resource exploitation. However, as I show through selected media examples of the greenwashing of dictatorship, climate and environmental issues are very much part of the SAC’s political activities.

Examples of Greening Dictatorship

In this section I explore three of the areas that military leaders and bureaucrats focus on in their attempt to green the military’s image through SAC-controlled media. These are greening through tree planting and forest conservation, greening through plastic reduction campaigns, and greening through renewable energy.

Greening Case 1: Tree Planting and Forest Conservation

One of the key areas in which the SAC attempts to green its image is through tree planting, reforestation, and announcements of forest and biodiversity conservation initiatives. Articles even depict military leaders like Min Aung Hlaing and other high-ranking SAC officials performing greening activities, illustrating how environmental efforts involve the highest echelons of the military dictatorship. Others convey how the MoNREC executes forest conservation and tree-planting programs.

Tree-Planting Ceremonies

Multiple articles celebrate in photos and text the tree-planting activities of military leaders and high-ranking SAC officials, which are usually linked to specific ceremonies and international days of import. One article claimed military leaders and officials planted 210,398 trees during the 2023 monsoon season tree-growing ceremony held in the capital city Nay Pyi Taw. On these occasions, as seen in figures 1-4, the SAC is represented as a ‘green’ state and military, with officials and Min Aung Hlaing either displayed in their green uniform or in civilian outfits.⁵⁰

Figure 1
SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing pouring water on teak saplings in a Nay Pyi Taw tree-planting ceremony.⁵¹

Figure 2
SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing views activities of staff in the 2024 monsoon tree-planting event in Nay Pyi Taw.⁵²

Figure 3
SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing leads tree-planting ceremony of military families in Nay Pyi Taw, July 2024.⁵³

Figure 4
SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing participates in tree-planting ceremony in Nay Pyi Taw.⁵⁴

The participants of these ceremonies, as depicted in the photos, are usually high school and university students, teachers, policewomen, and nurses, wearing their respective uniforms. They ceremonial greet Min Aung Hlaing as he walks smiling through the tree-planting area. The photos give a sense of ritual order and discipline in which Min Aung Hlaing is the central figure. That such high-level military leaders attend tree-planting ceremonies shows how high they are on the greening agenda for the SAC. In some tree-planting ceremonies, Min Aung Hlang and other generals bring their wives along, who also plant trees after their husbands. The newspaper articles describe that this shows how whole military families take care of the environment and plant trees for mitigating climate change effects.⁵⁵

Many of the articles also cite speeches made during the ceremonies, especially by Min Aung Hlaing. At a tree-planting ceremony celebrated in Nay Pyi Taw by the “families of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief,” Min Aung Hlaing said that it aimed to ease the impacts of climate change, to give shade and support the state economy. ⁵⁶ He further highlighted the long-term commitment of the military to tree planting, calling this a national duty:

(The) Tatmadaw has been holding the monsoon tree-growing ceremonies for over a decade on a yearly basis starting from 2011. Such ceremonies aim to sustain the forest resources of the State and conserve the environment and valuable ecosystems as a national duty.⁵⁷

At another ceremony in 2023, he reiterated the point about national duty, while also warning against timber extraction:

It is necessary to conserve forests close to the rural areas whereas urban people have to green their environs as a national duty. [He continued] that extracting the necessary volume of timbers for the development of the nation and growing trees will improve the socioeconomic life of the people in harmony with the conservation of the natural environment and ecosystem and extreme extraction of timber can cause climate change.⁵⁸

In the same speech he blamed the British colonialists for extracting timber from valuable forests of Myanmar without limit. Forest coverage in the country has declined to 42 per cent because of the extraction of timber in successive eras, he said. He did not mention that deforestation occurred during previous military regimes and today, including the selling of timber to China and Thailand. Instead, he said that he, as commander-in-chief of the army, navy and air force, had planted trees and windbreaks since he took the position in 2011. He further highlighted the need for forest conservation, saying “forests and forestry ecosystem are to be conserved as a national duty for ensuring sustainable development of the nation, food security, reduction of climate change and prevention of natural disasters.”⁵⁹ At the September 2024 tree-planting ceremony in Nay Pyi Taw, he similarly reiterated that between 2011 and 2024 (his period in office) 1,584 tree-planting ceremonies had been held nationwide, leading to the planting of a total of nearly 23 million trees.⁶⁰

Apart from featuring Min Aung Hlaing, articles show how the MoNREC promotes tree planting by leading ceremonies and distributing saplings to people across the nation, especially during the months of June and July. At some ceremonies other ministries also participate, and the type of audience is the same as during Min Aung Hlaing’s ceremonies—with many students and teachers especially. Sometimes the SAC’s Forestry Department provides saplings, while at other times the local schools must use their own budgets and arrangements. These initiatives are conveyed to address deforestation and its impacts, such as loss of biodiversity, soil damage, climate change, and natural disasters. Some rarer articles feature state-level tree planting, such as those by Mon State’s Department of Forestry, which planted trees like coconut palms, red mangrove trees, and shady windbreak trees along coastal areas to counteract strong winds and potential flooding.⁶¹

The SAC’s Hotels and Tourism Department also conducts tree planting under the “One Tourist—One Tree” program, launched in July 2024, with an example shown in figure 5. This initiative allows international tourists, primarily from China and Russia, to plant commemorative trees to promote responsible tourism and increasing biodiversity. These portray Myanmar as a well-functioning and environmentally friendly state, while ignoring the ongoing conflict in the country.⁶²

Figure 5
Chinese tourists visiting in May 2024 on a familiarization trip to promote Myanmar-China tourism participate in tree-planting activities.⁶³

Tree planting is portrayed in SAC-controlled media as a military-led initiative for which the commander-in-chief himself is given much credit. Organized tree planting is not some new activity only performed by the military in Myanmar. According to Thi Thi Han,⁶⁴ an inscription at the ancient Buddhist capital Bagan, dated 3 February 1234 C.E., notes that even then there was replantation of damaged forest, and ancient kingdoms in the area delimited their respective domains by tree planting and forestry. The government of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma designated July as a tree-planting month in 1977, promoting tree-planting initiatives with the participation of people from all walks of life.⁶⁵ Tree-planting ceremonies, especially during the monsoon season, are led by social welfare organizations, local volunteer groups, ethnic armed organizations, and since the 2021 coup, by the NUG. These are widely embraced by communities across Myanmar. However, SAC-controlled media highlights only military-sponsored tree-planting initiatives. By omitting others’ efforts, the military attempts to hijack tree planting as its own purview, with a particular focus on displaying Min Aung Hlaing as a green leader who upholds a national duty to protect the environment. This emphasis on national duty can further be linked to the military’s portrayal of itself as protector of national unity.⁶⁶

Forest and Biodiversity Conservation

Numerous articles feature the SAC’s commitment to preserving forests, national gardens, marine national parks, protected reserves, wildlife sanctuaries, unique geological sites, and community-protected natural areas. Many of these articles herald the MoNREC’s initiatives in such conservation as helping combat climate change and sustain biodiversity, benefiting both the environment and humans. Existing national parks are portrayed as supporting tourism, creating local job opportunities, and generating revenue for the country.⁶⁷ Many of the articles feature photographs of pristine nature, while completely silencing the ongoing conflict and violence against ordinary people and the environment, as can be seen in figures 6 to 9.

Figures 6-9
Tourist attractions Khakaborazi National Park, Lampi Marine National Park, the Myeik Archipelago, and Indawgyi Lake birdlife as depicted in The Global New Light of Myanmar.⁶⁸

The articles give the impression that Myanmar under SAC rule is at the forefront of conservation and biodiversity protection. They mention that the SAC maintains 59 ecological protection areas, covering 6.42 percent of Myanmar’s total area, including eight ASEAN heritage parks, protecting 43 types of rare wild animals and mammals, 470 bird species, 297 plant species, and 24 rare herbal plants.⁶⁹ SAC officials emphasize the importance of greening coastal regions to preserve Myanmar’s natural beauty and improve the weather.⁷⁰ Their supposed conservation efforts are also showcased to other countries in the region. For instance, at the Green Development Forum of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Countries held in China in 2024, SAC Vice-Senior General Soe Win attended in person and stated publicly:

Myanmar is implementing the re-establishment of forests, habitats for biodiversity species at natural conservation areas, and reduction of carbon emissions to prevent deforestation and degradation of forests.⁷¹

Myanmar’s forestry officials also visited ASEAN Heritage Parks in Indonesia to ostensibly learn how ASEAN countries safeguard their ecosystems, biodiversity, culture, and traditions. Articles on this visit aimed to showcase the SAC’s relationship with ASEAN members and directly exhibited their desire for legal recognition by the international community.⁷²

SAC-controlled media articles also proclaim the MoNREC’s conservation of mangroves across coastal areas to protect against natural disasters, with one article praising Myanmar for ranking seventh in the world for its mangrove conservation (among the 123 countries with mangrove areas) and also ranking it third in Southeast Asia.⁷³ The article fails to mention the fact that many of Myanmar’s mangrove areas in Rakhine State and Tanintharyi Region are now conflict zones and under severe repression by the military.

One article even praises the SAC for doing strong protective work, while blaming local people for depleting the mangroves:

Mangroves serve as crucial barriers protecting urban areas from storms, floods, and severe weather. However, the indiscriminate use of mangroves by locals has led to their depletion. In fact, 43 per cent of the total income of local households in mangrove areas comes from selling mangrove products such as charcoal, fish, crab, and prawns. Therefore, authorities are actively monitoring the use of mangrove products to conserve these vital ecosystems.⁷⁴

How this monitoring is done in practice is not described, but the rhetoric is revealing of how the SAC is greened as the actor that protects the environment.

An intriguing development since the coup is the announcement by the MoNREC of new forest conservation areas in areas either controlled by resistance forces or strongly affected by fighting between the military and resistance forces. Yet such announcements do not mention conflict, only the names of the areas and the aim of preserving forests, wildlife and biodiversity. One example is the Nanyok Protected Public Forestin Sagaing Region, announced in August 2023, and which is within a strong revolutionary area where the military conducts attacks.⁷⁵ In 2024, the MoNREC announced ten new forest conservation areas in contested areas of Chin, Rakhine, and Mon states, as well as Tanintharyi, Sagaing, and Mandalay regions.⁷⁶ More recently, it proclaimed the establishment of a conservation area in Thandwe, Rakhine State, right when the Arakan Army took control of the area.⁷⁷

The overlap of these conservation zones with resistance territories may not be coincidental. As Andersson argues in the case of Guatemala,⁷⁸ this could reflect SAC efforts to capture resistance areas under the guise of environmental protection. Notably, this is conveyed through a complete ‘ecologization’ of forest and biodiversity issues, omitting any reference to politics and war. Interestingly, when announcing these areas, MoNREC cites the 2018 Forest Law, passed during the National League for Democracy (NLD) government period before the 2021 coup.⁷⁹ This reflects a further attempt by MoNREC officials to project normalcy and stability and downplay the current crisis.

Greening Case 2: Plastic Reduction Campaigns

The SAC also tries to green itself through plastic reduction campaigns, with media articles featuring SAC officials supposedly organizing plastic collection, reminding the public about the need to reduce plastic pollution, and lecturing readers about the dangers for marine life if plastic waste reaches waterways. As with tree planting, these articles feature both military leaders and high-ranking public servants.⁸⁰ Although they mainly display activities from SAC-controlled areas, the articles also include text on nationwide campaigns, implying the nation is politically stable and under the control of the SAC.

For example, one article depicts public servants and local people collecting waste, clearing grass and bushes, and cleaning out drains to improve water flow and beautify areas along the Ayeyarwady River in Kyonpyaw Township. It also highlights an educational program on waste management led by the township’s municipal organization, teaching students and teachers how to differentiate and dispose of waste systematically with the purpose of promoting good living principles.⁸¹ Similar plastic campaigns were conducted in two other SAC-controlled townships of Ayeyarwady Region.⁸²

Another article depicts the Rakhine State Environmental Protection Organization cleaning oceans from increased microplastic contamination. This organization also carried out waste management plans for Kyaukpyu Beach, removing plastic from the sea at three locations and conducting educational lectures and videos for students, teachers, and local residents.⁸³

Another article highlights transitioning from single-use plastic to reusable glass bottles during the tourism peak season in Mon State, to reduce the environmental impacts of hotels.⁸⁴ In another article, Shan State’s Environmental Conservation Department was shown conducting water quality assessments, collecting water samples, and distributing flyers to raise awareness about mitigating plastic pollution around Inle Lake.⁸⁵

Figure 10
Locals take part in a plastic clean-up activity on Kyaukpyu Beach, Rakhine State. ⁸⁶

Figure 11
Local people collect rubbish in the Bagan Ancient Cultural Zone during a campaign on 16 November 2024.⁸⁷

Figure 12
SAC officials conduct water quality assessments in Inlay Lake. ⁸⁸

Figure 12 shows uniformed public servants collaborating with local people in an effort to persuade the reader that the SAC cares for the environment and is able to mobilize local people to collaborate with them. Again, this greening is devoid of any mention of the ongoing conflict and resistance against military rule by the population.

Greening Case 3: Renewable Energy

The SAC also displays its supposed commitment to transitioning to renewable energy to reduce carbon emissions. This is not only an effort at greening dictatorship, but it is also an attempt to deceive readers that the country is developing at the same pace or in the same way as other countries. The SAC’s articles often mention electrical vehicles (EVs), hydropower, solar power, and most recently wind power. Apart from showcasing the SAC itself, these articles also aim to convince an international audience, primarily in other Asian countries like Singapore, China and Thailand, that the military-owned Myanmar Investment Commission mitigates against environmental and social impacts and is aligned with attracting foreign investment in renewable energy.⁸⁹

Apparently, SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing dreams of turning the country into a green electricity paradise. On one occasion in 2023, SAC media reported him as saying:

Myanmar must electrify public transport – including trains and buses – private vehicles and heavy machinery. We will adopt plans to transform these vehicles into electric ones. If not, our country will lag behind the development of others. ⁹⁰

Similarly, SAC media reported Vice-Senior General Soe Win saying in his speech at the 2024 Green Development Forum in China:

Myanmar has adopted the electric vehicle development policy for the development of EVs in the country in order to reduce the use of fossil fuel vehicles in the transport sector. At present, the Electric Vehicle Development Action Plan has been drawn in accordance with the mission and visions, procedures, and guidelines that have been adopted to implement the import and assembly of EVs systematically.⁹¹

A SAC media article from March 2024 summarizes how electric vehicles imported by a Chinese company have been arriving in Myanmar since 2023, including 31 luxury EV taxis primarily serving urban areas of Yangon Region. A total of 1,888 electric vehicles were registered in 2023, the article says. It also highlights that EV charging stations have been installed on highways such as the Yangon-Mandalay Highway and are now being operated in Yangon and Mandalay public areas such as shopping malls, resorts, religious buildings, and highway bus terminals.⁹² Figure 13 depicts SAC officials ceremonially inaugurating charging stations, showcasing their supposed commitment to a green energy transition. ⁹³

Figure 13
SAC officials inspect EV car charging station in Naypyitaw.⁹⁴

This showcasing of EVs elides entirely the shortages, shutdowns and rising electricity prices facing ordinary people in cities like Yangon, with only up to four hours of daily supply. Ordinary people in Myanmar, with a low per capita income, cannot purchase or use EVs, and according to my knowledge only a few EVs, authorized by the SAC and crony groups, operate in Yangon, Mandalay, and Nay Pyi Taw.

Several articles also boast of solar power system installations implemented by SAC departments in different townships of the country. These are supposedly used for water pumping operations, eco-friendly farming, and other uses. In one article, the SAC’s Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development described that approximately 2.5 million people in over 10,000 villages gained access to electricity “between 2016-17 and 2023-24” (sic), mainly through small-scale power generation projects and home solar panel systems.⁹⁵ The department aims to extend nationwide electricity access to all villages through utilizing renewable energy resources by 2030, it claimed. Solar energy is heralded as clean, renewable, and as contributing to environmental sustainability. Mention is also made of how solar power attracts foreign investment from multiple countries.⁹⁶

One example of this is cooperation with China in building the Dapein Hydropower Station. This project commenced on 25 April 2024 and was grid-connected on 31 May. The articles on this project boast of its average annual power generation of 594.74 MWh, equivalent to a reduction of carbon emissions by 504 tons. It is part of the new development pattern of China Datang Overseas Investment Co., Ltd., driven by hydrogen energy, energy storage, green carbon, intelligent integrated energy, energy conservation, and environmental protection. The photos in the article show Chinese-Myanmar cooperation and the performance and care taken by the Chinese company to increase green energy in Myanmar (see figure 14 for an example).⁹⁷

Figure 14
Chinese- Myanmar cooperation in Dapein Hydropower Station.⁹⁸

Furthermore, in 2023 the SAC Ministry of Electric Power signed a Memorandum of Agreement on wind power projects, boasting the world’s largest installed base of wind power capacity with 400 million kilowatt-hours. These projects were launched in Ann, Gwa, and Thandwe townships of Rakhine State in collaboration with Chinese companies. It is written in the article that MoNREC will ensure that the projects do not negatively impact the environment and society.⁹⁹ No mention is made of public engagement and consultation or about the ongoing conflict in Rakhine State, where the project will supposedly be implemented.

The SAC media articles on renewable energy only serve to showcase how the SAC is supposedly contributing to a green energy transition and how it is able to attract foreign investments and technology. There is complete omission of the electricity problems affecting people, especially after the 2021 coup. This is similar to how the Israeli state boasts of its innovative green technologies to greenwash the fact that it neglects and oppresses the Palestinian people.¹⁰⁰

Greening for Regional and International Recognition

The showcasing of the SAC’s supposed commitment to renewable energy, discussed above, is one element of how the SAC’s greening of dictatorship also aims, I suggest, to advance their international recognition and cooperation. As I mentioned earlier, the frequent reporting in SAC media of the SAC’s celebration of international days linked to nature and environment is aimed at promoting international recognition and showing that the SAC is part of the world community.¹⁰¹ For instance, on World Water Day, celebrated at the Myanmar International Convention Centre II in Nay Pyi Taw in March 2023, Min Aung Hlaing was reported by SAC media as saying:

The development of urban areas and industries demands a larger volume of water year by year. On the other hand, climate change and human activities make impacts on water sources and the environment, lessening the water sources. Therefore, all global countries are trying to solve the reduction of water sources.

He then stressed the need to enhance technological cooperation, consultation and cooperation in the utilization of sustainable water and requested that:

Friendly countries and non-governmental organizations continuously cooperate in development undertakings on the water by relevant ministries under the leadership of the government. All the people (are) urged to participate in the tasks of water sufficiency for all living beings as a national duty and help in the tasks of implementing the sustainable development goals adopted by the UN.¹⁰²

By referencing the UN, Min Aung Hlaing tries to give the impression that he and the SAC are following international frameworks and are ready to cooperate with the international community. As shown in figure 15, the event in question was held in extravagant style, and the audience was not ordinary people, but rather high-ranking military officers and public servants, giving the impression of a show by the SAC and for the SAC—and the international community. The speeches and the photos completely conceal the political instability in the country.

Figure 15
Min Aung Hlaing speaks on the occasion of World Water Day at the Myanmar International Convention Centre II in Nay Pyi Taw on 22 March 2023.¹⁰³

The showcasing of the SAC’s participation in various events and meetings in Asia constitutes another way that the SAC seeks to demonstrate international participation. Notably, this participation never extends to UN events or those in Western countries. Cooperation with China features prominently. Examples include media reports on SAC officials’ participation in the 10th World Water Forum in Indonesia,¹⁰⁴ the 2023 Belt-And-Road Ministerial Forum on disaster management in China,¹⁰⁵ the 45^th ASEAN Ministers meeting on Agriculture and Forestry,¹⁰⁶ and the 18^th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transboundary Haze Pollution Control in Laos, which was combined with the 17th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment.¹⁰⁷

At that last-mentioned meeting, the MoNREC Minister attended, and a SAC media article highlighted that ASEAN partners like Japan, Korea, China and the United States were present. SAC media quoted the MoNREC Minister boasting of Myanmar’s forest conservation efforts and the importance of renewable energy projects. In the evening there were award ceremonies, which involved the recognition of Myanmar’s green contributions. The article concluded: “Myanmar’s involvement in these discussions highlights its commitment to regional environmental cooperation and sustainable practices.” ¹⁰⁸

In another article on this meeting, SAC media wrote:

Myanmar has outlined a comprehensive strategy for climate change mitigation and adaptation within the national framework for the years 2021 to 2030. This strategy encompasses various sectors, including energy, electricity, forests, land utilization, mixed crop and forest, all with specific objectives.

It further highlighted that Myanmar was ready to collaborate with Japan and other countries on climate change action plans.¹⁰⁹

In SAC media, SAC attendees are usually shown attending these meetings virtually, but there are some exceptions, like the abovementioned meeting in Laos and when Vice-Chairman General Soe Win and a large delegation attended the July 2024 Green Development Forum in China in person.¹¹⁰ SAC media reported Soe Win saying the following while giving a speech at the forum:

Myanmar cooperates with international countries in implementing carbon reduction processes such as clean development, sustainable development, generation of electricity from waste in carbon credit cooperation, distribution of efficient stoves, and green development projects on the establishment and conservation of mangrove forests. Myanmar plans to emphasize the promotion of cooperation with regional countries to encourage green investments, effectively assess and monitor environmental impacts, and enhance investments with the least emission of carbon to combat climate change through the promotion of government-private cooperation in order to contribute to a green economy for sustainable development of economic, social and environmental harmonization.¹¹¹

In the reporting of these meetings there is no mention of the ongoing conflict and instability in Myanmar, let alone that the SAC does not control many areas of the country. The impression generated is that the SAC is a well-functioning state capable of regional collaboration and nationwide implementation of environmental and climate change actions. A notable example of this silencing of conflict can also be seen in Min Aung Hlaing’s online participation and speech at a meeting between Myanmar, Laos and Thailand about collaborating on reducing air pollution through preventing forest fires in their border regions. Here Min Aung Hlaing promises that the SAC will contribute to this agenda by reducing hillside shifting cultivation in its border regions, implement other kinds of farming, and produce fertilizers. What is completely omitted from his speech is the fact that the SAC has hardly any control of Myanmar’s border regions. What seems more important for Min Aung Hlaing at this meeting is that he is recognized as the leader of the state by Myanmar’s neighbors, thereby using ‘greening’ to politically consolidate SAC rule of Myanmar.¹¹²

Figure 16
SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing, previous Prime Minister of Thailand Prayut Chan-o-cha and Lao Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone holding an online tripartite coordination meeting on the transboundary haze pollution issue. ¹¹³

SAC media articles also feature the SAC engaging in collaborative energy efforts with Russia and China that do not always focus on a greening agenda.¹¹⁴ For instance, the SAC Ministry of Energy attended the first energy forum of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Kazakhstan, which focused on nurturing energy cooperation with China and Russia.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the SAC Minister of Energy attended the Russia Energy Week International Forum in Moscow in October 2023 with the reported purpose to collaborate on oil energy for electricity as part of Myanmar-Russia-China collaboration. This meeting had no focus on renewable energy.¹¹⁶ Some articles in the SAC newspapers, are also dedicated to ‘greening’ China and Chinese investments in Myanmar, for instance by conveying the China belt-and-road initiative as a green project¹¹⁷ and by highlighting how China donates solar power to Myanmar.¹¹⁸ One article was also about how China is very committed to the green agenda.¹¹⁹ There is a clear sense here that the SAC is turning toward China for legitimacy and collaboration. SAC is excluded from COP summits and does not engage in collaboration with Western countries, despite trying to convey its commitment to UN agendas.

Greenwashing in Perspective: Everyday Experiences and Critique of the SAC

The SAC media’s beautiful pictures of wildlife sanctuaries and lengthy articles about how the SAC conserves national parks and plants trees stand in stark contrast to ordinary people’s everyday struggles. They also contradict reports by civil society groups, researchers, and independent media of rampant deforestation caused by logging and mining since the 2021 coup. In my survey of SAC-controlled media articles in The Global New Light of Myanmar and The Mirror,I could find only a single article thatmentioned mining, gold panning, or illegal timber extraction, and even then, the article omitted how the military contributes to such activities.¹²⁰

Research by the All-Burma Indigenous Peoples Alliance (ABIPA) describes how the SAC gave licenses for mining, dam projects and palm oil plantations after the 2021 coup, leading to deforestation. In stark contrast to the imagery of stability and normalcy in the SAC-controlled media, the report by ABIPA further argues that:

After the 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s forests and their custodian communities have come under unprecedented pressures. The military coup has unleashed chaos across the country, suspending the rule of law and enabling the rich and powerful to exploit and plunder the country’s land and resources with impunity.¹²¹

This research further highlights that under the SAC, organizing conservation activities has become extremely dangerous. Many individuals have been detained, assaulted, or murdered by the military for their involvement in these activities. Indigenous communities and environmental defenders, who are on the front lines of combating global biodiversity loss and climate change, are thus losing their freedom to protect the environment. ¹²²

Similarly, South’s research has shown that the idea of the SAC as actually acting on climate change and protecting the environment is incoherent with realities on the ground.¹²³ Rather, Myanmar people highlight that most climate change mitigation activities were halted after the coup, and that it is now too dangerous for civil society groups to engage in environmental protection activities.

An Al Jazeera report from December 2021 also warns that the military is exploiting natural resources to shore up its finances: “putting one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations at increased risk.”¹²⁴ It highlights how successive military regimes in Myanmar have contributed to deforestation, stating that it has the highest deforestation rate in Southeast Asia. In 1948, a total of 77 percent of the country was still forested; this decreased to 60 percent in 1990 and to 44 percent in 2015. This paints a very different picture to the one provided in SAC-controlled media, which boasts of pervasive conservation. Cowan argues that the cash-strapped SAC junta appears intent on maximizing short-term revenues through logging, mining, and commercial palm oil and rubber plantations in the country’s remaining forests.¹²⁵ These activities also displace people from their homes, forcing some to clear forested land to cultivate new fields.¹²⁶

The destruction of natural resources by the SAC and crony companies, some linked to the SAC and others to district- and township-level ethnic armed group leaders, is documented in a report by the Independent Research Network.¹²⁷ This report also notes that people in Tanintharyi Region report gold mining has expanded there since the coup, with heavy machinery mining along creeks and streams, causing rapid environmental devastation.¹²⁸ In addition, in Yangon, I observed SAC Electrical Department staff cutting down trees to set up electrical connections, so most townships no longer have adequate tree cover, making them suffer more from the summer heat.

The SAC’s showcasing of its organization of plastic garbage collection and awareness-raising seminars also contrasts with experiences on the ground. According to a founder of a private marine volunteer clean-up group in Tanintharyi Region, the plastic campaigns are just for show.¹²⁹ Most areas have become more polluted with plastic after the coup, because local volunteer youth groups can no longer operate and because many youths have joined People’s Defense Forces to resist the military with arms. A report about waste management in Bago Region indicated that the military coup has negatively impacted the ongoing pre-coup Environmental Programme II and Bago Waste project, because international donors have withdrawn their funding.¹³⁰

In general, despite the SAC’s efforts to demonstrate concern for plastic waste and waste management systems in their media outlets, people on the ground continue to suffer from various forms of pollution. In my own experience, the plastic waste situation in Yangon is now very bad and people do not dispose of their plastic waste with care. More than 2,500 tons of solid municipal waste is generated every day in Yangon, almost all of which is landfilled at open dump sites.¹³¹ Plastic is thrown in the drainage, which causes flooding during the monsoon. This contrasts with the period of NLD government before the coup when people conducted systematic waste disposal with organizations such as youth groups, volunteer waste collecting groups, philanthropic groups—collaborating with municipal and other departmental staffs in collecting waste. But since the coup, people are now afraid to instigate community-led initiatives.

I also noticed that, despite the SAC’s emphasis on reducing plastic waste, it hosted the “6th International Plastic Trade Fair” at the Novotel Hotel in Yangon, which is owned by Myanmar crony U Zaw Zaw. Entrepreneurs from India, China, Singapore, and Myanmar participated in the exhibition, showcasing raw materials and equipment for plastic factories and packaging. The SAC’s celebration of plastic products at a crony-owned hotel blatantly reflects their disregard for genuine environmental concerns. ¹³²

Reports by Global Witness in 2022 and 2024 detail how rare earth mining has increased dramatically after the coup in Myanmar’s north-eastern region, causing severe pollution.¹³³ Htet Myat Aung reported in early 2024 that this mining is happening in a region under the control of a Border Guard Force that falls under the military’s chain of command.¹³⁴ There are approximately 2,700 rare earth mining collection pools scattered across nearly 300 locations. Also, the effects of rare earth mining on local communities are long-lasting, resulting in significant environmental damage that requires billions of dollars in clean-up costs. The mining has terrible effects:

Rivers remain contaminated and this has led to the disappearance of most fish, birds and other animals. Local communities continue to struggle to access clean drinking water and farmers are unable to grow crops near the mining areas. A critical concern is that contaminated watercourses near the mines flow directly into the N’Mai River, a tributary of the Irrawaddy River, which supports two-thirds of the country’s population.¹³⁵

Independent media has also raised critiques of the SAC regarding its disaster management efforts. While SAC-controlled media often portrays the regime as effective in managing disasters and caring for victims, evidence from the ground indicates they have not sufficiently reached vulnerable populations. For instance, during the Ayeyarwady River flooding in Magway Region in July 2024, independent media outlet khit thit reported that SAC police officers and township administrators visited a less-affected area where only six inches of water covered the village. They made it look like they were helping and supporting the villagers, took photos (presumably for the media), and left. Residents of the wards most devastated by the floods received no assistance from the SAC at all, and had to pay approximately 10,000 Myanmar Kyat for access to clean water.¹³⁶

Furthermore, some independent media have suggested that the SAC’s participation in regional environmental meetings is not driven by genuine environmental concerns, but rather by a desire to bolster regional support for the regime. There was for instance speculation in exile media that SAC Vice-Senior General Soe Win attended the Green Development Forum at the Qingdao International Conference in China primarily to make a deal to purchase weapons, not for green development initiatives. Similarly, the SAC’s showcasing of renewable energy has faced considerable criticism for being out of touch with the real situation on the ground. An article in Frontier Myanmar describes how Yangon residents suffer from water shortages and power outages under the junta’s economic mismanagement. Most taxi drivers are unimpressed with EV cars due to the scarcity of charging stations, unreliable electricity supply, and high EV prices.¹³⁷ According to my analysis, the introduction of EVs is less about reducing carbon emissions and more about the SAC officials and cronies with access to EVs importing them and selling permits for financial profit.

Conclusion

By contrasting SAC-controlled media articles with independent media, scholarship, and peoples’ everyday experiences, it is clear that the SAC is greenwashing the dictatorship it established following the 2021 military coup. The SAC does this by staging extensive tree-planting ceremonies, promoting reforestation as a national duty, collecting plastic and heralding renewable energy, while simultaneously downplaying the ongoing crisis in the country. These actions mirror those of authoritarian regimes elsewhere, which, as the literature suggests, often exploit environmental initiatives to project an image of responsibility and stability as a cover up for repressive practices. As work by Fröhlich & Hirt,¹³⁸ as well as by Robbins,¹³⁹ have noted, authoritarian regimes often ecologize disasters, presenting them as purely natural occurrences while obscuring political causes and exacerbation. This process can be seen in Myanmar, where the SAC uses environmental rhetoric not only to divert attention from their violent rule but also to try to secure international recognition, funding, and investments. By emphasizing their supposed commitment to green development, the SAC seeks to consolidate power and convey an image of a functioning state, even as most countries reject them as the legitimate government of Myanmar.

Drawing on the concept of environmental authoritarianism, it is evident that the SAC’s emphasis on environmental policies in its media is not genuine, but is simply greenwashing, and is also about claiming control over contested territories and masking the regime’s role in resource exploitation. The SAC thus exploits climate change and environmental issues to legitimize its political aims. For instance, its announcement of new state forest conservation areas in areas held by opponents to its rule may serve as a tactic to try and suppress opposition and assert territorial control under the guise of environmental responsibility. This mirrors the militaries of some other countries like Guatemala, where the military used conservation as a cover for counterinsurgency operations.¹⁴⁰

Although SAC leaders attend regional green development forums, their greening activities are largely seen as showcases aimed at increasing persuading other countries to recognize the SAC as a sovereign state. Environmentalists, researchers, and independent media, meanwhile, criticize the SAC for land grabbing, logging, and extracting resources. These criticisms highlight how, in practice, authoritarian regimes often fail to deliver effective environmental governance, opting instead for performative acts of greening that serve their own interests. The concept of greening dictatorship encapsulates this process, wherein the SAC appropriates climate change and environmental issues to distract from Myanmar’s ongoing political rupture and its own role in perpetuating this crisis.

This article contributes to the theoretical understanding of greenwashing by showing how a military junta, through the lens of greening dictatorship, attempts to influence environmental discourse to legitimize its repressive rule. The SAC’s actions, while echoing familiar strategies of authoritarian environmentalism, differ in that they occur within a full-blown dictatorship where violence, territorial control, and military dominance are the primary modes of governance. By analyzing the SAC’s greenwashing strategies, this article sheds light on how environmental rhetoric can be wielded by authoritarian rulers not only to secure international recognition but also to display power domestically by presenting a façade of environmental responsibility and state functionality.

Endnotes

¹ In many cases, the same articles are written by the Ministry of Information and appear in both newspapers.
² Fröhlich & Hirt, 2021; Hughes et al., 2022.
³ Gverdtsiteli, 2022.
⁴ Hughes et al., 2022.
⁵ Holbraad et al., 2020; Lund, 2016.
⁶ IMS, 2022.
⁷ May, 2016.
⁸ For a recent study of military-controlled media in Myanmar and what role it played in fomenting a state of crisis, see Kironska et al., 2021.
⁹ Ministry of Information, 2022.
¹⁰ Fröhlich & Hirt, 2021, pp. 3-4.
¹¹ Fröhlich & Hirt, 2021.
¹² Robbins, 2004.
¹³ Fröhlich & Hirt, 2021, p. 3.
¹⁴ Hughes et al., 2022.
¹⁵ Hughes et al., 2022, p. 498.
¹⁶ Andersson, 2020.
¹⁷ Gverdtsiteli, 2022, pp. 163-170.
¹⁸ Beeson, 2010; Mittiga, 2021.
¹⁹ Li & Shapiro, 2020; Shahar, 2015; Wallace, 2022.
²⁰ Gverdtsiteli, 2022, p. 163.
²¹ Li & Shapiro, 2020.
²² Baviskar, 1995; Khagram, 2004; Mertha, 2008; Randell, 2018.
²³ See Woods & Naimark (2020) for work on how forest conservation was also used by the military prior to the coup as a counterinsurgency tactic.
²⁴ For an elaboration on dictatorship as a specific form of authoritarianism, see Geddes et al. (2018).
²⁵ “Flooded areas warned of heavy rain and strong winds”, 2024.
²⁶ “10 million Thais treated”, 2024; “Indigenous peoples hold many solutions”, 2023; “Rising seas a ‘death sentence’ for some”, 2023; “Thai tourist hotspot Chiang Mai”, 2024.
²⁷ Thein Tun, 2023.
²⁸ “Ease effects of El Nino”, 2023.
²⁹ “Climate and Gaza crises share spotlight”, 2023; “COP28 host UAE and India”, 2023; “COP28’s UAE chair says ‘we respect’ climate science”, 2023; “Nations rally behind renewables”, 2023; “UAE: fossil fuel power”, 2023; “With 80,000 attendees, COP28 is largest”, 2023; “World needs ‘trillions’ for climate”, 2023.
³⁰ See Chambers & Kyed, 2023.
³¹ “Everybody needs to make preparations”, 2023.
³² “Forest Dept marks International Day”,2024; “Myanmar achieves remarkable”, 2024.
³³ The National Unity Government also has a MoNREC, but when the abbreviation is used henceforth in this article, it refers to the SAC’s MoNREC.
³⁴ Suu Sandar Aung, 2024.
³⁵ “2023 International Day”, 2023.
³⁶ “Mt Popa, Myanmar’s first”, 2024; “Myanmar ranks third”, 2024.
³⁷ “Belt and Road Initiative”, 2023; “Myanmar, Thailand and Laos”, 2023;“Myanmar’s Minister attends ASEAN environment meetings”, 2023; “Thai, Myanmar delegates join technical workshop”, 2023.
³⁸ “MIC nods 6 investment projects”, 2023; “MoA signed for wind power”, 2023; “MoEP invites tenders”, 2023; “Solar power system”, 2023.
³⁹ “34 wintering, migratory bird species”, 2023; “Star tortoise from at Shwesettaw”, 2023.
⁴⁰ “Ancient volcano’s rock formations”, 2024; “Mt Popa, Myanmar’s first”, 2024.
⁴¹ “European tourists flock,” 2023.
⁴² “Annual water quality report”, 2024; “Heavy rains lessen cotton quality”, 2023; Moe Yan, 2023; “Raise public awareness for systematic waste”, 2024; “State-of-the-art on-site wastewater”, 2024.
⁴³ “DMH warns of nationwide thunderstorms”, 2024; “People over 45 top among heat stroke patients”, 2024; “Nearly 1,500 natural disasters strike nationwide”,2023.
⁴⁴ Fröhlich & Hirt, 2021.
⁴⁵ “DPM MoTC Union Minister provides cash”, 2023; “Flooding emergency in Myitkyina”, 2024; “Over 27,300 flood victims relocated”, 2023.
⁴⁶ Exceptions include: “Four major faiths unite,”, 2024; “Patthana recitation conducted”, 2023; “Prepare for natural disasters”, 2023.
⁴⁷ Nadi Min, 2023.
⁴⁸ “Every village in Magway Region”, 2024; “Prospects Brighten: State economy set to thrive”, 2024.
⁴⁹ “Senior General Min Aung Hlaing vows”, 2023.
⁵⁰ “Everybody needs to conserve forests”, 2023; “Restore Myanmar’s forests”, 2023.
⁵¹ “Everybody needs to conserve forests”, 2023.
⁵² “Restore Myanmar’s forests”, 2023.
⁵³ “Families of Office of the Commander-in-Chief”, 2024.
⁵⁴ “Restore Myanmar’s forests”, 2023.
⁵⁵ “Families of Office of the Commander-in-Chief”, 2024.
⁵⁶ “Perennial trees cannot immediately benefit”, 2023.
⁵⁷ “Perennial trees cannot immediately benefit”, 2023.
⁵⁸ “Everybody needs to conserve forests”, 2023.
⁵⁹ “Everybody needs to conserve forests”, 2023.
⁶⁰ “Forest conservation in watershed areas”, 2024.
⁶¹ “Mon State to plant over 20,000 trees”, 2024.
⁶² “One Tourist-One Tree programme”, 2024.
⁶³ “One Tourist-One Tree programme”, 2024.
⁶⁴ Thi Thi Han, 2018.
⁶⁵ “Let’s grow trees at the best time”, 2024.
⁶⁶ Selth, 2021.
⁶⁷ “Myanmar ranks third in ASEAN”, 2024.
⁶⁸ “Myanmar ranks third in ASEAN”, 2024.
⁶⁹ “Myanmar’s 59 protected areas”, 2024.
⁷⁰ Nyein Thu, 2024.
⁷¹ “Blue economy development”, 2024.
⁷² “Myanmar forestry officials”, 2024.
⁷³ “Establish and conserve mangrove forests,” 2024; “Myanmar’s systematic preservation,” 2024.
⁷⁴ “Myanmar’s systematic preservation,” 2024.
⁷⁵ “Recognition of Nanyok Protected Public Forest”, 2023.
⁷⁶ “Lawkananda Wildlife Sanctuary”, 2024; “Manloiyang designated as protected”, 2024; “MONREC designates Htin Mel protected public forest”, 2024; “MoNREC designates Kyun Natha Marine National Park”, 2024; “MoNREC designates Kyeikpi Shwethaungkwin”, 2024; “MoNREC designates new protected public mangrove forest”, 2024; “MoNREC designates Shwesandaw Protected Public Forest”, 2024; “MoNREC designates Yone Taung”, 2024; “Nangsapi designated as protected”, 2024; “Thayet Taunggyi protected public mangrove forest”, 2024.
⁷⁷ Roe Kyaw, 2018.
⁷⁸ Andersson, 2020.
⁷⁹ “Juuzi Forest confirmed as Protected Public Forest”, 2023.
⁸⁰ “Reduce the use of plastic products”, 2023.
⁸¹ “Raise public awareness,” 2024.
⁸² “Systematic waste disposal,” 2023.
⁸³ “Plastic cleanup underway at Kyaukpyu,” 2023.
⁸⁴ “Fostering sustainable business practices”, 2023.
⁸⁵ “Annual water quality report”, 2024.
⁸⁶ “Plastic cleanup underway at Kyaukpyu,” 2023.
⁸⁷ “Bagan Plastic Campaign”, 2024.
⁸⁸ “Annual water quality report”, 2024.
⁸⁹ “MIC nods 6 investment projects”,2023.
⁹⁰ “Electric vehicles arrive in Yangon”, 2023.
⁹¹ “Blue economy development”, 2024.
⁹² “Charging stations available for EVs”, 2024.
⁹³ “First-ever EV Charging Station inaugurated”,2023.
⁹⁴ “First-ever EV Charging Station inaugurated”,2023.
⁹⁵ “Over 10,000 villages gain electricity”, 2023.
⁹⁶ “Solar-powered pumps”, 2024; “Installation of 14MW solar power system”, 2024; “Six solar power plants in operation”, 2024.
⁹⁷ “Dapein (1) Hydropower Company”, 2023; “Dapein (1) Hydropower Station”, 2024.
⁹⁸ “Dapein (1) Hydropower Station”, 2024.
⁹⁹ “MoA signed for wind power”, 2023.
¹⁰⁰ Hughes et al., 2023.
¹⁰¹ “2023 International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer”,2023; “2024 World Environment Day”, 2024; “Celebrating World Environmental Maintenance Day”,2024; “SAC Member DPM MoTC Union Minister”,2023.
¹⁰² “Everybody needs to make preparations”, 2023.
¹⁰³ “Everybody needs to make preparations”, 2023.
¹⁰⁴ “Myanmar participates in 10^th World Water Forum”, 2024.
¹⁰⁵ “Myanmar showcases disaster management”, 2023.
¹⁰⁶ “MoALI UM leads delegation”, 2023.
¹⁰⁷ “Myanmar and ASEAN collaborate,” 2023.
¹⁰⁸ “Myanmar’s Minister attends ASEAN”, 2023.
¹⁰⁹ “Myanmar and ASEAN collaborate”, 2023.
¹¹⁰ “MoNREC Union Minister arrives back”, 2024; “MoNREC Union Minister leaves for PRC”, 2024; “SAC Vice-Chair Deputy PM Vice-Senior General Soe Win”, 2024.
¹¹¹ “Blue economy development”, 2024.
¹¹² “Myanmar, Thailand and Laos hold tripartite coordination”, 2023.
¹¹³ “Myanmar, Thailand and Laos hold tripartite coordination”, 2023.
¹¹⁴ Russia supports SAC-controlled media in Myanmar. The Global New Light of Myanmar signed an agreement with the Russian news information agency SPUTNIK in 2023, so “Myanmar journalists will have a chance to study news writing, editing and photography techniques … (the) union minister wished for the signatories to be successful in the purposes of mutual understanding between peoples of the two countries, news flow in a rapidly manner, dissemination of news on culture, humanitarian, sports, business and political arenas and media development” (“The Global New Light”, 2023).
¹¹⁵ “Union Energy Minister attends SCO Energy Forum”, 2023.
¹¹⁶ “Union Energy Minister engages in energy talks”, 2023.
¹¹⁷ “Belt and Road Initiative: A Road of Green Development”, 2023.
¹¹⁸ “China’s YNPAFFC donates”, 2023.
¹¹⁹ “Chinese Modernization: Harmony”, 2023.
¹²⁰ “Establish green areas for urban development”, 2024.
¹²¹ All-Burma Indigenous People’s Alliance, 2022.
¹²² All-Burma Indigenous People’s Alliance, 2022.
¹²³ South, 2023.
¹²⁴ Liu & Wallace, 2021.
¹²⁵ Cowan, 2021.
¹²⁶ Cowan, 2021; Hill & Kenney-Lazar, 2021.
¹²⁷ Independent Research Network, 2022.
¹²⁸ All Burma Indigenous People’s Alliance, 2022.
¹²⁹ Clean-up group founder, personal communication, 2024.
¹³⁰ Nesheim et al., 2022.
¹³¹ Philkoei International, 2022.
¹³² “Novotel Yangon to host”, 2023.
¹³³ Global Witness, 2024.
¹³⁴ Htet Myat Aung, 2024.
¹³⁵ Htet Myat Aung, 2024.
¹³⁶ Khit Thit Media, 2024.
¹³⁷ “Lights out: Myanmar’s junta dreams”, 2023.
¹³⁸ Fröhlich & Hirt, 2021.
¹³⁹ Robbins, 2004.
¹⁴⁰ Andersson, 2019.

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Articles from The Mirror and The Global New Light of Myanmar

10 million Thais treated for pollution health problems in 2023. (2024, March 6). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

2023 International Day for the Preservation of the Ozone Layer celebrated in Nay Pyi Taw. (2023, September 16). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

2024 World Environment Day. (2024, June 6). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

34 wintering, migratory bird species, including 5 rare, grace Inlay Lake for migration. (2023, December 14). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Ancient volcano’s rock formations, tropical beauty draw visitors. (2024, September 4). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 2.

Annual water quality report on Inlay Lake. (2024, May 25). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 10.

Bagan Plastic Campaign prioritizes plastic cleanup activities. (2024, November 18). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 4.

Belt and Road Initiative: A Road of Green Development for the New Era. (2023, October 22). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 10.

Blue economy development boosts sustainable use of Myanmar’s coastal resources. (2024, July 9). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

Celebrating World Environmental Maintenance Day Tree Plantation. (2024, June 8). The Mirror, p. 8, 10, 16, 18.

Charging stations available for EVs on highways. (2024, March 9). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 2.

China’s YNPAFFC donates 40 sets of solar-power streetlights to Thakayta Township. (2023, February 23). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 6.

Chinese Modernization: Harmony between Humanity and Nature. (2023, September 30). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 9.

Climate and Gaza crises share spotlight as world leaders attend COP28. (2023, December 2). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 10.

COP28 host UAE and India vow ‘successful’ climate summit. (2023, July 17). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

COP28’s UAE chair says ‘we respect’ climate science. (2023, December 5). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

Dapein (1) Hydropower Company Limited in Myanmar Begins “100-day Difficulties-overcoming” with “Three Focuses”. (2023, November 24). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 7.

Dapein (1) Hydropower Station Taking Actions to Accomplish Half of Its Annual Goal. (2024, July 10). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 7.

DMH warns of nationwide thunderstorms in May. (2024, May 2). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 11.

DPM MoTC Union Minister provides cash, foodstuffs to staff of affiliated departments under ministry, inspects rehabilitation processes in Rakhine State. (2023, June 1). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Ease effects of El Nino and climate change. (2023, October 18). Global New Light of Myanmar.

Electric vehicles arrive in Yangon. (2023, April 8). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

Establish and conserve mangrove forests for generations. (2024, July 13). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 8.

Establish green areas for urban development. (2024, June 11). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 8.

European tourists flock to Wa Ale Resort in Lampi Marine National Park annually. (2023, January 6). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Every village in Magway Region to plant two-acre forest to combat rising temperatures. (2024, May 25). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

Everybody needs to conserve forests in rural areas and green urban areas as national duty:Commander-in-Chief (Army, Navy and Air) office has planted 194,001 trees and windbreaks in 39 ceremonies from 2011 to date. (2023, September 8). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

Everybody needs to make preparations for easing the impacts of climate change: Senior General. (2023, March 23). The Mirror, p. 1.

Families of Office of the Commander-in-Chief (Army, Navy and Air) hold second monsoon tree-growing ceremony. (2024, July 13). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

First-ever EV Charging Station inaugurated in Nay Pyi Taw. (2023, March 5). The Mirror, p. 5.

Flooded areas warned of heavy rain and strong winds. (2024, July 16). Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Flooding emergency in Myitkyina prompts rapid rescue efforts. (2024, July 2). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 4.

Forest conservation in watershed areas helps sustainability of freshwater resources. (2024, September 8). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 4.

Forest Dept marks International Day of Forests 2024. (2024, March 26). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 24.

Fostering sustainable business practices: The hospitality industry in Mon State to replace single-use plastic with glass from upcoming tourism peak season. (2023, October 27). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. S-A.

Four major faiths unite for rain invocation. (2024, May 6). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 3.

Heavy rains lessen cotton quality. (2023, October 18). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 6.

Indigenous peoples hold many solutions to climate crisis, says UN chief. (2023, April 19). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 15.

Installation of 14MW solar power system planned for Thilawa SEZ. (2024, March 21). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

Juuzi Forest confirmed as Protected Public Forest in Putao Tsp, Putao Dostrict, Kachin State. (2024, October 20). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

Lawkananda Wildlife Sanctuarcy Launches ecotourism in Mandalay Region. (2024, March 31). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

Let’s grow trees at the best time. (2024, June 27). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 8.

Manloiyang designated as protected public forest to preserve wildlife and ecosystem in Katha Tsp, Katha District, Sagaing Region. (2024, September 13). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

MIC nods 6 investment projects including renewable energy project on 2 Oct. (2023, October 3). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

MoA signed for wind power projects in Rakhine State. (2023, March 2). The Mirror, p. 8.

MoALI UM leads delegation to join 45th ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture & Forestry Meeting. (2023, October 5). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

Moe Yan. (2023, February 25). Underground dam can conduct the green in drought hot regions. The Mirror.

MoEP invites tenders for Shweli-3 Hydropower Project investment. (2023, December 25). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Mon State to plant over 20,000 trees, including over 10,000 windbreaks. (2024, June 27). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 2.

MoNREC designates Htin Mel protected public forest in Bokpyin Township, Taninthayi Region. (2024, February 17). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

MoNREC designates Kyeikpi Shwethaungkwin protected public mangrove forest. (2024, February 15). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

MoNREC designates Kyun Natha Marine National Park in Gwa township, Thandwe District, Rakhine State. (2024, June 18). The Mirror, p. 13.

MoNREC designates new protected public mangrove forest in Myeik District, Taninthayi Region. (2024, August 3). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 2.

MoNREC designates Shwesandaw Protected Public Forest in Mandalay Region. (2024, September 14). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 11.

MoNREC designates Yone Taung protected public forest in Haka. (2024, September 13). The Mirror.

MoNREC Union Minister arrives back after attending China Xizang Forum. (2024, July 7). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 3.

MoNREC Union Minister leaves for PRC to attend 4th China Xizang Trans-Himalaya Forum for International Cooperation. (2024, July 2). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 3.

Mt Popa, Myanmar’s first National Geopark, to launch geotourism. (2024, May 22).The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 2.

Myanmar achieves remarkable 0.9% deforestation rate in 2010-2020. (2024, June 5). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

Myanmar and ASEAN collaborate with Japan, China, and Korea for environmental conservation and climate action: MONREC Union Minister. (2023, August 26). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 4.

Myanmar forestry officials to observe ASEAN Heritage Parks in Indonesia. (2024, June 19). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Myanmar participates in 10^th World Water Forum in Indonesia. (2024, May 25). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 10.

Myanmar ranks third in ASEAN for heritage parks. (2024, April 24). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

Myanmar showcases disaster management efforts at 2023 BRI Ministerial Forum. (2023, November 18). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 7.

Myanmar, Thailand and Laos hold tripartite coordination meeting on transborder smog issue. (2023, April 8). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

Myanmar’s 59 protected areas cover 6.42% of country. (2024, May 31). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 2.

Myanmar’s Minister attends ASEAN environment meetings. (2023a, August 25). The Mirror, p. 7.

Myanmar’s systematic preservation of mangroves: Home to the third-largest mangrove area. (2024, June 11). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 2.

Nadi Min. (2023, January 3). Chin State’s Konjac cultivation enhances rural livelihood and income, generates revenue. The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Nangsapi designated as protected public forest to preserve wildlife and ecosystem in Homalin Tsp, Homalin District, Sagaing Region. (2024, September 12). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

Nations rally behind renewables at COP28 climate talks. (2023, December 4). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

Nearly 1,500 natural disasters strike nationwide in eight months. (2023, September 27). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 6.

Novotel Yangon to host 6th International Plastic Trade Fair. (2023, March 19). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

Nyein Thu. (2024, May 30). Mountain ecosystem, forest conservation guarantee watershed area of Ayeyawady. The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 6.

One Tourist-One Tree programme to start in coming July. (2024, June 17). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Over 10,000 villages gain electricity access in 8 years via small-scale power projects, home solar systems. (2023, February 9). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 6.

Over 27,300 flood victims relocated to 47 temporary shelters. (2023, October 12). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 10.

Patthana recitation conducted at Botahtaung Pagoda to be free from natural disasters. (2023, May 11). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 10.

Perennial trees cannot immediately benefit the people but give shade and safety to posterity. (2023, June 9). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

People over 45 top among heat stroke patients. (2024, May 1). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 10.

Plastic cleanup underway at Kyaukpyu Beach. (2023, November 11). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 2.

Prepare for natural disasters to save lives and property. (2023, October 11). Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 8.

Prospects Brighten: State economy set to thrive, currency value to surge in post-sanctions and trade challenges. (2024, April 23). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

Raise public awareness for systematic waste management. (2024, May 29). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 8.

Recognition of Nanyok Protected Public Forest. (2023, August 30). The Mirror, p. 10.

Reduce the use of plastic products for beautifying the environment. (2024, April 10). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 8.

Restore Myanmar’s forests for a greener future. (2023, September 10). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 8.

Rising seas a ‘death sentence’ for some countries. (2023, February 27). The Mirror (Maung Thar Yar, Trans.), p. 15.

SAC Member DPM MoTC Union Minister attends 63rd Anniversary of World Meteorological Day. (2023, March 24). The Mirror, p. 3.

SAC Vice-Chair Deputy PM Vice-Senior General Soe Win leaves for China to attend SCO’s Green Development Forum. (2024, July 7). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 1.

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing vows vigilant efforts against insurgents. (2023, November 30). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 4.

Six solar power plants in operation, 13 under construction. (2024, March 31). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Solar-powered pumps enable eco-friendly farming in two villages. (2024, March 6). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 6.

Solar power system, cold storage project to complete in 2025 in two regions. (2023, January 20). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 10.

Star tortoise from at Shwesettaw Wildlife Sanctuary to be released into forests. (2023, October 23). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

State-of-the-art on-site wastewater treatment facility planned for Insein. (2024, January 5). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 11.

Suu Sandar Aung. (2024, May 19). Everybody participate and conduct to maintain the bio-diversity. The Mirror, pp. 6-7.

Systematic waste disposal education program. (2023, February 1). The Mirror.

Thai tourist hotspot Chiang Mai tops world’s most polluted cities. (2024, March 16). The Global New Light of Myanmar.

Thai, Myanmar delegates join technical workshop on Transboundary Haze Pollution Management. (2023, February 3). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 2.

Thayet Taunggyi protected public mangrove forest designated for biodiversity preservation in Thayetchaung Township of Dawei District in Taninthayi Region. (2024, June 15). The Mirror.

The Global New Light of Myanmar and SPUTNIK Information Agency sign an agreement. (2023, September 6). The Global New Light of Myanmar. https://www.gnlm.com.mm/the-global-new-light-of-myanmar-and-sputnik-information-agency-sign-an-agreement/

Thein Tun. (2023, May 1). Global warming and ethic. The Mirror,pp. 24-25.

UAE: fossil fuel power and COP28 host. (2023, November 27). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 10.

Union Energy Minister attends SCO Energy Forum in Kazakhstan. (2023, October 5). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 5.

Union Energy Minister engages in energy talks during Moscow visit. (2023, October 5). The Global New Light of Myanmar, p. 4.

With 80,000 attendees, COP28 is largest UN climate summit ever. (2023, December 3). The Global New Light of Myanmar. World needs ‘trillions’ for climate action: COP28 president. (2023, February 21). The Global New Light of Myanmar.