Marianne Mosberg | ယခုဆောင်းပါးကို မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ဖတ်ရှုရန် ဤနေရာတွင် နှိပ်ပါ

Cite as: 
Mosberg, M. (2026). Depoliticizing Vulnerability & Climate Action in Conflict Contexts: Reflections from Southeast Myanmar. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 7. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5670

Abstract

Climate change adaptation is often framed as a technical, apolitical process, yet adaptation policies and projects can deepen social inequities, perpetuate injustices, and intensify existing conflicts. This paper examines how violent conflict, vulnerability, and climate actions intersected in southeastern Myanmar in the years leading up to the 2021 military coup, drawing on in-depth interviews from multi-sited fieldwork conducted in 2018–2019, combined with critical policy analysis. By analyzing lived experiences of climate change and conflict in Karen State and Tanintharyi Region, the study highlights how structural violence undermines community resilience. The paper also argues that the depoliticization of climate actions obscures inherent political contestations and may legitimize interventions that (re)produce social injustices and perpetuate underlying grievances. These findings emphasize the need to integrate conflict considerations into climate policies and projects, and to place climate justice principles at the heart of climate actions to ensure equitable and effective adaptation efforts.

Introduction

The impacts of climate change are particularly severe in contexts affected by violent conflict, where people are already confronted with a multitude of risks to their lives and livelihoods. Yet conflict considerations are rarely incorporated into climate policies and adaptation strategies.¹ This disconnect was particularly evident in Myanmar during the 2010s when the semi-civilian government intensified engagement with climate change initiatives while navigating a contentious peace process. During this decade, the government developed seven national climate policies and strategies, and the country received more than US $6.6 billion in climate-related development finance.² Even though environmental governance and control over natural resources are closely tied to the country’s conflict dynamics, climate-related initiatives were entirely disconnected from the peacebuilding processes. The climate policies of the incumbent Myanmar governments during this period, for instance, made negligible references to ongoing armed conflicts or the fragile peace process—key factors in shaping vulnerability dynamics in many parts of the country.

Building on the critical adaptation studies literature useful for studying the politics of climate change³ and the depoliticization of climate actions,⁴ I examine in this article how conflict considerations were addressed—or neglected—in Myanmar’s climate policies, and one climate-related project in Tanintharyi Region, during the “political reforms era” of the 2010s. I also explore how these climate actions intersected with conflict dynamics in the years leading up to the 2021 military coup. To deepen this analysis, I engage with the concepts of chronic crisis⁵ and rupture⁶ to investigate how the protracted armed conflict in southeastern Myanmar contributed to produce vulnerability to climate change.

To examine the interplay between climate actions and conflict dynamics, research for this article focused on Karen State and Tanintharyi Region, where the world’s longest-running civil war continues between the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Myanmar military. In 2012, the KNLA’s political wing, the Karen National Union (KNU), signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement with Myanmar’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government, which was extended by the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015. Despite these agreements, and the KNU’s active participation in the peace process, political grievances remained unresolved and southeast Myanmar remained far from peaceful during the ceasefire period. ⁷

However, the political reforms and ceasefire agreements during the 2010s did prompt an influx of international organizations into southeast Myanmar, seeking to protect biodiversity and forest landscapes.⁸ One of the most prominent was the “Ridge to Reef: Integrated Protected Area Land and Seascape Management in Tanintharyi” project (henceforth just “R2R”), a large-scale environmental conservation initiative with climate mitigation and adaptation objectives. While the project was framed as a technical and apolitical initiative, it aimed to place one-third of Tanintharyi Region under an integrated land and seascape management scheme, effectively extending Myanmar government authority into KNU-controlled areas. The lack of information and sufficient consultation with local communities and key stakeholders in the region led to significant concern. Karen communities displaced by conflict in the 1990s were particularly concerned about their ability to return to their ancestral lands and continue their traditional livelihood practices.⁹

Some civil society organizations (CSOs) and the KNU then rallied in opposition to the project, advocating on behalf of communities to be affected by the scheme.¹⁰ In 2018, just as the project was about to begin, the Conservation Alliance of Tanawthari (CAT), a coalition of local CSOs, submitted a formal complaint to the project’s implementing agency and the donor, the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The complaint argued that the project violated provisions of the NCA, posed a significant risk to the fragile peace process, and disregarded the rights of affected populations.¹¹ The complaint led to a formal suspension and investigation of the project, which confirmed that the necessary steps had not been taken to ensure free prior informed consent, and that there was a failure to take the political context into sufficient consideration.¹²

This case highlights the tensions between climate initiatives and unresolved conflict dynamics in Myanmar during the 2010s, serving as a critical example of how climate policies and projects can unintentionally deepen existing drivers of conflict and vulnerability. By framing adaptation and mitigation efforts as purely technical endeavors, such initiatives can obscure the sociopolitical dimensions of vulnerability and render existing conflicts invisible. Yet, ignoring conflicts does not make them go away. On the contrary, overlooking political contestations can legitimize and promote climate actions that perpetuate social injustices, extend government control over people, territories, and resources, and inadvertently fuel underlying grievances.

The findings presented in this article thereby challenge the notion that climate change adaptation can, or should, be apolitical and technical.¹³ Instead, it emphasizes the risks of depoliticizing climate actions in conflict-affected contexts, and highlights the need to take into consideration political contestations, conflict dynamics, and social justice concerns when designing and implementing climate policies and projects.

In the next section, I situate this study within theoretical debates on the politics of climate change and vulnerability in conflict-affected contexts. I then follow with a brief outline of the methodological approach used in this research, before presenting the empirical findings in three parts. First, I examine whether and how Myanmar government climate policies took into consideration prevailing conflict dynamics and framed vulnerability to climate change. Second, I contrast this framing with realities on the ground in four villages in Karen State and Tanintharyi Region, emphasizing how vulnerability is sociopolitically produced. Finally, I use the R2R project as a case study to investigate how a climate-related initiative—aligned with objectives outlined in the climate policies—unfolded within the fragile ceasefire context of southeast Myanmar.

The Politics of Climate Change and Vulnerability in Conflict Contexts

This research is grounded in the understanding that vulnerability and adaptation to climate change are deeply sociopolitical processes, shaped by power asymmetries and struggles for authority and recognition.¹⁴ This premise is rooted in the field of critical adaptation studies, which emerged in the early 2000s as a critique of biophysical and technical approaches to adaptation that overlook the sociopolitical dimensions of vulnerability.¹⁵ In contrast, critical adaptation scholarship emphasizes how adaptation processes can reinforce inequitable power structures, perpetuate injustices, and lead to maladaptive outcomes.¹⁶

Vulnerability is here conceptualized as the predisposition to be negatively affected by climate change and other stressors,¹⁷ due to a combination of sociopolitical processes, historical legacies, and power imbalances operating across temporal and spatial scales.¹⁸ This perspective emphasizes that vulnerability is sociopolitically produced, not simply an outcome of exposure to biophysical climate events. As Ribot succinctly noted, “vulnerability does not just fall from the sky.”¹⁹ Rather, as Mikulewicz highlights, “vulnerability is, in essence, political.”²⁰ This reflects the ways in which systemic inequities place some people in more vulnerable situations than others.

Armed conflict is increasingly recognized as a significant driver of vulnerability to climate change, as they often have profound implications for food security, socioeconomic conditions, health and education systems, social protection schemes and so on.²¹ For example, qualitative research conducted in Gaza by Mason et al. revealed that participants perceived the impacts of political decisions related to the Israel-Palestine conflict as more significant contributors to their vulnerability than climate risks themselves.²² According to Mason et al., vulnerability to climate change in this context “arise from, or are compounded by, Israeli sanctions on, and blockade of, the Gaza Strip.”²³ Similarly, in Mindanao, the Philippines, Chandra et al. found that decades of armed conflict have had enduring effects on vulnerability.²⁴ These include malnutrition, disruption of education, and the erosion of traditional knowledge, sociocultural practices, and social cohesion—factors that are often overlooked in climate-related policies and projects.²⁵

This article contributes to this growing body of research on vulnerability and conflict by leveraging the concepts of chronic crisis²⁶ and rupture²⁷ to explore contextual vulnerability in southeast Myanmar. Vigh argues that in many parts of the world, crisis is not an isolated or episodic event but an endemic, cyclical condition.²⁸ In such contexts, crisis becomes a chronic state where the threat of renewed conflict and political instability is ever-present.²⁹ Some events are so profound that they constitute moments of rupture, however. Holbraad et al. define a rupture as a “radical and often forceful form of discontinuity” that brings about significant transformations in social and political landscapes.³⁰ In southeast Myanmar, decades of armed conflict and authoritarian governance have created a chronic crisis, which has been punctuated by moments of rupture. For instance, a military offensive in Kasuh Hpathaw, one of this study’s research sites in Tanintharyi Region, in 1996–1997, stands as a clear example of such a rupture, fundamentally altering local social and political dynamics.

In line with Kyed and Chambers,³¹ the politics of climate change is conceptualized in this article as discourses, policies, and actions related to climate change that are appropriated by different actors seeking authority in a contested political landscape. In this context, climate actionsare defined as formalized policies and projects aimed at climate change adaptation and/or mitigation. By emphasizing the political dimensions of actions undertaken “in the name of” climate change, this perspective underscores that these initiatives are not developed or implemented in a sociopolitical vacuum. Instead, they are deeply embedded in societal and historical contexts and must be understood within broader structural dynamics that shape vulnerability patterns and influence how individuals and communities manage change.³² For example, Dodman & Mitlin demonstrate how climate actions in Zimbabwe have become intertwined with national politics, and influenced relationships between citizens and state authorities.³³ Similarly, Funder et al. illustrate how, in Zambia, climate initiatives serve as a tool for political elites to assert authority over natural resources and present themselves favorably to external stakeholders.³⁴ In Myanmar, Borras et al. found that climate objectives have been used to legitimize state-led development projects, such as hydropower dams and climate-smart agriculture, thus demonstrating the close relationship between climate actions and national politics.³⁵

This perspective challenges the tendency to depoliticize climate actions, especially in policymaking processes and development aid.³⁶ In this article, depoliticization is defined as the discursive process of framing a topic as an apolitical, technical, and managerial issue, and removing it from its political context.³⁷ This conceptualization also draws on the growing literature on the anti-politics, or post-politics, of climate change.³⁸ The anti-politics concept, popularized by Ferguson’s seminal work The Anti-Politics Machine,³⁹ critiques how development aid depoliticizes issues by reducing them to technical problems detached from their political contexts. Similarly, the post-politics perspective, originating in political ecology and human geography literature, describes the reduction of political issues to consensual, managerial governance.⁴⁰

This article also builds on the recognition that climate actions may end up exacerbating the problems they aim to address—commonly referred to as maladaptation.⁴¹ Schipper argues that maladaptation is often a result of poorly designed adaptation interventions implemented by external actors who lack a deep understanding of the social and environmental contexts in which they unfold.⁴² Similarly, Eriksen et al. assert that inequitable stakeholder participation, a lack of critical engagement with defining what “adaptation success” means, and the tendency to retrofit adaptation into existing development initiatives, are key sources of maladaptive outcomes.⁴³ It is not only adaptation interventions that might have negative social and environmental impacts, however. Climate change mitigation efforts that neglect or harm the well-being of affected communities or ignore local realities may also lead to malmitigation.⁴⁴

The negative impacts of climate action on sociopolitical relations can be particularly acute in contexts of conflict. Scholars have highlighted how climate change adaptation and mitigation interventions can inadvertently trigger or intensify existing conflicts, for instance by altering power relations and shifting patterns of authority in environmental governance,⁴⁵ limiting the access or control that certain individuals or groups have over land and natural resources,⁴⁶ undermining established institutions or traditional cooperation mechanisms,⁴⁷ reinforcing processes of marginalization or exacerbating prevailing intergroup inequalities,⁴⁸ or deepening grievances related to cultural values or place attachments.⁴⁹ By situating vulnerability and climate actions within broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, this article thereby underscores how well-intentioned initiatives can inadvertently exacerbate social inequalities and conflicts unless the sociopolitical context and justice concerns are taken properly into consideration.

Methodology

This article draws on insights from 147 in-depth interviews conducted during multi-sited fieldwork in Myanmar in 2018 and 2019 as well as a critical analysis of climate policies and project documents. I characterize my interviews as being at the national (Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw), regional (Dawei, Hpa-an), and local levels (four villages in Karen State and Tanintharyi Region). A few of the interviews were also held online, while I was in Chiang Mai, Thailand, and in Norway.

At the national and regional level in Myanmar, I held semi-structured interviews with development practitioners including members of the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society actors with CSOs and community-based organizations, government staff, ethnic armed organization (EAO) representatives, embassy staff, international consultants, and experienced researchers. The participants were identified through a combination of snowball sampling and targeted outreach. While most participants were men, about one-third were women, spanning diverse professional and cultural backgrounds. The interviews were conversational and flexible, following semi-structured interview guides.

At the local level, I conducted life story narrative interviews with villagers and community leaders. This technique allowed for a deeper understanding of people’s lived experiences and situated knowledge. It proved particularly useful in the prevailing context of conflict and with the sensitivities of discussing political topics in Myanmar. Additionally, this method allowed for the exploration of non-predetermined topics. The interviewees were identified through a mix of stratified, strategic, and convenience sampling.

The research site selection was guided by a desire to follow the cross-scalar politics of climate change and gain an understanding of vulnerability dynamics from multiple perspectives. The four villages (Myit Ywa and Thae Hpathaw Thawaw in Karen State, and Thaung Ywa and Kasuh Hpathaw Thawaw in Tanintharyi Region)⁵⁰ were selected based on relevance and logistical practicalities. This enabled me to explore differences between villages located in government-controlled areas and mixed-control areas, each with different experiences of conflict, climate risks, and climate-related aid. Local research assistants, who go unnamed for security reasons, were essential to this project. They facilitated communication by translating interviews, helped me navigate the complex sociopolitical dynamics of the field, and provided valuable reflections and interpretations of participants’ responses. Their contributions greatly enriched this research. For further details regarding the methodology and ethical considerations of this study, please refer to Mosberg.⁵¹

Rendering Conflicts Invisible in Myanmar’s Climate Policies

During the “political reforms era” of the 2010s, the USDP (2011-2016) and National League for Democracy (2016-2021) governments of Myanmar developed seven national policies in response to the emerging climate crisis.⁵² These climate policies established clear targets and aspirations regarding efforts to adapt to and mitigate the effects of climate change, focusing primarily on the forestry, agriculture, and energy sectors. Although some of the targets outlined in the policies, such as extending protected areas and increasing hydropower capacity, were highly controversial, references to ongoing conflicts in the country were conspicuously absent.

Notably, none of the policy documents mentioned the NCA, the interim arrangements, or the ongoing peace process. The word “conflict” appeared only sporadically across the documents, and solely in reference to localized disputes, such as those between artisanal fishermen and trawlers,⁵³ shrimp farmers and other land and water users,⁵⁴ and potential resource conflicts linked to displacement from sea-level rise.⁵⁵ There was also no mention of the necessity for conflict sensitivity or “do no harm” measures when implementing climate actions in conflict-affected areas of the country. Importantly, conflict was also not mentioned as a key driver of vulnerability.

Instead, the climate policies framed climate change as an urgent and severe external threat to (economic) development, and vulnerability as a potential future outcome of physical exposure and “over-reliance” on climate-sensitive livelihoods. The climate policies did acknowledge a few other drivers of vulnerability, such as limited access to healthcare and high poverty levels,⁵⁶ social norms affecting children with disabilities, women’s limited access to natural resources, land ownership, and decision-making processes.⁵⁷ However, these factors receive significantly less attention compared to the emphasis on exposure, climate-sensitive livelihoods, and individual adaptive capacities. Importantly, the policies overlooked the sociopolitical drivers of vulnerability outlined in the next section of this article.

It appears that in these policies conflict was kept “out of frame,” as something not given special attention, subordinated to what was placed within the frame and defined as the main topic.⁵⁸ Interviews with actors involved in the policy development processes suggests that this neglect of conflict-related issues resulted from the technocratic nature of the formulation processes and the depoliticized ways of framing key policy issues. In an interview with a development practitioner and member of the drafting team of one of these climate policies, I asked if there were any discussions about conflicts or the peace process when the policy was developed. “No,” the interviewee responded. I followed up by asking if there were any discussions about how to think about non-government-controlled areas. “Oh, no, there was no discussion on that at all. It wasn’t even mentioned. It was just, I think, the assumption was just, “this covers Myanmar as a whole.” Later in the interview, I inquired whether the drafter had to navigate any political sensitivities during the policy development process, or if there were instances of censorship or self-censorship that influenced what the drafting team included in the policy document. This prompted the following reflection:

I feel like it was more self-censorship … I remember we had to really closely manage the information about vulnerable groups. It’s not like anyone said, we don’t want these particular ethnic groups included in the policy. But I do remember that this was obviously something all of us were aware of … So, we had to put in some wording that was not too specific, but that covered that, because obviously that was the very, well, not at the start, but it was like, yeah, we were in the middle of the Rohingya crisis. So that was in our minds.⁵⁹

The response implies that there was a general assumption among development practitioners that the government regarded conflict and ethnic groups as sensitive topics that were best avoided or navigated carefully in these processes.

The prevailing political sensitivity surrounding topics related to conflict and peace in the late 2010s was also frequently cited by civil society activists I interviewed, particularly in Tanintharyi Region and Karen State. For instance, a civil society activist based in Hpa-an shared that despite the NCA making their work easier in mixed-control areas and with the KNU, they still encountered restrictions when attempting to address peace-related topics. “With the government, you can’t freely discuss peace. If you organize an event about peace, or the peace talks, you will hardly get permission,” the activist said, and explained that the government, “says this is a sensitive topic, so we have to be careful working on this issue, talking about this issue.”⁶⁰

Prevailing political sensitivities thus appear to have contributed to the depoliticization of issues related to climate change. To avoid crossing invisible red lines in the discursive political landscape, both international and national non-state actors seem to have evaded topics that could potentially provoke sanctions or restrictions on their work. These self-imposed restraints likely resulted in less outright discussion of the interests and rights of ethnic and religious minorities, which in turn likely contributed to the finalized climate policies ignoring conflict altogether.

The omission of conflict considerations in the climate policies was also probably a result of the common assumption that climate policies and the peace process or broader conflict dynamics had little to do with each other. This sentiment was evident in many of my interviews, as well as my attempts to interview actors involved in the peace process, many of whom declined to speak to me, stating that their work on peace was not relevant for my research on the politics of climate change. Similarly, many development practitioners working with climate change policies and projects appeared to have a limited understanding of the peace process, conflict dynamics, and the underlying grievances of ethnic minority groups in the country.

The political context also influenced the policy formulation processes by shaping decision-making procedures and the scope for participation. Even though attempts were made to ensure stakeholder participation at both national and subnational levels during consultations for some of the climate policies, the decision-making power was still largely concentrated in the hands of government officials and international actors involved in drafting and coordinating these processes. Importantly, representatives from EAOs were not invited to participate in these consultations. Most of these documents were authored by international consultants or development practitioners. They were typically responsible for writing the initial drafts of the policies and revising them based on feedback from consultations with government officials and other invited commentators. The final documents were then translated into Burmese, a process that often required a significant amount of time due to the importance of accurately translating key terms.⁶¹ This process essentially granted the document holders the power to determine which comments to incorporate and which to dismiss. Ultimately, however, it was the government ministry in charge of formulating the policy that had the authority to approve its content, ensuring that it aligned with their objectives and political perspective.

These findings resonate well with what Wells & Lamb identify as the “post-political” tendencies of the 2016-2021 National League for Democracy government period.⁶² In a study of the New Yangon City project, they found that despite a growing emphasis on participation and inclusion in the 2010s, technocratic processes and a prevalent use of consultancy firms contributed to depoliticize development and disperse policy disagreements. Wells & Lamb suggest that this, “May not just have been a result of government repression, but rather can also be linked to processes and tactics of depoliticization of supposedly democratic planning processes.”⁶³

The development of climate policies in Myanmar saw an increased focus on participatory approaches toward the end of the 2010s, with deliberate efforts made to conduct stakeholder consultations. However, these processes fell short of ensuring meaningful participation of marginalized groups, such as ethnic and religious minorities, as the facilitators of these processes largely delineated the scope of discussions and decided who should be included or excluded from participating in discussions. Furthermore, prevailing power relations and uncertainties contributed to an avoidance of politically sensitive topics in these processes. This likely led to a further disconnect between the climate policies and peacebuilding processes.

The Sociopolitical Production of Vulnerability in Southeast Myanmar

At the time of this study, climate change was already having a noticeable impact on people’s lives and livelihoods in southeast Myanmar. Nearly everyone I spoke to in the four villages in Karen State and Tanintharyi Region claimed the climate had changed in their lifetimes. Weather patterns had become more unpredictable and irregular, and extreme weather events like floods, storms, and heatwaves had become more frequent, longer and more intense. The weather was not “stable” or “normal” anymore, people said. This increased variability and unpredictability manifested in more frequent harvest failures and in challenges with forecasting and evacuating from floods in a timely manner.

Climate change was particularly evident in shifting temperature patterns in the four villages. According to the people I spoke to, temperatures had increased significantly over the past few decades, and heat waves had become more frequent and severe. In Thae Hpathaw village in Karen State, a middle-aged man remarked that recent years had brought intense heat, describing how the sun’s scorching intensity felt like it was burning his skin.⁶⁴ These increasing temperatures were particularly detrimental to elderly, sick people and children, and to casual laborers working in the sun all day. A fisherman in Myit Ywa mentioned that the heat gave him headaches stopping him from working: “It’s too hot nowadays. I get a headache. Even if I want to go fishing, sometimes I can’t. I get a headache because it’s too hot.”⁶⁵ The increasing temperatures were also having a negative impact on agricultural production and fruit tree cultivation: as it was getting hotter, the leaves on cashew nut and betel nut trees were turning yellow and the fruits were drying up.

Rainfall patterns were also becoming more unpredictable, irregular, and intense in southeast Myanmar, according to interview participants. While it used to rain consistently during the rainy season, it had now become more erratic, and the onset of the rainy season was more frequently delayed. As succinctly expressed by a casual laborer in Myit Ywa village in Karen State, “It rains when it’s not supposed to rain.”⁶⁶ Across all four villages, participants also highlighted a perceived intensification of rainfall, as well as more frequent and prolonged floods, as in July and August 2018, when southeast Myanmar was severely affected by a record-breaking flood following unusually heavy monsoon rains. In total, nearly 150,000 people were temporarily displaced, and several people died.⁶⁷ These lived experiences correspond with and complement available meteorological statistics on temperature and rainfall changes in southeast Myanmar.⁶⁸

These climate change impacts were not experienced in isolation from other sociopolitical processes that were shaping people’s living conditions, however. Rather, they compounded the challenges people were already experiencing. In the following section, I focus on two key sociopolitical drivers of vulnerability identified in this study: lack of social service provision, and the enduring legacies of conflict.⁶⁹

Inadequate Government Investments in Social Sectors

In the four villages in Karen State and Tanintharyi Region studied here, limited access to social services (healthcare, education, social protection schemes) and infrastructure (roads, electricity, safe sanitation and water facilities) was a recurring theme in life story narratives. Nearly everyone I interviewed had experienced illness, injury, or death in their immediate family, or had suffered from health challenges themselves which had led to persistent financial and emotional struggles for them and their household. This illustrates the close interdependencies within and between households in these villages, and the responsibility to care for others when needed.

None of the four villages had healthcare facilities, schools, roads or electricity when the older generations were growing up, but even though access to these facilities had improved in recent years, access to these services was still far from universal and depended largely on the households’ socioeconomic situation. Only one of the four villages had its own small healthcare clinic in 2018-2019 and people in the other villages had to travel elsewhere to access healthcare. Going to public healthcare facilities often required relatively high out-of-pocket payments, and the patients were generally required to bring their own food, clothing, and other supplies. Their family members were usually expected to stay with them to help take care of them, which would take them away from their livelihood activities. Not everyone could afford this. Pregnant women from low-income families, for instance, continued to give birth in their villages with traditional midwives, rather than travelling and paying for healthcare services.

The inability to afford healthcare services served as a significant barrier for some individuals, preventing them from seeking timely medical assistance for treatable illnesses, consequently allowing their conditions to worsen. This had cascading effects, particularly for those reliant on income from casual labor, as health issues hindered their ability to work and led to additional financial struggles. The interconnection between health and livelihoods was further exacerbated by the absence of social protection schemes. In Myit Ywa village, a 39-year-old woman highlighted the significance of good health for wider well-being: “If we can make more money and can save it in summer, there will not be many difficulties in rainy season … (but to do that) we need energy. The main thing is health. If we’re healthy, we’re able to do anything.”⁷⁰

Furthermore, while education rates were improving in Myanmar in the 2010s—before the pandemic and the 2021 military coup d’état reversed these gains—premature school dropouts nonetheless remained prevalent in the four case study villages. A mere handful of individuals I interviewed had pursued education beyond the tenth grade, with the majority discontinuing their studies either after the seventh or the fourth grade. Although younger generations had slightly higher education than older generations, on average, the difference was not as stark as I was expecting. Individuals I interviewed identified financial constraints as the primary reason for leaving school. Although public schools in theory provide free education, parents said they were required to pay for uniforms, stationery, books, transportation, and meals. Additionally, it was common for parents to pay tuition fees to teachers or tutors, particularly for extra support at higher levels in preparation for exams. These cumulative expenses proved insurmountable for families facing financial difficulties. Furthermore, educational facilities beyond the primary school level were not readily accessible from the four case study villages, constituting an additional barrier.

This poor provision of social services is, inherently, political. For decades, government budget allocations to social sectors in Myanmar have been significantly lower than allocations to the defense sector, and there has been a noteworthy imbalance between investments in human capital and military capacity.⁷¹ As highlighted by Turnell in 2011:

A vast proportion of state spending in Myanmar goes to the military. Military spending is consistently in excess of that spent on health and education combined, a phenomenon that is unique to Myanmar among the nations of Southeast Asia. This is important, not just in what it exposes in the way of the regime’s current priorities, or its willingness to sustain immense human suffering among the people it rules over, but also for the implications for Myanmar’s future created by this willful neglect of the country’s (present and prospective) human capital.⁷²

For example, in 2004/2005, during the authoritarian rule of the State Peace and Development Council, more than 22 percent of the union budget was officially allocated to the military, while just 17 percent was spent on health and education combined.⁷³ Although investments in social sectors increased during the decade of political reforms, government allocations to environmental protection, including climate change, remained low. In the 2017/2018 fiscal year, 26.2 percent of the union budget went to the defense sector, compared to 6.8 percent for health, 13.7 percent for education, 5.7 percent for social welfare, and a mere 0.4 percent for environmental protection.⁷⁴ These figures demonstrate the persistent underinvestment by successive Myanmar regimes in sectors critical for building resilience to climate change and other stressors in Myanmar. They also highlight the disproportionate allocation of resources to the military—thus fueling counter-insurgency campaigns that have left many communities in a state of chronic crisis and vulnerability, as further explored in the next section.

The Enduring Legacies of Conflict

The four villages studied in this research project had different experiences with conflict. While Thaung Ywa, located on the shorelines of the Launglong peninsula in Tanintharyi Region, had not been directly affected by armed conflict, the other three villages had been exposed to varying degrees of violence and displacement in the past few decades. I will in this section focus on Kasuh Hpathaw, the most conflict-affected of the four villages, in the mountainous east of Tanintharyi Region, to analyze how the enduring legacies of conflict continued to shape the vulnerability context at the time of this study.

On 13 February 1997, leaders from Kasuh Hpathaw village were summoned to a meeting with representatives from the State Law & Order Restoration Council (SLORC), where they were informed that everyone had to move to SLORC-controlled relocation sites nearby. As the leaders were leaving the meeting, they could hear the first gunshots. Sit tat soldiers had started surrounding the village. The leaders ran around shouting and telling people to evacuate. As people were rounding up their family members and rummaging through their houses to collect their personal belongings, they could see black smoke rising from the first houses that had been set on fire. Some people headed further into the forest, towards KNU-controlled areas, while others headed towards the relocation sites.

The entire village was burned down that day. Houses, rice fields, orchards, livestock sheds. The sit tat soldiers burned down everything. This attack was an example of the infamous “four cuts” (hpyat lay hpyat) counter-insurgency strategy of the Myanmar military, initiated in the 1960s by Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council. The primary objective of this strategy is to cut insurgent groups’ ties to essential support from civilian populations by disrupting their access to food, funds, recruits, and intelligence.⁷⁵ To achieve this, territories were categorized into three zones: “black” areas controlled by insurgent groups like the KNU, “white” areas under military control, and “brown” areas where control remained contested. As a black area, Kasuh Hpathaw village was essentially designated as a “free-fire zone” where the military had the authority to apprehend or eliminate anyone suspected of being a KNU rebel or supporter, while forcing the other residents into relocation sites, or strategic villages (newpyu hla ywa) in “white” areas.⁷⁶

In the relocation sites, the Karen villagers were exposed to multiple forms of violence and oppression, such as forced labor, portering for the military, restrictions on movement, and forced recruitment into a civilian military service known as pyithusit, or the People’s Militia. As the displaced villagers had to abandon their farms and had limited access to livelihood opportunities in the relocation sites, living conditions were also characterized by a persistent lack of food, healthcare and other basic necessities.

When I visited Kasuh Hpathaw village in early 2019, the consequences of the rupture that the violent attacks and forced relocation constituted for people living there were still perceptible. Despite the bilateral ceasefire agreement that had been signed between KNU and the Myanmar government/military in 2012, which was extended with the NCA in 2015, the legacies of the conflict were still shaping people’s lives and livelihood opportunities. This contributed to a chronic state of vulnerability in two key ways.

First, the conflict contributed to exacerbating land tenure insecurity, a longstanding problem in the country.⁷⁷ In Kasuh Hpathaw village, only a few residents appeared to possess land documents issued either by the Myanmar government or the KNU. These documents were, however, primarily confined to those who had been able to retain ownership of their original land. For those who had fled to other areas or crossed the border into Thailand following the attacks of 1996–1997, the situation was more challenging, as they had lost ownership of their original land, and when they wanted to return, all available land in the village was already occupied. There was also a rapid surge in land prices after the ceasefire, making it difficult for “returnees” to purchase land. Some of the people still living in the relocation sites were also afraid that the original owner of the land they were living on would try to take it back, and that they would themselves become landless.

The absence of land tenure security not only renders individuals vulnerable to the sudden loss of resources and livelihood opportunities, but may also have implications for longer-term resilience, as highlighted by Murken & Gornott.⁷⁸ In Kasuh Hpathaw, people appeared to have become more reluctant to engage in shifting cultivation, as they were afraid that letting the land lie fallow could result in it being appropriated by authorities or others. This fear became particularly pronounced after September 2018, when the government adopted amendments to the 2012 Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Land Management Law that required farmers to register their land within six months, or face the risk of eviction, imprisonment, or fines for “trespassing on their own land”.⁷⁹ It was becoming more common to establish orchards with cashew nut, betel nut, or rubber trees. One of the village leaders explained, for instance, that he was encouraging people to go back and work on their farms, to demonstrate that they were actively using their land, to make sure that the government does not “assume that this village is free” or “regard it as vacant land”.⁸⁰ The fear of losing access to land thereby seemed to encourage farmers to abandon traditional shifting cultivation in favor of permanent tree plantations and commercial cash cropping, as also documented by Khin Htet Htet Pyone et al.⁸¹ However, crops like betel nut and cashew trees, now more widely cultivated in the area, appear more vulnerable to rising temperatures and climate change compared to traditional subsistence farming. Additionally, cash crops are often more exposed to fluctuating market dynamics, as discussed by Kusakabe & Myae.⁸²

 Second, this study found that the conflict had adverse effects on both physical and mental health, thereby limiting people’s ability to participate in livelihoods and pursue strategies to help them cope with and adjust to shocks and stressors. Miller & Rasmussen argue that the mental health outcomes of armed conflict are determined by a combination of direct exposure to war and the stressful social and material conditions of everyday life (daily stressors) in a conflictual context.⁸³ Consequently, psychological trauma arises not only from direct acts of violence but also from more systemic forms of violence. Residents of Kasuh Hpathaw village, as in other areas of Myanmar, were exposed to both types of violence over a long period of time, and did not receive any psychosocial support or trauma counseling after the conflict ended in a ceasefire agreement. Persistent uncertainties about the future and the fear of a potential resumption of conflict also seemed to prevent people from recovering from the horrors of war.

Exposure to the physical impacts of climate change or dependence on climate-sensitive livelihoods are thereby not the primary drivers of vulnerability in (southeast) Myanmar, as suggested by domestic climate policies. Rather, vulnerability is shaped by sociopolitical factors, particularly linked to political priorities and military agendas. These insights align with, and complement, a comprehensive assessment of vulnerability in Myanmar conducted by the Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme Facility and the Myanmar Information Management Unit in 2018, where 58.8 percent of the population in Karen State and 49.4 percent of the population in Tanintharyi Region were characterized as ‘vulnerable’ to shocks and stressors like climate change. The assessment found that conflict, displacement and low access to basic services and infrastructure were key drivers of vulnerability in Karen State and Tanintharyi Region, and it found that living conditions and access to education were considerably lower in conflict-affected areas, than in those not affected by conflict.

Depoliticization From Above and Resistance From Below: The Ridge to Reef Project

Tanintharyi Region, home to one of Southeast Asia’s largest remaining lowland wet evergreen forests, is increasingly recognized as a “global biodiversity hotspot”.⁸⁴ In the 2010s, political reforms and ceasefire agreements opened the region, previously restricted due to decades of armed conflict, to international organizations. By the end of the decade, several large-scale environmental conservation projects were planned for implementation, spearheaded by UN agencies and international NGOs in close collaboration with Myanmar government departments.

The most prominent, and controversial, of these initiatives was the R2R project, scheduled to run from 2017 to 2023.⁸⁵ The project explicitly aligned with a target outlined in Myanmar’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement, which sought to expand the country’s permanent forest estate to 30 percent of the total land area, including 10 percent protected area systems. The R2R project initially aimed to encompass 14,520 km²—equivalent to 33.5 percent of the Tanintharyi Region, a territory slightly larger than Denmark.⁸⁶

The R2R project was largely portrayed as a technical endeavor that emphasized the use of modern technology and scientific knowledge to enhance biodiversity conservation and contribute to climate objectives in Tanintharyi Region. To illustrate this, the term “technical” appears 42 times in the main project document, most commonly paired with terms such as support, assistance, guidance, expertise, backing, or advice.⁸⁷ This technical support was to be provided by project partners to local communities and the Myanmar government, including the Myanmar Navy.

Climate change was primarily framed by the project documents as a threat to biodiversity in Tanintharyi Region. In particular, climate change was expected to contribute to more frequent forest fires, accelerate beach and coastal erosion, and cause degradation of estuarine⁸⁸ communities, mangroves and coral reefs. To manage these impacts, the project sought to improve protected area management and landscape linkages, to maintain ecosystem resilience, and secure a sustainable flow of ecosystem services.⁸⁹ This framing of climate change lends itself easily to the techno-managerial interventions envisioned by the project.

Vulnerability, on the other hand, was depicted in the project documents as exposure to the future effects of climate change, especially extreme weather events. However, more emphasis was placed on the vulnerability of biodiversity and coastal habitats to climate change than on the vulnerability of human populations, and the documents primarily portrayed vulnerable people as threats to the environment. In particular, the project argued that internally displaced persons and refugees returning from Thailand were particularly responsible for environmental degradation: “Hundreds of thousands of refugee returnees, internally displaced persons, and poverty also exacerbate the threats to the biodiversity of the Tanintharyi Range, causing deforestation and increasing soil run-off and sedimentation”.⁹⁰ This creates an impression that waves of returned refugees and displaced people are flooding into the forested areas of Tanintharyi Region, causing massive environmental destruction. This narrative was subsequently employed as a justification for the external intervention aimed at educating people about the values of biodiversity and improved livelihoods in the R2R project.

When it comes to conflict, the R2R project documents characterized Tanintharyi Region as a post-conflict area, and framed the KNU conflict as “political tension” being addressed through “ongoing post-conflict negotiations”.⁹¹ It also erroneously referred to the ceasefire agreement as a “peace agreement”.⁹² This created the impression that the conflict in the Tanintharyi Region was largely resolved, when in reality, only a fragile ceasefire was in place. Additionally, the conflict was referred to as an “internal ethnic conflict”,⁹³ implying that it was a local-level dispute between different ethnic groups rather than a protracted armed conflict between the state and non-state insurgent groups. This obscured the fact that the Myanmar government, a key project partner, was one of the conflict’s parties. Importantly, the R2R documents neglected to mention the NCA. This oversight suggests that the project design was based on a misinterpretation of the existing conflict dynamics at the time. It also overlooked the requirement to adhere to the NCA and demonstrated a lack of sensitivity to the grievances of the KNU and the Karen people. This set the stage for the resistance that subsequently emerged against the project.

On 16 July 2018 the CAT sent an official complaint letter to the GEF and UN Development Programme (UNDP) about the R2R project. This letter was sent the day before an inception workshop for the project was to be held in Dawei.⁹⁴ In their letter, the CAT argued that the project not only violated the rights of Indigenous communities in Tanintharyi Region but also posed a threat to the ceasefire agreement between the KNU and the Myanmar government. Calling for the suspension and redesign of the project, the CAT underscored the need to prioritize the rights of Indigenous communities in environmental conservation efforts, rather than excluding them.⁹⁵ A letter of concern⁹⁶ was also sent, on the same day, from the KNU’s Kawthoolei Forest Department to the country director of UNDP Myanmar and the GEF Conflict Resolution Commissioner regarding the project.

The depoliticized nature of the R2R project was thereby countered by an attempt to “re-politicize” the intervention and its potential political ramifications. In particular, the complaints against the project centered around its failure to comply with sections 25a and 25b of the NCA. These sections stipulated that the Myanmar government and EAOs must coordinate with each other to carry out environmental conservation programs and projects during the interim period between the signing of the ceasefire agreement and the final peace accord, and that projects that may significantly affect civilians living in ceasefire areas should be planned in consultation with local communities.⁹⁷ The KNU argued that neither of these stipulations were satisfactorily adhered to, in that “the project was designed not in consultation with the KNU, or the community either”.⁹⁸

Upon receiving these formal complaint letters, the R2R project was put on hold and the case was forwarded to the UNDP’s Social and Environmental Compliance Unit (SECU).⁹⁹ In September 2018, the SECU conducted a “determination of eligibility” review of the complaint and concluded that it was eligible for a social and environmental compliance review owing to its potential harm to complainants and potential violation of the UNDP’s social and environmental commitments.¹⁰⁰ In July 2019, the SECU conducted a field visit to Myanmar, but a second planned field visit was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and then canceled again as a result of the political unrest following the 2021 military coup d’état. On 9 February 2022, the SECU published part one of their draft investigation report and announced that the second part would be made available once it was possible for them to travel to Myanmar again to complete the review.¹⁰¹ This has not yet been possible. Efforts to redesign and renegotiate the scope of the project were also disrupted by the 2021 military coup and the subsequent violence that has engulfed the country. At the time of writing, the project remains suspended.

Concluding Reflections

This article has explored the complex interplay between climate actions, vulnerability, and conflict dynamics in southeast Myanmar in the late 2010s, challenging the notion that adaptation can—or should—be an apolitical and technical endeavor. Instead, it demonstrates that climate-related policies and projects can lead to maladaptation, or malmitigation, if sociopolitical dimensions are ignored. By reproducing social injustices and reinforcing underlying grievances, such interventions can exacerbate conflict dynamics and deepen vulnerabilities, ultimately undermining their intended objectives.

However, in some situations, depoliticizing climate actions may be a pragmatic strategy to protect non-state actors from potential sanctions or restrictions to their work and enable them to navigate prevailing political sensitivities. Desportes & Moyo-Nyoni highlight how, in authoritarian, conflict-affected settings, “depoliticisation strategically allows state and non-state actors to defuse sensitive issues and actor relations and to remain safe”.¹⁰² This is particularly relevant to Myanmar today. Since the 2021 military coup, the delivery of humanitarian and development aid has been severely constrained by systemic restrictions imposed by the State Administration Council. As noted by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,¹⁰³ aid has become heavily politicized and used by different actors as a tool for gaining legitimacy. In this environment, the strategic depoliticization of climate-related aid may contribute to safeguard aid workers and ensure that assistance reaches those in need.

Nevertheless, it is essential to recognize that climate actions take place within contested sociopolitical landscapes, where they can inadvertently reinforce the authority and legitimacy of some actors while marginalizing others. Even well-intentioned interventions risk reproducing social injustices and exacerbating underlying grievances, potentially intensifying conflict dynamics. To avoid these outcomes, climate actions must be guided by the principles of climate justice and anchored in a commitment to conflict sensitivity as an ethics of practice.

Endnotes

¹ Remling & Meijer, 2025.
² Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2024.
³ Eriksen et al., 2021.
⁴ Mikulewicz, 2018.
⁵ Vigh, 2008.
⁶ Holbraad et al., 2019; Lund, 2016.
⁷ Stokke et al., 2022.
⁸ See Naw Htee Ku & Hoffman (2026) [this issue].
⁹ Woods & Naimark, 2020; Woods, 2021.
¹⁰ Sekine, 2021.
¹¹ Conservation Alliance Tanawthari, 2018.
¹² UNDP SECU, 2022a.
¹³ Raleigh et al., 2024.
¹⁴ Eriksen et al., 2015; Nightingale, 2017.
¹⁵ Klepp & Chavez-Rodriguez, 2018; Leichenko & O’Brien, 2019; Webber, 2016.
¹⁶ Eriksen et al., 2021; O’Brien et al., 2007; Schipper, 2020.
¹⁷ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022.
¹⁸ Eriksen et al., 2021; Thomas et al., 2019; Thomas & Warner, 2019.
¹⁹ Ribot 2013, p. 164.
²⁰ Mikulewicz, 2018, p. 29.
²¹ Buhaug & von Uexkull, 2021.
²² Mason et al., 2011.
²³ Mason et al., 2011, p. 289.
²⁴ Chandra et al., 2017.
²⁵ Chandra et al., 2017.
²⁶ Vigh, 2008.
²⁷ Holbraad et al., 2019; Lund, 2016.
²⁸ Vigh, 2008.
²⁹ Vigh, 2008.
³⁰ Holbraad et al., 2019, p. 1.
³¹ See Kyed & Chambers (2026) [this issue].
³² Adger et al., 2014, Hartmann, 2013.
³³ Dodman & Mitlin, 2015.
³⁴ Funder et al., 2018.
³⁵ Borras et al., 2020.
³⁶ Desportes & Moyo-Nyoni, 2022; Remling, 2018; Swyngedouw, 2011.
³⁷ Wood & Flinders, 2014.
³⁸ Mikulewicz, 2017; Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020; Symons, 2014.
³⁹ Ferguson, 1990.
⁴⁰ Swyngedouw, 2011.
⁴¹ Barnett & O’Neill, 2010.
⁴² Schipper, 2020.
⁴³ Eriksen et al., 2021.
⁴⁴ Aall et al., 2023; Kongsager & Corbera, 2015.
⁴⁵ Nightingale, 2017.
⁴⁶ Froese & Schilling, 2019; Milman & Arsano, 2014; Work et al., 2018.
⁴⁷ Ngaruiya & Scheffran, 2016; Smucker et al., 2015.
⁴⁸ Ensor et al., 2018; Krampe et al., 2021; Sovacool, 2018.
⁴⁹ Jeffers, 2019.
⁵⁰ The village names are pseudonyms to protect research participants’ identity.
⁵¹ Mosberg, 2024.
⁵² These included the 2012 Initial National Communication, 2012 Myanmar National Adaptation Plan of Action, 2015 Myanmar Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, 2015 Myanmar Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy, 2019 Myanmar Climate Change Master Plan, 2019 Myanmar Climate Change Strategy and the 2019 Myanmar Climate Change Policy.
⁵³ Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, 2012a.
⁵⁴ Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry, 2012b.
⁵⁵ Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, 2019b.
⁵⁶ Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, 2019c.
⁵⁷ Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, 2019a.
⁵⁸ Goffman, 1974, p. 210.
⁵⁹ Member of policy drafting team, personal communication, December 2, 2019.
⁶⁰ Hpa-an civil society activist, personal communication, March 13, 2019.
⁶¹ International development consultant, personal communication, December 2, 2022.
⁶² Wells & Lamb, 2021.
⁶³ Wells & Lamb, 2021, p. 287.
⁶⁴ Thae Hpathaw small business owner, personal communication, March 11, 2019.
⁶⁵ Myit Ywar fisherman, personal communication, February 28, 2019.
⁶⁶ Myit Ywa laborer, personal communication, March 10, 2019.
⁶⁷ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2018.
⁶⁸ I outline this further separately (Mosberg, 2024).
⁶⁹ For a more comprehensive assessment of the vulnerability context in the four villages, please see Mosberg (2024).
⁷⁰ Young person with disabilities in Thae Hpathaw village, personal communication, February 28, 2019.
⁷¹ Asian Development Bank, 2015; Selth, 1998.
⁷² Turnell, 2011, p. 141.
⁷³ Turnell, 2011, p. 141.
⁷⁴ World Bank, 2020, p. 27.
⁷⁵ Ferguson, 2014.
⁷⁶ Ferguson, 2014.
⁷⁷ Kenney-Lazar et al., 2022; Suhardiman et al., 2019.
⁷⁸ Murken & Gornott, 2022.
⁷⁹ Kenney-Lazar et al., 2022, p. 9.
⁸⁰ KNU village leader in Kasuh Hpathaw village, personal communication, March 20, 2019.
⁸¹ Khin Htet Htet Pyone et al., 2024.
⁸² Kusakabe & Myae, 2019.
⁸³ Miller & Rasmussen, 2014.
⁸⁴ Allendorf et al., 2018; Connette et al., 2016; Mandle et al., 2017; Nay Myo Shwe et al., 2023.
⁸⁵ The relevant agreement was signed on 8 December 2017 by the Myanmar government and on 11 December 2017 by UNDP Myanmar (UNDP, 2017).
⁸⁶ UNDP, 2017.
⁸⁷ UNDP, 2017.
⁸⁸ Estuaries are bodies of water usually found in places where rivers meet the sea, which typically harbor unique plants and species.
⁸⁹ UNDP, 2017.
⁹⁰ UNDP, 2017, p. 12.
⁹¹ UNDP, 2017, p. 26.
⁹² UNDP, 2017, p. 42.
⁹³ UNDP, 2017, p. 38.
⁹⁴ UNDP, 2018.
⁹⁵ Conservation Alliance Tanawthari, 2018.
⁹⁶ The letter was shared with me personally.
⁹⁷ Government of Myanmar and Ethnic Armed Organizations, 2015.
⁹⁸ KNU representative, personal communication, December 13, 2018.
⁹⁹ UNDP SECU, 2022b.
¹⁰⁰ UNDP SECU, 2018.
¹⁰¹ UNDP SECU, 2022a.
¹⁰² Desportes & Moyo-Nyoni (2022, p. 1098).
¹⁰³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2024.

References

Aall, C., Meyer-Habighorst, C., Gram-Hanssen, I., Korsbrekke, M. H., & Hovelsrud, G. (2023). “I’m Fixing a Hole Where the Rain Gets in, and Stops My Mind from Wandering”: Approaching Sustainable Climate Change Adaptations. Weather, Climate, and Society, 15(2), 349-364. https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-22-0113.1

Adger, N., Pulhin, J., Barnett, J., Dabelko, G., Hovelsrud, G., Levy, M., Oswald Spring, Ú., Vogel, C., Adams, H., & Hodbod, J. (2014). Human security. In C. B. Field, V. R. Barros, D. J. Dokken, K. J. Mach, M. D. Mastrandrea, T. E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K. L. Ebi, Y. O. Estrada, R. C. Genova, B. Girma, E. S. Kissel, A. N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P. R. Mastrandrea, & L. L. White (Eds.). Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (pp. 755-791). Cambridge University Press. https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-FrontMatterA_FINAL.pdf

Allendorf, T. D., Khine Khine Swe, Myint Aung, & Thorsen, A. (2018). Community use and perceptions of a biodiversity corridor in Myanmar’s threatened southern forests. Global Ecology and Conservation, 15, e00409. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2018.e00409

Asian Development Bank. (2015). Fiscal Management in Myanmar. ADB Economics Working Paper Series.

Barnett, J., & O’Neill, S. (2010). Maladaptation. Global Environmental Change, 20(2), 211-213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.11.004

Borras, S. M., Franco, J. C., & Zau Nam. (2020). Climate change and land: Insights from Myanmar. World Development, 129. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104864

Buhaug, H., & von Uexkull, N. (2021). Vicious Circles: Violence, Vulnerability, and Climate Change. Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 46, 545-568. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-012220-014708

Chandra, A., McNamara, K. E., Dargusch, P., Caspe, A. M., & Dalabajan, D. (2017). Gendered vulnerabilities of smallholder farmers to climate change in conflict-prone areas: A case study from Mindanao, Philippines. Journal of Rural Studies, 50, 45-59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2016.12.011

Connette, G., Oswald, P., Songer, M., & Leimgruber, P. (2016). Mapping distinct forest types improves overall forest identification based on multi-spectral landsat imagery for Myanmar’s Tanintharyi region. Remote Sensing, 8(11), https://doi.org/10.3390/rs8110882

Conservation Alliance Tanawthari. (2018, July 16). Re: Complaint letter to the Global Environment Facility concerning the Ridge to Reef Project and the violation of the rights of Indigenous People. https://www.iccaconsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/CAT-GEF-complaint.pdf

Desportes, I., & Moyo-Nyoni, N. (2022). Depoliticising disaster response in a politically saturated context: the case of the 2016–19 droughts in Zimbabwe. Disasters, 46(4), 1098-1120. https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12516

Dodman, D., & Mitlin, D. (2015). The national and local politics of climate change adaptation in Zimbabwe. Climate and Development, 7(3), 223-234. https://10.1080/17565529.2014.934777

Ensor, J., Forrester, J., & Matin, N. (2018). Bringing rights into resilience: Revealing complexities of climate risks and social conflict. Disasters, 42(S2), S287-S305. https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12304

Eriksen, S. H., Nightingale, A. J., & Eakin, H. (2015). Reframing adaptation: The political nature of climate change adaptation. Global Environmental Change, 35, 523-533. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.09.014

Eriksen, S., Schipper, E. L. F., Scoville-Simonds, M., Vincent, K., Adam, H. N., Brooks, N., Harding, B., Khatri, D., Lenaerts, L., Liverman, D., Mills-Novoa, M., Mosberg, M., Movik, S., Muok, B., Nightingale, A., Ojha, H., Sygna, L., Taylor, M., Vogel, C., & West, J. J. (2021). Adaptation interventions and their effect on vulnerability in developing countries: Help, hindrance or irrelevance? World Development, 141, 105383. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105383

Ferguson, J. (1990). The anti-politics machine: “Development,” depoliticization, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho. Cambridge University Press.

Ferguson, J. M. (2014). The scramble for the Waste Lands: Tracking colonial legacies, counterinsurgency and international investment through the lens of land laws in Burma/Myanmar. Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, 35(3), 295-311. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjtg.12078

Froese, R., & Schilling, J. (2019). The Nexus of climate change, land use, and conflicts. Current Climate Change Reports, 5(1), 24-35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40641-019-00122-1

Funder, M., Mweemba, C., & Nyambe, I. (2018). The politics of climate change adaptation in development: Authority, resource control and state intervention in rural Zambia. The Journal of Development Studies, 54(1), 30-46. https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1277021

Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience. Harvard University Press.

Government of Myanmar and Ethnic Armed Organizations. (2015). The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organisations. English version.

Hartmann, B. (2013). Lines in the shifting sand: The strategic politics of climate change, human security and national defense. In L. Sygna, K. O’Brien, & J. Wolf. (Eds). A Changing environment for human security: Transformative approaches to research, policy and action (pp. 46-55). Routledge.

Holbraad, M., Kapferer, B., & Sauma, J. F. (2019). Ruptures: Anthropologies of Discontinuity in Times of Turmoil. UCL Press.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022). Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Cambridge University Press.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2018). DREF Operation Update Myanmar: Monsoon Floods. https://reliefweb.int/attachments/5180ee28-6a10-387b-9a02-a7e83c5b444b/MDRMM011du1.pdf

Jeffers, J. M. (2019). Saving Cork City? Place attachment and conflicting framings of flood hazards. Geoforum, 103, 26-35. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.02.003

Kenney-Lazar, M., Suhardiman, D., & Hunt, G. (2022). The spatial politics of land policy reform in Myanmar and Laos. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 50(4), 1529-1548. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2022.2054700

Khin Htet Htet Pyone, Crego, R. D., Saw San Ngwe, Saw Di Win, Connette, K. L., Songer, M., & Connette, G. M. (2024). Understanding the transition of community land use from shifting cultivation to cash cropping in southern Tanintharyi, Myanmar. People and Nature, 6(3), 1130–1142. https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10631

Klepp, S., & Chavez-Rodriguez, L. (Eds). (2018). A critical approach to climate change adaptation: Discourses, policies and practices. Routledge.

Kongsager, R., & Corbera, E. (2015). Linking Mitigation and Adaptation in Carbon Forestry Projects: Evidence from Belize. World Development, 76, 132-146. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.07.003

Krampe, F., Smith, E. S., & Hamidi, M. D. (2021). Security implications of climate development in conflict-affected states: Implications of local-level effects of rural hydropower development on farmers in Herat. Political Geography, 90, 102454. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102454

Kusakabe, K., & Aye Chan Myae. (2019). Precarity and Vulnerability: Rubber Plantations in Northern Laos and Northern Shan State, Myanmar. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 49(4), 586-601. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2018.1554161

Kyed, H. M., & Chambers, J. (2026). Introduction to the Special Issue on Climate Change and Conflict: Advancing Understandings of the Climate-Conflict Nexus in Times of Political Rupture and Chronic Crisis. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 7. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5641

Leichenko, R. M., & O’Brien, K. L. (2019). Climate and society: Transforming the future. Polity Press.

Lund, C. (2016). Rule and Rupture: State Formation through the Production of Property and Citizenship. Development and Change, 47(6), 1199-1228. https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12274

Mandle, L., Wolny, S., Bhagabati, N., Helsingen, H., Hamel, P., Bartlett, R., Dixon, A., Horton, R., Lesk, C., Manley, D., Mel, M. D., Bader, D., Sai Nay Won Myint, Win Myint, & Myat Su Mon. (2017). Assessing ecosystem service provision under climate change to support conservation and development planning in Myanmar. PLOS ONE, 12(9), e0184951. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184951

Mason, M., Zeitoun, M. & El Sheikh, R. (2011). Conflict and social vulnerability to climate change: Lessons from Gaza. Climate and Development, 3(4), 285-297. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2011.618386

Mikulewicz, M. (2017). The post-politics of adaptation to climate change. University of Manchester.

Mikulewicz, M. (2018). Politicizing vulnerability and adaptation: On the need to democratize local responses to climate impacts in developing countries. Climate and Development, 10(1), 18-34. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2017.1304887

Miller, K. E., & Rasmussen, A. (2014). War experiences, daily stressors and mental health five years on: Elaborations and future directions. Intervention, 12, 33-42. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2009.09.029

Milman, A., & Arsano, Y. (2014). Climate adaptation and development: Contradictions for human security in Gambella, Ethiopia. Global Environmental Change, 29, 349-359. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2013.11.017

Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry. (2012a). Myanmar’s Initial National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry. (2012b). Myanmar’s National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) to Climate Change. National Environmental Conservation Committee.

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. (2019a). Myanmar Climate Change Master Plan 2018-2030.

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. (2019b). Myanmar Climate Change Policy.

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. (2019c). Myanmar Climate Change Strategy 2018-2030. Mosberg, M. (2024). The politics of climate change adaptation, vulnerability, and conflict dynamics: Insights from southeastern Myanmar [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. Norwegian University of Life Sciences.

Murken, L. & Gornott, C. (2022). The importance of different land tenure systems for farmers’ response to climate change: A systematic review. Climate Risk Management, 35, 100419. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crm.2022.100419

Naw Htee Ku, & Hoffmann, K. (2026). Shifting Tides: Political Ruptures and Environmental Activism in Tanintharyi Region. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 7. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5649

Nay Myo Shwe, Grainger, M., Ngoprasert, D., Saw Soe Aung, Grindley, M., & Savini, T. (2023). Anthropogenic pressure on large carnivores and their prey in the highly threatened forests of Tanintharyi, southern Myanmar. Oryx, 57(2), 262–271. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0030605321001654

Ngaruiya, G. W., & Scheffran, J. (2016). Actors and networks in resource conflict resolution under climate change in rural Kenya. Earth System Dynamics, 7(2), 441-452. https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-7-441-2016

Nightingale, A. J. (2017). Power and politics in climate change adaptation efforts: Struggles over authority and recognition in the context of political instability. Geoforum, 84, 11-20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.05.011

O’Brien, K., Eriksen, S., Nygaard, L. P., & Schjolden, A. (2007). Why different interpretations of vulnerability matter in climate change discourses. Climate Policy, 7(1), 73-88. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2007.9685639

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2024). Dataset: Climate-related development finance at the activity level, Recipient perspective, all years: 2000-2021. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) External Development Finance Statistics. https://webfs.oecd.org/climate/RecipientPerspective/CRDF-RP-2000-2021.xlsx

Raleigh, C., Linke, A., Barrett, S., & Kazemi, E. (2024). Climate finance and conflict: Adaptation amid instability. The Lancet Planetary Health, 8(1), e51-e60. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2542-5196(23)00256-5

Remling, E. (2018). Depoliticizing adaptation: A critical analysis of EU climate adaptation policy. Environmental Politics, 27(3), 477-497. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1429207

Remling, E., & Meijer, K. (2025). Conflict considerations in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s National Adaptation Plans. Climate and Development, 17(1), 37–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2024.2321156

Ribot, J. (2013). Vulnerability does not just fall from the sky: Toward multi-scale pro-poor climate policy. In M. R. Redclift & M. Grasso (Eds.), Handbook on Climate Change and Human Security (pp. 164-172). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Schipper, E. L. F. (2020). Maladaptation: When adaptation to climate change goes very wrong. One Earth, 3(4), 409-414. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oneear.2020.09.014

Scoville-Simonds, M., Jamali, H., & Hufty, M. (2020). The hazards of mainstreaming: Climate change adaptation politics in three dimensions. World Development, 125, 104683. https://10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104683

Sekine, Y. (2021). Emerging ‘agrarian climate justice’ struggles in Myanmar. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 48(3), 517-540. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2020.1839054

Selth, A. (1998). Burma’s defence expenditure and arms industries. Contemporary Security Policy, 19(2), 23-49. https://10.1080/13523269808404189

Smucker, T. A., Wisner, B., Mascarenhas, A., Munishi, P., Wangui, E. E., Sinha, G., Weiner, D., Bwenge, C. & Lovell, E. (2015). Differentiated livelihoods, local institutions, and the adaptation imperative: Assessing climate change adaptation policy in Tanzania. Geoforum, 59, 39-50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.11.018

Sovacool, B. K. (2018). Bamboo beating bandits: Conflict, inequality, and vulnerability in the political ecology of climate change adaptation in Bangladesh. World Development, 102, 183-194. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.10.014

Stokke, K., Klo Kwe Moo Kham, Nang K. L. Nge, & Kvanvik, S. H. (2022). Illiberal peacebuilding in a hybrid regime. Authoritarian strategies for conflict containment in Myanmar. Political Geography, 93, 102551. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102551

Suhardiman, D., Kenney-Lazar, M., & Meinzen-Dick, R. (2019). The contested terrain of land governance reform in Myanmar. Critical Asian Studies, 51(3), 368-385. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2019.1630845

Swyngedouw, E. (2011). Depoliticized environments: The end of nature, climate change and the post-political condition. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 69, 253-274. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246111000300

Symons, K. (2014). Anti-politics, apocalypse and adaptation in Kenya’s National Climate Change Response Strategy. Scottish Geographical Journal, 130(4), 266-278. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702541.2014.907442

Thomas, K., Hardy, R. D., Lazrus, H., Mendez, M., Orlove, B., Rivera-Collazo, I., Roberts, J. T., Rockman, M., Warner, B. P., & Winthrop, R. (2019). Explaining differential vulnerability to climate change: A social science review. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews. Climate Change, 10(2), e565. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.565

Thomas, K., & Warner, B. P. (2019). Weaponizing vulnerability to climate change. Global Environmental Change, 57, 101928. https://10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.101928

Turnell, S. (2011). Fundamentals of Myanmar’s Macroeconomy: A Political Economy Perspective. Asian Economic Policy Review, 6(1), 136-153. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-3131.2011.01190.x

UNDP. (2017). Project Document – Ridge to Reef: Integrated Protected Area Land and Seascape Management in Tanintharyi.

UNDP. (2018, July 16). Media Advisory: Inception Workshop for the Ridge to Reef – Integrated Protected Area Land and Seascape Management in Tanintharyi Project.

UNDP SECU. (2018, December 13). Eligibility determination: Complaintant: Indigenous Communities represented by the Conservation Alliance Tanawthari (CAT) regarding the Ridge to Reef project in Myanmar. Case no. SECU0010. UNDP Social and Environmental Compliance Unit.

UNDP SECU. (2022a, February 9). Draft Investigation Report Part 1 of 2, Investigating allegations of non-compliance with UNDP social and environmental commitments relating to the Ridge to Reef project in Tanintharyi. Case no. SECU0010. UNDP Social and Environmental Compliance Unit.

UNDP SECU. (2022b). Case File – SECU0010 – Integrated Protected Area Land and Seascape Management in Tanintharyi (Ridge to Reef). https://info.undp.org/sites/registry/secu/SECUPages/CaseFile.aspx?ItemID=28

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2024). Humanitarian needs and response plan Myanmar.

Vigh, H. (2008). Crisis and Chronicity: Anthropological Perspectives on Continuous Conflict and Decline. Ethnos, 73 (1), 5-24. https://doi.org/10.1080/00141840801927509

Webber, S. (2016). Climate change adaptation as a growing development priority: Towards critical adaptation scholarship. Geography Compass, 10(10), 401-413. https://doi.org/10.1111/gec3.12278

Wells, T., & Lamb, V. (2021). The imaginary of a modern city: Post-politics and Myanmar’s urban development. Urban Studies, 59(14), 2875-2892. https://doi.org/10.1177/00420980211044006

Woods, K., & Naimark, J. (2020). Conservation as counterinsurgency: A case of ceasefire in a rebel forest in southeast Myanmsar. Political Geography, 83, 102251. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102251

Woods, K. (2021). Rebel territory in a resource frontier: Commodification and spatialized orders of rule in Tanintharyi Region, Myanmar. Geoforum, 124, 371-380. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2021.04.030

Wood, M., & Flinders, M. (2014). Rethinking depoliticisation: Beyond the governmental. Policy & Politics, 42(2), 151-70.

Work, C., Rong, V., Song, D. & Scheidel, A. (2018). Maladaptation and development as usual? Investigating climate change mitigation and adaptation projects in Cambodia. Climate Policy, 19, S47-S62. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2018.1527677

World Bank. (2020). Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Assessment Report 2020. World Bank Group and the Myanmar Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry.