Justine Chambers, Saint Sann Aye, Helene Maria Kyed, Ah Lynn & Nway Kant Kaw | ယခုဆောင်းပါးကို မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ဖတ်ရှုရန် ဤနေရာတွင် နှိပ်ပါ

Cite as: 
Chambers, J., Saint Sann Aye, Kyed, H. M., Ah Lynn, & Nway Kant Kaw. (2026). Cyclone Mocha as a Theater of Power: Competitive State-making in Post-coup, Climate-vulnerable Myanmar. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 7. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5666

Abstract

This article examines competing responses to Cyclone Mocha, a category 5 cyclone that devastated Rakhine State in May 2023, within the context of ongoing political conflict and climate crisis. We analyze how different state-like actors—including the military’s State Administration Council (SAC), the Arakan Army, and the National Unity Government—appropriated disaster response efforts as manifestations of pluralized state-making during a period of violent rupture following the 2021 military coup. Drawing on digital ethnography of media representations and interviews with affected Rohingya populations, we demonstrate how disaster responses were both materially impactful and inherently performative, functioning as theatrical displays of authority and legitimacy. Despite competing narratives of effective disaster management, the Rohingya people suffered the most yet received the least assistance, while being marginalized and neglected. Theoretically, we contribute to scholarship that challenges the framing of cyclones as merely ‘natural’ disasters by highlighting how vulnerabilities and responses are embedded in complex social, political, and historical processes. We argue that the politics of climate change in Myanmar exemplifies how disaster responses become sites for competitive state-making, where actors attempt to green their image while maintaining exploitative practices. This case illustrates how climate-related disasters become entangled with existing structures of violence and exclusion within contexts of chronic crisis and contested governance.

Introduction

On 14 May 2023, a devastating category 5 cyclone in the Bay of Bengal struck Myanmar’s western Rakhine State, inflicting massive damage and loss of lives.¹ The storm wiped out entire villages in Sittwe, Pauktaw, Rathedaung, Ponnagyun, Minbya, Kyauktaw, Mrauk-U, and Buthidaung townships. An estimated 400,000 buildings, including hospitals, schools and other public infrastructure were partially or completely destroyed.² The United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs identified some 1.6 million people as in need of assistance. However, the military’s SAC cancelled travel authorizations for international humanitarian relief operations and revoked approvals to provide relief, inhibiting support to vulnerable populations and displacement camps, where stateless and long-persecuted Rohingya people reside.³ Despite this, photos and messages depicting the SAC responding to the storm and helping victims circulated on social media, as did similar representations of assistance efforts by the Arakan Army (AA), a competing actor in Rakhine State, and other resistance actors opposing the SAC.

This article explores these competing responses to a supposed ‘natural’ disaster. We ask, how do representations of disaster response by these competing actors unfold within a context of violent rupture and climate crisis? We contrast these representations to the on-the-ground experiences of those most affected by Cyclone Mocha, the Rohingya. We argue that the competitive appropriation of the ‘natural’ disaster serves as a manifestation of pluralized state-making during a time of profound rupture⁴ wherein responses to climate change-induced crises are particularly politicized. This politicization is deeply entwined with the broader conflict between the junta and resistance groups, each contending for state-like control over people and territories. We further show that while the different disaster responses did have material effects, they were also inherently performative: portrayals of caring and effective states, capable of dispensing disaster management, concealed the neglect and further marginalization of Rohingya people. This concealment was particularly evident in the military-controlled media’s representations of SAC activities, which aimed to create an impression of caring and effective governance. Media aligned with the SAC failed to report accusations that it was hindering access to international humanitarian aid and disrupting the ability of local self-help groups to aid victims.⁵

During Cyclone Nargis in 2008 such restrictions were deliberately used to “weaponize” post-disaster relief efforts for “political purposes”.⁶ What was different with Cyclone Mocha in 2023 is that the military was not the only state-like actor to respond to the disaster. When Cyclone Mocha hit, many of the areas affected were under the control of the AA and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA)—one of the largest ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) in Myanmar, established in 2009.⁷ The SAC was competing with the AA/ULA and to some extent the parallel National Unity Government (NUG), which highlighted its own response to the disaster and criticized the military for not assisting the vulnerable populations that were most affected. Meanwhile, the Rohingya who bore the brunt of the disaster received very little assistance from any party.

This article’s findings draw on the collaborative research of five researchers and are based on digital ethnography⁸ of social and print media representations of responses to Cyclone Mocha, including official statements, newspaper reports, interviews, and social media posts. We combine and contrast these with interviews with affected Rohingya people. These interviews were done through regular telephone and digital communication between May-June 2023 with five research participants, primarily from one village in the disaster area, who we have trusted relationships with, built through ongoing partnerships since 2016. All participants interviewed identify as Rohingya. The interviews were conducted by the fourth author in the Burmese language and included a religious leader and village administrator.

Theoretically, this article contributes to scholarship that criticizes the view of disasters such as cyclones as being merely ‘natural’, by highlighting how responses and vulnerabilities to disasters are deeply embedded in complex, power-laden social, political, economic and historical processes.⁹ Much of Myanmar’s vulnerability to climate change-related disasters lies in its governance arrangements and the long-lasting impacts of military rule, state violence and conflict in its borderland regions.¹⁰ We build on this with an approach combining the politics of climate change¹¹ with insights from Ayesha Siddiqi¹² and Colin Walch¹³ who make a case for contending with the “politics of disasters” in conflict-affected states. In this article, the politics of climate change refers to how competing state-making actors appropriate a disaster associated with climate change to boost their legitimacy by “greening” their image, including by “greenwashing” otherwise exploitative practices.¹⁴ We see this as occurring within a context of the political rupture¹⁵ caused by the 2021 military coup, giving way to a deepening of competition for authority, and against the background of longer legacies of ‘chronic crisis’.¹⁶ Our analysis of the competing responses to Cyclone Mocha is also informed by political anthropological work on how state authority and institutions are constructed through not only material and practical governance, but also through “performativity”, including rituals, discourse and theatrical displays of authority.¹⁷ Based on these perspectives, we suggest that the responses to Cyclone Mocha by competing state-like actors can be seen as a kind of theater of power.

After elaborating more in detail on the conceptual framing of this article, we explore the performativity of the SAC, the AA/ULA and the NUG, as conveyed in media reporting of Cyclone Mocha. We then move to examine how Rohingya people in affected areas experienced Cyclone Mocha and the disaster responses of these competing actors. We conclude the article by returning to a discussion of the politics of climate change and competitive state-making in the context of disaster.

Conceptual Discussion: Disaster Politics and Competitive State-Making

Scholars from anthropology and human geography have long recognized the political nature of disasters and how they provide a unique analytical window for understanding wider social and political relations.¹⁸ Literature on disaster politics highlight disasters as a “critical juncture”¹⁹ in the social contract between a state and its citizens where the state marshals its “material and discursive powers”²⁰ in order to gain popular legitimacy.²¹ This often builds off an understanding of the state as an entity with a clear sense of moral obligation to its citizens as part of the social contract.²² Work on the performance of political authority in the aftermath of disasters by Hart,²³ and Olson & Gawronski,²⁴ show how states and political leaders benefit from demonstrating their care and technical capacity to deliver services and emergency relief, which then becomes part of performing state legitimacy.

Images, symbols, myths, rituals and other acts of political dramaturgy also play a role in state responses to crisis, as noted by Hart.²⁵ This resonates with insights from the anthropological literature on statecraft and state formation,²⁶ which we combine in this article with the politics of disaster and climate change. Hansen & Stepputat argue that “the state tries to make itself real” through different “languages of stateness”, which apart from legislation, bureaucratic systems, and technical governance, include practices, rituals, myths and performative gestures for the “expression of effective territorial sovereignty and authority capable of protecting and nurturing population and economy”.²⁷ Following Geertz’s classic study of the Balinese theater state,²⁸ the use of royal pomp, state rituals, symbols and pageantry serve to “efface and occlude the foundational violence, which is the origins of the state”.²⁹

Apart from effacing violence, state performances can also work to silence critics of a regime, quell unrest or exclude particular populations. This is particularly the case in authoritarian and conflict-affected contexts, as documented in disaster politics studies. Makley,³⁰ for instance, describes how the state in China used highly publicized rituals to perform “charity” for Tibetan Buddhist communities affected by the 2008 Sichuan earthquake in an area long affected by wide-scale uprisings against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). She argues that this was partly a result of the CCP’s campaign in the lead up to the 2008 Olympic Games to project itself as a “legitimately popular” sovereign ruler and compassionate state actor to both domestic and international audiences, in a context of increasing international attention on human rights abuses suffered by the Tibetan population.³¹ Other research highlights how the “weaponization” of disasters by authoritarian regimes results in the uneven distribution of humanitarian aid.³² Kahl suggests that in countries with severe ethnic cleavages, specific groups are deliberately excluded from access to disaster relief as a way of signaling membership to national communities.³³ Thomas & Warner³⁴ similarly show that for marginal segments of society, the experience of disaster often overlaps with and enhances other forms of state-based discrimination and marginalization. Following this body of work, Passeri argues that the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar was weaponized by the military “with the precise intent of crushing internal enemies and defusing the prospects of regime change”.³⁵

While previous research shows that states use disasters to secure legitimacy and political stability, disasters can also trigger political dissent against states and provide competing non-state authorities opportunities to gain credibility and popular support.³⁶ This is especially the case in contexts of civil war. For example, Hossain suggests that the mismanagement of the 1970 Bhola Cyclone in East Pakistan by the Government of Pakistan contributed to the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971,³⁷ which led to the new nation state of Bangladesh forming out of East Pakistan. Goodhand & Klem³⁸ conversely describe how the 2004 tsunami that hit Sri Lanka, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious context affected by protracted war, led to competition between the state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam over the distribution of aid, which “had the effect of further de-legitimizing the state”.³⁹ They argue:

The tsunami response reflected the underlying pathologies of the state and the competing systems of governance in Sri Lanka. Each party saw the tsunami as an opportunity to strengthen their legitimacy through the control and distribution of resources.⁴⁰

In the context of a disaster in a conflict situation, non-state resistance actors also use languages of stateness to project their authority over particular territories and peoples. As we address in this article, Cyclone Mocha was not only appropriated by the military to perform stateness in the midst of a political rupture, but was also used to support contentious claims by non-state armed and civilian resistance groups. In that way disaster response and rehabilitation become optimal strategies for resistance groups to present themselves as the preferable and most credible state-like actors. However, the competition over stateness that we describe in this article did not simply emerge out of Cyclone Mocha or the military coup, it is embedded in a much longer history of competitive state-making.

Studies of competitive state-making in the context of disaster response need to recognize historical dynamics and the contested nature of sovereignty and state-society relations, which are always somewhat in the making.⁴¹ This is particularly significant in the nation state of Myanmar, which has never had a central authority exercising full control over all of the country’s internationally-delimited territory. The 2021 political rupture builds off decades of revolutionary wars and resistance from EROs that have operated governance systems and public goods provision in parallel to the mainly military-controlled central state, as documented by many researchers.⁴² However, less attention has been paid to how EROs respond to disasters, as we do in this article. Before turning to this, we first describe the Myanmar military’s performative response to Cyclone Mocha.

The Military’s Performative Response to Cyclone Mocha

Prior to, during, and after Cyclone Mocha hit Rakhine State, the military-state controlled media carried extensive coverage of the SAC and military officers’ preparations for and response to the disaster. As discussed by Nway Kant Kaw in this issue,⁴³ the military utilizes state-controlled media to “greenwash” its image, and that of its leader Min Aung Hlaing. Similarly, in the wake of Cyclone Mocha, the media projected an image of Min Aung Hlaing as a caring, charitable and benevolent state leader, and portrayed his state apparatus and military personnel as being capable of effectively responding to the population’s needs in the face of a ‘natural’ disaster.

Highlighting the technical competency of state officials to prepare for the cyclone, military-controlled media covered the SAC’s disaster preparedness activities, including the planning, organizing, training and equipping of local communities “to have the resources and knowledge necessary to combat the effects of the disaster when and if it takes place”.⁴⁴ Using apolitical, technical language, articles highlighted the activation of ‘disaster response mechanisms’ under the Natural Disaster Management Committee, headed by Vice-Senior General Soe Win and the subsequent introduction of ‘emergency management exercises’ by military personnel. In the lead up to the cyclone, there were also photos showing the evacuation of women, children and the elderly to shelters and monasteries in coastal areas of Rakhine State and Ayeyarwady Region, to showcase the SAC’s supposed care for vulnerable people.

After the cyclone made landfall, state media focused on military-led efforts to support victims with food relief, medical supplies, clean drinking water, and building supplies. While they published some photographs of the destruction caused by the cyclone, most images were of aid being dispatched by different military units. There was also significant coverage of relief and rehabilitation efforts throughout June 2023. Many headlines used repetitive language to emphasize the technical efficiency of the military in both overseeing and delivering supplies (particularly through the air force and navy). They celebrated the success of early warning systems, evacuation plans and rapid disaster responses by the SAC and military actors, arguing that these prevented high casualties and reduced property damage.⁴⁵ Articles in June 2023 also highlighted the SAC’s ability to collect data on the cyclone damage, its success at rehabilitation efforts, its provision of training, and technical assistance to residents for long-term strategies to minimize loss and damage from future disasters.⁴⁶ As a demonstration of the success of state-led efforts, one headline ran: “Over 70% of Rakhine’s tourism business resumes operations after disaster”.⁴⁷

In contrast to independent media that highlighted the struggles of cyclone victims, military-controlled media exhibited a strong celebratory tone, praising the junta. Overall, state media emphasized a grand narrative of progress and nationalistic triumph as evidence of the SAC’s legitimacy and sovereignty over the nation. In support of these domestic efforts, the deputy chief of mission at the Myanmar Embassy in Thailand, Than Htwe, praised the SAC’s efforts in Thailand media outlet the Bangkok Post, criticizing outsiders’ perceptions of the Myanmar military:

The SAC has shown its management capability, efficient action, and ability to plan long-term by quickly coming up with a resettlement plan for those affected by the cyclone. Cyclone Mocha showed how the image of Myanmar painted by unreliable media outlets was nothing but an exaggeration which undermines the sovereignty of Myanmar.⁴⁸

Apart from showcasing the technical capacity of the SAC, the military-controlled media also tried to demonstrate the SAC’s authority and control over highly-contested territories. This included deploying ceremonial, ritualistic and performative languages of stateness, which centered on conveying the care and compassion of military officers and the 2021 coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.

Photos in the military-controlled media showed military generals and senior officials wearing fatigues, handing over donations, and inspecting material damage. In many images, military personnel are depicted as personable and caring ‘fathers of the nation’.⁴⁹ Several articles featured Vice-Senior General Soe Win, with images of him meeting frontline personnel, overseeing rehabilitation efforts, and giving donations.⁵⁰ There were also images of uniformed soldiers, police and Red Cross staff aiding people in the cleanup effort, including in the repair of roads, electricity poles, schools and religious buildings. However, most of the articles focused on the performative displays of Min Aung Hlaing as a responsive, compassionate and capable state leader. Images showed Min Aung Hlaing visiting Sittwe on 15 May, the day after the cyclone hit, supposedly taking the disaster very seriously (see figures 1, 2, and 3).

Figure 1
Photos of Min Aung Hlaing accepting cash donations from well-wishers published in the Global New Light of Myanmar.⁵¹

Figure 2
Photo in the Global New Light of Myanmar of Min Aung Hlaing presenting 7 billion Myanmar Kyat in assistance for Rakhine State.⁵²

Figure 3
Photo of Min Aung Hlaing assessing damage in Sittwe following Cyclone Mocha published in the Global New Light of Myanmar.⁵³

Min Aung Hlaing visited parts of Rakhine State on 11 July together with his wife, inspecting reconstruction efforts and pledging “to fulfil the needs of townships” affected by the disaster.⁵⁴ Figure 4 is an example of photos showing Min Aung Hlaing and his wife in civilian clothes smiling at crowds they visited, received in formal dress to denote an aura of ceremonial officialdom and discipline.

Figure 4
Photo of Min Aung Hlaing and his wife Daw Kyu Kyu Hla greeting families of the military published in the Global New Light of Myanmar.⁵⁵

Articles also quoted Min Aung Hlaing’s speeches. In one visit he stressed the SAC’s commitment to the people of Rakhine State, mentioning various forms of infrastructural repairs, the delivery of healthcare services and the distribution of agricultural inputs. Without any mention of the ongoing conflict and tensions with competing actors, he stated: “If local authorities and locals cooperate with each other, Rakhine State will be better than the previous situation.”⁵⁶ On visits to military stations in Rathedaung and Buthidaung townships, he emphasized the importance of unity, internal strength, and patriotism.⁵⁷ Similarly, in a speech where he donated 7 billion Myanmar Kyat to the Rakhine State chief minister for relief and rehabilitation, Min Aung Hlaing stressed the importance of having “united strength” and “strong spirit”, declaring that “if all cooperate in relief and rehabilitation tasks, the affected areas will soonest (sic) have the original situation”.⁵⁸ In state media pledges to unity co-exist with displays of Min Aung Hlaing caring for Rakhine culture and heritage, such as visiting the Rakhine State Cultural Museum, where he was shown booths highlighting specific Rakhine traditions, history and culture.⁵⁹

Another major theme in the military’s media coverage of Cyclone Mocha is highlighting donations and fundraising by the military. In the days and months after the cyclone, state media broadcast Min Aung Hlaing and other SAC officials holding ceremonial fundraising events for victims of the cyclone. Photographs from these spectacles featured SAC officials donating money in prominent uniforms. Min Aung Hlaing was often featured in the images as both giving and receiving donations (as seen in figure 1). Other senior SAC officials were also displayed as generous givers at other events.⁶⁰ Newspapers reported detailed information about the amounts donated and by whom, emphasizing the goodwill of the army (as an institution), military families, and SAC officials, with images of donations flown into Rakhine State with military aircraft and ships.⁶¹ A key characteristic of this reporting was that it lacked details about the distribution of relief to affected groups and hardly ever emphasized the impact on the victims of the cyclone. Instead, it focused on showcasing the military and SAC as benevolent and compassionate actors. The same applied for military-owned companies, who were celebrated for having set a below-market price for basic food items, including rice, oil, salt, meat, fish and eggs, as part of their care for victims of the storm.⁶² However, independent reports from Rakhine State suggested that such offers were only made available to SAC staff and that many people affected by the cyclone had to pay for basic goods at inflated prices.⁶³

In the reporting on military donations and generosity, frequent links were also drawn between the military and Buddhism. For instance, a large number of articles documented donation ceremonies and rehabilitation efforts, including by Soe Win and Min Aung Hlaing, for monasteries and other Buddhist religious sites damaged by the cyclone (see figure 5).⁶⁴ Prior to the cyclone, the military held many high-publicized prayer ceremonies with notable Buddhist religious leaders, as a demonstration of the close relationship between military officials and the Buddhist clergy. Drawing on a long tradition in Myanmar of Buddhist statesmanship and the performance of moral authority as emblematic of auspicious rule,⁶⁵ SAC officials in Rakhine State, and Yangon and Ayeyarwady regions, invited prominent monks to perform prayer ceremonies, recite parittas, and conduct preventive rituals like the dragon feeding rite, to influence the route of the storm.⁶⁶

Figure 5
Photo of Vice-Senior General Soe Win donating rice and alms in Mrauk-U published in the Global New Light of Myanmar.⁶⁷

Alongside highlighting their technical capacity as state actors, the military drew on Buddhist language, symbols, and performances of kingship as part of their response to the cyclone. This is not new. As Jordt⁶⁸ and Schober⁶⁹ describe in their analyses of Buddhism and the construction of power in Myanmar, military generals have long co-opted Buddhist discourse and symbolism to legitimize their rule and project an image of themselves as rightful Buddhist monarchs (dhammarāja). This is based on the Aśokan model of kingship, a major premise Myanmar’s military and civilian leaders have used to seek and consolidate political power.⁷⁰

As evident in the military’s media articles on Cyclone Mocha, the military harnessed the surge of public interest in the cyclone by linking themes of both universalized and Buddhist-inflected ‘goodwill’, ‘generosity’ and ‘virtues’ of the people and state of Myanmar on the one hand, with militarized state management on the other. One example is the following quote from a state newspaper on 5 July 2023:

The people of Myanmar, irrespective of their religion, language, or ethnicity, have come together to extend their compassion, empathy, and goodwill to the storm victims. This genuine goodwill has been evident whenever the nation faced adversity, and the impact of storm Mocha has served as a catalyst for the rejuvenation of Myanmar society, with individuals showcasing their inherent generosity and virtues. The gratitude expressed towards the devastating storm Mocha is rooted in the opportunity it provided for people from all walks of life to demonstrate their compassion, empathy, four cardinal virtues and genuine goodwill.⁷¹

The above quote, and state media reporting in general, sought to erase ongoing tensions and conflicts in Rakhine State, including the fact that large parts of the storm-affected areas were and are under control of the AA. Military media downplayed the competitive, state-making context that relief efforts were embedded in. There was no mention of the AA or other resistance actors providing support to victims nor any discussion of the restrictions the SAC put in place to prevent international humanitarian organizations accessing cyclone-affected areas.⁷² Only one article we identified mentioned offers from United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to participate in relief efforts. Another article highlighted a donation of 150 million Myanmar Kyat from the Karen Border Guard Force under the auspices of the Second-Myainggyingu Sayadaw, known to be allied with the military.⁷³ Offers of humanitarian assistance from Russia, Japan, India, Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were mentioned in several news articles, but in a way that conveyed international recognition of the regime.

The suffering and experiences of cyclone victims, especially the Rohingya, were silenced in favor of displaying the actions and supposed good will of the military. Although some articles mentioned SAC visits to internally displaced people (IDP) camps in Sittwe and evacuation plans for them, there was no information on whether these plans materialized, nor the fact that residents of these camps are Rohingya.⁷⁴ Min Aung Hlaing visited Buthidaung in July 2023, a site of both communal violence and genocidal military-clearance operations against the Rohingya. He did not mention the Rohingya victims when speaking there, nor did he take responsibility for the development needs and conflict in the region. Instead he focused on directing blame on the people. He was quoted saying:

It’s necessary to protect the region (Buthidaung) with a patriotic spirit. As the people reside in Myanmar, they have to be loyal to their land. Only when the region is peaceful and stable will residents be able to undertake regional development tasks as quickly as possible.⁷⁵

He also highlighted inter-ethnic unity: “As local people are ethnics of the nation, residing in the same places through thick and thin, they all have to serve each other in fraternity so as to contribute to regional development.”⁷⁶ In other speeches during his visits he also drew on familiar military rhetoric, declaring “strength of the nation lies within” and “if all the people are united at a time when the country has requirements … the country will go forward to the goal along the smooth path.”⁷⁷

These expressions of unity stand in stark contrast not only to the ongoing conflict and military atrocities against civilians across the country, but also to the provision of cyclone support by resistance actors, especially the AA and the NUG, which we address next. Following that, we show how the military media’s celebration of military generosity and state effectiveness in delivering aid to cyclone victims did not represent the experiences of those most affected by the cyclone.

The Resistance’s Competing Cyclone Responses

Many of the areas affected by Cyclone Mocha were administrated by the AA and its political wing, the ULA, which operates its own governance and judicial system. Established in 2009 with the goal of autonomy for the people of Rakhine State, the AA/ULA is now one of the most powerful EROs in Myanmar.⁷⁸ From 2019 the AA was in open combat with the military, but a fragile humanitarian ceasefire was signed shortly before the 2021 coup, which was still in effect when Cyclone Mocha hit. Due to this ceasefire, the AA/ULA was removed from the SAC’s list of terrorist organizations and did not, as other EROs did, actively resist the military coup. This enabled the ULA to extend its administrative and judicial presence in Rakhine State.⁷⁹ However, the ceasefire broke down in late 2023, following Operation 10/27, with active fighting and AA territorial expansion still ongoing at the time of writing in November 2024.

The AA/ULA’s responses to Cyclone Mocha demonstrated not only its advancements in administrative control and organization since the 2021 coup, but also its aspirations as a state actor in Rakhine State, drawing on familiar languages of stateness.⁸⁰ The AA/ULA’s social media platforms issued cyclone warnings and a series of “do’s and don’ts” which were shared widely across Rakhine State through messaging platforms like Signal and Telegram.⁸¹ As a demonstration of its state-like character, the ULA/AA’s Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office released a number of public announcements,⁸² declaring it evacuated more than 100,000 people in the cyclone path, including Rohingya people, and with an emphasis on the elderly, children and people with disabilities (see figures 6 and 7).⁸³

Figure 6
Photo of AA personnel evacuate residents from Myebon published by Development Media Group.⁸⁴

Figure 7
Photo of AA soldiers evacuating people from low-lying areas prior to Cyclone Mocha published by Development Media Group.⁸⁵

The ULA established the Cyclone Mocha Emergency Rescue and Rehabilitation Committee for Arakan (ERRCA) to coordinate its disaster efforts. The ERRCA’s Facebook page documented its activities, showcasing images of AA personnel repairing roofs, roads and helping in the clean up of various communities. In parallel to the SAC, the AA/ULA also assessed damage to housing, schools, healthcare facilities and religious buildings, often presenting higher figures than the SAC.⁸⁶ In a clear effort to highlight AA/ULA effectiveness as a state actor, ERRCA posted a statement (in English and Burmese) two months after the cyclone, noting:

By utilizing the human resources and financial ones both from our political, administrative, civilian and military departments of the organization, and from the domestic and international communities, we are able to manage and perform the relief work successfully.⁸⁷

The statement continued that 75 percent of the affected population had been re-sheltered and that the ULA was supporting victims of the cyclone with rice seeds, health services, basic food, and clothing.

Apart from highlighting its effectiveness in responding to the disaster, the AA/ULA presented itself as a sympathetic state actor above political interests and divides. In highly symbolic displays, information and photos released by the AA/ULA showcased their support to Muslim communities (see figure 8).⁸⁸ An official of ERRCA noted in a statement: “We are providing food supplies for storm victims regardless of race and religion … We also help repair houses for Muslims.”⁸⁹ Like a state actor, the AA also urged businesspersons, traders and shopkeepers to sell basic goods and construction materials at a “fair price.”⁹⁰ In media interviews after the cyclone, the AA also affirmed its commitment to working with all authorities in supporting the needs of victims, including the SAC.⁹¹

Figure 8
Photo of the ULA/AA donating food supplies to storm victims.⁹²

The AA/ULA’s response to the disaster also involved efforts to gain financial support and recognition from foreign and domestic actors. On 15 May, the day following the cyclone, the ULA issued a statement (in English and Burmese) urging foreign countries, members of ASEAN, and international aid agencies to support its delivery of humanitarian relief.⁹³ As a demonstration of his state-like authority, the AA commander-in-chief Major General Twan Mrat Naing also made a special video appeal for support from civil society organizations (CSOs) and INGOs for shelter, drinking water, food, and medicine.⁹⁴ While aid delivered from international actors was to our knowledge not accessed by the AA/ULA, reflecting a lack of foreign recognition of the AA/ULA as a state actor, it did receive donations from other resistance organizations, especially other EROs and the NUG, amounting to an apparent total of 2 billion Myanmar Kyat.⁹⁵ AA/ULA websites and Telegram channels displayed the amount of donations from EROs alongside thank you letters, often signed by the AA commander-in-chief, as being on behalf of “the people of Rakhine.” There were also certificates posted of donations collected by Arakan community organizations based in Germany, Australia and Denmark. As a reflection of their support for federal principles, the NUG made a donation of 100 million kyatto the AA/ULA.

It is evident that these resistance actors afforded a degree of legitimacy and recognition to the AA/ULA. Many of the statements from EROs in response to the cyclone also fed into the dynamics of competition over statehood and authority with the SAC, in which they are also engaged. This was especially apparent in the statements made by the AA/ULA’s fellow Three Brotherhood Alliance members, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. On 18 May 2023, these allies expressed their compassion for the people of Arakan, and their support for the AA/ULA. As a symbol of their trust in the AA/ULA as a governing body for Arakan people, they noted:

Our brotherhood alliance earnestly believes that the ULA/AA can do its best by leading the public, CSOs and philanthropic organizations in the systematic management of emergency aid and rehabilitation works for the people in cyclone-affected Arakan State.⁹⁶

Similar to the military, the AA/ULA relied on its own media efforts to publicize its activities. But unlike the military, it also engaged with independent media to portray itself as an efficient and reliable state actor. It was strongly supported by pro-resistance media, especially Narinjara TV news and the Development Media Group. These and other pro-resistance outlets praised the AA/ULA for its disaster preparations and response, almost exclusively covering their activities.⁹⁷ Images from the Cyclone Mocha ERRCA team circulated widely, showing AA soldiers delivering rice, tarpaulin sheets, cooking oil and other essentials to the villages hit hardest by the storm.⁹⁸ Independent and pro-resistance media news articles highlighted that the AA/ULA, despite hinderances accessing international aid and limited logistic resources, was able to reach vulnerable victims, such as Muslim villagers in Mrauk-U, Kyauktaw, Rathedaung, and Buthidaung townships.⁹⁹ Articles highlighted the work of AA troops undertaking reconstruction efforts, clearing the roads and providing shelter, rice and other essentials, house by house, village by village.¹⁰⁰ Narinjara further demonstrated the AA/ULA’s responsibility as a state actor by broadcasting its efforts at replanting trees to mitigate the effects of future disasters.¹⁰¹ Pro-resistance and independent media outlets, while acknowledging the military as a state actor, often criticized the SAC, highlighting SAC restrictions on international aid and its failure to provide relief to people in the worst hit areas, especially IDP camps.¹⁰² While the AA/ULA could not meet all the needs of victims of the storm, they were painted in a much more positive light.

While we are unable to accurately assess the public support for the AA in their response to the cyclone, some political analysts suggested that they scored “a huge propaganda victory”.¹⁰³ Social media comments by people congratulating the AA for their good work also suggested widespread support. Political commentator Kyaw Hsan Hlaing praised the ULA/AA, while painting the military as an unreliable state actor playing politics and creating obstacles for delivering humanitarian aid to victims.¹⁰⁴ Just as Furlan¹⁰⁵ describes in other contexts with non-state armed groups, where the Myanmar military was expected to address the needs of cyclone victims “in absolute terms”, the emergency situation became an opportunity for the AA/ULA to out-perform the state “in relative terms.” As noted earlier, this performance in relative terms also involved recognition of the AA/ULA by the NUG and EROs, exemplified by how they made donations through the AA/ULA.

There was a difference however between the ways that the NUG and EROs donated through the AA/ULA. Unlike EROs, the NUG also responded to Cyclone Mocha through a number of public displays as part, we suggest, of presenting itself as a state actor and legitimate authority. In other words, it did not confine itself only to donating through the AA/ULA, but also provided relief efforts as a competing state actor. Like the SAC, it did so as a national rather than regional actor. The NUG claims to be the legitimate national government of Myanmar since it was established with several ministers that were elected to parliament in the 2020 elections.¹⁰⁶

Unlike the AA, the NUG could not easily access cyclone victims on the ground in Rakhine State, because the NUG does not hold any territory there. However, prior to the storm, it did use social media to inform the wider public about the risks of the coming disaster and encouraged residents in danger zones to prepare and to identify safe evacuation routes. On the day before the cyclone hit, the NUG’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation arranged a talk show on their Facebook page, inviting the NUG Minister of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (NUG-MoHaDM) to discuss disaster risk reduction. The NUG called on international aid organizations to connect with them and use their trusted networks in Rakhine State, rather than relying on the SAC. Unlike the military-controlled media which ignored resistance actors, the NUG portrayed the SAC as a corrupt and obstructionist state actor causing suffering for the people of Rakhine State in the wake of the cyclone.

The NUG also pledged its own donations. Apart from raising 1 million Myanmar Kyat for the AA/ULA and civil society groups in Rakhine, it pledged ten percent of its overall tax revenues to victims of the storm.¹⁰⁷ In recognition of the specific vulnerabilities of Rohingya victims, the NUG distributed emergency preparedness kits to refugee camps in Bangladesh through local organizations. The NUG also held public fundraising initiatives. For example, on 16 June 2023 the NUG held a “mother’s gift yat taung” (hand fan) fundraising campaign in homage to Aung San Suu Kyi. The NUG-MoHaDM also made reports on their Facebook page of their collaboration with public administration bodies and local humanitarian groups in affected areas, including detailed reports of where donations were going (see figure 9). On 3 June 2023, the NUG’s acting president, Duwa Lashi La, posted images of himself visiting people affected by the storm in an undisclosed liberated area (likely not in Rakhine State), showcasing his support and care for victims. Linking this support to resisting military rule, he declared during the visit: “The revolution shall definitely succeed”.¹⁰⁸ As another symbolic demonstration of their legitimate authority, the NUG-MoHaDM Minister Win Myat Aye met with France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the impacts of Cyclone Mocha and how France could best support rehabilitation efforts.

Figure 9
NUG-MoHaDM reports of humanitarian aid provision for Cyclone Mocha.¹⁰⁹

Unlike the military who did not acknowledge the political instability in the country nor the role of non-SAC resistance actors in affected areas, the NUG directly blamed the SAC for the lack of humanitarian assistance given to affected communities. Thus, while the NUG was not directly competing with the SAC on the ground in Rakhine State, as the AA/ULA did, the NUG did appropriate the disaster to demonstrate its role as a caring and responsible government, directly juxtaposing its role to that of the SAC. However, the degree to which this competitive involvement of the NUG benefitted the most vulnerable victims of the cyclone, the Rohingya is debatable, as we address next.

Neglected Victims: Experiences from a Rohingya Village

Cyclone Mocha left a trail of destruction in Rakhine State, not least for those Rohingya residing in displacement camps and IDP villages set up after waves of intercommunal violence in 2012. While the SAC and the AA/ULA projected themselves through media as responding to the cyclone with pure kindness, transcending ethnic and religious boundaries, the accounts we heard from residents of one coastal IDP village, which we will call Swal Taw, illustrate that Rohingya people were widely neglected by these institutional actors. While it is important not to generalize from the experiences of one village, our interviews are broadly indicative of reports from other locations by independent media and international NGOs.¹¹⁰ Residents in Swal Taw were unable to move to safe locations due to the failure of both the SAC and the AA to lift the special requirements for travel permissions imposed on Rohingya, they had access to very little aid, were restricted from rebuilding their houses, and were unable to return to their primary livelihoods after the storm. Meanwhile, the ethnic Rakhine residents of neighboring villages were able to freely move to safe locations following separate announcements by the SAC and the AA.

The current Swal Taw village has 185 households and is in Kyauktaw Township. It was established as an IDP village by the Myanmar military government following the original Swal Taw village being burned down by ethnic Rakhine during communal violence in 2012.¹¹¹ Until 2019 Swal Taw’s Rohingya residents were prohibited from traveling. In late 2019 they were granted permission to travel, but only if an immigration officer issued them a so-called Form D document. In addition, Rohingya residents were barred from using the same public transportation as ethnic Rakhine residents. Their transportation costs are significantly higher, often involving additional payments to security forces and brokers, making travel both difficult and expensive. Travel outside of Rakhine State is nearly impossible due to these costs. Since 2020, Swal Taw village has been under mixed AA and SAC control with local leaders reporting to both the AA and the SAC. However, when Cyclone Mocha hit, it was predominantly under AA control, as most SAC officials had left.¹¹²

In the days leading up to Cyclone Mocha residents of Swal Taw were left to prepare for the storm on their own. Many residents were alerted to the impending storm via the village’s administrator (VA) and a religious leader, who became aware of it through a WhatsApp group. On May 11, during Friday prayers at the mosque, they warned about the storm and advised residents against going out to sea and to their paddy fields. The AA also informed the VA to advise villagers to stay within the village from May 12 to 14 and to prepare emergency supplies, including food, medicine, and important documents. According to the VA, the SAC did not provide information or make adequate preparations to mitigate the storm’s impact for Rohingya residents of Swal Taw, instead prioritizing ethnic Rakhine people, including evacuating them to shelters in monasteries, universities, and schools. Some Rohingya IDPs were invited by regime officials to stay at Sittwe University, but they hesitated to do so, as they feared the SAC might be using the storm as a pretext to relocate them. Additionally, the lack of clarity on travel permissions, given that the Form D requirement remained in place, added to the confusion about whether evacuation was in fact permitted. Reflecting this situation, a Rohingya school teacher from Swal Taw stated to us: “Many Rakhine people from Sittwe were able to relocate to safer areas because they received information about the cyclone from various sources. However, we Rohingya were unable to do the same. We were not permitted to not travel.”¹¹³

When the cyclone made landfall, Swal Taw village suffered significant damage. Seventy homes were completely destroyed, while the remaining 115 houses were partially damaged, with many roofs blown off. Public buildings, including a mosque, nursery school, and two primary schools built by international donors, were also destroyed. Essential resources such as perennial plants, motor boats, and livestock were destroyed. Although there were no human casualties in the village itself, the storm led to the loss of over 70 boats, with 60 eventually recovered and 10 still missing. Many of the residents also lost relatives staying in other IDP villages hit by the storm.

Despite the severe damage, Swal Taw residents received hardly any aid, even though the AA, the SAC, and the World Food Programme (WFP) had data on the damage. The AA instructed the VA to collect damage reports on 14 May, but no AA staff visited the village and no aid was provided. On 21 May, staff from WFP conducted a damage assessment, and on 25 May, the SAC directed school teachers and students to gather data under the supervision of the VA. The SAC provided only a single blanket, a bag of rice, a bar of soap, and one male and female longyi for the entire village. The only additional assistance came from cash donations organized by our group of researchers, which the villagers used to purchase tarpaulins for emergency shelter. As of August 2024, the village had not received further support from the AA or the SAC. In contrast, a nearby ethnic Rakhine village received substantial aid from local charity organizations which were able to mobilize aid through the village monastery, which caused frustration among Swal Taw villagers.

One respondent we interviewed from Swal Taw highlighted how the former communal violence between Rakhine and Rohingya communities exacerbated the impact of the cyclone for their community. They suggested that Rohingya were often forced to live in unsafe, flood-prone areas with limited mobility, hindering their ability to escape the storm:

All of my ward was destroyed. I didn’t get any early warning information from the AA or SAC. I only read about the cyclone on social media. We had no choice but to stay in our homes and couldn’t move anywhere. We couldn’t prepare to avoid the storm … We haven’t had any help from any organization until today.¹¹⁴

This respondent believed that the SAC deliberately neglected the Rohingya before and after Cyclone Mocha, resulting in high casualties among the Rohingya community. The respondent criticized both the lack of SAC support and the perceived disregard for the lives of the Rohingya. An ethnic Rakhine researcher we interviewed noted that while the AA did provide some emergency aid in the areas they controlled, the overall impact of the cyclone was so severe that they did not have sufficient capacity to respond adequately and this led them to prioritize ethnic Rakhine people. He also noted that competition between the SAC and AA over the cyclone response led to a lack of coordination, which had the strongest impact on the Rohingya. He mainly blamed the SAC for its restrictions on external organizations and charity groups.

To grasp the deep vulnerability of the Rohingya to the cyclone and the ways in which they were neglected by competing state-makers, it is important to highlight the deeper historical and political dynamics at play. Stripped of their citizenship status in 1982, the Rohingya have faced decades of systematic state-based exclusion, persecution, and repression, including massive waves of displacement, which have left them marginalized and discriminated against in all political and social realms.¹¹⁵ This has also, as Johnson et al. address,¹¹⁶ left the Rohingya particularly vulnerable to extreme climate events, compounded by mobility restrictions, poverty, poor housing, lack of basic infrastructure and services, and reliance on livelihoods susceptible to the impacts of cyclones.¹¹⁷

This reflects how Cyclone Mocha was not simply a ‘natural’ disaster, but a disaster deeply embedded in politics and historical forms of discrimination and marginalization.¹¹⁸ Even though both the SAC and especially the AA gave the impression of neutral state actors above religious and ethnic divisions, in their competitive responses to the cyclone, their actions in reality reinforced the marginalization of the Rohingya as a stateless people. For this reason, we suggest that Cyclone Mocha became a ‘theater of power’ within which genuine concerns for storm victims were ultimately undermined by aspirations to demonstrate power and assert state-like control.

Conclusion

The case of Cyclone Mocha feeds into a growing body of work on the politics of disasters, which calls for more sustained and critical engagement with the political and social processes in which disasters occur and are responded to.¹¹⁹ Far from seeing a disaster like Cyclone Mocha as a single, permanent, or involuntary event, work from political ecology and anthropology shows how disasters are embedded in complex, power-laden social, political, economic and historical processes.¹²⁰ In this article we have suggested Cyclone Mocha became a ‘theater of power’ as it was appropriated by competing state-making actors to display their effectiveness and legitimacy through disaster responses during a time of profound political rupture, ongoing violent conflict and contestations over territorial control. In particular we explored how the military junta usurped the cyclone to make extensive media displays of themselves not only as an effective state apparatus, but also as generous and caring actors, often clouted in Buddhist religious symbols and language, while silencing its ongoing battles with resistance groups, atrocities against civilians, and declining territorial control across the country. We also addressed how the AA/ULA responded by aiding cyclone victims and mobilizing its evolving governance system to assert and reinforce its increased presence. It achieved recognition as a state actor by Rakhine people and other actors in the resistance movement. While the NUG was not able to physically reach affected communities on the ground, it participated in this theater of power by demonstrating care and support for victims of the storm. As we have described, the SAC, the AA/ULA, and the NUG, each utilized different rituals and spectacles of state power to try and demonstrate legitimacy and governance capabilities. In this way we demonstrate how, within a time of political rupture, ‘natural’ disasters can also constitute a unique spectacle or ‘theater’ in which to enact and display state authority-in-the-making.

In this theater of power, however the politicization of disaster response also came at the expense of the most hard-hit victims, the Rohingya. In our analysis of media and social media representations, the plight of the Rohingya victims was strikingly absent from the military-controlled media, as the focus remained on celebrating the junta’s successful disaster response, donations, and purported care for civilians. While there was some acknowledgement of the unique vulnerability of Muslim communities in displacement camps by the AA/ULA, they never referred to them as Rohingya, and there was a clear prioritization of ethnic Rakhine’s needs in the AA/ULA responses, as we showed with the case of Swal Taw village. To understand how this played out, it is necessary to view the politicization of Cyclone Mocha not only in relation to the contestations following the rupture caused by the coup, but also as layered upon decades of state persecution, communal violence and genocide against the Rohingya. In line with the findings of this article, Le Billon & Waizenegger¹²¹ demonstrate the unequal impacts of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Sri Lanka and Aceh, reinforcing existing fault lines for politically marginalized groups. Pelling & Dill¹²² in addition show that during periods of civil war the state actively discriminates against certain groups and regions. Like Branch¹²³ relates from drought-stricken communities in conflict-affected areas of northern Uganda, for Rohingya communities in Rakhine State, the cyclone was seen and experienced as a continuation of state violence and neglect. With the work of Giorgio Agamben in mind,¹²⁴ in the context of disasters and crisis, humanitarian relief effectively allows state actors to treat the ‘Other’ as ‘bare’ or ‘banished’ life, to whom nothing is owed. The case of the Rohingya following Cyclone Mocha exemplifies this argument. They have long been the excluded other of society for both the military and the AA.¹²⁵

Endnotes

¹ The official death toll published by the military-controlled media was 145. The United League of Arakan claimed 164 deaths, but reports from Rohingya communities indicated that the death toll was much closer to 500 (“Myanmar Junta says”, 2023).
² Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, 2023a.
³ Kamal et al., 2024; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2023b; Zahed, 2023.
⁴ Holbraad et al., 2019; Lund, 2017.
⁵ BBC Burmese & Ng, 2023; Naw Theresa, 2023; “They ignore us”, 2023.
⁶ Passeri, 2022.
⁷ Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, 2023a.
⁸ See Kyed & Chambers, 2026 [this issue].
⁹ Branch 2018; Nixon, 2011; Paprocki, 2021.
¹⁰ Borras et al., 2020; Simpson & South, 2021.
¹¹ See Kyed & Chambers, 2026 [this issue].
¹² Siddiqi, 2018.
¹³ Walch, 2014; 2018.
¹⁴ Also see Nway Kant Kaw (2026) [this issue].
¹⁵ Lund, 2017.
¹⁶ Vigh, 2008; 2022.
¹⁷ Geertz, 1980; Makley, 2014; Stepputat & Nuijten, 2018, p. 127.
¹⁸ Siddiqi, 2019.
¹⁹ Pelling & Dill, 2010.
²⁰ Pelling & Dill, 2008.
²¹ Healy & Malhotra, 2009; Olson, 2008; Pelling & Dill, 2008.
²² Olson & Drury, 1997, pp. 227-228.
²³ Hart, 1993, p. 94.
²⁴ Olson & Gawronski, 2010.
²⁵ Hart, 1993. Also see Boin (2008).
²⁶ Geertz, 1980; Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; Taussig, 1997; Wedeen, 2008.
²⁷ Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, pp. 5-7.
²⁸ Geertz, 1980.
²⁹ Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 15.
³⁰ Makley, 2014.
³¹ Makley, 2014, p. 377.
³² Kahl, 2006; Passeri, 2022; Pelling & Dill, 2010.
³³ Kahl, 2006.
³⁴ Thomas & Warner, 2019.
³⁵ Passeri, 2022, p. 282.
³⁶ Furlan, 2023.
³⁷ Hossain, 2018.
³⁸ Goodhand & Klem, 2005.
³⁹ Goodhand & Klem, 2005, p. 59.
⁴⁰ Goodhand & Klem, 2005, p. 58.
⁴¹ Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; Lund, 2017, p. 1.
⁴² Brenner, 2017; Harrisson & Kyed, 2019; South, 2018.
⁴³ See Nway Kant Kaw (2026) [this issue].
⁴⁴ Than Lwin Tun, 2023.
⁴⁵ For example, see Myanmar News Agency (2023a).
⁴⁶ “Rehabilitate livelihoods”, 2023.
⁴⁷ Myanmar News Agency, 2023b.
⁴⁸ Than Htwe, 2023.
⁴⁹ Myanmar News Agency, 2023c.
⁵⁰ Myanmar News Agency, 2023d; 2023e; 2023f.
⁵¹ Myanmar News Agency, 2023g.
⁵² Myanmar News Agency, 2023h.
⁵³ Myanmar News Agency, 2023h.
⁵⁴ Myanmar News Agency, 2023i.
⁵⁵ Myanmar News Agency, 2023i.
⁵⁶ “Collaborative efforts called for”, 2023.
⁵⁷ Myanmar News Agency, 2023i.
⁵⁸ Myanmar News Agency, 2023h.
⁵⁹ “Senior General Min Aung Hlaing”, 2023.
⁶⁰ “Fundraising concert”, 2023; Myanmar News Agency, 2023j.
⁶¹ See for instance, “Naval vessels deliver” (2023).
⁶² “Affordable essentials”, 2023.
⁶³ “Low-income families”, 2023.
⁶⁴ “Donation ceremony held”, 2023.
⁶⁵ Chambers & Cheesman, 2019.
⁶⁶ “Patthana recitation conducted”, 2023.
⁶⁷ Myanmar News Agency, 2023f.
⁶⁸ Jordt, 2003; 2007.
⁶⁹ Schober, 2005; 2011.
⁷⁰ Also see: Houtman (1999); Turner (2014); Walton (2016).
⁷¹ “Soonest rehabilitate”, 2023.
⁷² Rakhine civil society was critical of the military’s efforts, denouncing the ban on international humanitarian aid deliveries as “a completely irresponsible and inhumane act” (Visual Rebellion Myanmar, 2023).
⁷³ Myanmar News Agency, 2023l.
⁷⁴ Myanmar News Agency, 2023h.
⁷⁵ Myanmar News Agency, 2023i.
⁷⁶ Myanmar News Agency, 2023i.
⁷⁷ Myanmar News Agency, 2023k.
⁷⁸ Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, 2023a. Over the course of the 2010s, the AA/ULA became a dominant political force in Rakhine State, encouraging ethnic Rakhine people towards the realization of the “Arakan Dream” based on the philosophy of “The Way of Rakhita,” focused on the aspiration of Arakan freedom and sovereignty over their homeland.
⁷⁹ Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, 2021.
⁸⁰ Hansen & Stepputat, 2001.
⁸¹ Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office, 2023.
⁸² See United League of Arakan (2023), for example.
⁸³ “AA assists evacuation”, 2023; “Thousands flee homes”, 2023.
⁸⁴ “AA assists evacuation”, 2023.
⁸⁵ “AA: Myanmar Junta”, 2023.
⁸⁶ “AA offers its own accounting”, 2023.
⁸⁷ Arakan Army, 2023b.
⁸⁸ “Arakan Army provides relief”, 2023.
⁸⁹ “Arakan Army provides relief”, 2023.
⁹⁰ Arakan Army, 2023b.
⁹¹ E.g., see “AA: Myanmar Junta”, 2023.
⁹² “One billion kyats donated to storm victims through AA”, 2023.
⁹³ United League of Arakan, 2023.
⁹⁴ Arakan Army, 2023a.
⁹⁵ “FPNCC, UWSA donate”, 2023. This included sizable donations from the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee, the New Mon State Party, the Kachin Independence Organization, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the United Wa State Army, and the Shan State Progessive Party.
⁹⁶ Myanmar Peace Monitor, 2023.
⁹⁷ See for example, “Arakan Army is” (2023), Kyaw Hsan Hlaing (2023a; 2023b), and Naw Theresa (2023).
⁹⁸ “One billion kyats”, 2023.
⁹⁹ See e.g. “Thousands of Pauk Taw Muslim refugees shifted to safer place”, 2023.
¹⁰⁰ “Arakan Army is actively doing rehabilitation work in Rakhine”, 2023.
¹⁰¹ “ULA/AA replants shade”, 2023.
¹⁰² See for example, “Arakan State residents” (2024), “Ban on aid deliveries” (2023), “Dozens of storm-hit villages” (2023), “Junta bars collection” (2023), “Junta falls woefully short” (2023), Maung Khaing Tun (2023), and “Myanmar junta bars aid” (2023).
¹⁰³ Naw Theresa, 2023.
¹⁰⁴ Kyaw Hsan Hlaing, 2023a; 2023b.
¹⁰⁵ Furlan, 2023, p. 1446.
¹⁰⁶ Renshaw, 2023.
¹⁰⁷ National Unity Government of Myanmar, 2023; Naw Theresa, 2023.
¹⁰⁸ Acting President Duwa Lashi La, 2023.
¹⁰⁹ Public Voice Television, 2023.
¹¹⁰ See for example, “They ignore us” (2023) and Amnesty International (2023).
¹¹¹ For more details of the 2012 communal violence, see Cheesman (2017).
¹¹² Since mid-May 2024, Kyaukaw Township has been fully under AA/ULA control.
¹¹³ Swal Taw resident, personal communication, May 28, 2023.
¹¹⁴ Swal Taw resident, personal communication, June 30, 2023.
¹¹⁵ De Chickera, 2021; Gehlot, 2021; Nyana Yoni, 2021; Zahed, 2023.
¹¹⁶ Johnson et al., 2019.
¹¹⁷ Johnson et al., 2019, p. 86.
¹¹⁸ Siddiqi, 2018; Walch, 2014; 2018.
¹¹⁹ Makley, 2014; Siddiqi, 2014; 2018; Venugopal & Yasir, 2017; Walch, 2015.
¹²⁰ Branch 2018; Paprocki, 2021; Passeri 2021; Siddiqi 2018.
¹²¹ Le Billon & Waizenegger, 2007.
¹²² Pelling & Dill, 2010.
¹²³ Branch, 2018.
¹²⁴ Agamben, 1998.
¹²⁵ Since Cyclone Mocha hit, there have been increasing reports of violence and human rights abuses inflicted on Rohingya communities as the war between the SAC and the AA escalates. See “Fog of War” (2024) for more details.

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