Saint Sann Aye | ယခုဆောင်းပါးကို မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ဖတ်ရှုရန် ဤနေရာတွင် နှိပ်ပါ

Cite as: 
Saint Sann Aye. (2026). Climate Change Politics and the National Unity Government: Performing the State and Resisting the Military. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 7. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5657

Abstract

This article analyzes the climate change and environment discourses and activities of the alternative National Unity Government’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (NUG-MoNREC). Formed in 2021 during an ongoing revolution against military rule, the ways in which the NUG-MoNREC relates to other groups in the anti-coup resistance movement and tries to engage international actors not only affects Myanmar’s environmental and political future, but also provides an example of how an oppositional state entity leverages climate change politics as part of broader resistance struggles for authority and state-recognition during a time of profound political rupture. My analysis is based on digital ethnographic research, with data collected between February 2021 and June 2024, and interviews with a NUG-MoNREC staff member. I find that the ministry faces many challenges and the contribution its climate and environmental initiatives make to the NUG’s overall efforts to perform as a state and receive domestic and international legitimacy is unclear.

Introduction

In the days following the military coup on 1 February 2021, resistance quickly emerged across Myanmar. Public movements including street protests, strike committees, and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) gained momentum, with people expressing their opposition to the military’s new State Administration Council (SAC). Soldiers and police threatened, beat, detained, tortured, shot, and killed participants involved in these movements. In reaction to these events and as part of the broader resistance, on 16 April 2021 the new Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), consisting of 17 members of parliament elected in the 2020 elections, 14 from the winning National League for Democracy (NLD) party, established a new interim National Unity Government (NUG).

The NUG sought recognition from the people of Myanmar, ethnic resistance organizations (EROs), other nations’ governments, and international organizations, as the legitimate national government of Myanmar. It is more inclusive of diverse ethnic and other interests than the 2016-2021 NLD government and presents itself as one of the primary organizations responsible for laying the foundations of “a federal union that seeks to address decades of structural violence against all the people of Myanmar regardless of race and religion”.¹ The NUG formed 17 ministries and was involved in drafting a new federal democracy charter, together with the National Unity Consultative Council, which consists of people from the CRPH, the CDM, EROs, political parties, and civil society organizations (CSOs).²

Since May 2021 the NUG has backed the formation of People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), local armed groups resisting the military, and in August 2021 it declared a nationwide armed struggle, waged by PDFs, local defense forces (LDFs), and EROs, through various degrees of collaboration.³ In the parts of the country where these resistance forces have managed to resist or push back the Myanmar military, new ‘liberated’ areas have been created, joining the many liberated areas long fought for and controlled by EROs, and resistance groups have taken on various governance roles within them.⁴ While the NUG is trying to gain legitimacy as a truly national government, it is in Sagaing and Magway regions that it exercises the most control and influence.⁵ In other liberated areas, EROs and/or LDFs/PDFs and new state-level consultative bodies have assumed governing roles.⁶

The principal concerns of the resistance groups that emerged after the 2021 coup are to combat military dictatorship, govern territory, and develop a political vision for the future. Climate change and environmental issues are part of some of these groups’ efforts to consolidate authority. Key to this is concern for the environment and for mitigating the devasting effects of climate change—like severe heatwaves, floods, cyclones and drought—and questions related to the management of natural resources. The NUG’s efforts show how climate change and environmental issues, albeit not the group’s highest priority, have become important in the politics of resistance against the military junta.

In this article I analyze the discourses and activities of the NUG’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (NUG-MoNREC), which is the core NUG ministry engaged with climate change and the environment.⁷ I also explore how the NUG-MoNREC relates to other groups in the resistance movement, including EROs and civil society actors, and how it tries to engage international actors. This means positioning the NUG-MoNREC as different from and more legitimate than the equivalent ministry under the SAC, carrying the same name of MoNREC.⁸ My analysis is based on digital ethnographic research, using data from NUG-MoNREC reports, online talk shows, social media postings, and newsletters shared on its Facebook and website pages. The data was collected between February 2021 and June 2024. I supplement this with two interviews with a NUG-MoNREC staff member, who acts as a technical advisor for the organization.

Drawing on Lund’s theory of rupture that highlights institutional renewal and competition for authority,⁹ I argue that the NUG-MoNREC’s climate and environmental initiatives are part of efforts to perform the NUG as a state¹⁰ and to afford the NUG with domestic and international legitimacy. This takes place in a highly volatile and competitive environment. On the one hand the NUG-MoNREC is defining its climate and environmental responsibility in opposition to the SAC, by blaming the military for destroying the environment and contributing to a worsening of climate change. On the other hand, the NUG-MoNREC, while developing policies and targeting its online campaigns nationwide, is only able to implement activities in areas that it nominally controls. Despite collaboration with some EROs, the NUG has little sway over climate change and environmental activities in ERO-controlled areas. This reflects the pluralism of authorities during times of rupture, but also hints at different layers of both collaboration and competition over the management of natural resources and the environment in Myanmar.

This article begins with a short overview of the theoretical use of rupture and climate change politics. I then explore how the NUG, through the NUG-MoNREC, positions itself as a state actor that acts responsibly in regards to the environment and climate change, both discursively in online spaces and in terms of activities on the ground. Finally, I address the NUG’s relations to EROs, civil society actors and the international community.

Political Rupture and Climate Change Politics

I combine Lund’s conceptualization of rupture¹¹ with what Kyed & Chambers define as “the politics of climate change”,¹² approaching this politics as a form of resistance against authoritarian rule¹³ and part of oppositional state performance.¹⁴ Lund defines ruptures as “open moments” when opportunities and risks multiply. Moments of rupture increase competitions over authority, potentially leading to profound reconfigurations of polities, institutions, norms, and prevailing social contracts.¹⁵ Ruptures, Lund suggests, are particularly propitious times for analyzing how authority is both at stake and under construction. While rupture causes negative or destructive effects, it can also be productive and transformative in various ways.¹⁶

I draw on this understanding of rupture to capture the rupturing violence and abrupt political changes in Myanmar that were ignited by the coup. During this rupture, the military continues to perpetrate numerous atrocities and threats, negatively affecting people’s everyday lives. The military also engages in the exploitation of natural resources, which is damaging the environment. However, the rupture has also mobilized various groups against the military regime, with entities such as the EROs and NUG vying for legitimate authority in opposition to the military’s SAC. These entities are trying to develop new and transformative initiatives, albeit within a context of intense, often violent, competition for power and authority.

Studies of rupture do not yet directly address how climate and environmental issues may become part of the competition for authority and reconfiguration of policies and institutions during times of political rupture. This article aims to address this by focusing on the NUG-MoNREC’s activities since April 2021, showing how climate change and environmental issues in the context of rupture can be appropriated as a form of resistance politics and state performance. As McCarthy argues, “environmental movements and politics remain both a critical front of resistance to authoritarian and populist politics in many places and one of the chief sources of visions of progressive alternatives to them”.¹⁷

There is today a growing body of literature on how Indigenous social movements across Asia, Latin America, and Africa increasingly utilize climate change and environmental issues as platforms for resisting and protesting repressive state policies. These movements often intersect with broader socio-political struggles, leveraging environmental activism to highlight systemic injustices and advocate for Indigenous rights and sovereignty, while also pushing for broader social and political change.¹⁸ There are also examples where grassroots movements and local communities leverage “environmental justice” as a platform to challenge authoritarian regimes, advocating for more democratic and inclusive approaches to environmental governance. For instance, research has shown how protests against the environmental degradation caused by oil extraction in the Niger delta were used to challenge the military government’s politics and control of resources.¹⁹ Today this resistance politics is partly pursued by drawing on global climate change language and norms and by using social media.²⁰ In Indonesia and the Philippines for instance, Indigenous social movements initially organized around resisting development projects (dams, illegal logging, and mining), thereby contesting repressive regimes and corporate actors that violated their rights. Now they draw on international climate and environmental norms and policies to raise broader issues of social injustice and exclusion, as part of critiquing the central state.²¹ Ranjbar similarly shows how environmentally destructive issues were raised by protest movements in Iran to critique the repressive state’s human rights abuses.²² As Naw Htee Ku and Hoffman show in this special issue,²³ environmental activism has been a feature of resistance to military rule in Myanmar too for decades, especially in ethnic minority areas where control over land and natural resources has long been contested.

Despite the growing attention to Indigenous-led and environmental social movements opposing states across the world, there has been less attention paid to the role played by oppositional interim governments in authoritarian military regimes or in the aftermath of military coups and how they too appropriate environmental and climate issues as resistance politics. The focus has been predominantly on non-state actors which make no claims to nationwide statehood. Furthermore, in studies of rupture there is very little attention to how climate and environmental politics can also play a role in oppositional state performance. I hope to provide a better understanding of such dynamics through my analysis of the NUG in Myanmar, showing how the NUG performs ‘stateness’ despite not being formally recognized as a state internationally.

Establishment and Development of the NUG-MoNREC

Since its establishment on 16 April 2021, the NUG-MoNREC has been addressing issues related to natural resources, the environment, and climate change as an integrated part of the NUG’s broader resistance and federalism agenda. Its minister and deputy ministers are all of ethnic nationality background, playing strong roles in their own ethnic movements and in wider resistance to the military. The NUG-MoNREC minister is Tu Hkawng, an ethnic Jinghpaw Kachin with a degree in botanical science, previously a researcher and pastor. Among holding other positions, he was the director of the Kachin Peace and Political Consultative Team, a member of the federal guiding principal taskforce for EROs, and is a member of the Kachin Political Interim Coordination Team formed on 15 March 2021.²⁴ The original deputy minister, Khun Bedu, who is ethnic Kayan, is the chair of the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force, one of the strongest Karenni resistance groups to form after the coup, and he also used to be a political candidate for the Kayan National Party. He left the deputy minister post in June 2023 to become the vice-chair of the new Interim Executive Council of Karenni State.²⁵ The new deputy minister, Hkun Saw Hpu, also ethnic Kayan, served as secretary of the Kayan literature and cultural committee and was active in demonstrations and strike activities after the coup. These leaders bring to the NUG-MoNREC experience in both ethnic affairs and military resistance.

Directly after forming the NUG-MoNREC focused on recruiting more technical personnel, mostly CDM public servants from the civilian MoNREC ministry who left after the coup. Persons from educational institutions such as the Yezin University of Forestry also joined the new NUG-MoNREC. The recruitment of CDM members was to ensure skilled staff to execute environmental monitoring, forest conservation, and natural resource management, but also to draw on their skills and knowledge in the creation of a functioning parallel government that opposes the military regime.

The NUG-MoNREC launched a website and social media platforms on 25 April 2021 to spread awareness and knowledge on environmental issues and ‘resource federalism’. One of its first campaigns involved efforts to cut off the SAC’s environmentally destructive revenue streams, such as gem and mineral extraction.²⁶ For instance, it announced in 2021 that the Myanmar Gems and Jewelry Entrepreneurs Association, which provides tax revenue to the junta, was now dissolved. The NUG also urged the international community to stop purchasing timber from the SAC, alongside the work of environmental groups like Forest Trends.²⁷

Later in 2021, the NUG-MoNREC published on its website what it calls a “people-oriented” resource and environmental management system with a vision to “establish a clean and green natural environment and a prosperous social environment.” The ministry’s mission includes severing financial and logistical ties to the SAC, collecting revenue from natural resource management, and implementing policies that prioritize conservation, biodiversity, cultural heritage, and climate resilience. The ministry’s basic principles emphasize the rights of all people, including Indigenous communities, to balance environmental conservation with economic development.²⁸ These principles are designed to ensure the equitable distribution of natural resource benefits across administrative levels and sectors. The NUG-MoNREC ties its goals to the 2021 Federal Democracy Charter, which outlines that natural resource extraction in a federal union should benefit local communities and requires their consent. It states that resource revenues should directly support local development.²⁹

In line with this vision, in 2022, the NUG-MoNREC published an “Interim Resources Management Framework” for the forestry and biodiversity sectors, aimed at preventing illegal activities, such as the production, transportation and trade of forest and biodiversity resources. It particularly highlights prohibitions on commercial logging and timber extraction by the SAC-controlled Myanmar Timber Enterprise.³⁰ The introduction to the framework states:

At the present time, there are the increased threats of uncontrolled production of natural resources by the State Administration Council (SAC), and the increased risks of illegal overexploitation of resources by the entrepreneur and business entities under the lack of rule of law in many areas. Therefore, according to the Article 22, Sub-section (b), Article 23, Sub-section (e) and Article 25, Sub-section (a) of Chapter (4) in the Federal Democracy Charter (Part II); for the tasks of the Interim National Unity Government (NUG), the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation (MONREC) enacted this framework to prevent the existing forest and biodiversity resources from being depleted and to manage the resources in a timely manner for the long-term sustainability.³¹

The NUG-MoNREC’s Interim Resources Management Framework promotes collaboration with local communities, ethnic minority groups, and EROs, supporting traditional practices like subsistence farming and shifting cultivation, while prohibiting commercial exploitation. In short, it clearly supports local and Indigenous practices, while criminalizing commercial activities, emphasizing how the SAC profits from destroying the environment.³² It furthermore stresses that cooperation with EROs and local communities is necessary to assess, monitor, and remediate the environmental and social impacts of resource extraction. The NUG has issued instructions to manage seized forest resources, ensuring their sustainable use during the current interim or revolutionary period.³³

Regarding implementation, the framework states that “notifications, instructions, and procedures will be developed and issued for the management of forest resources and biodiversity seized by the administrative bodies under the direct administration of the NUG”.³⁴ While this gives the impression of nationwide execution, representing the NUG as a national oppositional government, the framework also notes that “[i]n the areas controlled by the EROs, the policies and regulations enacted by these organizations shall be abided”.³⁵ As I will address later, this reflects how the NUG does not seek to execute control in all resistance areas, but only in their own ‘liberated areas’ in central Myanmar where they have Township Administration Bodies.

The reports and messages on its website show how the NUG-MoNREC seeks to convey itself as a state actor capable of issuing regulations and carries the same name as the NLD government ministry, and as that under the current SAC.³⁶ This state performativity, as addressed in more detail next, very much relies on the NUG-MoNREC defining itself in opposition to the SAC, highlighting its own people-centered approaches, dedication to human rights, sustainability and environmental protection, under the guise of a federal democratic charter.

Condemnation of the Military as Environmentally Destructive

The NUG-MoNREC consistently blames the SAC and previous military regimes for environmentally destructive activities and for deepening the climate crisis in its online public discussions and reports. For example, on 29 May 2023, the NUG-MoNREC held an online talk show with the NUG Minister of International Cooperation, often called Dr. Sasa, on the topic of “international cooperation for Myanmar’s natural resources and environmental protection”, strongly emphasizing the harmful impacts of the SAC’s illegal natural resource extraction on the environment. Ministers Tu Hkawng and Sasa highlighted the importance of cutting off the SAC’s revenue streams from its sale of natural resources, as this income funds purchases of arms which are then often used against civilians. Minister Sasa explained that after the SAC sells natural resources to China, it then buys weapons from China and Russia to conduct air strikes on villages. He also highlighted how the SAC’s illegal oil extraction causes pollution, which worsens the impacts of natural disasters like cyclones. He requested that foreign countries do not buy natural resources from the SAC, as in fact, he stated, these are owned by the Myanmar people. Minister Tu Hkawng said that the NUG-MoNREC is trying to block the SAC’s representatives from attending international meetings and conferences, such as the international climate-focused Conference of the Parties (COP).³⁷ Other NUG-MoNREC talk shows similarly highlight how the SAC continues to give permission to corrupt cronies to conduct illegal logging and gold mining in conflict-affected areas for the economic benefit of the SAC.³⁸

In July 2021, the NUG-MoNREC published an English language report on the “Status of Natural Resources Depletion during Military Regimes in Myanmar” detailing the depletion of forests since the first military coup of 1962, including the illegal extraction of timber. It states that a large variety of natural resources and biodiversity have been depleted due to incompetent administration and misconduct including successive leaders using natural resources to enrich themselves.³⁹ The report also draws on international research to criticize the SAC and highlight the importance of protecting Myanmar’s forests, including two publications by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA). One of these states:

The military coup could bring Myanmar back to those days when the forests were being tremendously devastated by the military dictatorship, and the current coup creates significant risks that the timber trade is financing human rights violations.⁴⁰

The other EIA publication shows how the Myanmar military is receiving significant cash flows from its post-coup illegal timber trade, but also points out that illegal logging and trading with China has long been pursued, including during the quasi-democratic period.⁴¹ The NUG-MoNREC report quotes researcher Ben Heubl claiming “[s]atellite images show evidence suggesting that Myanmar’s recent coup d’état increased the risk of unsustainable deforestation in the country”.⁴² According to the NUG, Heubl’s research shows that the SAC benefits from selling timber to neighboring countries, including from illegal harvesting in Alaungdaw Kathapha National Park, a protected Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) heritage site. The NUG-MoNREC report also cites researcher Eoghan Darbyshire: “Unregulated selling of timber resources looks like pouring the water on the sand for all reforms made by the quasi-democracy government”.⁴³

While strongly criticizing the military’s SAC for depleting forests, the NUG-MoNREC report celebrates the gains achieved during the NLD’s term of government, such as international cooperation on implementing the Myanmar Reforestation and Rehabilitation Program. For example, the report states that the nationwide deforestation rate was under control, and forest cover increased in some states/regions between the years 2016-2021.⁴⁴ This positive assessment is somewhat modified at the end of the report, when it states that the military still impeded progress when the NLD was in government, including by sponsoring illegal logging. The report calls for a new system where people “manage their own resources in their own way by collectively conquering such challenges or hindrances” caused by the practices of military leaders.⁴⁵ Through this report, the NUG-MoNREC not only defines itself in opposition to the military regime, but also as different from the NLD government period by highlighting people-centered natural resource management and federalism.

In December 2022, the NUG-MoNREC published a report in Burmese about the destruction of Myanmar’s natural resources during military rule, especially focusing on minerals and gems. Highlighting elite self-interests and corruption, it blames the military for 60 years of mismanagement of natural resources counter to the interests of the people. It further states that the country’s natural resources are not benefiting the country, but only a small group of people in positions of power.⁴⁶

As we can see from these examples, the NUG-MoNREC’s criticism of the military for its environmentally destructive activities and its attempts to define itself in opposition to them relies on the support of international research, environmental activists like Kheh Thoo, and protest leaders like Ester Wah.⁴⁷ Next, I examine how the NUG-MoNREC conducts campaigns through a politics of resistance against the military.

NUG-MoNREC Environmental and Climate Campaigns

The principal ways that the NUG-MoNREC engages with the public and disseminates its messages and initiatives is through online communication, including live talk shows and other posts on Facebook, and sharing information such as newsletters on its website. These center on creating awareness about environment and wildlife conservation, climate change, and biodiversity. The NUG-MoNREC performs itself as a state to the public through digital mediums as it does not have a centralized physical presence.

The Facebook live talk shows typically include the participation of invited guests from the resistance movement, and aside from sharing knowledge about environmental and climate issues, these talks also center on articulating resistance to military dictatorship. In a NUG-MoNREC talk show held on 8 May 2022 titled “Is it necessary to preserve the environment during the revolution?”, a well-known resistance actor and CDM military captain featured on the show.⁴⁸ Participants discussed the concept of environmental conservation, its importance, and factors impacting the environment. They highlighted that environmental damage has escalated due to the SAC granting illegal permits for logging and gold mining, financially benefiting SAC. Their main messages to the public were to reduce plastic pollution, dispose of waste systematically, avoid illegal natural resource extraction, and prevent bush and forest fires to protect the environment.

For another talk show held on 6 November 2022, titled “Should climate action be taken during the revolution?”, the NUG-MoNREC invited a Myanmar environmental activist and a Korea-based moderator.⁴⁹ This session focused on climate change, man-made impacts, and damage to natural resources following the coup. While the talk involved discussions on ways to reduce plastic use, encouraging people to adopt the 3 R’s (Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle) in their daily lives, a lot of the talk was focused on criticizing the SAC for contributing to climate change due to exploitation of natural resources and lawlessness. One discussant said that the SAC’s MoNREC is not interested in preventing climate change and is failing to act against illegal logging and deforestation. As a result, deforestation has increased since the coup, exacerbating climate change. The moderator also said:

Now, we (the people) are suffering from the impact of climate change as well as the political crisis. Therefore, we must try to escape quickly from the military dictatorship. We must take climate change action for a peaceful and beautiful future world.

The NUG-MoNREC also uses Facebook to encourage activities on the ground and to present itself as an environmentally caring and climate-friendly ministry. This often involves criticizing the military dictatorship in a less direct, but more action-oriented manner. Examples include celebrations of international days, such as World Environment Day.

On this day in 2021, covert tree planting activities were conducted in different regions to honor 845 heroes who died during the first year of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution.⁵⁰ The NUG-MoNREC’s Facebook page published posts about tree-planting campaigns for environmental conservation and climate change protection in resistance-held areas of Karen, Chin and Shan states, and Tanintharyi, Magway, and Sagaing regions. On the same day in 2022, 200 trees were planted in Min Hla Township, Magway Region in honor of revolutionary heroes from PDFs who had died.⁵¹ In 2023 the NUG-MoNREC launched a campaign encouraging people to “beat plastic pollution and fight to root out the dictatorship.”⁵² On the same day it launched the tawhlan thitpin, which was led by the Dawna Column Htout Phoet group(htout phoet refers to ‘People’s Revolution Supply Family’) with the support of the NUG-MoNREC. As part of this campaign, local and international people were encouraged to ‘buy a plant’ for 10,000 Myanmar Kyat to support reforestation. The revolutionary tree campaign achieved donations of 20,000 plants.⁵³ In 2024 the NUG’s theme for World Environment Day was “Our land, our future. We are Generation Restoration”,⁵⁴ focusing on recreating the earth by planting new trees, conserving existing trees, and maintaining soil quality. There was also an online essay competition and lectures were given on the day about the importance of environmental knowledge and of reducing plastic pollution, including tree-planting activities by students attending online education provided by the NUG. A Facebook post also mentioned that employees of the NUG-MoNREC planted a total of 200 new trees in liberated areas to commemorate World Environment Day.⁵⁵ See figures 1-8 below for images taken from these campaigns.

Figure 1
Photo from a NUG-MonREC Facebook post depicting secret tree planting in Mandalay Region in 2021.⁵⁶

Figure 2
Graphic from a NUG-MonREC Facebook post encouraging the public to plant trees to honor resistance forces and fallen comrades for 2021 World Environment Day.⁵⁷

Figure 3
Photo collage from a NUG-MonREC Facebook post depicting tree planting by a PDF in Magway Region in 2022.⁵⁸

Figure 4
Graphic from a 2023 NUG-MonREC Facebook post encouraging participation in the tawhlan thitpin campaign.⁵⁹

Figure 5
Photo from a NUG-MonREC Facebook post depicting tree planting activities in Sagaing Region in 2024.⁶⁰

Figure 6
Photo from a NUG-MonREC Facebook post depicting tree planting activities for 2022 World Environment Day.⁶¹

Figure 7
Photo from a NUG-MonREC Facebook post depicting a lecture held in conjunction with tree planting to commemorate 2024 World Environment Day.⁶²

According to a NUG-MoNREC newsletter, tree-planting initiatives in areas liberated by and connected to the NUG were organized openly as early as 2023, including during the celebration of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s 78th birthday.⁶³ Figure 8 shows how on that day in Myinmu Township, Sagaing District, the NUG’s district-level security group, township and district administrative bodies, and township-level natural resource management group, planted 1,500 different kinds of shady trees across five villages together with teachers and students. The newsletter emphasized that these activities facilitated by the NUG were highly effective for environmental protection. It noted that the tree planting got children, youth, local communities, and PDFs involved in environmental conservation, highlighting the significance of such efforts during the revolutionary period. It also stressed the importance of these activities in helping youth and children understand the role of tree planting in mitigating climate change and creating a healthier environment for their communities in the future.

Figure 8
Photo collage from a NUG-MonREC Facebook post depicting tree planting activities on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s 78^th birthday in Myinmu Township, Sagaing Region.⁶⁴

The evolution of NUG-MoNREC’s tree planting campaigns, from being initially done only covertly, to then being done openly in liberated areas, reflects how the NUG-MoNREC has increased its presence through CDM staff and the establishment of NUG-linked administrative structures on the ground. This enables the NUG-MoNREC to perform the state not only online, but also through concrete activities in person, in collaboration with local communities. Notably, this is taking place through at least indirect competition with the SAC, which as Nway Kant Kaw shows, is also showcasing its care for the environment through ceremonial tree-planting activities in SAC-controlled towns.⁶⁵

The NUG-MoNREC’s monthly Burmese-language newsletters try to create environmental and climate awareness, showcase NUG-MoNREC activities, and cover topics like raising monetary support for CDM staff, seizures of illegal timber, messages from the minister, cartoons, and poems. They feature articles on the celebrations of international days which concern the environment, the impacts of climate change, the importance of environmental conservation, how to prevent environmental degradation, the problems associated with deforestation, the extinction of wildlife and biodiversity, declining freshwater reserves, and how to tackle climate-related disasters.

For example, the newsletter highlights an article by environmental activist Nan May Thu Aung in which she writes, “The Mocha storm hit in May 2023 and there are still many states that have not yet received any response until now. It is known that Rakhine State suffered the worst from the storm.”⁶⁶ The newsletter also reproduced a Burmese translation of a university paper by the same author, where she discussed human rights, emphasizing how the SAC’s delays in responding to floods, landslides, droughts and cyclones, and lack of assistance in reconstruction management, violate civil and collective rights.⁶⁷ She emphasized abnormal weather conditions and pointed out the severe impact of climate change on the major rivers in Myanmar. These climate-induced disasters adversely affect agricultural activities for farmers and fishermen.⁶⁸ In another article she wrote about “Preparedness to respond to climate change”⁶⁹ and encouraged the public to be self-reliant during the current political situation. Among the various violations conducted since the military coup, she argued that the ban on environmental activism and the abuse of international relief materials violate human rights. Therefore, she suggested, it is necessary to implement personal changes to try and respond and prepare for natural disasters during the revolution.⁷⁰

The NUG-MoNREC newsletter articles often refer to how global information can help the situation in Myanmar, especially when they feature international days of commemoration. For example, on 29 June 2024, the newsletter stated that the United Nations (UN) General Assembly had declared that 29 June of each year was International Day of the Tropics to honor the first report on the tropics released in 2014 by Myanmar’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.⁷¹ On the International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment during War and Armed Conflict, the NUG-MoNREC wrote:

The cities devastated during the battle are the symbol of humanity. The occupations of people, fallen or injured soldiers; despite the fact that only the victims of war—citizens, for example—have been mentioned, the environment has frequently continued to suffer from conflict. The repercussions of military and conflict include contaminated water wells, burned crops, destroyed forests, poisoned soil, and slaughtered animals.

It continued by mentioning how conflict is linked to the extraction of scarce natural resources like water and agricultural land as well as valuable natural resources like oil and gold. “So, the UN General Assembly decided that 6 November each year has been set as a day to commemorate the prevention of overexploitation of the natural environment during war and conflict.”⁷² In these ways the NUG-MoNREC is also linking itself to the UN and its global and climate agendas.

The NUG-MoNREC also uses art such as poems to highlight the brutality of the SAC in its newsletters. For example, poet Eain Moe wrote about the brutal treatment people suffer from military abuses, describing horrific acts such as soldiers cutting off people’s hands and feet and then mockingly telling them they can “play and run,” or severing tongues and then asking them to “sing and laugh.” It portrays the military’s cruelty and their so-called ‘generosity’ as they exist comfortably with their brutal actions.⁷³ Cartoons in the newsletter also depict the impact of the military’s destructive environmental activities, the vulnerability of people to climate change (see figures 9 and 10), and try to encourage people to protect the environment. Some also explicitly criticize the military. For example, figure 9 illustrates how the military has not only killed many people since the coup through what they refer to as ‘genocide’ but also illegally exploited natural resources and destroyed the environment, through ‘ecocide’.

Figure 9
A cartoon by cartoonist Sapphire featured in the NUG-MoNREC newsletter and posted on Facebook on 29 February 2024.⁷⁴

Figure 10
A drawing by cartoonist Sapphire featured in the NUG-MoNREC newsletter and posted on Facebook on 31 August 2023.⁷⁵

Part of my analysis of the NUG-MoNREC’s online posts and newsletters involved examining Facebook comments, ‘likes,’ and social media account ‘follows.’ This was a difficult task. While NUG-MoNREC’s Facebook page has over 151,000 followers and had received over 139,000 likes by 20 September 2024, posts usually receive only few comments and are sometimes later hidden from view. When comment lists are visible, they are often very brief. For instance, the post about tree planting on World Environment Day in 2024 had just one comment, six shares and 78 likes.⁷⁶ There are some exceptions, however. For instance, on 3 December 2021, the NUG-MoNREC Facebook page asserted in a post that “Myanmar is facing climate change impacts and many dangers after the coup.” This post received six comments disparaging the SAC, for instance referring to illegal overextraction of jade in Hpakant being a result of military impunity. Another Facebook post titled the “Status of Natural Resources Depletion During the Military Regimes in Myanmar” received 21 comments critical of the SAC, with users writing, “The cronies have devoured the country’s resources under various names,” “Armies are thieves,” and “Bombing by air strike also destroys the environment.” On 21 June 2021, the NUG-MoNREC Facebook page posted that PDFs had prevented timber smuggling from the Alaungdaw Kathapha National Park. All 36 comments on that post criticized the SAC’s timber smuggling. One comment read: “Let’s all come together to prevent the smuggling of the timbers into the hands of China.”

It is difficult to know how influential the NUG-MoNREC’s online activities are. However, NUG-MoNREC representations of climate and environmental issues are inseparable from its deeper critique of military rule and actions committed by the military. This climate change politics of resistance is central to how the NUG-MoNREC defines itself as an alternative state ministry that cares for the environment. Next, I address how the NUG-MoNREC has tried to go beyond representation, by acting on the ground to affect forestry, logging, tree planting, and more.

Deforestation and Actions Against Illegal Logging

The NUG-MoNREC has made efforts to implement its Interim Resource Management Framework⁷⁷ in liberated areas where the NUG has an administrative presence, especially in Sagaing Region, and then to a lesser extent in Magway and Mandalay regions. Implementation is through Township Administrative Bodies for Natural Resources (TAB-NRs), which were first set up under the NUG’s Township Administrative Bodies (TABs) in liberated areas of Sagaing Region. The NUG-MoNREC provides technical support to TAB-NRs to ensure effective management of natural resources in the current period and for a future federal democratic system. According to interviews with NUG-MoNREC technical staff, activities have so far covered efforts to monitor deforestation and illegal extraction activities.⁷⁸ For forest conservation, some TABs have also requested seedlings to plant in riverbank areas to prevent flooding. Additionally, the NUG-MoNREC promotes the use of electric stoves to reduce the reliance on firewood for cooking, as many internally displaced persons currently use forest wood for fuel.

In a report from October 2022, the NUG-MoNREC details how it has been facilitating capacity building for 17 CDM staff in Sagaing Region in collaboration with TAB-NRs to collect on-the- ground data on deforestation. This pilot project received international funding and was conducted with support from Global Forest Watch, which trained NUG-MoNREC staff in using its platform for deforestation alerts. This platform integrates data from the University of Maryland, NASA’s Landsat satellites, the European Space Agency, and Wageningen University. The project recorded 22,607 deforestation alerts from 1 February 2021 to 13 October 2022, particularly in the central areas of Sagaing Region, including Kalay, Hkamti, and Mawlaik, among others, confirming that deforestation had expanded since the coup. The report highlights how the use of near-real-time deforestation alerts can help inform TAB-NRs to better assess the direct and indirect causes of deforestation and to make informed decisions and take actions for forest conservation. It also encourages local communities, PDFs, and CSOs to collaborate to manage natural resources sustainably.⁷⁹

Concerning illegal logging, TAB-NRs collaborate with local PDFs to take actions drawing on the NUG-MoNREC’s interim procedures and instructions. If timber smugglers for instance steal teak or other kinds of forest products in NUG-administrated areas, TAB-NRs apply interim procedures to resolve the case. This includes tax collection and fines for smaller cases (like carrying timber by motorbike). For bigger cases, like illegal timber carried by businessmen, the timber is seized by the TAB-NR and is then used as humanitarian aid to rebuild houses that are burnt down by the military. Some funds from illegal logging are also used for covering the costs of trainings about climate change, constitutional change, and the monitoring of illegal activities in Sagaing Region.⁸⁰ This information was confirmed by interviews and in the NUG-MoNREC newsletters. The taxation and seizure of timber is allegedly done with the help of the security and resistance groups that have developed after the coup, including village-level local security groups (pyithu karkwoiye aphwet / pa ka pha),⁸¹ local police forces (pa la pha,), PDFs, and LDFs. These groups have established numerous checkpoints along roads across anyar⁸² to control and tax commercial trade, as well as to cut off supplies for the military.⁸³ However, how this is done in relation to timber, and how much timber is taxed and seized by these groups is unknown.

According to a NUG-MoNREC staff member, it is difficult to implement activities and procedures and there are numerous challenges due to the volatile and insecure situation on the ground. He said that in the NUG’s liberated areas “we have a lot of work because we have limited resource persons to implement our tasks.”⁸⁴ Also, collaboration with local administrative bodies is difficult because they are often mobile and more focused on their fight against the military regime. Even though the NUG-MoNREC has standard operating procedures, the interviewee described that it is difficult to monitor environmental destruction and go into the field, but they try as much as they can to collaborate with local communities and CDM staff on the ground. The military’s frequent internet cuts also create challenges, as most training and communication by the NUG-MoNREC relies on online platforms. Another core challenge is that the NUG-MoNREC lacks formal international funding for their projects. It is hard to access international aid so long as they are not formally recognized as a government as much climate funding goes through bilateral loans.⁸⁵

In addition, while the NUG-MoNREC’s policies are nationwide, its actions have been limited to NUG-liberated areas in anyar. In other areas, especially those with more ethnic minority communities, it is rather the policies and rules of EROs that are applied, in various ways. This reflects the pluralism of authorities in Myanmar, where the NUG is only one among many groups performing statehood and engaging in natural resource management.⁸⁶ However, limited forms of collaboration between the NUG and other actors are also occurring, as I address next.

NUG-MoNREC Collaboration with Indigenous Groups and EROs

The NUG-MoNREC staff members I interviewed said that the ministry does not interfere in EROs’ natural resource management, or climate and environmental initiatives, but they do try to coordinate with them.⁸⁷ One said, “our policy is not to interfere with the EROs, but if they need it, we would like to support them. We need to collaborate with them.” He went on to say that there are no on-the-ground collaborative activities at present, but exchanges of knowledge, experiences, and policies about climate, environment, and natural resources have been conducted online.⁸⁸ According to a spokesperson, the NUG-MoNREC has reached out to the Karen National Union (KNU), the ERO best known for having strong environmental policies and taking action on climate change.⁸⁹

For instance, in November 2023 an official from the KNU met with the minister of NUG-MoNREC to talk about climate change in Myanmar.⁹⁰ Earlier that year, the NUG-MoNREC also invited Padoh Mahn Ba Tun from the KNU’s Forestry Department to present a live Facebook talk together with the NUG-MoNREC Minister for World Environment Day. Padoh Mahn Ba Tun talked about the importance of preserving the forests not only during this revolutionary period but also after the revolution and about the importance of preserving traditional Indigenous Karen environmental and forestry practices.⁹¹

He said, “if we do revolution, we have to depend on good forest and good environment,” adding that the KNU was able to survive and stand strong for many years because there were good forests, “but now (after the coup) we can see the opposite forest situation.” He noted further:

We (Karen people) and the forest management department must preserve the forest for future generations. Indigenous Karen people have understood how to live with the forest, how to maintain and how to protect the forest, to use the forest products, to avoid harming wildlife and so forth for thousands of years. Establishing (the KNU forestry department) isn’t just about getting money. It’s also to conserve the forest. Forest conservation is so important during revolutionary periods.

In this video, the NUG-MoNREC Minister also discussed the ministry’s activities, such as planting trees on World Environment Day, raising awareness about forest and environmental conservation, holding essay competitions in a school opened by the NUG’s Ministry of Education, and the creation of the NUG-MoNREC Resource Management Committee. He said:

We must cooperate with ethnic people on natural resource and environmental conservation. As a government, we must give space for them to speak out and we must consider ethnic people’s traditions, practiced by their ancestors on the forest, when we develop forest and environmental policies.⁹²

What the video show illustrates is that the NUG-MoNREC is open to learning about the forestry actions and laws of the KNU and the traditional practices of ethnic nationalities. This is in contrast to other ruling regimes before the 2021 coup, including the NLD government.⁹³

Another example of engagement with ethnic organizations can be seen from a live Facebook talk show held on 30 December 2022, when the then-deputy minister from NUG-MoNREC, Khun Bedu, who is ethnic Kayan, appeared together with a representative from the Chin National Consultative Council. The topic was “Biodiversity preservation during interim periods and beyond the Spring Revolution.” They discussed the reduction in biodiversity in the ethnic states and how to avoid killing rare animals during the revolutionary period. They said there are local birds for sale on Facebook and at local markets. This shows that people lack knowledge about biodiversity conservation. The talk show aimed to raise local people’s awareness of the importance of preserving biodiversity and ecosystems. As noted, Khun Bedu left the NUG-MoNREC to chair the Interim Executive Council (IEC) of Karenni State. In an article in Frontier, he highlighted that the IEC often coordinates with the NUG, but that a clear power-sharing agreement has not yet been created, and for now the NUG should not impose their administration on Karenni State. He noted, for example, that the NUG shares their budget with the IEC and the IEC implements projects effectively. “We have a good mechanism so far,” he said, adding that, “this is the beginning of federalism in Burma.”⁹⁴ Again this reflects how each ethnic region manages its own affairs, but in the Karenni case with a degree of collaboration with the NUG.

In general, the impression is that the NUG has good connections with Karenni, Chin and Karen organizations. It is also noticeable that both the original deputy ministers of the NUG-MoNREC were from Karenni State. Some connections have also been established with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). According to an Independent People’s News’ Facebook post on 1 April 2024, there is an agreement between the NUG and KIO to extract 818 tons of timber from Banmauk Township.⁹⁵ It is unclear if this agreement adheres to the interim framework prohibiting commercial logging. One critical comment was attached to the Facebook post at the time of viewing, reflecting how local people do not accept timber extraction from their community: “They ignore the disagreement from most of the locals. All of the timber will be sold to China.” It remains to be seen if this case is representative for how the NUG-MoNREC collaborates with EROs or whether the NUG will adhere to its promise of people-centered resource management by allocating the money from sales of timber to humanitarian aid and the wider revolution.

The NUG-MoNREC has also engaged with some NGOs and Indigenous CSOs. This includes the Karen Environmental and Social Action Network (KESAN), the main Karen organization that works on climate change and environmental conservation, which is focused on supporting Karen Indigenous communities and knowledge. KESAN has helped the NUG-MoNREC to draft a federal natural resource policy. They have also shared their knowledge on forestry and biodiversity conservation in the Salween Peace Park and provided the NUG-MoNREC with on-the-ground experiences and information. This could be seen as another illustration of the NUG-MoNREC trying to be much more inclusive of ethnic views and practices, in contrast to the 2016-2021 NLD government. It also has an international appeal, as noted by the NUG-MoNREC staff member I interviewed: “We are also collaborating with the Indigenous groups, because they have a channel to the UN.”⁹⁶ Here, he was referring to the All Burma Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance, and Promotion of Indigenous and Nature Together, which both attended the COP summits in 2021 and 2023 on Indigenous panels, as well as the biodiversity COP in 2022—an attendance record not yet achieved by the NUG. I now turn to this international dimension.

International Performance and Recognition

The NUG-MoNREC has tried to position itself as a responsible climate change actor in the international arena. This can be seen as part of the NUG’s wider calls for recognition as the legitimate government of Myanmar. Already in July 2021 the NUG-MoNREC shared an announcement for “International Cooperation in the Fields of Natural Resources and Environment,” encouraging partnerships with and funding from international agencies to implement climate change actions. In the announcement, it mentioned that Myanmar (prior to the coup) was a responsible party in the fields of ozone protection, waste management and pollution control, biodiversity, ecosystem conservation and climate change. It also mentioned that Myanmar had access to global climate funds. It urged the international community to suspend any communications with the SAC and instead engage the NUG. ⁹⁷ Furthermore, the NUG-MoNREC’s six-month progress report stated that the NUG called for information meetings with international bodies like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan and Korea, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Global Environment Facility, and the UN Environment Program, to encourage collaboration in the fields of natural resources and environmental management.⁹⁸ After Cyclone Mocha in May 2023, the NUG’s Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management (NUG-MoHADM) also called for urgent international action to support local Myanmar organizations (not the SAC) for humanitarian and emergency responses.⁹⁹

The NUG has also tried to engage the international community to be recognized as Myanmar’s representative to the COP summits, and as a mode of resistance to the military junta. Before COP 26 in 2021, the NUG submitted Myanmar’s 2022-2030 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), developed in 2020 under the NLD government, to the secretariat of the UNFCCC.¹⁰⁰ The acting president of the NUG, Duwa Lashi La, also sent special messages to COP 26, COP 27 and COP 28, addressed to the UNFCCC, about Myanmar’s vulnerability to climate change and the NUG’s commitments to the NDC inherited from the previous NLD government.

For COP 26, Duwa Lashi La’s message highlighted that the NDC is intended to increase the adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities and sectors so that they are resilient to the adverse impacts of climate change. He also assured that it aimed to create and maximize opportunities to pursue a low-carbon growth pathway by ensuring development benefits to communities and all economic sectors. Simultaneously, he sent the message that the NDC submitted by the military regime for COP 26, “is merely a document that will never see the daylight of implementation.” He assured that the NUG’s commitment was by contrast firm and he also requested the UNFCCC to recognize the NUG and its legitimacy while denying it to the military’s SAC.¹⁰¹ At COP 26, representatives from the Myanmar junta were blocked from attending.¹⁰² This was due to protests by CSOs, which the NUG-MoNREC supported. It was seen as a victory by the anti-coup resistance movement.¹⁰³ However, the NUG was also not permitted to send a delegation, because it has not achieved international recognition as a state. In response, the NUG Deputy Foreign Minister told Radio Free Asia that “Our government was formed on behalf of the people. Therefore, UN officials should recognize our government’s representation and allow us to attend such major conferences.”¹⁰⁴ No official state representative to Myanmar has been present at the COPs since the 2021 coup, because the NUG is not regarded internationally as a state, while at the same time the SAC is still seen as illegitimate by the UN system.

In his message to COP 27, NUG’s acting president highlighted the collapse of the rule of law and the illegal overexploitation of natural resources following the military coup. The message condemned the SAC for burning civilian villages, arguing that this significantly contributes to global climate change. It drew a contrast with reforestation activities of the NUG and mentioned how EROs are crucial to implementing the NDCs since many forested areas fall under their jurisdiction. He further stated that in collaboration with EROs, the NUG is carrying out climate change mitigation and adaptation activities and implementing people-centered conservation initiatives in line with the Federal Democratic Charter. He also said that the NUG warmly invites all community-based organizations, CSOs, and Indigenous peoples to collaborate: “The goal is to achieve a sustainable low-carbon environment for current and future generations while addressing the crisis and hardships faced by the people of Myanmar.”¹⁰⁵

The NUG’s message to COP 28 reiterated how theNUG is deeply aware of the devastating impacts of climate change that Myanmar is vulnerable to, made worse by the criminal actions of the military junta. The message continued that the NUG and EROs are rapidly expanding their territorial control and administration, enabling responsible stewardship of the environment and implementation of climate commitments towards achieving the sustainable development goals.¹⁰⁶ The NUG’s appeal to COP 28 was supported by UN experts, Thomas Andrew and David Boyd, who requested world leaders to focus on the situation in Myanmar, due to its vulnerability to climate change. According to BBC Burmese, the two UN experts said that the military coup not only poses risks to human rights and humanitarian needs, but also increases people’s vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.¹⁰⁷

The NUG has also tried to be recognized as the legitimate government of Myanmar by ASEAN and other countries in the region, for instance, by being invited to meetings as the country’s representative. The NUG-MoNREC Minister was invited in late 2021 to the “Third Climate Smart and Disaster Resilient ASEAN” conference as the minister to represent Myanmar for the first time, while the SAC was excluded. The article argued that “this move is a significant sign that the 10-member grouping is starting to officially engage with the NUG.”¹⁰⁸ However, since this meeting back in 2021, ASEAN and China have, as discussed by Nway Kant Kaw in this special issue, invited the SAC instead of NUG-MoNREC representatives to climate and environment meetings.¹⁰⁹ International recognition, in addition to funding, remains a challenge for the NUG-MoNREC, despite its efforts to address climate and environmental issues in Myanmar.

Conclusion

This article’s analysis of the NUG-MoNREC’s attempts to convey its vision, frameworks, and actions on climate change, environmental issues, and natural resource management, both in online fora and on the ground, shows how these are examples of the politics of climate change during times of political rupture. The rupture, caused by the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, reflects a situation where authority and statehood are profoundly contested and pluralized, and where new frameworks emerge amid violence and destruction. This period has seen the NUG-MoNREC leveraging climate change and environmental protection as part of its wider resistance against the military junta. This is partly done by framing the SAC as environmentally destructive and exploitative of natural resources, while defining the NUG-MoNREC as caring for the environment and the people.

In contrast to the SAC’s actions, the NUG has sought to establish transformative environmental and natural resource frameworks that emphasize people-centered approaches, federalism, and recognition of ethnic and Indigenous practices. In doing so it is distinguishing itself from not only previous military regimes, but also the state-centric pre-coup NLD government’s climate and environmental policies, as Mosberg details in this special issue.¹¹⁰ It also emphasizes collaborations with EROs, and judging from its NUG-MoNREC’s online talk shows, it is best connected with Karen, Chin, and Karenni groups.

On the ground, the NUG-MoNREC has tried to counter the SAC and its affiliated businesses from engaging in the illegal timber trade. It is taxing and fining timber traders with the help of local resistance groups, PDFs, and LDFs. This relies on the NUG-MoNREC’s newly established township level administrative bodies in NUG-liberated areas. It has also urged international actors to refrain from doing business with the SAC. These efforts mirror global trends where environmental politics increasingly serve as platforms for opposing authoritarian regimes by grassroots movements and CSOs.¹¹¹ The NUG-MoNREC, however, presents a unique case, as its resistance politics of leveraging climate change and environmental issues is also part of performing statehood. Not only does the NUG-MoNREC mirror the pre-coup government’s ministerial name, it also performs activities like tree-planting on World Days, issues national policies, and sets up administrative bodies for natural resource management—just as the SAC does and previous regimes did before the coup.¹¹² It therefore draws on “languages of stateness”¹¹³ rather than simply leveraging climate change and environmental issues as part of resisting the state. It tries to perform the state in opposition and as an alternative to the SAC and previous regimes. These enactments, I suggest, center on gaining domestic and international legitimacy and recognition. The NUG’s engagement with global climate agendas, including attempts to participate in the UN COP summits and sending messages to the UNFCC, for instance, illustrates its attempts to position itself as a responsible state actor on the international stage.

Despite these efforts, the NUG faces multiple challenges. It is difficult for the NUG-MoNREC to fully implement its policies on the ground nationwide due to the NUG’s limited administrative presence, concentrated as it is in Sagaing and Magway regions. In other areas, EROs and local PDFs play more prominent roles in governance, reflecting how the NUG is operating in an arena of plural authority, where forms of collaboration coexist with competition and different interests. The NUG has also struggled to secure international recognition and funding. As Chambers & Kyed highlight,¹¹⁴ most global climate change funding is channeled through state entities, creating additional barriers for the NUG in accessing necessary resources and gaining international support. Finally, it is difficult to assess how effective and widespread NUG-MoNREC’s online campaigns are, and to what extent climate and environmental issues are conceived as priorities during the current rupture, where people are facing immense insecurities and livelihood constraints.¹¹⁵ The ministry’s Facebook page has around 150,000 followers, which is a small number, when compared to the Myanmar population. It is also important to acknowledge that many environmental activists remain skeptical of the NUG-MoNREC’s commitment to ethnic and Indigenous rights, given their previous history of centralized decision-making under the NLD government. Nevertheless, this case study does show how climate change politics can be leveraged by oppositional state entities as part of broader resistance struggles for authority and state-recognition during times of profound political rupture.

Endnotes

¹ Moe Thuzar & Htet Myet Min Tun, 2022, p. 3.
² Moe Thuzar & Htet Myet Min Tun, 2022.
³ LDFs are local resistance groups that occasionally collaborate with other autonomous defense groups, while PDFs are by now mostly under the NUG’s Ministry of Defense (Nyana et al., 2024, p. 224).
⁴ Jacquet, 2024, p. 17.
⁵ Nyana et al., 2024, pp. 203, 225.
⁶ Jolliffe, 2023.
⁷ The SAC has its own Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, so I apply the NUG prefix to the acronym to differentiate it.
⁸ See Nway Kant Kaw (2026) [this issue] for an analysis of the SAC-MoNREC.
⁹ Lund, 2016.
¹⁰ The Acting President of the NUG explicitly stated in an interview that while some stakeholders “don’t exactly recognize the NUG as a central government, we are performing as one” (Lovatt & Salai Johnny, 2025).
¹¹ Lund, 2016.
¹² Kyed & Chambers, 2026 [this issue].
¹³ McCarthy, 2020, p. 2.
¹⁴ Hansen & Stepputat, 2001.
¹⁵ Lund, 2016, p. 1203.
¹⁶ Also see the work of Ahmann (2018), Holbraad et al. (2019), and Holloway et al. (2009).
¹⁷ McCarthy, 2020, p. 2.
¹⁸ For example, see Ulloa, 2017.
¹⁹ Obi, 2010; Watts, 2004.
²⁰ Lupien et al., 2024; Manaysay, 2020.
²¹ Manaysay, 2020.
²² Ranjbar, 2023.
²³ Naw Htee Ku & Hoffman, 2026 [this issue].
²⁴ See the NUG’s website for more information on Tu Hkawng (NUG-MoNREC, 2021b).
²⁵ “Q&A: Karenni leader”, 2023.
²⁶ Luu, 2022.
²⁷ Forest Trends has played a key role in highlighting the issues of international buyers purchasing timber from Myanmar, with data on their website (Forest Trends, 2024).
²⁸ For more on this, see the ministry’s website (NUG-MoNREC, 2021c).
²⁹ Hickey & Maria-Sube, 2022.
³⁰ NUG-MoNREC, 2022a, p. 2.
³¹ NUG-MoNREC, 2022a, p. 2
³² NUG-MoNREC, 2022a, p. 5.
³³ NUG-MoNREC, 2022a, p. 6. Also see Hickey & Maria-Sube (2022).
³⁴ NUG-MoNREC, 2022a, p. 6.
³⁵ NUG-MoNREC, 2022a, p. 5.
³⁶ See Nway Kant Kaw, 2026 [this issue].
³⁷Ministry of Natural Resources, 2023a.
³⁸Ministry of Natural Resources, 2022a; 2022c.
³⁹ NUG-MoNREC, 2021a, pp. 1, 2.
⁴⁰ NUG-MoNREC, 2021a, p. 2.
⁴¹ NUG-MoNREC, 2021a, p. 13.
⁴² NUG-MoNREC, 2021a, p. 12.
⁴³ NUG-MoNREC, 2021a, pp. 12, 13.
⁴⁴ NUG-MoNREC, 2021a, pp. 4, 5.
⁴⁵ NUG-MoNREC, 2021a, p. 23.
⁴⁶ သယံဇာတနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ၂၀၂၂။
⁴⁷ Wah, 2022.
⁴⁸ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2022a.
⁴⁹ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2022c.
⁵⁰ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2021a.
⁵¹ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2022b.
⁵² Ministry of Natural Resources, 2023b.
⁵³ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2021a.
⁵⁴ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2024c.
⁵⁵ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2024b.
⁵⁶ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2021a.
⁵⁷ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2021b.
⁵⁸ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2022e.
⁵⁹ Htout Phoet – ထောက်ပို့၊ 2023.
⁶⁰ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2024d.
⁶¹ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2021f.
⁶² Ministry of Natural Resources, 2021f.
⁶³ NUG-MoNREC, 2023a.
⁶⁴ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2023c.
⁶⁵ See Nway Kant Kaw (2026) [this issue].
⁶⁶ For more on the impact of Cyclone Mocha, see Chambers et al. (2026) [this issue].
⁶⁷ NUG-MoNREC’s, 2023d.
⁶⁸ NUG-MoNREC’s, 2023e.
⁶⁹ NUG-MoNREC, 2023f.
⁷⁰ NUG-MoNREC, 2023f.
⁷¹ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2024e.
⁷² Ministry of Natural Resources, 2022d.
⁷³ NUG-MoNREC, 2023c.
⁷⁴ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2024a.
⁷⁵ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2024d.
⁷⁶ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2024b.
⁷⁷ NUG-MoNREC, 2022a.
⁷⁸ NUG-MoNREC staff member, personal communication, March 14, 2023; November 30, 2023.
⁷⁹ NUG-MoNREC, 2022b.
⁸⁰ NUG-MoNREC staff member, personal communication, March 14, 2023; November 30, 2023.
⁸¹ Pa ka pha deal with security matters for a village or village tract. They areusually composed of local youths and activists who improvise community security with mostly handmade or light weapons (Nyana et al., 2024).
⁸²Anyar refers to the central dry zone of the country, which encompasses parts of Sagaing, Magway, and Mandalay regions (Nyana et al., 2024).
⁸³ Nyana et al. (2024, pp. 228-229) report that taxation by associated groups at such checkpoints is mostly done in accordance with the NUG’s regulations. They reference a respondent in Sagaing Region who explained the revenue management for their township: 30 percent of taxes are reserved for the NUG and 70 percent is designated for investments in local services and infrastructure such as health, education, humanitarian aid, and resistance forces. However, this publication does not specifically refer to forestry issues.
⁸⁴ NUG-MoNREC staff, personal communication, March 14, 2023.
⁸⁵ NUG-MoNREC staff, personal communication, March 14, 2023. For more details on the difficulties of accessing international climate finance see Chambers & Kyed (2024).
⁸⁶ See also South, 2024.
⁸⁷ NUG-MoNREC staff, personal communication, March 14, 2023.
⁸⁸ NUG-MoNREC staff, personal communication, March 14, 2023.
⁸⁹ See Kyed & Chambers, 2023; South, 2024.
⁹⁰ NUG-MoNREC staff, personal communication, November 30, 2023.
⁹¹ I gloss the English term he used as “Indigenous,” but in Padoh Mahn Ba Tun’s talk he used the terms karen lumyo (ကရင်လူမျိုး), karen taingyintha (ကရင်တိုင်းရင်းသား) and tane (ဌာနေ) taingyintha. When he talked about forest rules, forest and environmental conservation and land law, he just used the term taingyintha.
⁹² Ministry of Natural Resources, 2022b.
⁹³ Mosberg, 2026 [this issue].
⁹⁴ “Q&A: Karenni leader”, 2023.
⁹⁵ Independent People’s News, 2024.
⁹⁶ NUG-MoNREC staff, personal communication, November 30, 2023.
⁹⁷ NUG-MoNREC, 2021d.
⁹⁸ NUG-MoNREC, 2021e.
⁹⁹ NUG-MoHADM, 2023. See also Chambers et al. (2026) [this issue].
¹⁰⁰ National Unity Government, 2020.
¹⁰¹ Ministry of Natural Resources, 2021c.
¹⁰² Nway Kant Kaw, 2026 [this issue].
¹⁰³ See Chambers & Kyed, 2023.
¹⁰⁴ “Myanmar’s junta”, 2021.
¹⁰⁵ NUG-MoNREC, 2022c.
¹⁰⁶ NUG-MoNREC, 2023b.
¹⁰⁷ “နိုဝင်ဘာ ၂၈ ရက် ထိပ်တန်းသတင်းများ” ၊ ၂၀၂၃။
¹⁰⁸ “ASEAN Invites Minister”, 2021.
¹⁰⁹ See Nway Kant Kaw (2026) [this issue].
¹¹⁰ See Mosberg (2026) [this issue].
¹¹¹ McCarthy 2020; Obi, 2010; Watts, 2004.
¹¹² Nway Kant Kaw, 2026 [this issue].
¹¹³ Hansen & Stepputat, 2001.
¹¹⁴ Chambers & Kyed, 2024.
¹¹⁵ See Kyed et al. (2026) [this issue].

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Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2021a, June 6). ၂၀၂၁ခုနစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၅)ရက် ကမ္ဘာ့ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးနေ့၌ မြန်မာ့နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးအတွင်း ကျဆုံးသွားသည့် သူရဲကောင်း (၈၄၅)ဦး [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=122406736670241&set=pcb.122406936670221

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2021b, June 3). မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား တိုင်းရင်းသားပြည်သူညီအစ်ကိုမောင်နှမများခင်ဗျာ….လာမယ့် ၅-၆-၂၀၂၁ ရက်နေ့ ဟာကမ္ဘာ့ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးနေ့ (World Environment Day) ဘဲဖြစ်ပါတယ် [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=121186243458957&set=a.103124538598461

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2021c, November 1). ကုလသမဂ္ဂရာသီဥတုပြောင်းလဲမှုဆိုင်ရာ မူဘောင်ကွန်ဗင်းရှင်း အဖွဲ့ဝင်နိုင်ငံများ၏ (၂၆) ကြိမ်မြောက် အစည်းအဝေး (COP 26) သို့ အမျိုးသားညီညွတ်ရေးအစိုးရ၊ ယာယီသမ္မတ ဒူဝါလရှီးလမှ သဝဏ်လွှာပေးပို့ခဲ့ခြင်း [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/MONRECNUGMyanmar/posts/pfbid023cL2hBEhk6hajUHLSgtyNGqEguKvEWrbM9Lj6XiWeBmQn6T6iWNxwUJsWy69YTDEl

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2022a, May 8). MONREC PR Live [Facebook video]. Facebook. https://fb.watch/x4wvBJozJJ/

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2022b, June 5). ကမ္ဘာ့ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးနေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ် ဆွေးနွေးပွဲ [Facebook video]. Facebook. https://fb.watch/x2oTyK4rRR/

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2022c, November 6). MONREC Talk Show (6) [Facebook video]. Facebook. https://fb.watch/x2mK7SGCHB/

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2022d, November 6). စစ်နှင့် လက်နက်ကိုင်ပဋိပက္ခများဖြစ်ပွားစဥ် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်အပေါ် အလွန်အကျွံထုတ်ယူသုံးစွဲမှုအား ကာကွယ်ခြင်းအထိမ်းအမှတ်နေ့ [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/MONRECNUGMyanmar/posts/pfbid02YxUPJNVw5L41KwjqqEwGmV3JdpJJxBsU6EzhW9JjtNo3EMEXhkFZNMpFDkJabnT8l

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2022e, June 5). နွေဦးတော်လှန်ရေးကာလအတွင်း ကျဆုံးသွားသည့် တော်လှန်ရေးသူရဲကောင်း ရဲဘော်များအား ဂုဏ်ပြုသောအားဖြင့် မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသကြီး၊ [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/MONRECNUGMyanmar/posts/pfbid0NviTV6gZeCmdWK5mic4CdHRjperJH5LW38eoBfuyNk5vbvSQXXHX44iFeTpfV9JDl

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2022f, June 4). ၂၀၂၂ ခုနှစ် ကမ္ဘာ့ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးနေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ် အကြိုသစ်ပင်စိုက်ပျိုးပွဲ [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/MONRECNUGMyanmar/posts/pfbid02CvUtcLWucxxhdn8csdjfaDMnFDcs3PxTWe741SrWsDmbCqZ2PptTPNFRD3vM4eNBl

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Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2023b, June 3). ၂၀၂၃ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၅) ရက်နေ့ ကမ္ဘာ့ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးထုတ်ပြန်ချက် [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=562072996099869&set=a.562083749432127

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2023c, June 20). နိုင်ငံတော်၏ အတိုင်ပင်ခံပုဂ္ဂိုလ် အမေဒေါ်အောင်ဆန်းစုကြည်၏ (၇၈) နှစ်ပြည့်မွေးနေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ် သစ်ပင်စိုက်ပျိုးခြင်းမှတ်တမ်းများ [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/MONRECNUGMyanmar/posts/pfbid02dUugXjXNLuFF21FYcL5dGrXRnQwtVQojgoB53kifWNzpSm8yZFSvHXbBGb7MxGNHl

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2023d, August 31). သယံဇာတနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ သတင်းလွှာ [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=608711474769354&set=pcb.608714511435717

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2024a, February 29). သယံဇာတနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ သတင်းလွှာ [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=707950408178793&set=pcb.707951021512065

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2024b, June 5). ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၅) ရက်နေ့ ကမ္ဘာ့ပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးနေ့ အထိမ်းအမှတ် သစ်ပင်စိုက်ပျိုးခြင်း [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/MONRECNUGMyanmar/posts/pfbid02PzmsbRUNa8SYeUsyuGaW1y6Q3r3tb47qFMJv7KVJavywRKNnfPUj3gTFqr7PQqnLl?rdid=BC7sGGe2lXzCkPQW

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2024c, June 5). ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၅) ရက်နေ့ ကမ္ဘာ့ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးထုတ်ပြန်ချက် [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=764128965894270&set=a.536390195334816

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2024d, June 8). ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၅) ရက်နေ့ ကမ္ဘာ့ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးနေ့အထိမ်းအမှတ် သစ်ပင်စိုက်ပျိုးခြင်းနှင့် ဟောပြောပွဲများပြုလုပ်ခြင်း [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/MONRECNUGMyanmar/posts/pfbid0222UvtGE3JcfE4NsNujA9d6G5RP2fPRv5wseqHQjMaxWT4BiGYoAtv5PfNdtXcXz6l

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2024e, June 29). အပြည်ပြည်ဆိုင်ရာ အပူပိုင်းဒေသများနေ့ (ဇွန်လ ၂၉ရက်၊ ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်) [Facebook video]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=778766431097190&set=a.547294570848120

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation – NUG. (2024f, June 5). ၂၀၂၄ ခုနှစ်၊ ဇွန်လ (၅) ရက်နေ့ ကမ္ဘာ့ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးနေ့အထိမ်းအမှတ် သစ်ပင်ပန်းပင်စိုက်ပျိုးခြင်းနှင့် ဟောပြောပွဲများပြုလုပ်ခြင်း [Facebook post]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/MONRECNUGMyanmar/posts/pfbid0w3WhREqUgKx3MFGDFaaRiTgWJm9NpVvMckSwPcC3F8u54YbHr3pUxuWGwu7GFTT2l

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နိုဝင်ဘာ ၂၈ ရက် ထိပ်တန်းသတင်းများ – စစ်အာဏာသိမ်းထားတဲ့ မြန်မာမှာ ရာသီဥတုအန္တရာယ်ပိုဆိုးလာတယ်လို့ ကုလပြော၊ (၂၀၂၃၊ ၂၈ နိုဝင်ဘာ)၊ BBC News မြန်မာ ။ https://www.bbc.com/burmese/articles/cmjp1k3nldvo

နန်းမေသူအောင်၊ (၂၀၂၃၊ ဩဂုတ် ၁)၊ “သယံဇာတနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ သတင်းလွှာ, အတွဲ ၂၊ အမှတ် ၈ – ရာသီဉတုပြောင်းလဲမှု၏သက်ရောက်မှု-မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည်ထာဝရဓားစာခံဖြစ်၊ စာမျက်နှာ ၉-၁၂၊ ၂၀၂၃ အောက်တိုဘာ ၁။ https://assets-monrec.nugmyanmar.org/images/2023/10/MONREC_MonthlyJournal_2.8.pdf

နန်းမေသူအောင်၊ (၂၀၂၃၊ ဩဂုတ် ၁)၊ သယံဇာတနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ သတင်းလွှာ, အတွဲ ၂၊ အမှတ် ၉ – ရာသီဉတုပြောင်းလဲမှု၏သက်ရောက်မှု-မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည်ထာဝရဓားစာခံဖြစ်၊ စာမျက်နှာ ၇-၁၀၊ ၂၀၂၃ အောက်တိုဘာ ၃၁။ https://assets-monrec.nugmyanmar.org/images/2023/10/MONREC_MonthlyJournal_2.9.pdf

နန်းမေသူအောင်၊ (၂၀၂၃၊ ဩဂုတ် ၁)၊ သယံဇာတနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ သတင်းလွှာ, အတွဲ ၂၊ အမှတ် ၁၀ – ရာသီဉတုပြောင်းလဲမှု၏သက်ရောက်မှု-မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည်ထာဝရဓားစာခံဖြစ်၊ စာမျက်နှာ ၉-၁၃၊ ၂၀၂၃ နိုဝင်ဘာ ၃၀။ https://assets-monrec.nugmyanmar.org/images/2023/11/MONREC_MonthlyJournal_2.10.pdf

သယံဇာတနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ (၂၀၂၂၊ နိုင်ဝင်ဘာ)၊ စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကာလများအတွင်း မြန်မာ့သဘာဝသယံဇာတများ ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးမှုအား ဆန်းစစ် လေ့လာခြင်း (သတ္တုနှင့် ကျောက်မျက်ကဏ္ဍ)။ https://monrec.nugmyanmar.org/စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကာလများ/

သယံဇာတနှင့် သဘာဝပတ်ဝန်းကျင် ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ (၂၀၂၂၊ နိုင်ဝင်ဘာ)၊ စစ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးကာလများအတွင်း မြန်မာ့သဘာဝသယံဇာတများ ပျက်စီးဆုံးရှုံးမှုအား ဆန်းစစ် လေ့လာခြင်း (သတ္တုနှင့် ကျောက်မျက်ကဏ္ဍ)။ https://assets-monrec.nugmyanmar.org/images/2022/11/Status-of-Natural-Resources-Depletion-during-military-regime_mining-and-gems.pdf