Maw Kun | ယခုဆောင်းပါးကို မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ဖတ်ရှုရန် ဤနေရာတွင် နှိပ်ပါ

Cite as: 
Maw Kun. (2025). Problems with the Military’s Artillery Corps. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 5. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5294

Abstract

The Myanmar military’s artillery corps has a long history and has helped the military win several key battles against forces resisting its rule. Infantry forces still rely heavily on artillery, but today, the artillery corps is in a very poor state, with insufficient recruits, poorly maintained equipment, and ill-trained personnel suffering from terrible morale. Furthermore, military officers ignore all these problems, focusing instead on their own self-enrichment and promotion. This will eventually lead to the Myanmar military’s defeat at the hands of the People’s Defense Forces and ethnic armed organizations.

Introduction

The people of Myanmar peacefully protested on the streets following the 1 February 2021 military coup. In reaction to these protests, the military violently dispersed crowds and gatherings, detaining and killing protesters. The anti-military resistance forces rose up in defense and dissent erupted throughout the country. As a former soldier, I want to share my personal experiences and the knowledge that I have gathered from inside the military so that the people may come to learn more about the artillery corps, its weaponry and manpower, as well as the opinions of the military’s own battalion officers and soldiers about their own army.

About the Artillery Corps

The purpose of the military’s artillery corps is to provide firepower support to ground troops and prevent enemies from interfering with military operations. Having access to artillery when the enemy does not provides an advantage on the battlefield and disrupts the formation of enemy forces. The artillery corps has several kinds of armaments for different purposes and tactical deployments.

Types of Artillery

Armaments are categorized by weight and barrel diameter into small, medium and large sizes. Small armaments are lighter than 7,000 pounds and have barrels that are smaller than 115 mm (4.5 inches). Large mortars are also included in the small armaments category. Because mortars are not as accurate as other artillery, they are more dangerous for friendly troops. However, they can provide effective firepower support as they easily reach areas out of direct line of sight such as behind hills and in ravines. Their firing speed and shrapnel spread is good and, therefore, they can usefully suppress enemy troops that are within close or medium range. They are less effective for long-range targets.

Medium armaments have barrels between 115-155mm (4.5-6.1 inches) and weigh between 7,000-10,000 pounds. Medium armaments complement small armaments’ firepower. They deliver more destructive shells and can hit more distant targets. However, as larger shells are used, they have a lower firing rate and cannot provide close-range support.

Large armaments have barrels larger than 155 mm (6.1 inches) and weigh between 10,000-50,000 pounds. They are mainly used for destroying inert targets and as long-range interference. As their weight indicates, transporting large armaments is difficult. Additionally, the firing rate of these cannons is lower than medium and small armaments. The fastest firing speed is approximately one round per minute.

The Roles of Teams Involved in Operating Armaments

Only when the spotting, directional, and firing teams coordinate effectively can the correct number of shells be fired at the designated targets at the intended time as ordered. This section briefly explains the duties and structures of these three artillery teams, as well as the miscellaneous support team. It includes tables with details on rank and numbers of personnel.

The spotting team is responsible for reconnoitering target areas and reporting target information to the directional team, seeking permission from commanders to fire shells, and trying to ensure shells hit their targets. The standard composition of the spotting team is shown in table 1.

Table 1
Structure of a spotting team in the artillery corps.

Directional teams station at artillery bases and convert targeting information reported by spotting teams into firing data. They relay said data to the firing team and order firing. The composition of a typical section-sized firing direction team is shown in table 2.

Table 2
Structure of a section-sized directional team in the artillery corps.

Firing teams operate artillery in accordance with orders received from the directional team by inputting firing data into the cannon and subsequently firing the cannon. The structure of a section-level firing team with two armaments is shown in table 3.

Table 3
Structure of a section-sized directional team with two armaments.

On top of this, a miscellaneous team works in support functions. The standard composition of these teams is shown in table 4.

Table 4
Structure of a miscellaneous support team in the artillery corps.

As you can see by totaling the number of people in these teams from tables 1-4, a standard section formation supporting two armaments has a minimum of 27 personnel.

Capabilities of Various Artillery

In this section I go through some information I am aware of regarding the power of various artillery armaments that are currently being utilized in the military.

120mm Mortars (MA 6, MK-1, MK-2)

These mortars are commonly used by the military. They are manufactured in Myanmar. Distance-wise, the MK-1 has a reach of up to 8,500 meters, and the MK-2 can reach up to 10,073 meters. The ammunition used in these mortars is known as High Explosive Extended Range (HEER). 120mm mortars are normal mortars with smooth barrels that fin-stabilized ammunition is inserted into and fired. Mortars are easy to assemble and disassemble, making them efficient for mobile operations. They also have a trigger enabling them to be preloaded and then utilized as required. Weaknesses of these mortars are inaccuracy when shooting, ammunition is costly, and they are easily spotted by the enemy.

76mm Cannons (M-42, M-48)

These were originally manufactured in Yugoslavia. The M-42 has a range of up to 13,290 meters and the M-48 can hit targets 8,860 meters away. Only two types of ammunition can be used in these cannons—High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) and armor-piercing rounds. This is their principal disadvantage. These cannons also typically need to be towed by vehicles or animals. Their advantages are that they can be disassembled into many parts without requiring any special equipment, have a high firing rate, and are lightweight. They also include automatic breechloaders and, therefore, can shoot up to 25 rounds per minute. These cannons are no longer in active service within the artillery corps but are still used in some artillery support units within infantry headquarters.

25lb Cannons

These are manufactured in England and have a range of up to 12,253 meters. Various types of ammunition can be used in these cannons, including HEAT, armor-piercing, smoke, and tracer rounds, and so on. These cannons were the first artillery to be used by the Burma Independence Army. The unique thing about these cannons is that they have a base, and they can be turned 360 degrees to shoot, and use a degree system for aiming. If powerful explosive rounds are used, the barrel can become eroded and, therefore, they are not permitted to be used during normal operations. They cannot be transported easily and are difficult to disassemble. Currently, they are not used at inland bases, but only at island bases that protect sea territories.

105mm Howitzer (M2A1, M-56)

The M2A1 howitzer was originally manufactured in the United States and the M-56 in Yugoslavia. The M2A1 can reach up to 11,274 meters; the M-56 has a range of up to 18,084 meters. They can use HEAT, incendiary, smoke, tracer, and armor-piercing rounds. These howitzers can be easily angled at up to 65 degrees, making them effective for military operations in mountainous regions. They usually need to be transported by helicopter as they cannot be easily disassembled. The M2A1 and M-65 howitzer cannons are very commonly used at front line artillery bases in Myanmar.

122mm Howitzer (D-30-2)

These are a Chinese-manufactured variant of the original D-30 invented in the Soviet Union and can hit targets at up to 22,000 meters. They use full bore (FB) HEER and base bleed (BB) HEER ammunition. The howitzer barrels can be easily angled at up to 65 degrees and are used in mountainous regions, including many recent military operations. In these mountainous regions where the operations are taking place, base camps have been built to provide firepower support.

155mm Howitzer (KH-179, M-845, K-0, SH-1)

These are the armaments with the largest barrels in the artillery corps. The KH-179 is manufactured in South Korea and has a reach of up to 27,900 meters. The ammunition used in these cannons is HE M-107/ER FB-BB. This howitzer is quite large and all its components and accessories must be manually carried by human operators. These units have not been deployed for military operations in years and are kept in storage.

The M-845 howitzer is manufactured in Israel and has a range of up to 39,000 meters. They use HE M-107/ER FB-BB ammunition. The M-845s have auxiliary power units built in and, therefore, their operation is less reliant on human input. They can be mechanically transported short distances. Transport over long distances is more difficult as the howitzers are large. I have never seen the military transporting the M-845 via helicopter. These cannons have been utilized in recent military operations; however, they are not usually located at front line bases, but rather at backup bases.

Next are the K-0 howitzers originally manufactured in Yugoslavia with a reach of up to 41,000 meters; ammunition used is ERFB-BB. These are regarded as the worst purchase that the military’s procurement team and artillery corps’ leader ever made, as they were expensive, but have still never been deployed to bases or operations. They are still in storage somewhere for testing.

Last, the SH-1 howitzers are manufactured in China, have a range of up to 32 kilometers when using HEER FB ammunition, 41 kilometers if using HEER FB-BB, and 52 kilometers when using HEER FB-BB RAP ammunition respectively. These cannons are mounted on vehicles and can be easily maneuvered when shooting and in motion. The weakness of these cannons is that they are highly technical to operate and, therefore, highly skilled personnel conversant in the relevant technology are required to operate them.

The History of the Artillery Corps

The artillery corps was formed on 3 February 1949 when 63 soldiers, led by Captain Ye Tun, were providing artillery support in the battle for Insein. Since the corps was first established, there have been four battalions, one central artillery base, one anti-aircraft artillery company, one artillery training division, and one demonstration division at the army training school. The artillery corps established each battalion with approximately 600 to 700 personnel as prescribed.

Military Propaganda Directed at the People of Myanmar

The Myanmar military has long attempted to subjugate the ethnic armed organizations (EAO) that resist their rule, supported by the propaganda slogan, “Our Three Main National Causes: Non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, and the perpetuation of sovereignty.” The military uses military-affiliated newspapers, magazines, television networks, and movies to frame EAOs as conducting illegal businesses. The military spreads and supports media content that portrays EAOs as demanding money from the people, demonizing ethnic people so that the wider public misunderstands the true situation, and comes to distrust, even fear, all EAOs.

Destruction of Ethnic Homelands by the Military

The leaders of the military on one hand spread propaganda while on the other fan the flames of war by expanding bases into the ethnic regions, taunting EAOs. In the cases where there are fights on the ground and military bases face many casualties, they usually frighten surrounding areas by attacking and burning down local ethnic villages, stating that such villages are patrons of the enemy. Whenever an EAO confronts the army, soldiers retaliate by burning down local villages and torturing locals, so that the EAOs will desist their attacks. However, in strategic battles over bases and towns, the military usually fails repeatedly in its attacks, suffering numerous casualties, and then calls in artillery and air support. Most of the military’s force capability comes from artillery support carried out alongside infantry operations.

The artillery corps has in this way provided support to infantry forces during many battles with EAOs since independence, contributing to some victories. Among these are the 1971 Kunlong 40-day battle and the 1973 Sisiwan Tarpan battle for Communist Party of Burma territory (Northeast Regional Command), the 1983 Yan Nyein Aung military operation, the 1988 Mae Tha Woh, Maw Phoe Ke, Wah Kha Houng, and Wah Kah Thit military operations, and the 1989 Wah Kah Thit and Pahlu military operations, all for Karen National Liberation Army territory (Southeast Regional Command). In these battles the artillery corps were commemorated and awarded medals. Although the military was victorious in these battles, victory came at the cost of the lives and limbs of many soldiers.

Prerogatives of Military Leaders

The military was victorious in these battles because they had the full strength of their battalions and forces. Troop morale was high, as troops were supplied with continuous artillery support, as well as sufficient small arms and ammunition, which led to the infantry being able to confidently and successfully maneuver and contest the battlefield. In contrast, the EAO armies had no artillery support to counter the military and did not have adequate weapons and ammunition.

It must be stressed that during battles, most military leaders pay no mind to the soldiers who lose their lives; they are only concerned about the promotions they will receive if they win. Military leaders also use money received to support and implement military operations for their own benefit. So, while the institution adheres to the “Three Main National Causes,” individual military leaders do not focus on peace negotiations with their EAO counterparts and prefer to continue and start new military operations to achieve promotions and receive personal benefits, which are obviously a higher priority to them than national peace and prosperity. Whenever and wherever the military is involved in armed conflict, it is the military leaders who benefit; the soldiers do the actual killing and manage to survive receive only a piece of paper stating the military is “proud of them.”

Military Base Expansion

In 1990 during direct military rule, the army started expanding its overall number of bases and battalions, including artillery corps battalions. There is a total of ten Division Headquarters, and each of them hosts a target-seeking battalion that starts with the number ‘2’, nine ground artillery battalions that start the number ‘3’, one anti-aircraft artillery battalion that starts with ‘4’, and one heavy artillery battalion that starts with the number ‘5’—totaling 12 battalions in each Division Headquarters. According to the structural plans for the battalions, all expanded battalions needed to consist of over 600 to 700 personnel. However, the military could not afford such numbers and therefore they recreated the suggested battalion structure with only around 150 soldiers in each battalion. At the time of writing in 2022, however, there are not even 100 people at these artillery bases.

Problems with Recruitment

During recruitment, the military prioritizes quantity over quality. Even before the 2021 coup, there were very few new recruits joining the military. The situation was so bad that the bases/battalions had to start “buying” recruits—thereby creating a “new recruit market” for the military. Military officers and soldiers would persuade, trick, force, or bribe new recruits—all of which resulted in the new recruits starting with low morale.

While technically new recruits are supposed to have passed middle school, the military takes in people who do not meet that requirement. The personnel at recruitment bases and training schools are only concerned with money and do not care about qualifications. They in fact do not care about improving the military, nor do they act with goodwill toward recruits—they are purely self-interested.

Weakening of the Military and the Duties of Soldiers

Soldiers currently serving in the artillery corps are carrying out their duties as if they are operating within a fully equipped military organization, but in reality, the number of soldiers on the ground is nowhere near the desired or official numbers. Within a single battalion, if you exclude the soldiers out on military operations, part of security details, undergoing training, on temporary duty elsewhere, hospitalized, or away without leave, then there are actually only 30 to 40 soldiers remaining on active duty. When these soldiers carry out their base duties, they must take on three to four duties instead of the standard single duty they should be tasked with. Due to this overwork, they are unable to complete all their tasks, let alone continue their artillery-related education—the lifeblood of the artillery corps.

According to policy, military superiors must inspect bases three times every four-month period. But when they do so, they show no interest in work conditions or the fact that the bases are under-resourced; instead, they just take pictures for their records, oblivious to or ignoring the needs of the bases and soldiers. Furthermore, base commanders primarily work toward their own promotions, focusing on their own tasks; they are not at all concerned about the wellbeing of the soldiers carrying out base duties. For example, in the mornings, soldiers must do chores around the base, like cleaning and garden work, to ensure that the grounds are presentable, instead of doing the required fitness routines that keep soldiers fit and ready for deployment. Some superiors even go so far as saying, “Physical exercise makes you sweat, and so does working with a shovel—though working with a shovel is better for your health.” After cleaning, soldiers then have to carry out their other assigned duties. Many of these soldiers also have to go on watch duty almost every night. Then, during the night watch, these soldiers would have to continue trying to finish the tasks they could not finish during the day. Single soldiers do not have any rest time, and soldiers with families do not have time to spend with their loved ones. Following the coup, support bases and battalions have also been required to carry out security duties, as there has been no available infantry soldiers. Support teams have had to take on the security of urban areas, banks, schools, hospitals, and even telecommunications towers.

One military slogan is, “Be happy in the barracks and be good at warfare.” But soldiers within the barracks are not happy and there are increased occurrences of single soldiers going away without leave, as well as married soldiers requesting to be in front line operations and then attending post-operations training thereafter. This shows that there are very few soldiers who want to serve in base headquarters.

Failed Modernization of Armaments

The main purpose of artillery is to increase the firepower available at the front lines. With said firepower, the military is able to suppress the enemy and keep their heads down at the same time. Artillery bases need to send modern weapons and personnel to accompany infantry forces and provide firepower support at close quarters—these soldiers must be protected from enemy counter-fire as it is difficult to swiftly relocate artillery. As discussed earlier, for effective firepower support, the artillery corps is provided with armaments with different features, such as long target range capability, greater destructive power, greater maneuverability, target-seeking radars and laser rangefinders able to locate enemy mortars, amend location details, and correct target information when fired shells miss their targets, as well as computers, phones, and spotting teams. The military’s defense equipment factory also manufactures some of its own artillery including cannons, mortars, and ammunition.

With all this said, the advancement of global weapons technology and changes in available military strategies and tactics are important factors limiting the utility of artillery. Although the Myanmar military can be said to be equipped with some modern weapons, artillery personnel use dated methods to fire their armaments because procurement teams and artillery corps leaders make decisions to benefit themselves rather than invest in military training and capabilities, resulting in a situation where procured weaponry is either in bad condition or in an incomplete state.

Training Conditions at Schools and Bases

The military needs skilled instructors to train personnel at military training schools, at bases, and during operations and exercises. However, there are many problems with training conditions in the military. First, the number of skilled trainers in the military has significantly decreased as experienced instructors from decades past retire and are not replaced. This is causing a reduction in the skills and knowledge of the military’s human resources. Some problems relate particularly to training schools.

These schools still set and follow regular training course dates, but this is mostly just to monitor new recruits and ensure they do not run away, and to ensure procedure is followed, as opposed to the schools actually dedicating themselves to education and training. During classes, instructors are unable to effectively monitor participant engagement levels as the teacher-to-student ratio is not appropriate. New recruits who actually want to learn often do not have access to the required equipment and are unable to do so systematically. Trainees are also required to carry out other duties during designated training times, as bases and schools are chronically short-staffed. Furthermore, the managers of the military training academies do not permit the usage of sufficient fuel for training exercises when required. For the artillery corps, trainees must learn all of the different artillery team duties (i.e., spotting, firing, and so on) instead of just one specific duty, meaning they need considerable training. What this all means is that if an individual “completes” an artillery training course, all they really gain is a piece of paper (“Completion Certificate”)—not an actual adequate artillery-related education.

In theory, artillery training does not end once personnel have graduated from military schools. Effective use of artillery requires ongoing education, and therefore, the artillery corps has weekly training schedules for personnel stationed at bases, usually with artillery exercises on Mondays, artillery-related discussions on Thursdays, and artillery tactical training on Fridays. Put simply, while this ongoing education exists on paper, it is not actually adhered to. Instead, military superiors take photographs from previous training sessions, and the opening and closing ceremonies of school training, then supply these as evidence of ongoing training at bases.

Even if artillery training is available at a base, soldiers are so overburdened with superfluous additional duties appointed by base commanders that they cannot dedicate time to any studies, artillery-related or not. Base commanders prioritize superficially inspecting bases and supplying photographs for their quarterly reports in pursuit of promotions, over developing a base’s actual military capacity or effectiveness. In their photographs, the artillery corps looks like it is carrying out artillery exercises; however, in reality, personnel are mostly busy with farm animals and carrying out work related to agriculture, shopkeeping, and accounting.

Cannons, howitzers, and vehicle-mounted artillery are kept in artillery storage units. Radar vehicles are kept in radar storage units, fire-monitoring computers and phones are kept in restricted storage units, etc. Everything that arrives at the base is immediately put into storage, without any training provided on how to use it. The military sends graduates from the Defense Services Technological Academy to maintain said modern weaponry at military bases; however, these graduates do not undertake artillery training to learn how artillery is used, nor do they gain other required skills. On top of that, base commanders tend to assign these technical graduates to other areas anyway, because there is an insufficient number of soldiers at the base, and then these technically trained soldiers eventually forget how to fulfill their original maintenance duties.

For each tour of duty, soldiers at artillery bases must deploy to forward bases for four months. Currently, in the post-coup era, soldiers are having to serve for six to seven months. Soldiers are able to better engage with equipment and undergo more training at these forward artillery bases compared to the rear bases. However, many soldiers only elect to deploy to front line artillery bases because they want to avoid the relentless chores back at the rear bases. They are not really interested in understanding artillery and would prefer to relax and gamble their time away. Moreover, in their minds, the knowledge about artillery they may pick up at the forward base is not relevant to their menial duties at the rear bases, so these soldiers pay little mind to the new opportunity for training and consider it as just another mandatory duty handed down from above.

In military operation areas, artillery bases are connected to one another by a chain of long-range howitzers. In recent times, the military never dares engage in a military operation without air or artillery support. Whenever infantry forces mobilize, artillery forces stand by for firepower support. Artillery bases must be organized and ready with 27 personnel (i.e., 2 plus 25) as per the organizational structure; however, because the military does not have enough personnel, the current formation is only 18 personnel (i.e., 2 plus 16). The military no longer has units able to accompany infantry forces to assist with reconnaissance. Whenever there are fights or battles, infantry commanders immediately ask for artillery support without giving thought to enemy size, strength, or the physical distances between themselves and said enemy. This means inaccurate coordinates are often provided to artillery units, who, due to their lack of proficiency with their own armaments, combined with low-quality ammunition manufactured by the military’s defense equipment companies, results in shells not landing on designated targets. Instead, shells land on the military’s own troops, in non-combat areas, in neighboring countries, and often repeatedly miss their targets until all ammunition is depleted.

And so on.

Evaluation

While the military has equipped its artillery corps with modern weapons and expanded its bases and battalions under the slogan, “To build a modern and skillful army,” military leaders have only ever been concerned with their own self-interest and, therefore, military development in these areas is weak. I also believe that, although military leaders have in some ways expanded the military at an exponential (and ridiculous) rate, they have not been able to meet the human resources targets in accordance with the official structure, resulting in overworked soldiers and increased incidents of soldiers fleeing from service. Focusing on quantity over quality when recruiting, as well as recruiting soldiers using various illegal means, has also resulted in large numbers of soldiers with low morale. With recruitment bases overlooking qualifications, the military relies on underqualified soldiers unable to operate modern weapons. In my opinion, base commanders work mainly toward getting a promotion, and do not provide quality training in artillery-related matters at all; they also do not assign newly graduated technical soldiers to the right areas. Furthermore, training schools are unable to provide quality education in artillery-related matters, so soldiers who come to front line bases are not competent in these areas, despite being trained. Lastly, some soldiers elect to join front line bases only because they want to avoid the intense duties and inspections back at headquarters, and, as such, these soldiers are neither motivated nor have the will to fight.

Conclusion

Since 2021, very few people want to enlist in the military, let alone the artillery corps. More and more soldiers are joining the people’s side and participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement. There has been a steady and gradual deterioration of military bases and battalions. Soldiers are suffering from war fatigue due to a lack of rest, and the People’s Defense Forces and EAOs have become stronger—their collaborative attacks will result in the military suffering tremendous losses and eventual demise.