Yucca Wai & Joseph Andersson | ယခုဆောင်းပါးကို မြန်မာဘာသာဖြင့် ဖတ်ရှုရန် ဤနေရာတွင် နှိပ်ပါ

Cite as: 
Yucca Wai & Andersson, J. (2025). Leap into Freedom: The Disintegration of the sit tat Through Defections. Independent Journal of Burmese Scholarship, 5. https://ijbs.online/?page_id=5136

Abstract

The unprecedented number of recent defections from the sit tat indicates that it is struggling to hold its rank and file together in the face of nationwide popular resistance against its rule. Given the importance of defections to the future of Myanmar, this article, originally written in 2023, uses survey interviews with 50 defected soldiers and many Spring Revolution stakeholders to better understand the reasons why soldiers leave, or stay in, the sit tat. This report is informed by a mixed methods approach; in addition to surveys and key stakeholder interviews, the authors also employed archive and desk research. We identify gaps in the assistance offered to defected soldiers; some can utilize many available resources while others are not reached at all. Our findings show that the overall defection efforts, while strengthening and gaining structure since the 2021 coup, are still small, with much room for improvement. Given the power held by the military, defections have the potential to influence the future of Myanmar, and it is important for revolutionary stakeholders to follow a defections strategy. This could be a deciding factor in the revolution if it receives adequate technical and material support from regional and international actors.

Introduction

Of all the missing plaques, we specially miss this one: “This is for a man who refused to kill his fellow men.”

– Kurt Tucholsky

The first defections of soldiers from the Myanmar military (sit tat) started just days after it carried out a coup against the elected civilian government on 1 February 2021. Protesters responded by chanting “pyithu ye!” (“People’s police!”) as they marched through the streets. The protestors even handed out flowers to the soldiers and police being rapidly deployed to streets in cities and towns across the country.¹ However, public goodwill quickly faded when these same soldiers and police violently attacked peaceful protesters.

The first confirmed fatality was Mya Thwe Thwe Khine, a 20-year-old woman shot in the head through her motorcycle helmet while sheltering at a bus stop in the capital city of Nay Pyi Taw on 9 February 2021. At the time of writing on 16 August 2023, conservative estimates put the civilian death toll since the coup at 3,933 people.² Hundreds of thousands of people have joined pro-democracy movement organizations and armed resistance groups since 2021, and this become known as the “Spring Revolution” against military rule in Myanmar. These numbers have been bolstered by many of the roughly 3,000 soldiers and 9,000 police who have defected from the sit tat since the coup.³

Defection in the context of the Spring Revolution is an act by ordinary servicemen and servicewomen to defy the sit tat and express their disapproval of the coup regime, which took the name of the State Administration Council (SAC) after the coup. Defections during the Spring Revolution can be understood as political resistance. This is reflected in the fact that many of the soldiers that defect also formally joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).⁴

Consequently, there is growing support among the revolutionary movement to encourage defections among military and police personnel. The National Unity Government (NUG) has incorporated defections into its official offensive strategy, with NUG Minister of Foreign Affairs Daw Zin Mar Aung stating that, “the defection program is an NUG priority and could lead to a turning point for the revolution”.⁵ The Spring Revolution marks the largest, most widespread and concerted effort to encourage and support defections from the sit tat in the history of Myanmar.

Large-scale defections are the strongest indicator of a movement’s likelihood to achieve regime change⁶ and for countries with military regimes, defections “are a necessary condition for pro-democratic regime transition”.⁷ The unprecedented level of defections in Myanmar today indicates that the sit tat is struggling to hold its rank and file together, while facing nationwide popular resistance against its rule. As of 2023, the sit tat has lost nearly 90 military bases in the country’s ethnic states since the coup, including 20 bases in Kachin State, 3 in Chin State, 19 in Karenni State, 12 in Karen State, and 36 in Rakhine State,⁸ and these losses are increasing. The military has also engaged in brutal clearance operations against anti-junta resistance groups in the country’s regions, especially what is considered the Bama-Buddhist heartland of Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay regions, traditionally a support base and source of recruits for the sit tat.

This article uses survey interviews with 50 defected soldiers and several Spring Revolution stakeholders to better understand the reasons why soldiers leave, or stay in, the Myanmar army and police force. It continues in six sections. First, we provide further context on the 2021 military coup and the history of defections in Myanmar through a literature review. Second, the methodology used to conduct the research for this article is outlined. Third, a typology of key actors in military defection campaigns is presented. Fourth, the research findings are presented and discussed. We find that the drivers and barriers to defection often overlap, expressed in forms such as personal/family considerations, ethical and political standpoints, and financial concerns. The article then concludes with reflections on the role that large-scale defections play in the overall strategy to deny the sit tat legitimacy and how the international community can support pro-democracy actors to facilitate military and police defections. A supplementary list of recommendations follows the conclusion.

Context and Literature Review

Defections from the sit tat are not new. Soldiers who defected long before the 2021 coup have given testimonies of physical and psychological abuse, forced labor, terrible living conditions, and atrocities against civilians. With that said, the 2021 coup set the conditions for a huge increase in defections, which now occur on a wider scale through processes led by new anti-coup resistance organizations. Immediately after the coup, most defections were from the auxiliary forces (such as engineers, artillery, and office staff), but since 2022 most have been light infantrymen.

Following the 1988 coup and the marked increase in military violence against the urban public that followed through the 1990s and 2000s, studies on Myanmar military desertions and defections increased, but remained relatively rare. Human Rights Watch released reports in 2002 and 2007 on child soldiers in the sit tat, detailing the systematic practice of forcibly recruiting and abusing children.⁹ Since then, several other organizations released reports and interviews with defected child soldier testimonies.¹⁰ These reports highlight the strong legacy of forced recruitment within the sit tat. With more military defections undoubtedly more accounts will appear.

Whether they joined voluntarily or not, the psyches of individual soldiers are affected by a complicated web of push and pull factors: Selth notes that the sit tat maintains control over its soldiers through a combination of indoctrination, provision of security, and the cultivation of a hawkish fear of civilians and ethnic forces, a perpetual making of enemies.¹¹ He provides a useful understanding of defectors’ mindsets and struggles and the impact of sit tat life on their psyche, breaking down soldier characteristics into categories: Patriotism, Deference & Loyalty, Individualism, Ambition, Fear, Economic Self-Interest, Buddhism, and Personal Feelings.¹² These categories play different and often competing roles in individual psyches, creating degrees of cognitive dissonance when soldiers reconcile their received orders with their individual values. Selth’s categories and analyses inform how this article makes sense of its interviews and understands soldiers’ and defectors’ decision-making processes.

Another stark insight into the internal institutional makeup of the sit tat is Sai Latt’s 2016 doctoral dissertation. He notes that while soldiers are characterized by perpetuating violence on enemies, they are themselves subject to direct violence and injustice within the military: exploited through a dynamic web of military corruption, patron-client relations, gift-giving, arbitrary taxation, and unpaid labor. This is because a culture of corruption and exploitation is endemic in the sit tat Defense Services Academy (DSA); the officer corps is “exposed and accustomed to violence, exploitation and various forms of injustice” from the very beginning of their military careers, reenacting this trauma upon their juniors as they climb the military ranks. Through interviews with DSA graduates, Sai Latt calls this the kogyi–nyilay (senior-junior) culture. It demands “complete loyalty and unquestioning obedience to seniors” and subjects recruits to “extreme poverty, forced labor and the endurance of physical violence” at the hands of their seniors.¹³

Furthermore, low-ranked soldiers and their families are subjected to an almost fixed state of poverty, where “senior officers physically abuse and financially exploit their subordinates for personal wealth”.¹⁴ As a result, one reason behind sit tat soldiers’ incessant looting may be “to mitigate their own poverty, and to counter the exploitation and oppression they face within the military by offloading the burden onto civilians”.¹⁵ The conditions of exploitation and corruption within the sit tat illustrated by Sai Latt enables us to better understand the relationship between low-ranking soldiers and their commanding officers and how military violence can be seen as a symptom of socioeconomic relations, “in which some are empowered and enriched, while some are impoverished and disempowered”.¹⁶

That being said, Sai Latt’s explanation of soldiers’ violence against Myanmar civilians as being due to this uneven, top-down power relationship between low-ranking soldiers and their senior officers can only be a partial one. It does not account for all the kinds of war crimes, acts of terror and crimes against humanity¹⁷ inflicted on innocent civilians, many of which cannot be rationalized merely through the internal institutional makeup of the sit tat. Sai Latt falls into a familiar structuralist trap of removing agency and responsibility from individual soldiers and attributing their personal actions to being results of processes. A deeply ingrained hierarchical system among the sit tat may explain why some soldiers commit crimes such as looting, but this does not account for soldiers’ ongoing acts of rape, torture and murder. Our own article strives to make soldiers accountable for their actions, while simultaneously paying attention to the structural reasons behind their war crimes.

In late 2021, Helene Maria Kyed and Ah Lynn released a compelling analysis¹⁸ of the conditions required for large-scale military defections to occur in Myanmar, based on testimonies from defected soldiers, their wives and activists involved in defection campaigns from May-October 2021.¹⁹ Their report identifies varied motivations for military defection, including concerns about violence against peaceful protesters after the coup, dissatisfaction with the internal structures of corruption and oppression in the sit tat, and the availability of support mechanisms to leave, noting the importance of social media access.²⁰ In addition to motivations, the report lists defection obstacles, including fear of violent repercussion, deep ideological programming (about the military’s guardianship of Buddhism and the nation, and its perpetual enemies),²¹ and the hierarchical system of rewards, promotions, and punishments within the sit tat that is especially obstructive for lower-ranked soldiers. Kyed and Ah Lynn draw attention to the flow of information as a key variable in defection decisions: “access to the internet and social media (that is) not tied to the military significantly facilitate(s) defections”²² but “(the sit tat) has heightened efforts to prevent soldiers from defecting … by increasing the closure of information flows”.²³ The military actively censors information and pushes an ideology that it is the guardian of Buddhism and the nation. Our own article follows Kyed and Ah Lynn in examining how variables such as information flows can both assist and obstruct defections.

With that said, we depart from Kyed and Ah Lynn’s acceptance of “brainwashing” as a justification for why many soldiers commit atrocities. Many low-ranking soldiers within the sit tat are in fact forced conscripts, with little option other than to obey the orders of their commanding officer, whether their brain is “washed” or not. Defectors are not perfect victims, and justifying their previous actions away through a brainwashing defense is inappropriate. This is particularly the case regarding the educated officer corps who are usually DSA graduates with substantial access to varied education and information. Our article takes any claims by defector interviewees that they were victims of brainwashing lightly, always striving to be objective and examining each individual’s experiences and circumstances in totality.

Kyed followed up her co-authored reports with an article introduction to this journal’s August 2022 special issue on “Memories of Leaving the Myanmar Military”.²⁴ Kyed explores the memoirs of fifteen military defectors and three military spouses, ghostwritten into narratives from interviews. The majority of these testimonies are from Bama memoirists, reflecting the general composition of the sit tat.²⁵ What distinguishes this paper from Kyed’s earlier work is its examination of third-wave defections. Unlike the first wave of sit tat defectors immediately after the 2021 military coup, and the second wave, which began after a surge of clashes and skirmishes with opposition forces, the third wave includes soldiers already involved in post-coup military violence for over a year. Kyed acknowledges that some of the third wave may have left the sit tat because of moral concerns but were delayed in doing so for reasons such as fear of capture by military informants. However, Kyed attributes the majority of third wave military defections to “combat fatigue and self-interest in the form of fears for their own and their family’s safety”, and to a “growing disbelief in the military’s capacity to defeat or repress the armed resistance”.²⁶

Corporal Aung who left the sit tat in 2022 encapsulated this in his testimony to a BBC reporter: “If I thought the military would win in the long run, I wouldn’t have switched sides to the people”.²⁷ This is important and answers some of the questions Kyed and Ah Lynn acknowledge but do not comment on. Kyed’s analysis of third-wave defections suggests that the increase in violent resistance has not in fact been a key obstacle preventing soldiers from leaving, but rather that some soldiers are simply “weighing the extent to which they perceive the resistance as being able to defeat the army or not” before defecting.²⁸ This informs our own research on the reasons why soldiers may consider defecting but are yet to do so.

Kyed also usefully examines the NUG’s nine-point reward system, announced on 7 April 2022, in which rewards ranging from US $100,000 to $500,000 will supposedly be given to “soldiers who either destroy military supplies or join the People’s Embrace with military supplies and vehicles”.²⁹ This could lead to large-scale defections in the future, but no such reward had been given by the time of writing.³⁰ This could be because no soldiers have defected with such military intelligence, but it is also likely that the NUG lacks access to resources for such rewards.

In general, research done on defections since the 2021 coup has led to further understanding of the phenomenon. Yet, it is subject to major limitations. Military defection is a long process, which does not end once a soldier leaves the sit tat. One must also consider the reintegration and rehabilitation stages, and how the safety of defectors is to be guaranteed if any large-scale defections were to take place. Research so far fails to substantially consider the practical aspects of how defectors are integrated into the new society that they must live in. Kyed and Ah Lynn’s 2021 paper is the closest, mentioning the complication of reintegration.³¹ The authors quickly move on however, stating that encouraging more defections requires a relationship built on trust, in which defected soldiers can be guaranteed protection and some life prospects.³² No attention is given to the practical aspects of how to build and sustain this trust-based relationship. Our own article attempts to cast more light onto the practical aspects of how reintegration and rehabilitation can be achieved.

The second limitation of this reviewed body of research is that it is predominantly based on data either from or about low-ranking soldiers. The lack of testimonies from high-ranking officers is attributed to the fact that there have been few defections from the officer corps. By mid-October 2021, only one top-level officer had attempted to defect, but without success.³³ Despite this, there is a possibility that large-scale defections among low-ranking soldiers may serve as a catalyst that eventually encourages higher-ranking officers to defect. Thus, our research attempts to identify the driving factors for defections which are shared by both low-ranking and high-ranking soldiers, while also trying to identify factors more relevant to those in the sit tat officer corps.

Research Methodology

The research for this article employed mixed methods, gaining primary data from surveys distributed to military defectors and interviews with key stakeholders, as well as archive and desk research. Before commencing interviews and survey work, we conducted a review of public roundtable discussions held by People’s Goal, an organization introduced in the next section. Participants in these events are not always forthcoming in their views, but they nonetheless gave us relevant background information for structuring our research.

Surveys were distributed to 50 defected soldiers (our limit based on financial constraints) within a two-month period. The survey questions were designed to help us understand the incentives and challenges of defectors, and the full survey is reproduced in Appendix 1.³⁴ Access and introductions to defected soldiers was achieved through the snowball method, with the help of civilian groups promoting defections and ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs). Survey participants were carefully selected to ensure diversity in terms of geography, education, economic background, rank, family status, age, and years of service. Before commencing the interviews, our team sought advice about how to frame and deliver questions from recently defected soldiers, regional security experts, and practitioners that provide psychosocial support to defectors.

Out of the 50 defectors we interviewed, 40 served in the army, seven in the navy, two in the air force, and one in the police.³⁵ Respondents’ ages ranged from 23-46 years with an average age of 30. The youngest age of enlistment was 13, while the oldest enlisted at 27. A total of 19 out of the 50 soldiers (38 percent) enlisted before the legal age of 18. Cross referencing the age of enlistment with the year of enlistment, underage enlistments stopped in 2015, the year Myanmar signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child regarding the use of minors in armed conflict.³⁶

Survey respondents hailed from all over the country, with the largest concentration being from Yangon (ten), Ayeyarwady (nine), Bago (seven), and Sagaing (seven) regions, majority Buddhist, Bama areas known to be recruitment strongholds.³⁷ For a map, see figure 1. Our respondents were mostly Bama (74 percent), reflecting the fact that the sit tat is a majority Bama army. A total of 45 out of 50 respondents identified as Buddhist (90 percent), with the rest identifying as Christian. The Christians were either ethnic Chin or Karen. Around half (51 percent) of interviewees were married and 15 interviewees had children.

Figure 1
Location of respondents’ hometowns.

The education levels of respondents varied widely and was strongly correlated with rank. A total of 11 respondents had only a primary or middle school education, 10 graduated high school, nine attended some university. Three attended some technical or defense service school and three had a master’s degree. Respondents’ ranks varied, with 13 officers, 20 insignia-wearing staffers, 16 enlisted soldiers without rank, and one system engineer without rank. Middle and primary school graduates were often assigned to combat roles and had low or no rank (sergeant and below), while higher education was correlated with higher ranks and being given technical, medical, and administrative assignments.

Most respondents defected either right after the coup between February-March 2021, between September-November 2021 when fighting intensified heavily nationwide, or between April-September 2022.³⁸ Our research found that the higher-level defections of officers happened in the early days of the coup, between February and April 2021. September 2021 to August 2022 saw a steady stream of defections from insignia-wearing staff to enlisted soldiers. Captains were the most common rank to defect from the officer class. For a timeline of when our respondents defected, see figure 2 and to see this cross-referenced with rank, see figure 3.

Figure 2
Timeline of when respondents left the military.

Figure 3
Timeline of date of defection with rank of defector.

Research and interviews were conducted in Burmese, then translated into English for data tagging, analysis, and drawing quotations. During the analysis stage of our research, we used the Dedoose cross-platform application to tag and organize key quotes and concepts from the interviews. These key concepts were then sorted and analyzed alongside each other in order to identify trends. While translations can often yield inaccurate or confusing results, our entire research team can speak, read, and write Burmese, thus allowing us to reference the original interviews whenever necessary.

The sample size of only 50 respondents prevented certain data points, interpretations and comparisons from being drawn. If we had the funding to reach more respondents, stronger inferences and more detailed data could be achieved. Further, the interviews relied heavily on soldiers self-reporting their personal experiences. As such, it was difficult to verify the information presented and most was accepted at face value. We cross-referenced some accounts of general trends across the 50 interviews to verify information and achieve consistency in our findings.

Our team also spoke with representatives from organizations encouraging/assisting defections, such as the NUG, EROs, and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs). We also analyzed a diverse range of secondary resources such as news articles, existing research reports on defections both in Myanmar and around the globe, and public statements from the military junta and anti-coup resistance organizations.

While conducting social science research in Myanmar is difficult, various steps were taken to manage risk. These included, but were not limited to, a risk assessment before each interview; anonymization of all key informant interviews; and use of the team’s trusted networks to identify and contact appropriate interviewees. We initially separated deserters and defectors into two different categories. However, after consulting with the NUG and some EROs, we found that in the current conflict, there was little to differentiate between defectors and deserters; that is, deserters were being treated by all sides as de facto defectors.

Our team faced many challenges with data collection. It was difficult to get survey responses from people in active war zones or liberated areas. In the interview process, some former soldiers experienced distress. We paused these interviews and consulted with a mental health practitioner, who also ran a short course for our team on trauma-sensitive interviewing and psychosocial first aid practices. This was to ensure that we knew what to do when entering an emotionally charged situation, and that the interviewers themselves would not experience vicarious trauma from the interviews.

Overview of Key Organizations

This section outlines some of the key groups providing assistance to defectors and encouraging defections. The groups listed all have some level of coordination with at least one other group in the set. Many of the defected soldiers we interviewed identified with the CDM and received support from at least one of these groups. The Kachin Independence Army and the Arakan Army declined to participate in our research, but they harbor and support sit tat defectors as well.

The organizations described here can be divided into three broad categories: ERO and NUG actors, civilian-led groups, and CDM groups. As revolutionary bodies, the NUG and EROs have tactical and strategic interests in encouraging defections; they view the success of defections as part of their respective armies’ larger offensive strategies to defeat the sit tat. The civilian-led and CDM groups are primarily composed of activists and volunteers and often align with nonviolent resistance. These groups believe encouraging and promoting military defections is a way to support the revolution through direct action and civil resistance. CDM groups provide for the welfare of defected soldiers and their families. These groups are integral to the overall strategy of the success of the revolution, but they are relatively new, and due to their close and long-standing military connections, most lack experience operating in civilian space. Each group plays a different but vital role in the encouragement of defections and provides different kinds of support.

National Unity Government Ministry of Defense

The NUG Ministry of Defense (NUG-MoD) includes defections as a key factor of its offensive strategy. A core member of the NUG-MoD’s defection unit stated to us that encouraging defection aims to hasten the revolution with the least amount of bloodshed, but resource limitations hamper the strategy from being fully effective. The NUG-MoD works with another group, People’s Embrace, to encourage defections and document defectors under the CDM registry by issuing CDM codes to them. At the time of writing in 2023, the NUG-MoD had registered 1,500 defected soldiers and around 3,000 defected police under the CDM registry. As part of the registration process, the NUG-MoD also occasionally interviews these soldiers to gather intelligence and for documentation purposes.

At one point, the NUG promised cash rewards to soldiers who defected with their weapons, alluding to possible resettlement in Australia. In part, these messages were strategic, to convince soldiers that life as a defector outside the military is comfortable and attractive, but unfulfilled promises may backfire and slow down defections. Many defectors told us being resettled to Australia was a key push factor in their decision to leave.

The support the NUG-MoD can give to defectors is severely limited. The NUG-MoD can connect defectors to aid programs such as the UN World Food Program for internally displaced persons in Myanmar, but the NUG-MoD representative interviewed did not say how many people have accessed that support. As is the case with CDM support for striking CDM civil servants, the NUG-MoD struggles to give money or food even to defectors that have officially joined the CDM registry. The NUG-MoD is simply unable to guarantee the personal security, education, or healthcare of police and military defectors or their families.

As prices of goods rise inside Myanmar, especially in conflict zones, we can expect resource allocation difficulties to increase. The NUG-MoD is unable to make many guarantees, and the material offers for potential defectors are poor. This results in most successful defectors being ideologically motivated to leave or being unable to tolerate their present circumstances (such as having personal grievances or witnessing injustice), rather than leaving confidently with assurances of safety and support.

Unless the NUG-MoD is able to somehow fulfill the promises it made early after the coup, or win significant military victories against the sit tat, it is unlikely that it will influence large-scale defections in the near future.

People’s Embrace

People’s Embrace (pyithu yin kwin) is a group founded by Captain Lin Htet Aung, a defected sit tat soldier, for the purpose of encouraging soldiers to defect. People’s Embrace differs from the other CDM soldier groups and civilian-led groups in that it has close ties with the NUG and other EROs. Today, it operates under the administration of the NUG-MoD, and the Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration through the People’s Embrace Central Committee.

People’s Embrace is made up of five numbered “Task Forces”: #1 is responsible for organizing social media, #2 for verifying identities of defected soldiers and police, #3 for sending supplies to liberated areas, #4 for distributing supplies to and providing accommodation for defectors in liberated areas, and #5 for relocation of CDM soldiers to liberated areas. Once CDM soldiers are verified by Task Force #2, they are registered and eligible to receive CDM codes from the NUG. However, not all those who register are issued a CDM code; this concern was voiced by our interviewees. People’s Embrace has managed to support CDM soldiers under their care with 60,000 Myanmar Kyat each month and accepts donations. At the time of writing, People’s Embrace has received around 100 million kyat in donations. The organization runs Telegram channels encouraging soldiers to defect and offers support to “watermelons”³⁹ and “pre-CDMs” (those who are informants for the revolution within the military and who may wish to defect but are not yet able to).

Karenni Nationalities Defense Force & Karenni People’s Embrace

The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) formed in response to the 2021 coup d’état and is composed of local Karenni PDFs and militias. They operate under the NUG-MoD’s official defense policy.⁴⁰ As a relatively young and disparate organization, the KNDF struggles to acquire resources for their own struggle against the sit tat, while contending with the influx of defectors into their territories as fighting continues in their region. We interviewed the head of the KNDF’s CDM department and the second-in-charge of the Karenni chapter of People’s Embrace (KPE). He stated that there are 60 CDM soldiers under his care and a total of 100 CDM soldiers in Karenni State overall, with some waiting to be resettled to a third country.

The KNDF and the KPE have been pushing information campaigns among serving soldiers, supporting CDM soldiers, and rehabilitating them for civilian life. Their aim is to encourage mutiny on a larger scale (such as a whole battalion) through spreading messages to encourage defections. The KNDF claims that many sit tat soldiers have low morale from seeing news on social media and/or media. As part of their broader information campaigns, the KPE also calls the phones of individual soldiers to facilitate defections.⁴¹ At the time of our interview, the KNDF was planning to drop messages and leaflets encouraging defections with drones to forces on the ground.

The messaging in their campaign is concordant with the NUG-MoD. They try to persuade soldiers to believe that if they defect they will be treated well by the KNDF, that there is a pathway to moving to a third country, and that they could even receive a cash reward if they defect with arms. However, the KNDF representative we interviewed thought the financial incentives were not attractive to the soldiers; rather, the soldiers found respect, dignity, proper treatment and self-responsibility to be more attractive. The resettlement and cash rewards offered are unlikely to be realized; the KNDF themselves are struggling to support their own armed resistance, and the KPE do not have any specific funds allocated to them to facilitate defections or to support the CDM soldiers after they have defected. This weakens a KNDF/KPE systematic mechanism to support defection and leads to the organizations’ personnel risking their own security and resources in order to facilitate defection and house defectors. Without access to further funds and resources, it does not seem likely that the KNDF/KPE will be able to handle the kinds of large-scale defections they are encouraging.

However, it is worth noting that the KNDF regularly engages the sit tat in pitched battles and skirmishes and Karenni State remains one of the toughest fronts of resistance. As such, they are likely to see more defections, desertions, and surrenders from the front lines than other areas. While the number of defectors harbored by the KNDF/KPE is small for now, we can expect those numbers to grow if the tides of battle turn in favor of the resistance. In a recent example, two battalions of the Border Guard Force, a unit under the command of the sit tat, totaling around 600 troops, joined resistance forces to raid junta bases in the Karenni town of Mese in June 2023.⁴² The existing forces in the area lack the resources to absorb a large number of defectors, which could lead to further unrest in the region. It is therefore of strategic and tactical importance that the KNDF/KPE are equipped with the resources, both material and technical, to absorb defections in the area.

Karen National Union

The Karen National Union (KNU) and its armed wing the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) play a pivotal role in the revolution against the sit tat, one that their peoples have been fighting since 31 January 1949. The KNU shelters protesters and striking civil servants, and trains anti-coup militias and PDFs.⁴³ The KNU provides governance mechanisms in the areas it controls such as healthcare, education and administration.⁴⁴ The KNU has established significant relationships with the NUG, working together on many levels, and many defectors and resistance fighters have sought shelter in KNU-controlled territory. The KNU has had to deal with complicated logistical considerations for resettlement and integration of these populations since the 2021 coup. We interviewed a former joint secretary of the KNU and a spokesperson of a key KNU brigade responsible for the resettlement of a large number of CDM soldiers and police.

The KNU views those who defect from the police or from the military very differently; while police are treated like normal civil servants and employees, sit tat soldiers are handled with more scrutiny and suspicion. Soldiers are taught to kill, torture, and inflict violence, and the KNU believes they must be treated with more consideration. The KNU has extensive experience in dealing with the difficulty of reintegrating military deserters and defectors from decades past.

KNU officials ensure that military defectors are never housed alongside PDF groups for fear of violence breaking out between them. The KNU is playing a complicated logistical game of dividing up local villages to house either defectors or PDFs. Because of the difficulty of integrating defectors into civilian life, they only allow a maximum of 2-3 defectors to be hosted in each village. Currently the KNU is housing only a small number of defectors (in the hundreds). If there were to be a large-scale defection, such as a whole battalion, the KNU may not be able to accept them like they are doing now, and some other arrangement would need to be made. However, to date, what that arrangement is or should look like is unclear.

In the past, the KNU was able to send some military deserters home with financial support; however, the latest wave of deserters cannot be sent back and have no desire to return to their homes. Many “defectors” in fact do not want to be identified as such; some have surrendered themselves as prisoners of war. In the eyes of the KNU, they are treated the same as defectors. If a soldier defects and joins the CDM, there is a significant risk posed to their families and their personal safety; whereas if they are captured as prisoners of war, their safety is more guaranteed. The KNU have ceased returning prisoners of war to the sit tat like they have done in the past and have urged other groups to do the same.

The KNU has issued an official statement saying they will give 2 million Myanmar Kyat to any defector who surrenders with arms. The KNU has considered the low morale and likelihood of defections of sit tat soldiers in their offensive strategy. Before attacking a sit tat battalion, the KNU often issues a public notice to warn those in the area that they are about to attack. This gives the enemy time to defect, run away, or back down, which reduces the number of skirmishes. The main strategy of the KNU is to win their war without engaging in battle and therefore minimize casualties on all sides. The acquisition of arms through defectors is proving to be a winning strategy for the KNU: while arms prices have escalated recently due to high demand, giving 2 million kyat to a defector with a gun is essentially purchasing arms for a cheaper price than through regular means on the market. In an interview, a KNU representative told us that the organization would prefer to spend money on assisting defectors rather than on buying arms.

The KNU is currently in discussion with People’s Embrace to support defectors with rehabilitation and reintegration into civilian life. Some defectors have joined the KNU to fight against the military; so far, they have mostly provided training. There is a serious concern that defectors who are given arms may form their own militias, which could increase instability in the region.

People’s Goal

People’s Goal (pyithu pantaing) was initially called People’s Soldiers (pyithu sitthar), and was led by CDM Captain Nyi Thuta, the first military officer to speak out publicly against the coup in a Facebook interview. In January 2022, People’s Soldiers rebranded to People’s Goal and shifted from a CDM soldier-led group to a civilian group. They are therefore uniquely positioned, as they have the respect and support of defectors, as well as the eyes and ears of the general public.

People’s Goal advocates a non-violent ideological revolution. Their executive team consists of four civilians (including three women) and two former soldiers. Members of the People’s Goal team struggle with mental health challenges, with many having to take leave from work in order to attend to mental health issues. We interviewed several members of the team, including Thinzar Shunlei Yi, a member of the executive.

The group differs from other key organizations in that it focuses on public outreach through talk shows and other programs on Facebook, YouTube, and other media outlets. Since June 2021 they have produced weekly talk shows and roundtable discussions which share the experiences of CDM soldiers in order to increase public understanding of and support for CDM soldiers. As of January 2023 they have more than 70 episodes available to watch online, with their most popular video garnering over 346,000 views. While they have produced messages and content through various channels, they have been unable to conduct proper monitoring and evaluation to learn from and improve their outreach work.

People’s Goal currently provides limited material support for 470 defected soldiers and households. Many are either based in Karen State, or elsewhere on the Thailand-Myanmar border, or on the India-Myanmar border, and the support team is led by eight CDM soldiers. Support can include monthly stipends (depending on availability) and funds for relocation and emergency situations (such as medical needs). People’s Goal struggles to secure sustainable, long-term funding; its reliance on small-scale donations and short-term (one or two month) project funding means that it is unable to provide the large-scale support to defectors that is achieved by groups such as People’s Embrace or the NUG-MoD. The most effective work conducted by People’s Goal is advocacy and outreach.

People’s Goal have targeted both international and domestic audiences in their advocacy. For international advocacy, they have engaged foreign embassies, international organizations, the United Nations, justice mechanisms (such as the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar and Justice for Myanmar), and international media (by writing op-eds and engaging in interviews). For domestic advocacy, they target military families and relatives to spread defection campaign messaging. They identify three groups within the military: those who actively support the revolution; those who are loyal to the sit tat but disagree with the coup; and those who are active coup supporters. People’s Goal believes the first and second groups are best targeted to encourage shirking, disobedience, and eventual defection.

People’s Goal is concerned that some soldiers, especially those loyal to the coup, will never be reached by their messaging; the sit tat considers Facebook as the “enemy’s (social media) platform”, so some soldiers may not use it. On top of that, mobile data in Myanmar is becoming more expensive and access to information is being constrained by the SAC, which is increasingly restricting censorship circumvention technologies (such as virtual private networks). People’s Goal works with EROs to broadcast shortwave messages to the frontline and to distribute pamphlets via drones in order to reach soldiers who do not access social media or use mobile data regularly.

People’s Goal is an independent entity but still collaborates with other defection and CDM organizations. Some members of People’s Goal are also members of the People’s Embrace central committee, and they have issued joint statements with other defection groups. Despite this cooperation, People’s Goal still struggles to triage which CDM soldiers and households they should support, as they cannot verify who is also being supported by other organizations, due to a lack of information and data being shared between them. While People’s Goal admits that less people now join the CDM from the civilian public service than in the first year after the coup, there are still regular defections from the army and police: People’s Goal claim there is at least one defection, and many desertions, every week.

Spouses of People’s Soldiers

This group (pyithu sitthar zaneemya) was formed in September 2021 with only three original members, supported by an initial donation from Dr. Sasa and a few women’s organizations. Today, their group has expanded to over 10 people and supports 50-70 families with monthly stipends and supplies. This group was formed under the premise that defections heavily depend on support from soldiers’ wives and families. A founder of the group, Su Thit, urged her own soldier husband to leave his unit after the coup, and they arrived to a safe zone in August 2021.

In addition to supporting CDM soldier families, the group urges the wives of currently enlisted soldiers to pressure their husbands to leave, targeting spouses through Facebook, discussion groups, and weekly public conversations with the NUG. As mostly military wives, many of the women members are able to directly reach wives of currently serving soldiers through personal networks and social media.

The group also provides livelihood skills training for soldier’s wives and provides equipment for them to monetize these skills. Wives of soldiers are often homemakers or housewives who had lived with their husbands in military compounds, in essentially single-income households. They usually do not have any independent wealth or assets, leaving them dependent on the military for all their needs. The military for its part ensures that soldiers are dependent on the institution, as this is a significant barrier to defection.

Other Initiatives

In addition to these key organizations, there are a handful of smaller initiatives that also assist defections and support defectors. It is worth noting also that many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) provide assistance and support to some defectors and others in the CDM. This includes basic living support, housing, rations, and small stipends. These groups do not support CDM soldiers exclusively, however, so are not listed in detail. Many are based on the Myanmar-Thailand border and are unable to support those inside the country, yet alone on the Myanmar-India border.⁴⁵ The rest of this section briefly outlines two of the smaller initiatives that do target defections and defectors.

Blooming Padauk & Breaking Brainwashed

Blooming Padauk (padauk phu) is an initiative led by Su Thit (introduced above) and her husband Htet Myat, a military captain and member of People’s Soldiers. This minor initiative provides support for around 20-30 people, around 300,000 Myanmar Kyat per person for subsistence. They have released an eBook entitled Memories of 15 Years in the Military and publish stories on the Breaking Brainwashed weblog, containing information on how the military indoctrinates its personnel, and a YouTube channel dedicated to combating sit tat propaganda. Three of our interviewees mentioned working with Breaking Brainwashed after their defection.

Unnamed Defection Support Group

This small underground organization works to promote defections through high-risk direct communications with enlisted soldiers. They also provide psychological counseling for soldiers that are defecting, before and after they have left. They are one of the main groups behind the Watermelon Campaign, which encouraged shirking and other forms of resistance. Because their main goal is to reach those inside the sit tat and not advocate to the general public, they maintain a very low profile and rarely answer any interviews.

Joining the sit tat

While there is a long history of forced recruitment and child soldiers in the sit tat, and some of our respondents were recruited under the age of 18, many stated fairly mundane reasons for joining the sit tat in their surveys. A desire to serve and seeking job and education opportunities were the main reasons.

I had no idea what to do when I passed matriculation in 2011 … My friend in Tedim showed me an advertisement in the newspaper calling for applications for Computer Diploma Sergeant Clerks. I was very interested. I didn’t have any particular ambition in my mind. I just wanted to work in a nice office wearing a nice uniform. I didn’t know about the military or their bullying culture so I just enlisted.⁴⁶

Poverty and problems in their personal lives also incentivized many young men to sign up for the military:

My family forced me to join. They’re in poverty. When my grandpa died and no one was around to take care of our future, they asked me to apply for the DSA. I refused (but) later I was forced to join the military and ended up at the military computer and technological institute in Hopong anyway.⁴⁷

Others explained it as a mistake from the very beginning:

I quarreled with my parents before passing matriculation and I made the wrong choice. I enlisted, but not because I knew anything about the military, and I realized I made a mistake after signing up. I wasn’t even 17 when I enlisted in the army. I tried to quit, using my age as an excuse, but failed.⁴⁸

The military closed all of Myanmar’s universities for two years after the 8888 Uprising and 1988 coup; student protests between 1996 and 1998 similarly led to university closures for another three years.⁴⁹ Many young men ended up enlisting in the military during that time. Three of our respondents, who were recruited between 1997 and 2001, said they enlisted because at that time the only way to receive a university education was in the army.

Universities were closed most of the time and there weren’t many job opportunities either … The country’s economy was not favorable to us so we had to struggle a lot if we decided to join other universities. These were the main factors (pushing me to enlist in 2001).⁵⁰

As the state of education declines across Myanmar due to the current military dictatorship and anti-coup resistance, many youths and students are in a similar situation, where they have few options for education and furthering their careers. However, the CDM has encouraged students, teachers, and civil servants in general to exercise non-compliance to any military-backed initiatives, making the current situation different and prospective students do not appear to be flocking to military education institutions.

In fact, it is evident that the sit tat has faced recruitment challenges since the 2021 coup. Senior officials were known to receive bribes ranging from US $1,000 to $2,500 for recruitment before the coup, as there was high demand for employment in the government. Today, the SAC has had to reduce the standard for entry into the civil and armed forces. Researcher Lian Bawi Thang notes:

The acceptance rate of Myanmar’s three military schools—the DSA, the Defense Services Technological Academy, and the Defense Service Medical Academy—was around 10 percent (prior to the coup). These schools also received a high volume of applications―approximately 12,000 annually. After the coup, they received around 100 applications in 2021, primarily from military families. As a result, the schools extended the deadline hoping to receive more applications. The entry requirements were also relaxed in an attempt to rebuild the medical community. On 9 June 2022 the regime’s Ministry of Health issued a statement encouraging students who passed the matriculation exam but did not meet the criteria for admission to medical universities to apply anyway.⁵¹

Despite the poor economic situation in Myanmar, and the decline in education opportunities, youths are still choosing alternatives to joining any military institution. Youths who do not have the opportunity to continue their education are today more likely to join PDFs and EROs across the country to fight the military.

When we asked our respondents if they received any military training from foreign instructors, 10 out of 47 (21.3 percent) affirmed. Most instructors were from China and Russia (five each) and from India (four).⁵² Some analysts have questioned if Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine led to a decrease in military support provided to Myanmar. This may seem plausible, but Justice for Myanmar argues that “the pace of Russia’s involvement in Myanmar has increased … while proposing Myanmar as a market that Russia can potentially use to circumvent economic sanctions”.⁵³ It is not yet entirely clear if Russia’s commitment to supporting the SAC involves continuing military training, but it deserves close monitoring.

Motivations to Leave

To get a sense of what pushes personnel to defect, we asked defectors a series of questions to understand why they left, what challenges they faced in the military, and how they managed to defect. The main motivations and enabling factors we identified were the CDM, a moral conscience and political stance, peer and family pressure and systematic injustice.

Civil Disobedience Movement

Nearly half of the respondents mentioned the CDM (21 out of 50) as a motivating factor for leaving. Awareness of CDM could be due to the initial defections by CDM soldiers Captain Nyi Thuta and Captain Lin Htet Aung, who went on to found People’s Soldiers and People’s Embrace respectively. The CDM began when healthcare workers from state-run hospitals instituted a labor strike on 3 February 2021, two days after the coup. This led to a cascade effect, where hundreds of thousands of civil servants from government sectors resigned in opposition to the coup. CDM soldiers and police were initially faced with scrutiny and mistrust by the other strikers, but the NUG and strike leaders welcomed defecting soldiers as legitimate members of the resistance against the coup.

(I left) to join the CDM. I had the idea to leave a while ago but didn’t dare tell anyone as the situation was not favorable. I didn’t like what they were doing and secretly planned to leave all by myself.⁵⁴

Surprisingly, a few soldiers mentioned that they themselves took part in pro-democracy demonstrations after the coup.

When the coup occurred, I was still outside (the barracks) so I joined the demonstrations for three days. My parents always told me not to lose track of reality … After the coup, the battalion commander didn’t let us go outside (the army compound) … I went back and waited for a chance to flee to the liberated areas.⁵⁵

News of the CDM, a nationwide movement that swept every corner of the country, managed to reach many soldiers. They mentioned access to outside information as a reason for their defection.

I snuck out to use the phone and check what was happening on the internet during a military operation in Lashio. I saw it all. I contacted my uncles, verified what’s going on outside. When I was sure of what was happening I felt enraged. That’s why I left.⁵⁶

It appears that access to independent information and close contact with civilians is a major factor in soldiers’ decision-making. Throughout our interviews, 14 soldiers mentioned access to outside information as a factor influencing defection, highlighting the importance of different ways of communicating with and reaching currently enlisted soldiers.

Moral Conscience & Political Stance

Twenty respondents referred to their moral conscience as a motivating factor for leaving. Two of the interviewed soldiers said the killing of people of their own ethnic group was a motivating factor. Many cited the killing and torture of protesters after the coup as affecting their conscience.

(I left) because the crackdowns on the strikes were getting more and more violent. They killed people and justified what they were doing in a press conference. I hated it so much.⁵⁷

Many soldiers bore direct witness to atrocities committed by the military in their attacks on protesters. Others learned from the media or through other forms of investigation.

I heard news that the military burned over 30 people alive. I investigated and went out to scout. I asked the (affected) people and IDPs and found out these people thought that we soldiers were just murderers.⁵⁸

Some had a personal political stance that went against the sit tat and many were anti-coup and anti-dictatorship. Seventeen respondents stated their political stance as a motivation for leaving: eight mentioned anti-coup beliefs, five mentioned anti-dictatorship beliefs, and four mentioned pro-democracy beliefs. Some mentioned the military’s fraudulent overturning of the election as a significant factor.

When the National League for Democracy had power from 2016-2021, there were some changes in the military. It was not completely transformed but there were slight changes. You could talk back when you thought you were right. After the coup, they just shoot and kill innocent people, raid homes and arrest people at night, and bust the windows of cars parked on the street. I didn’t have the stomach for this injustice. It didn’t feel right to stay so I left.⁵⁹

Many of the defectors reported illegal or wrong actions by the military during their service. A total of 57 percent of respondents mentioned being ordered to perform work that they considered illegal or wrong and 71 percent said they witnessed their colleagues performing actions that were illegal or wrong. Then, 70 percent mentioned illegal actions performed by their superiors. Of those, many mentioned instances of impossible or unjust orders (16), unlawful detention or imprisonment (13), beatings and torture (six), and five mentioned unlawful killings. Of these instances, 72 percent of them were performed following orders given by superiors.

They burned houses at the front line. They shouldn’t. It’s not easy for a person to own a house. They’d be angry. The military just finds an easy target because they can’t find the enemy. Soldiers burn houses just to get a clear shot (at a person). Sometimes when the enemy hid in a house and shot at them, the soldiers would burn the house. The rank-and-file soldiers would say that they were ordered to do so by officers. The officers in turn are commanded by their superiors.⁶⁰

Also, 80 percent of respondents reported illegal drug use in their battalion or company, and 98 percent reported heavy drinking in their battalion or company. Many respondents reported shirking orders before they defected. It is not clear whether the shirking was tied to a moral objection or reluctance from laziness or other reasons, but nonetheless, reports of shirking, partial obedience, and lying were common across the interviews.

Peer and Family Pressure

Peer and family influence play a significant role in soldiers’ decision to defect. When asked, 70 percent of respondents reported that they did not make the decision to leave by themselves and 42 percent said they were encouraged to leave by their friends or family.

My girlfriend often sent me video clips of the military killing people in demonstrations … When the revolution occurred, she said she’d only keep dating me if I joined the CDM.⁶¹

Many stated they consulted colleagues or superior officers when deciding to leave. Some soldiers without support from peers or family said they hesitated to defect before there were support groups available. The presence of groups like People’s Goal and People’s Embrace helped soldiers gain the courage to leave: “I had wanted to join the CDM from April 2021, but back then there was no organization like People’s Soldiers, so I didn’t know where to go.”⁶²

Injustice in the Military System

When asked about the challenges of serving in the military, an overwhelming majority of respondents (72 percent) mentioned systematic injustice: corruption, discrimination, organizational dysfunctionality, food insecurity, forced labor, poor living conditions, personal mistreatment, mobility restrictions, lack of support, rights violations, being forced to obey unjust orders, and many other forms of oppression.

We’re supposed to have two annual leave breaks per year on paper. That’s not the case in reality. The salary is low. We don’t have enough food to eat. Living conditions are quite depressing too. Battalion commanders make demands every day and it’s really frustrating. Officers take advantage of the labor of low-ranking soldiers without paying. We have to do household chores at the battalion commander’s house and work at the chicken farm. Soldiers at the frontline are supposed to rotate every six months but they don’t do that either.⁶³

While there are some comforts associated with the free education, healthcare, and other services available in the military, those who grew up in the system see the injustice faced by their own family members: 81 percent of respondents claimed that women and children are treated badly in the military. Wives of soldiers, especially lower-ranking ones, are often subjected to forced labor serving in the homes of higher-ranking officers. Sai Latt put it this way: “senior officers physically abuse and financially exploit their subordinates for personal wealth”.⁶⁴ These problems have been endemic in the military system likely since its formation, yet the institution has persisted until this day.

Since I grew up in the military, I saw my mom having to wash the clothes of officers’ wives. I didn’t want to say it to my mom, but she was like their housemaid. Children were also subject to discrimination in terms of parents’ positions. They raised children to become just like them. My mom worked for them like a slave. That’s the reason I didn’t bring my own wife to the base (when I got married).⁶⁵

Even though participants recounted long-term institutionalized injustice as a motivating factor for their defection, many of them remained in the system for years, suffering these various abuses. The punishments and barriers to defection are high. It took the 2021 coup and subsequent atrocities to push many soldiers to make the move.

There’s always been reasons for me to leave. I long knew that the institution was wrong. I’ve carried out unjust orders and been subject to them. Though I wanted to leave, I never had a chance. For people like me who had no backup, it’s impossible to find a route to escape. My main opportunity was the coup itself. My decision to leave was confirmed.⁶⁶

Some respondents pointed out the contrasting treatment they received at the hands of the EROs after defecting (often the same EROs these soldiers had spent years fighting while in the sit tat). Juxtaposing the poor treatment one receives in the sit tat with the kind treatment one receives at the hands of the resistance is a tactic now used to entice defections.

I was oppressed in the military. Food was pretty bad. Ever since I arrived at this ERO, I can take a shower every day and eat three meals a day. I can drink water as much as I want. As long as I’m on good behavior and honest with them, they provide me security.⁶⁷

Barriers to Defection

Our respondents highlighted four main barriers to defection: communications and surveillance, finances, safety concerns, and fear of punishment. They also mentioned other implications of leaving. The sit tat maintains control over soldiers through a combination of ideological propaganda, isolation of external information, framing those who resist the dictatorship as perpetual enemies, provision of security, a hierarchical system of rewards, promotions and punishments, and threats and intimidation aimed at keeping soldiers within the military.

Figure 4
Chart of respondents’ answers to the question: Do you know of other soldiers wishing to defect?

Figure 5
Chart of responses to the question: Why do you think your colleagues still remain in the military?

Communications & Surveillance

When asked about the communication channels they used to speak with their fellow sit tat soldiers, respondents said they communicated by phone (30) and the Viber application (19). Others mentioned in order of frequency: SMS, Telegram, email, Facebook Messenger, radio, an application called Icon, and fax. When asked about the communication channels used in daily life, phone calls and Facebook Messenger were mentioned most (both with 35).

Figure 6
Chart of responses citing communications channels used by respondents to communicate with other soldiers.

Figure 7
Chart of responses citing which communication channels respondents said their fellow soldiers were using when in the military.

The military closely monitors these communication channels not only when used by soldiers for work purposes, but also apparently when soldiers (and their families) are off-duty. A total of 31 respondents (62 percent) stated their personal communications were monitored on a daily basis. There were 20 mentions of the military collecting social media and email accounts (including names and passwords), 16 mentions of digital surveillance (with seven specifically mentioning military surveillance teams dedicated to monitoring soldiers’ online activity), 10 mentions of not being permitted to use phones or social media at all, and nine mentions of soldiers physically searching others’ devices. Some also mentioned being instructed to listen in on their peers’ calls, monitor them, and some had their devices confiscated or were questioned about their online activity.

Soldiers’ phone numbers, Facebook and Gmail accounts, and those of their wives and children, had to be listed … Family members are monitored on social media as much as the soldiers. They formed and operated online surveillance teams.⁶⁸

Therefore, it is understandable why some military personnel thinking about defecting are hesitant to use digital communication channels to seek assistance from support groups or former colleagues/friends who have already defected.

According to Code 38, if you leave your military outpost for more than 21 days, you will have to serve 5-7 years in prison. Now they are afraid of watermelons … Therefore, the adjutants sometimes do surprise checks on your social media accounts. If your family members live in the base compound, their accounts are also checked.⁶⁹

The Israeli investigative analytics firm Cognyte, formerly known as Verint Systems, “won a tender to provide monitoring services for Myanmar’s state telecommunications agency, just before the 2021 military coup … (allowing) the Myanmar military to tap calls in real time, aiding and abetting its atrocity crimes” and this digital authoritarianism is only expected to get worse in light of the later deal between the sit tat and NSO Group Technologies, the creator of the Pegasus spyware system.⁷⁰ Correspondingly, several responses mentioned a lack of information and misinformation as an obstacle both for themselves and for those still serving in the military: “Those fighting on the front line with a poor internet connection didn’t know about the coup at all. They (still) have no idea what’s going on”.⁷¹ But even for some of those stuck at base:

(The army) blocks access to news media and replaces it with preaching propaganda during assembly. Soldiers tend to believe it due to peer pressure, loyalty (to your own intake, own battalion/company), and an inability to differentiate right from wrong.⁷²

The kogyi–nyilay culture instilled into the system is a strong source of dissatisfaction within the military, but this system also binds soldiers to their superior officers so firmly that it makes it even more difficult to break away from the SAC (both physically and mentally). This is heightened by the sit tat’s propagation of military nationalist, Buddhist ideology, both to soldiers and the Myanmar population more widely. Belief in this military propaganda constitutes yet another barrier to defection, one in which many soldiers who decide to stay in the military lack any moral concerns over the violence the military inflicts upon the public, especially when victims are conceived as existential threats to the nation and to Buddhism. But “for some, it’s like the Burmese proverb: Even if you do not love him, hold your breath and kiss him.”⁷³

Furthermore, the extreme isolationist policies that the sit tat has placed on serving members of the military constitute another set of barriers for soldiers to defect. This includes implementing structural obstacles such as checkpoints, guards at the front of housing, curfews, prohibitions against leaving the compound, and placing families into military compounds, which makes it harder for soldiers to defect, let alone leave the military base unattended.

Married soldiers have to think about their wives and families. The light infantry soldiers are threatened that if they join the CDM, their wives and children will be sent to jail or murdered.⁷⁴

When asked what kind of support would make defections easier, nine respondents mentioned facilitating travel from military outposts; the second most frequent answer after personal security (12). This was reinforced when we asked about obstacles for soldiers considering defecting. The most frequently mentioned obstacle by our respondents was military surveillance/tight security measures (14), including guards and checkpoints in front of the compounds, monitoring of communication channels like phone calls and social media, restrictions and bans from leaving the base. Secluding soldiers as a tactic for retaining them is not new,⁷⁵ but measures have been heightened since the 2021 coup. Notably, of the 14 respondents mentioning military surveillance/tight security measures as a key obstacle to defection, 12 lived inside a military base prior to their defecting.

The military has its own plans for restricting defections: if they suspect an individual, they never leave them alone, and instead assign three to five other soldiers who strongly support the military to monitor them. In this situation, soldiers dare not talk about their defection plan with their colleagues. There is always a chance that they will get reported to their commander, so they don’t dare hint at how sick they are of the military.⁷⁶

One barrier to defection not mentioned by our respondents is the challenge of leaving the country via air travel. Under Myanmar law, all government employees are required to hand over their passports to their departments, and get permission to travel abroad.⁷⁷ The relevant ministry will look into their reasons for travel, and if this is deemed appropriate, they will be issued with their passport identifying them as a government representative.⁷⁸ This prevents members of the military with financial means (specifically the officer corps) from leaving Myanmar by plane.

Financial Considerations

Another barrier to defection interviewees repeatedly mentioned by our interviewees was the financial implications of leaving the military. Soldiers fear losing their primary source of income. Furthermore, when asked why they think their colleagues still remain in the military, eight mentioned financial security as important.

The official salary in the military is based on position. It is rare for low- to mid-ranking soldiers to achieve a comfortable salary. Unless their superiors permit them to steal from civilians during operations, only high-ranking officials are known to have a salary deemed comfortable. Among the defected soldiers interviewed for this research work, 36 out of 49 (73.5 percent) said that their salary was between 100,000-300,000 Myanmar Kyat, and 13 said it was between 300,000-500,000 kyat. When we cross-analyzed the defected soldiers’ salaries with their ranks in the military, 28 out of 36 said that their salary was between 100,000-300,000 kyat and were in the three lowest ranks of the respondents.⁷⁹ Seven out of the 13 that reported a salary between 300,000-500,000 kyat were in the top-ranked tier of respondents (major, captain, lieutenant, and warrant officer II, in descending order).

Figure 8
Chart of the reported ranks of respondents and the incidence of their salary grouping, shown in Myanmar Kyat.

Figure 9
Chart of respondents’ salary grouping, shown in Myanmar Kyat, and their answer to the question of whether they had any alternative means of income.

Further, 20 out of 36 respondents with salaries between 100,000-300,000 Myanmar Kyat were the sole breadwinner of their family. While higher ranking military personnel certainly stand to lose more in economic terms if they defect, the fact that many soldiers have no alternative means of generating income, let alone certainty of support from groups encouraging defections, also presents an obstacle to defection among lower ranks. With low salaries and no other means of income, they rely on the military to provide basic living support, including housing, education and food. Many of our research participants mentioned relying on the sit tat for subsistence, shelter, and other necessities.

Safety Concerns

Those who have intergenerational or other close ties within the military face more challenges when they decide to leave. A total of 16 out of 50 (32 percent) of respondents had family members or relatives that served in the military. Of the five that grew up in military housing, all attended primary schools in the military compounds. For them, their main concerns were for the safety of their family who were still in the compounds. Even those without family in the compounds saw the threats their families could face should they be discovered as defectors.

Many respondents worry about their family being interrogated or otherwise harassed by the military should they be identified as defectors. Some mentioned this as a reason for why their defection took longer than expected. When asked what their concerns were when they defected, 29 mentioned family safety. Additionally, 15 mentioned that both themselves and their family are not safe in their current place, and three mentioned that they themselves are safe but their family are not. “As soon as I left, I became just a deserter to them … The parents of people hunted by the soldiers are arrested when they can’t find them. I’m very worried that they will take my mother as a hostage.”⁸⁰

Figure 10
Chart of responses to the question: Are you and your family safe in your current place?

Additionally, when we asked why they think their former colleagues still remain in the military, the most frequent response was “family considerations” (22). Within these responses, most mentioned the anticipated threats to their family’s safety if they were left behind in the military bases.

There are many things to consider before defection … If we defect alone, we’re worried that (the sit tat) will capture our families. Staying in the military is a safe zone for us. We just need to work at the office, take the salary and live comfortably. In the end everybody thinks of themselves.⁸¹

Defectors are as concerned about their own personal security as that of their families. A total of 28 mentioned personal safety as of top concern once they defected, in order of frequency: fear of capture and arrest (22), fear of death (five), fear of torture (two), and the need for legal protection (one).

Figure 11
Respondents’ concerns about kinds of personal safety.

Punishments for Defection

Despite being ethically and/or ideologically discontent with the violence inflicted by the sit tat against civilians, and keeping in mind the other previously outlined factors, safety concerns certainly serve as an obstacle to defection. The military’s punishment for defection is ruthless and the sit tat is reputed for tracking down defectors and similarly punishing anyone with ties to them. The repercussions on defectors’ families are serious and several former soldiers provided us with personal accounts of the sit tat attempting to track them down after leaving.⁸² When we asked what the punishments are for defection, the most frequent response was imprisonment (38), followed by the death sentence (19). A total of 16 responses also highlighted that punishments for defection depend on the situation/circumstance. Of these 16, eight mentioned that whether you defect with arms or not is the determining factor for one’s punishment.

Whether you desert from a base or from the frontline, it’s a very minor case if you leave without a weapon … You are put in prison for a short period and then sent back to the frontline. But since we (went on to) join the CDM, we can expect a prison sentence, at the least. The gravity of our case is less serious because we didn’t defect with arms.⁸³

While the punishments for defection are significantly higher for those who leave the military with arms, this is an affordable and preferable way for the armed resistance movement to acquire weapons (as previously mentioned). There are several reward schemes in place from defection support groups providing cash prizes to military personnel who defect with arms. The amounts actually awarded in practice are not clear (and some of the advertised rates, such as those by the NUG, are in the realm of fantasy) but some estimates have put the prizes at around US $1,000,⁸⁴ which is around three times lower than the market rates for rifles.

Consequences of Defecting

When we asked respondents what they felt like they had lost from defecting, the most frequent response was “nothing” (18), with the second-most frequent being loss of monetary savings (11). We expected the most common responses to highlight the loss of safety and security, income, and savings in the military-run banks. But if we look more closely at the most common response of losing “nothing” we see a recurring theme of ethical and moral discontent with the way in which they and their colleagues treated Myanmar civilians since the coup. Dissatisfaction with the military system, its coup and treatment of the public in the past two years were direct reasons why many did not feel like they had lost anything by defecting (one assumes, they felt instead like they had gained something). One participant put it bluntly: “Leaving the military does not make me feel any sense of loss. I didn’t do the right thing when I was serving as a soldier”.⁸⁵ Another adopted a wider perspective: “Since the military is not doing its own job, our country has become the poorest in Southeast Asia. As a result, I don’t feel like I have lost anything by leaving the military”.⁸⁶

Figure 12
Chart of responses to the question, “What did you lose after defection?”

A total of 44 out of 48 relevant respondents (91.7 percent) said that their defection impacted soldiers in their past battalion/company.

Figure 13
What were the impacts of your defection on your previous battalion/company, if any?

These impacts included disciplinary action (13), fear of intelligence being obtained by defectors, and providing inspiration for other soldiers to abandon their positions. By motivating others to defect, those who leave engage in an act of defiance which challenges the internal stability of the military system. Among the 13 respondents who mentioned disciplinary action taken against their colleagues, seven mentioned disciplinary action being taken against their superior officers.

Every responsible party (including the battalion commander) has experienced legal repercussions from my defection. Battalion and company commanders underwent a trial. I feel both empathy and sympathy for them. I left the army because of the crooked leaders at the top and I want to extend my apologies to those who suffered for my defection.⁸⁷

Figure 14
The forms of reported disciplinary action taken out on respondents’ colleagues after they defected.

Another interesting response provided by respondents on the implications for their former colleagues was underreporting of the defection (5). When soldiers abandon their positions, their officers may not report their absence due to fear of repercussions from their superiors. Additionally, unrecorded defections can serve the officers well, whereby they can collect the salaries of these deserters for themselves.

If someone deserts from the frontline, the officers are supposed to put them on the casualty list. But the commander would normally only put the name on the list after one or two years. Meanwhile, he would take the salary of these deserters. I had my share of this money during my service. My battalion commander gave it to me. When an audit was about to come, we rushed through and faked the data.⁸⁸

A Lift Before the Leap

New people joining the CDM has slowed down considerably in 2023, but the military and police are still steadily defecting. The defectors we interviewed all undertook perilous journeys to attain freedom. While some braved the journey alone, many had outside support of some kind. While the high barriers to defection prevent many from leaving, our research finds that providing effective support from outside is vital for enabling defections. Of the 50 respondents, 16 are inside Myanmar, 24 are outside, 2 are somewhere along the Myanmar-Thailand border, and 8 did not specify their current location. Of the 24 respondents outside of Myanmar, most are in Mae Sot, Thailand.

Figure 15
Map of respondents’ answers to the question: “Where are you now?”

How They Left

The mobility of defectors varied greatly depending on their rank, whether they were on a front line, or if they were on leave. A total of 48 percent of respondents left in the company of others, 15 people mentioned colleague(s) in some capacity, while 13 people mentioned family and/or friend(s). Two defectors mentioned they left with a superior officer, with one recounting: “A sergeant who patrolled with me half-jokingly said he wanted to desert … Since he started talking about it, we fled together.”⁸⁹

Others mentioned that they received support from their seniors or other soldiers when they made the decision to defect. One soldier told how his superior officer deserted first, facilitating the further escape of four soldiers:

Our squad was assigned ‘last duty’ because our captain had deserted. If he were still there, we wouldn’t have had the chance to leave … We pretended we had to go and get rain shelters. Two pairs of us left twenty minutes apart.⁹⁰

Many took the chance to escape while they had an excuse to be away from duty. Some never reported back after going on leave. Others fled from the frontline or surrendered themselves to EROs when nearby. Others simply walked or drove off from their base when an opportunity arose.

I was an office staffer so no one really cared about me. I said I was going out for betel nut. As soon as I arrived at the betel shop I rented a sidecar motorcycle taxi and went to (another town). There were no checkpoints.⁹¹

Support Received

Many soldiers received help to defect and assistance after defecting from outside sources; only seven did not. Seven mentioned family and friends helping them to leave. Seven mentioned People’s Goal/Soldier’s and six mentioned People’s Embrace. Five mentioned that their seniors or other colleagues still in the military assisted them. Four contacted other soldiers that they knew had defected. Some people received multiple forms of support along the way:

When I left the army compound, a colleague gave me his motorbike. I drove it to a spot where a car was waiting for me. Right after I left, my childhood friends supported me by providing me with living expenses. One of my friends even brought me with him to his house. Later I reached out to the People’s Soldiers. In Mae Sot, I made contact with a lady (offering support) through a friend’s connection.⁹²

When asked how they made contact to get support, 13 mentioned they received support by phone. Eight were in touch through personal networks or contacts, while seven mentioned reaching out through Telegram. Four reached out on Facebook and three on Signal. This shows that despite the communication restrictions imposed by the military to stem the tide of defections, soldiers are still able to reach out for support if they are careful.

Figure 16
Responses to the question: “After you decided to defect, what kind of support did you receive from others?”

When asked what kind of support they received from other people after their defection, many mentioned basic living and financial support. A total of 26 respondents gave the name of organizations from which they received support: People’s Goal, People’s Embrace, the NUG, PDFs, the Spouses of People’s Soldiers, the KNU and the KNDF. There were also two mentions of the Restoration Council of Shan State and one mention of the Cobra Column, a PDF that works as a special operations unit of the KNLA, and there was one mention of a peacebuilding organization operating in Myanmar.

Figure 17
Chart with respondents’ explicitly named sources of support.

The fact that seven defectors received no support from any organization could be because they did not manage to contact these organizations: some mentioned that they did not even know the existence of defection support groups. This may mean that more outreach is necessary to reach defectors that have already left but are not connected to the wider network of support.

I received no help from organizations. I had to rely on my parents for bus fares and accommodation fees. I didn’t even know that this kind of organization existed. Three of us who left received no help from anyone but our parents.⁹³

Support Needed

When asked what kind of support would have helped them to defect earlier or more easily, respondents mentioned assurances of personal security (12) and help for travel from military outposts (9) as the main things that would have aided them. Many of the respondents defected at great peril to their own personal safety.

We brought guns and ammunition with us but the soldiers chased us and shot at us from the rear. I was wearing a vest with magazines and a bullet hit one. It didn’t kill me but it knocked me out. The soldiers thought I was dead and stopped shooting. I woke up and just left my gun and ran away.⁹⁴

Figure 18
Chart of responses to the question: “What kinds of support would have made it easier for you to defect?”

Many suggested basic living support, financial support, welfare programs or job opportunities as factors that would have aided their defections. Others mentioned ensuring the safety of their family, the need for a closer network between defectors and support groups, and one person mentioned the need for more systematic and timely responses and actions from support groups. While support groups are currently operating to support defections, their teams are small and their funding is limited. Few organizations have the resources or manpower to aid defectors in all the ways that they require.

Many defectors mentioned education (24) and job opportunities (16) as key support they would need to transition to civilian life. Most respondents (70 percent) were willing to attend useful training courses (i.e., vocational, computer, language training). Alongside reskilling and retraining for defectors to integrate better into civilian life, support for obtaining legal documentation is equally important. Many former soldiers have sought refuge in Thailand, but lack proper identification documents. Like many others who fled from Myanmar to Thailand, they experience difficulties in obtaining a work permit card (also known as a ‘pink card’), which requires disclosing their personal information and professional background to Thailand authorities. If one were to do so, there is a risk that this information could be shared with the SAC back in Myanmar. Because defection carries significant punishments (as outlined previously), few risk disclosing their personal information to the authorities, preventing them from obtaining documents.

When asked, nearly 37 percent of soldiers said that they or their family members and friends may need psychological support to help them with their traumatizing experiences.

Many defectors reported active contact with serving soldiers who wanted to defect, saying they needed support such as: facilitating travel from military outposts (9), assurances of safety (6), basic living support (7), financial support (9), family support (8), and job opportunities, in order to assist them to defect. Some mentioned acquiring legal documentation (4) and resettlement to a third country after defecting (3) as factors.

Current Conditions

When asked about their future plans, most respondents said they wanted to continue working in the Spring Revolution in some capacity, with 10 specifically mentioning armed resistance against the military.

The revolution must prevail. We can have a better life only if we succeed, so we’re fighting hard for it. People need to keep financing the revolution. We need both fighters and financiers to win this war.⁹⁵

Twenty-one respondents said they wanted a job or to start a business. However, many struggle to find gainful employment and some are stuck doing low-wage menial labor or service sector jobs. They struggle with mistrust in their new communities, with locals unwilling to give them work, especially those still inside Myanmar. A total of 80 percent of respondents had no job or income at the time of our interviews. Most also had very little savings, or none at all.

Figure 19
Responses to the question: “Do you currently have a job?”

A sizable proportion of defectors mentioned resettlement to a third country (17), specifically Australia, as part of their future plans. In the early days of the coup, a handful of CDM soldiers and police were accepted for resettlement in third countries.⁹⁶ The Sydney Morning Herald published an article in March of 2022 which suggested the Australian government is issuing protection visas for defectors from Myanmar.⁹⁷ There have been few accounts of defectors being accepted since then, but the idea remains attractive to many soldiers.⁹⁸

Figure 20
Responses to the question: “What organizations are you helping now?”

As defectors adapt to life outside of the military, many respondents stated they were not only being helped by, but also helping and contributing to, organizations involved in the resistance. Many joined EROs (11) such as the KNDF and KNLA. Still others work with the NUG (nine) and with PDFs (eight). One who served in the medical corps said he volunteers for an online telehealth service.

Conclusion

The servicemen and women who have sacrificed their security and careers as an act of defiance against the sit tat have taken significant risks in order to leave the institution. However, many are finding themselves in poverty and/or impossible situations where they are at risk of arrest or detention by the sit tat as well as by authorities in neighboring countries. This is concerning, as “nobody will take the path of losing their title, position, income, and respect if (becoming destitute) is the outcome.”⁹⁹

The key organizations interviewed for this paper have worked in various ways to promote defections since the 2021 coup, with varying degrees of cooperation between the different actors. The CDM Soldiers’ Registry, organized by the NUG and People’s Embrace, attempts to catalog all CDM soldiers in order to assess the volume of defectors and adequately deliver aid. While (by their estimates) nearly half of defected soldiers have joined the registry, many have not. Meanwhile, the KNU reports that there are a lot of soldiers who do not wish to be identified with the CDM for security reasons; for those soldiers, it is easier to desert, go missing in action, or presume to be killed. People’s Goal suggests there are far more soldiers defecting or deserting than are known about.

These key actors provide a variety of support for defections, including: creating communication products and content to encourage defections across online and traditional media channels; providing cash incentives and rewards for soldiers that defect with their arms; guiding and assisting defectors’ journeys to safe places; providing material support such as basic living and monthly stipends; providing psychological counseling to soldiers and their family members; and retraining defectors to prepare them for civilian life. They mention that they lack human and financial resources to address the current needs of defectors, suggesting that they are only able to cover a small portion of the total number. They also lack the resources to continue these activities at scale, and should there be a large-scale or cascade of defections as hoped for by the revolutionary forces, there would be no institution or mechanism in place to absorb these numbers. This could lead to unrest and instability.

From our interviews with defectors, a gap in the assistance offered is evident, whereby some can utilize many of the resources while others none at all. We identified gaps in the support being provided with regards to the facilitation of secure escape routes, basic living support, mental health, job opportunities, reskilling and training,¹⁰⁰ and relocation to a third country. Few skilled jobs are available to defectors, and while manual labor work is acceptable for many rank and file soldiers who are familiar with hard labor, educated officer classes often report feeling underutilized. On the other hand, many soldiers have been in the military since their teens and often lack the skills to work or live outside of the institution of the military. Defected soldiers constantly highlight their aspiration to seek asylum in a third country; specifically Australia. However, to date, only a small handful of soldiers have made the journey there.

Defections are still a viable and active part of the CDM and resistance against the sit tat, but if not managed well, there could be poor outcomes in the regions where defectors are based. Absorbing defections poses challenges for EROs, the NUG, and civilians. Soldiers are likely to have a history of violence, drug and alcohol abuse, and there are valid concerns about integrating them into communities, and how such programs will be perceived by civilians who suffer daily at the hands of the sit tat. Established methods for managing and rehabilitating violent extremists exist in various parts of the world, and some of these methods could be used to deradicalize defectors and reintegrate them as functioning, safe members of society.

Our findings show that the overall defection efforts, while having strength and structure since the start of the coup, are still in their infancy, with much room for growth. Yet there is a potential for defections to be highly influential and they could be a deciding factor in the revolution with adequate technical and material support from regional and international actors.

Another factor is defections from the officer corps. By mid-October 2021, “there had only been one example of a top-level officer – a regional commander – who attempted to defect but without success”.¹⁰¹ Many defectors’ former colleagues remain in high-ranking positions within the military regime. If there is an increase in defections from the sit tat officer corps, it could provide the encouragement needed for large-scale defections to take place.

Recommendations

In this section we provide concrete steps that will assist the defection strategy achieve its goals.

1. Channel Support to Groups and Communities Currently Encouraging and Assisting Defections

The NUG and People’s Embrace have the largest reach to current defectors and must be supported to provide more aid to defectors. They are the most likely to develop a comprehensive plan for deradicalization and reintegration of defectors into civilian life. EROs deal with the physical and material burden of defectors living on their territories and in their villages; they face the danger of defectors forming militias in their controlled territories, which leads to increased instability for their own people. Therefore, EROs have a pressing strategic need to deal with the “what-ifs” of large-scale defections.¹⁰² Local communities in ethnic and ERO areas also deal with the social and material burdens of hosting defectors and those in the CDM, and humanitarian actors should ease their burden by providing more support. Independent groups encouraging defections, especially those started by former soldiers and those that are regionally based, are often close to soldiers remaining in the sit tat. Supporting these entities will help reach soldiers distrustful of the NUG or EROs but still interested in defecting.

2. Facilitate Cooperation Between Groups Encouraging and Assisting Defections

Networking opportunities should be provided for smaller bands of defectors or minor and regional defection efforts to contact larger groups such as People’s Goal, the NUG, and EROs. There should also be efforts to encourage cooperation between the independent groups and the NUG/EROs; independent groups have many members distrustful of the NUG/EROs. This should be remedied quickly in order to increase the chances of soldiers in different regions being able to access defection offers.

3. Increase Communication Efforts Aimed at non-CDM or Enlisted Personnel

Develop and communicate mechanisms for military personnel to understand the support available to them if they defect. This can be done through social and traditional media campaigns, leaflets and flyers, and infiltrating existing networks of soldiers to share information. Existing communication efforts should be supported and expert advice should be provided to improve these channels as many are run by teams with little to no media training. Opportunities should also be created for communicating to soldiers in the sit tat within independent and mainstream media. Soldiers on the frontline and across bases frequently listen to the radio and, despite restrictions, use social media. Access to information acts as a significant factor in their defections. Incentives can be provided to independent media to report on and keep sharing information about defections and the military’s actions. The international community should support and fund satellite internet for communities across the country in order to increase information flow.

4. Train Groups on Rehabilitation and Integration

Many of the groups encouraging/assisting defection formed as ad-hoc affiliations with little to no formal experience in social work, humanitarian assistance, or mental health support. These groups frequently consist of volunteers and former soldiers who wish to support defections for ideological reasons. Groups supporting defections can learn from historically successful international efforts working on deradicalization and defections in other areas in order to develop comparative data on how other regions are resolving the situation of defectors.¹⁰³

5. Provide Specific Training Opportunities for Soldiers to Better Integrate into Civilian Life

The sit tat is an institution which exerts cult-like and near-total control over its members and their families. Those who join quickly find themselves in a jarring system that is traumatic to escape from. It is common for those with prestige and rank to stay in the military for a lifetime, and their children often join it also. Due to the military’s strict isolationist policies, these soldiers lack the skills to survive in civilian life. While there are some groups retraining CDM participants for a new life as a migrant outside Myanmar, soldiers require unique reskilling and retraining. Support should also be provided to spouses and children of soldiers in order to increase the pull of defection offers. Many soldiers join the military for access to jobs, education opportunities, and financial stability, and seeing better opportunities available elsewhere may be attractive to them and lead to defection.

6. Develop Clear Roles for Defectors

Based on our findings, it is clear that many defectors feel useless and lost without work and income. While many would benefit from any kind of employment, it would also be useful to develop new initiatives and projects for defectors to participate in. Defectors are sometimes involved in training PDF forces, but this is not at a large enough scale. While many EROs and PDFs are hesitant to trust and involve defectors in operations against the sit tat, defectors often have skills that others in the resistance do not have. It is important that these skills are utilized. One way could be a skill swap or share program, where defectors can participate in a volunteer program that helps them establish meaningful contact with civilians and integrate them into society.

7. Provide Humanitarian Support for Migrants

EROs and border areas need support to absorb defectors. They need to be housed away from strategically significant areas, and mechanisms must exist to move them onwards. The UN Refugee Agency should provide defectors with Person of Concern status to offer them a layer of protection. Many defectors are on either side of the Myanmar-Thailand border and advocacy should be aimed at the Thailand government to improve the situation for refugees from Myanmar (including defectors).

8. Offer Resettlement Programs in Third Countries to Defectors

Sympathetic countries have the opportunity to play a vital role in facilitating high-ranking defections by offering them asylum. The biggest barrier to defections is the lack of a clear pathway out. Many defectors mention the supposed Australian offer for resettlement as a strong incentive for leaving the military. When there is a clear path before them, many more soldiers will be willing to leave the institution.

9. Support the Development of Transitional Justice Mechanisms for Conflict in Myanmar

Soldiers are likely to have either witnessed or committed acts of unjust violence and torture against civilians or enemy combatants. Mechanisms should be implemented to document and respond to such accounts. There should also be mechanisms in place for the safe surrender of sit tat soldiers who wish to defect, such as use of amnesties, the fair treatment of prisoners of war, a clear prohibition of extrajudicial killings, and guarantees for surrender.

10. Support Further Research on Defections

Any communications efforts that target defectors need to be backed by evidence of efficacy. More research should be conducted to collect baseline data and analytics on existing communications aimed at defections. Desk research should be conducted on defection strategies across the world and communicated, in Burmese, to existing defection efforts so that they can test different strategies for the local context.

Endnotes

¹ Sherwell, 2021.
² Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, 2023.
³ Abuza, 2023.
⁴ Independent Research Network, 2022.
⁵ “Myanmar’s Parallel Government”, 2022.
⁶ Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008.
⁷ Degaut, 2019.
⁸ Lian Bawi Thang, 2023.
⁹ Human Rights Watch, 2002; 2007.
¹⁰ For example, Arakan Army (2020).
¹¹ Selth uses data from testimonies of former soldiers, but urges caution when assessing this data’s objectivity, and draws on previous research by observers he claims are “well-informed” (2021).
¹² Selth, 2021, pp. 17-21.
¹³ Sai Latt, 2016, pp. 136-137.
¹⁴ Sai Latt, 2016, p. 129.
¹⁵ Sai Latt, 2016, p. 156.
¹⁶ Sai Latt, 2016, p. 156.
¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, 2021.
¹⁸ Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021.
¹⁹ Nyan Corridor & Kyed also published a report focused on police defections (2021). Its findings are based on interviews with police officers and their wives, secondary media, and social media sources, but the authors admit its arguments “cannot be generalized across Myanmar and must be read as preliminary insights” (2021, p. 2).
²⁰ Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021, p. 61.
²¹ Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021, p. 98.
²² Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021, p. 12.
²³ Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021, p. 68.
²⁴ Kyed, 2022.
²⁵ Kyed, 2022, p. 7.
²⁶ Kyed, 2022, p. 13.
²⁷ Attwood et al., 2022.
²⁸ Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021, p. 13.
²⁹ Min Min, 2022.
³⁰ Kyed, 2022, p. 18.
³¹ Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021, pp. 58-59.
³² Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021, p. 99.
³³ Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021, p. 9.
³⁴ Appendix 1 is lengthy and not included in the print/.PDF edition of this article. It is reproduced in the full text HTML online versions easily accessed on the IJBS website (Wai & Andersson, 2025).
³⁵ The medical corps of the sit tat are classed as serving in the army, even if they are positioned on a naval ship or air base. Several respondents served in the medical corps.
³⁶ This was then ratified in 2019 (Zue Zue, 2019).
³⁷ Martin, 2022.
³⁸ On 7 September 2021 the NUG declared a “people’s defensive war” with a hard deadline for civil servants to join the CDM (Strangio, 2021).
³⁹ Soldiers are sometimes accused of being watermelons: green on the outside (the color of military uniforms) and red on the inside (the color of the National League for Democracy and revolution).
⁴⁰ National Unity Government, 2023.
⁴¹ Contact information for soldiers is closely guarded from those outside the military and this is a special case of them possessing extremely valuable data.
⁴² Esther J, 2023.
⁴³ Loong, 2022.
⁴⁴ South, 2018.
⁴⁵ “Myanmar Refugees in India”, 2022; “We are facing a crisis”, 2022.
⁴⁶ Participant 22, survey/interview response.
⁴⁷ Participant 24, survey/interview response.
⁴⁸ Participant 23, survey/interview response.
⁴⁹ Skidmore & Wilson, 2008.
⁵⁰ Participant 8, survey/interview response.
⁵¹ Lian Bawi Thang, 2023.
⁵² This corroborates with Justice for Myanmar’s findings: while it is common knowledge that China and Russia are two of the main suppliers of weapons to the junta, Justice for Myanmar highlights China and Russia’s increasing involvement in training Myanmar security personnel (2023, p. 53).
⁵³ Justice for Myanmar, 2023, pp. 48-49.
⁵⁴ Participant 3, survey/interview response.
⁵⁵ Participant 23, survey/interview response.
⁵⁶ Participant 33, survey/interview response.
⁵⁷ Participant 10, survey/interview response.
⁵⁸ Participant 44, survey/interview response.
⁵⁹ Participant 24, survey/interview response.
⁶⁰ Participant 45, survey/interview response.
⁶¹ Participant 4, survey/interview response.
⁶² Participant 44, survey/interview response.
⁶³ Participant 6, survey/interview response.
⁶⁴ Sai Latt, 2016, p. 129.
⁶⁵ Participant 21, survey/interview response.
⁶⁶ Participant 43, survey/interview response.
⁶⁷ Participant 31, survey/interview response.
⁶⁸ Participant 48, survey/interview response.
⁶⁹ Participant 4, survey/interview response.
⁷⁰ Biddle, 2023.
⁷¹ Participant 2, survey/interview response.
⁷² Participant 4, survey/interview response.
⁷³ Participant 2, survey/interview response.
⁷⁴ Participant 30, survey/interview response.
⁷⁵ Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021.
⁷⁶ Participant 22, survey/interview response.
⁷⁷ “Striking civil servants”, 2022.
⁷⁸ Civil servants are issued with special green passports that differ from the regular red passports issued to private citizens.
⁷⁹ The three lowest ranks in descending order among respondents were sergeant, lance corporal, and private. The rank of systems engineer is not included in this hierarchy as it is a separate position specifically for members of the engineering corps.
⁸⁰ Participant 24, survey/interview response.
⁸¹ Participant 10, survey/interview response.
⁸² “They put a tracking device in my gun and I didn’t notice it at first … I (only) noticed a red light blinking when I put the gun on my waist … I left the gun when troops were getting close to my position” (participant 45, survey/interview response).
⁸³ Participant 37, survey/interview response.
⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, 2022, p. 6.
⁸⁵ Participant 18, survey/interview response.
⁸⁶ Participant 22, survey/interview response.
⁸⁷ Participant 33, survey/interview response.
⁸⁸ Participant 45, survey/interview response.
⁸⁹ Participant 45, survey/interview response.
⁹⁰ Participant 37, survey/interview response.
⁹¹ Participant 7, survey/interview response.
⁹² Participant 24, survey/interview response.
⁹³ Participant 33, survey/interview response.
⁹⁴ Participant 45, survey/interview response.
⁹⁵ Participant 31, survey/interview response.
⁹⁶ Independent Research Network, 2022, p. 2.
⁹⁷ Barrett, 2022.
⁹⁸ As mentioned previously however, if soldiers start to realize that the offer may not pan out, this is likely to deter future defections.
⁹⁹ Thuzar from Spouses of People’s Soldiers, personal communication, 2022.
¹⁰⁰ Many CSOs provide such reskilling and retraining initiatives along the Myanmar-Thailand border, but their efforts are constrained by limited resources.
¹⁰¹ Kyed & Ah Lynn, 2021, p. 9.
¹⁰² The sit tat claims to have a fighting force of around 300,000 troops. Should even a tenth of these defect, it would create social and humanitarian crises in the regions they relocate to. The KNU has suggested the creation of border camps in neutral but protected territories to house defectors.
¹⁰³ One example is the 2002 Yemeni model of the Committee for Dialogue; a pioneer program in deradicalization. Another is the relatively successful defection and reintegration programs in Colombia, which targeted members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia and Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia.

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Appendix I – Survey

English translations of the exact questions put to respondents are listed below. As mentioned, no identifying data was recorded and all data was stripped of identifying material. Consent was provided by each respondent who was informed they could stop the survey at any time or skip any of the questions. Respondents were explicitly informed:

We are trying to understand the current state of the defection, what kind of messages resonate with potential defectors, and how best external actors can support the defection campaign and defectors, if at all. We aim to provide recommendations to stakeholders such as the NUG, EROs, and international organizations for facilitating and supporting better conditions for military and police defectors and their families.

Summary of Questions (Some questions combined for brevity)

Demographics

• How old are you?
• Which ethnicity or ethnicities do you identify with?
• What is your religion, if any?
• Where is your native town/hometown?
• What is the highest level of education you have achieved?

Last Position

• What was your rank, position, responsibilities?
• What was your last unit/department and can you explain its chain of command?
• Who and what rank was your superior?
• What name and rank was the head of your unit?
• Which command did they report through?
• What name and rank was that Commander?
• How were you given instructions/orders?
• Verbally? In typed orders? Otherwise?

• How was your performance measured?
• What were you rewarded for, and an example?
• What were you punished for, and an example?

Enlistment

• In which year and why did you join the military?
• Was your father or another close relative in the military and if so, did you grow up in a military barracks and/or attend a military primary school?

Military Training

• Which training center did you attend?
• Have you attended further training in the military, such as specialized airborne training, naval training, language training, staff college, etc.?
• If so, can you list the trainings you have attended?
• Have you attended any training overseas, if so, where?
• Have you attended any other specialized training seminars or short courses?
• Were any of these also attended by international trainers?

Livelihood

• What was your monthly salary?
• Did you or your immediate family have any other sources of income and if so, what were they?
• Are military officers allowed to run businesses?
• If so, what were the rules for running a business?

• Do you own Myanmar Economics Holding Limited or Myanmar Economic Corporation shares?
• Did you have to pay monthly for these shares? Was this taken out of your wages? Or did you have to pay for it yourself?
• How many shares do you own?
• How much did you pay per share?
• Did you receive any dividends/profits from your shares and if so, how often did you receive them?

• Did you have life insurance?
• If so, was this paid for you or was it taken out of your wages?
• Can you access your savings now? Where are your savings kept? In a military bank?

Family Situation

• Are you married?
• If not, do you have a partner (girlfriend/ boyfriend)?
• If yes, was there any process in the military before you were able to be married? (i.e., to approve your wife.)
• Do you have children? If so, how many and what age/s?
• Which schools do your children attend?
• Where is your barracks/military housing? Which no.?
• How many residents were in your military housing?
• Were family members together with you in your military housing? If so, how many people?
• Were family members living in military housing elsewhere? If so, where? (No need for specifics.)

Leaving

• When and why did you leave the military?
• Did you make the decision to leave alone?
• Did you receive influence from friends or family to leave?
• What other factors influenced your decision to leave the military?

• How did you leave the military?
• Did someone help you organize to leave? (Please do not identify who helped you.)
• How did you communicate to organize leaving?
• What kind of help was provided to you?
• Did you leave with anyone else?
• If so, who were they? (Colleagues, family, etc.)

• Where are you now? (No need for address or specifics.)
• What were your concerns/worries when leaving the military?
• What were the challenges/barriers to you leaving the military?
• What is the punishment for leaving? For defecting?
• What did you lose by leaving?
• What kind of outside assistance did you receive after you decided to leave the military?
• What additional support would have made leaving the military easier?
• Why do you think your former comrades continue to stay in the military?
• Do you have any other colleagues in the military who want to leave?
• What are their reasons for staying?
• What are the barriers to them leaving?
• What assistance would they need to leave?

Communications

• Which communication methods did you use to contact your military comrades before the coup?
• Which communication methods did you use to contact your military comrades after the coup, but before leaving the military?
• Which communication methods did you use in your personal life before the coup?
• Which communication methods did you use in your personal life after the coup but before leaving the military?
• Were your personal communications monitored?
• If so, how were they monitored?
• What communication methods do you currently use in your life after leaving the military?

Experiences in the Army

• What did you find most difficult about being in the military?
• What did you like about being in the military?
• Which groups within the tatmadaw, if any, did you feel were respected?
• Which groups within the tatmadaw, if any, did you feel were disrespected?
• How were women and children treated?
• Were you ever given any orders that you felt were illegal or wrong?
• Did you ever see other comrades do anything that you felt was illegal or wrong?
• If so, what did they do? (List important, relevant examples you are comfortable sharing.)
• Of the actions that you just described, which were under orders from superiors, and which were done independently?
• Did you ever see any of your superiors do anything you felt was illegal or wrong?
• Have you seen or heard others in your military unit use any drugs?
• Have you seen or heard others in your military unit drink alcohol?

Future Plans

• Where do you hope/plan to go next?
• How do you hope/plan on earning a living now you have left the military?
• Do you have work or an income now?
• How much funds do you have access to now?
• Do you need psychological support for traumatic experiences? Or members of your family with you? Or others with you?
• What kind of help would you need to reintegrate back into civilian life?
• Do you want access to further education or training to make it more comfortable to reintegrate into civilian life?

Morale

• Do you think the military is weaker or stronger now, compared to before the coup?
• Will your defection have an impact on your unit and the military as a whole? If so, what do you think that impact is?
• Are you a member of any other group, in contact with or supportive of other groups? Such as the CDM, PDFs, etc. Please elaborate.